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Summary
This thesis attempts to assess the effects of the control of 
imports on the allocation of resources in the Australian economy from 
1952-1960. The control system and methods are described briefly in 
Chapters II and III. Chapters IV - VI analyse the theoetical implica­
tions of quantitative import controls and provide the framework for 
the empirical investigation.
Chapter VII sets out the main lines of the enquiry, some general 
aspects of the period and some methodological considerations. The 
importance of the form and methods of control is examined in Chapters 
VIII - X from three aspects: speed and accuracy of the controls; 
discrimination among countries and among goods; and protection 
provided to domestic industries.
The effect of the method of operation of the controls on 
investment - domestic and overseas - is deferred for examination, 
together with other aspects of the effects on secondary industry 
in Chapters XI - XV. Consideration is given to the pattern of 
development in secondary industry during the period and implications 
of the concurrent operation of the tariff. Since the effects of the 
controls depend importantly upon the policies of businessmen, the 
price reactions of exporters are discussed in Chapter XVI and those 
of importers, along with other effects, in Chapter XVII.
The concluding chapter - Chapter XVIII - attempts to assess the 
effects of the controls on the pattern of resource allocation during 
the period.
Chapter I
Introduction
The system of import licensing which operated from March 1952
to February I960, and which for a number of items continued to
operate after that time, dates from December 1939. When all imports
were brought within the licensing regulations in 1941 it was the
first occasion in the history of the Commonwealth that a general system
of quantitative import control had been in operation.
Prior to 1939 there had been several occasions when, for different
reasons and for relatively short periods, quantitative controls had
been Imposed on imports into Australia. Certain luxury-type imports
1were restricted during the latter years of the first World War;
some 7S items were prohibited except under licence as an emergency
2measure from 1930 to 1932; and a fairly large group of items was 
regulated by licence during the short lived ’Trade Diversion* policy 
from 1936 to 1938.^
In addition there are a few examples of quantitative controls 
being maintained for longer periods: quantitative controls on imports
T
Commonwealth Year Book, No.11, (1901-1917), p.559.
2
Ibid, No.26, (1933), pp.221-2.
3
D.F. Nicholson, Australia’s Trade Relations, Melbourne, 1955, p.83*
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of p la in  sh e e t g la s s  imposed under the emergency measures of 1930-32
were r e ta in e d  u n t i l  1959, under the term s o f the A ustra lia-B elg ium
Trade Agreement o f 1934, to  meet th r e a ts  o f r e t a l i a t i o n  by Belgium
1
a g a in s t the  p ro te c t io n  given to  the A u s tra lia n  g la s s  in d u s try ;
im ports o f m otor v e h ic le  c h a s s is  from c o u n tr ie s  o th e r  th an  the U nited
Kingdom, which were r e s t r i c t e d  by quo ta  under the ‘Trade D iv e rs io n 1
m easures o f  1936-38, con tinued  to  be r e s t r i c t e d  in  th i s  way when the
quota r e s t r i c t i o n s  on o th e r item s were l i f t e d ,  p r in c ip a l ly  to  stim u-
la te  the  m otor v e h ic le  in d u s try ; and fo r  a number o f y ea rs  th e re  has
been an embargo on the  im p o rta tio n  of sugar to  p ro te c t  domestic
3
p r ic in g  a rrangem en ts . C e r ta in  im ports are  a lso  c o n tro lle d  by p erm it 
f o r  reasons o f  de fen ce , s e c u r i ty ,  h e a lth , f o r  s o c ia l  reasons e tc .  
under th e  Customs Act
U n ti l  1939, however, th e re  was in  A u s tra l ia  no t r a d i t io n  of 
q u a n t i ta t iv e  c o n tro l o f im ports w hether fo r  the m aintenance o f dom estic 
economic a c t i v i t y ,  f o r  the p ro te c tio n  of lo c a l  in d u s try , as a b a rg a in ­
ing co u n te r in  in te r n a t io n a l  n e g o tia t io n s , o r to  p ro te c t  the  balance 
o f paym ents.
N icholson , o p . c i t . , pp .74-7S .
2 I b id . ,  p .1 1 4 .
3
Commonwealth Year Book, Nos .3 7 ,(1 9 5 0 ),p p .943-15 and 47,(1961) , p.924*
4 S h ip s , a i r c r a f t ,  c e r ta in  ty p es  o f weapons, n a rc o t ic s ,  obscene l i t e r ­
a tu re  e t c .  are  c o n tro l le d  under the C ustom s(P roh ib ited  Im ports) Regu­
la t io n s  . That th ese  re g u la tio n s  may be used  fo r  p u re ly  economic reasons 
may be seen from the  fa c t  th a t  the  q u a n t i ta t iv e  c o n tro ls  imposed under 
the ’Trade D iv e rs io n 1 p o lic y  were imposed under th ese  r e g u la t io n s .
C .f . N icho lson , o p . c i t . , p . l l i .
Since 1952 both the level of economic activity and the pattern 
of resource allocation in Australia have been importantly influenced
by the controls on imports. The main aim of the controls was to 
reduce overall expenditure of foreign exchange, either of all currencies 
or of particular currencies. The reduction of this expenditure on 
imports affected the overall relationship between aggregate supply 
and aggregate demand within the economy. The form of this change 
induced relative price changes, shifts in the distribution of income, 
changes in the propensity to save and the inducement to invest, etc.
The logic of the controls is that actual decisions to import 
were made on a basis different to that which would have resulted 
from the use of the price mechanism. Moreover, imports include imports 
of raw materials and investment goods upon which existing output and 
expansion of that output depend. The bases on which these decisions 
were made were important in determining directly and indirectly the 
pattern of economic activity and of development. Consequently, the 
term import control is incomplete since it obscures the fact that the 
control of imports involves some degree of control of production 
and investment.
Arising out of the Keynesian and post-Keynesian emphasis on levels 
and rates of growth of aggregate expenditure, coupled with the dissat­
isfaction with the principle of comparative advantage, the current 
approach to economic development tends to give little attention to 
the question of what allocation of resources will give the highest
rate of growth. Under certain circumstances, as in the case of 
underdeveloped economies, this may well be justified. It is argued 
that it may not be justified in the circumstances of the Australian 
economy.
We may argue a priori that interference with the price mechanism 
will in general reduce welfare. The supplanting of the price mechan­
ism with direct physical controls in certain areas of the system will 
be even more likely to lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
It is necessary to recognise that the theoretical model behind such 
a priori reasoning is the classical and neo-classical international 
trade model based on the principle of comparative advantage, and is 
based essentially on certain broad assumptions regarding the nature 
of the economic system.
The validity of a number of these assumptions has been strongly 
assailled. The major criticisms are that the classical static model 
takes only limited cognisance of various dynamic factors; where non 
optimum conditions apply it is not necessarily the case that optim­
ising in other sectors will minimise the deviation from the total 
optimum; and businessmen do not maximise profits.
At this stage, of course, any businessman is able to justify any 
monopolistic practice, any protectionist can validate claims for a 
tariff of any height, and restrictions on economic activities can be 
opposed or supported by a variety of arguments; the economist, qua 
economist, if these criticisms are valid, can say little to disprove 
arguments of this nature.
Soms theory, irrespective of its validity, is not necessarily
better than having no formal theory. On the other hand, simply
because the niceties of marginal cost and price are not calculated
to the *nth degree, does not mean that the aim of businessmen is
not to approximate to this position; simply because current
opportunity costs may differ now from opportunity costs in the
future does not necessarily mean that existing opportunity costs
are not a better guide than anything else to economic resource
allocation; simply because a constraint on one sector makes it a
non optimum sector does not necessarily mean that a movement
towards optimising in other sectors is not better than a movement
1
in the other direction.
Clearly there are limitations which have to be kept in mind 
in examining any economic phenomena in terms of the welfare model 
but despite these limitations it seems to provide a useful
1.
The 1 second best1 theorists would argue that it may have been
General
so, (e.g. R.G.Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The/Theory of Second 
Best"»Rariew dfSconomic Studies, Vol.XXV(l) No.63)# For a counter 
argument see E.J.Mishan, "Second Thoughts on Second Best", Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol.l4> No.3 (October 1962).
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framework for the investigation.
Moreover, the results of this study will themselves enable 
a judgement to be made regarding the Validity of the assumption 
in the Australian environment of profit maximising businessmen.
Chapters II and III describe the variations in the nature of 
the control system over time and the basic methods used during 
the period to operate these controls.
The second section, Chapters IV - VI, is concerned with the 
principal theoretical issues involved in the quantitative restriction 
of imports. Chapter IV deals with the general aspects of the use 
of quantitative import controls as an instrument of balance of 
payments policy. Chapter V considers more particular aspects of 
the effects on domestic economy including the effects on industries 
receiving incidental protection from the controls. Chapter VI 
deals briefly with some theoretical aspects of the methods of 
control employed.
1
1.
Where, for some pair of goods, the relative marginal costs 
are greatly out of line with relative prices, there is a prima 
facie case for investigation. In making the investigation one will 
be aware of the fact that any change in the outputs of the two goods 
in question will affect not only their own relative prices and 
costs, but possibly those of many other goods. One will also be 
aware of the fact that marginal costs may be partly in respect of 
goods whose price is already distorted1 and one must keep one*s 
eyes open for external economies and diseconomies, etc. Even given 
these elaborate complications, one may nevertheless sometimes be 
justified in the view that the national income could be increased 
by a change. I.M.D.Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics,(paper- 
back), London, I960, pp.164-5*
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This s e c tio n  i s  no t in tended  to  exhaust the  th e o r e t ic a l  is su e s  
a r is in g  from the use of q u a n t i ta t iv e  c o n tro ls  -  r a th e r  i t  i s  in ten d ed  
to  p rovide the  th e o r e t i c a l  background to  the  subsequent d isc u ss io n  
of the  experience  o f the p e r io d .
The experience of the p e rio d  from 1952 to  i960 then  p ro v id es  the  
su b je c t m a tte r  of the rem ainder of the s tu d y . In  th i s  p a r t  answers 
are being sought to  th re e  q u e s tio n s . The f i r s t  concerns the e x te n t 
to  which the  methods o f c o n tro l and th e i r  o p e ra tio n  m itig a te d  or 
accen tu a ted  the d i s to r t in g  e f f e c t s  o f the d i r e c t  c o n tro ls  as such.
The second concerns more d i r e c t l y  the e f f e c t s  o f th e  a l lo c a t io n  of 
re so u rces  induced by the c o n tro ls  and asks w hether and in  what way 
the  c o n tro ls  on Im ports c o n tr ib u te d  to  t h e i r  own rem oval. The th i r d  
q u estio n  concerns the use o f q u a n ti ta t iv e  c o n tro ls  fo r  sh o rt p e rio d s  
and r e l a t e s  Im p o rtan tly  to  th e  r e a c t io n s , in c lu d in g  p r ic e  r e a c t io n s , 
of businessm en.
C hapters V III -  X c o n sid e r p a r t i c u la r  a sp e c ts  of the lic e n s in g  
system . The in v e s t ig a t io n  o f the  e f f e c t s  o f th e  c o n tro ls  on p a r t i c u la r  
s e c to rs  o f th e  economy i s  l im ite d  to  the  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on secondary 
in d u s try . A b r i e f  exam ination  of some in d u s t r ie s  su b jec t norm ally  
to  im port co m p etitio n  i s  made in  ChaptersXI and X II. The ro le  of th e  
T a r if f  Board and the  t a r i f f  are con sid ered  in  C hapter X III and the 
e f f e c t  of the  c o n tro ls  on investm en t, in c lu d in g  overseas investm en t, 
i s  considered  in  C hapter XIV. Chapter XV sums up the experience  of 
secondary in d u s t iy .  I t  i s  argued th a t  some b e n e f i ts  from the c o n tro ls
8
were ex p erien ced  since th ey  f a c i l i t a t e d  the r e a l i s a t io n  of some 
economies o f s c a le .
An exam ination  o f the p r ic e  re a c tio n s  of e x p o rte rs  to  the c o n tro ls  
was made in  C hapter XVI to  see w hether these c o n tr ib u te d  to  o r s u b tra c t­
ed from the  r e a l  c o s ts  o f the r e s t r i c t i o n s  on im p o rts .
ChapterXVII th en  co n sid e rs  the  p o s it io n  of im porters under the 
c o n tro ls ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  the  f l e x i b i l i t y  of im porting and th e  n a tu re  
of t h e i r  p r ic e  re a c t io n s .
In  t h i s  s tudy  we have argued th re e  th in g s . We have a rg ie d  th a t  
the form and method o f o p e ra tio n  of the c o n tro ls  them selves served  
to  m itig a te  some o f the d is to r t io n s  which m ight be expected  to  
r e s u l t  from the use of d i r e c t  c o n tro ls ;  i t  was co n sid ered , however, 
th a t  the e x te n t to  which t h i s  was p o ss ib le  was l im ite d  bu t was 
g re a te r  th e  c lo s e r  the  method o f c o n tro l approached equivalence to  a 
p r ic e  m easure.
Secondly, we have argued th a t  although the c o n tro ls  on im ports 
may have a s s i s te d  to  some e x te n t in  b rin g in g  about c o n d itio n s  in  
which they  cou ld  be removed, the e x te n t of th ese  favourab le  e f f e c t s  
was co n sid e ra b ly  o f f s e t  by the  d i s to r t io n s  induced by them. Most, 
i f  no t a l l ,  o f the fav o u rab le  e f f e c t s  and s u b s ta n t ia l ly  few er o f the 
unfavourab le  e f f e c t s  of the  c o n tro ls  could  have been achieved w ith  
the  use o f the  p r ic e  mechanism.
F in a l ly ,  we have argued th a t  p r ic e  p o l ic ie s  o f businessm en tend  
to  be f l e x ib l e .  Consequently the  len g th  of the p e rio d  during which
9q u a n ti ta t iv e  c o n tro ls  could  be used to  meet o th e r  than s t r u c tu r a l  
balance o f payments problems w ith o u t e f f e c t s  on the c o s t s tru c tu re  
would p robab ly  be q u ite  s h o r t .
S u b s ta n t ia l  l im i ta t io n s  to  th i s  study  should  be no ted . We have 
c o n sid e rab le  sympathy w ith  P igou ’ s view th a t  to  know simply the 
d i r e c t io n  o f sny movement of economic fo rc e s  i s  " . . .  on a par w ith  
knowing m erely th a t  a man’ s tem perature  i s  above o r  below norm al.
To g e t any la rg e  and im p o rtan t guidance fo r  p ra c t ic e  we must know, 
or a t  a l l  e v e n ts , we must have some rough g en e ra l id e a , as to  how 
much above o r  below the normal i t  i s . ” For reaso n s o f a concep tual 
as w ell as a s t a t i s t i c a l  n a tu re , q u a n ti ta t iv e  assessm ents have no t 
in  g e n e ra l been p o s s ib le .  While i t  i s  co n sid ered  th a t  the r e s u l t s  
provide some b a s is  fo r  q u a l i ta t iv e  assessm ent o f the  s ig n if ic a n c e  
of the e f f e c t s  o f the c o n tro ls  such assessm ents must n e c e s s a r i ly  
co n ta in  a s u b s ta n t ia l  elem ent o f su b je c tiv e  judgement.
While a ttem p ts  have been made to  draw co n clu sio n s  from s t a t i s t i c a l  
m a te r ia l ,  the n a tu re  o f the  a v a ila b le  s t a t i s t i c s  is  such th a t ,  in  gen­
e r a l ,  they  can be l i t t l e  more than  a rough guide to  the f a c ts  of th e  
s i tu a t io n .  For t h i s  reaso n  the use of r e f in e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  tech n iq u es  
has been avoided in  the  s t a t i s t i c a l  m a te r ia l p re sen te d  in  the s tu d y .
We take  the d e c is io n  to  impose im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  1952 o r to  
re impose them in  1954^55 a s  a b a s ic  datum. While an im p lic a tio n  o f
A .C .Pigou, "Empty Economic Boxes: A R eply", Economic 
Jo u rn a l, Vol.XXXII, 1922, p.4&3*
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our conclusions from ex post analysis is that some other method 
of redirecting demand from imports would have been preferable to 
quantitative controls on purely economic grounds, the basic decision to 
use quantitative controls is in general not of concern to us. We are 
concerned with evaluating what followed from that decision. While 
the comparison of alternative methods of limiting expenditure on 
imports is not a major purpose of this study, comparison with one or 
more of the alternative methods of achieving this end has been found 
at various times to be a useful technique for demonstrating the partic­
ular features of the quantitative control on imports.
Essentially this is a partial analysis in two respects. Attention 
is directed primarily to the resource allocation effects of the con­
trols. We do not attempt to give other than limited attention to the 
effects of the controls on aggregates of the economy. This would be 
an interesting study in itself since levels of output and employment 
of the economy as a whole have been importantly affected by the 
restrictions on imports. We have considered it reasonable to assume 
that in the situation in 1952 and again in 1954-55, the alternatives 
were not action to control imports by import licensing or no action 
at all, but direct control of imports or some other import policy 
measure. Similarly, only limited attention is given to the interaction 
of the policy of import control with the domestic monetary and fiscal 
policies of the period.
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I t  i s  a lso  a p a r t i a l  a n a ly s is  in  th a t  i t  was considered  necessa ry  
to  l im i t  our a t te n t io n  to  c e r ta in  a reas  in  which the in flu en ce  o f 
th e  d i r e c t  c o n tro ls  might be expected  to  be s ig n i f ic a n t .  While we 
have examined the d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  on secondary in d u s try  on ly  l im ite d  
a t te n t io n  has been given to  the in d ir e c t  e f f e c t s  e i th e r  on secondary 
in d u s try  o r on o th e r s e c to rs  o f the economy. L i t t l e  a t te n t io n  has 
been given to  the  e f f e c t s  o f the  c o n tro ls  on A u s t r a l ia ’ s tra d in g  
r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith  o th e r c o u n tr ie s  -  as d i s t i n c t  from the p r ic in g  
p o l ic ie s  of p a r t i c u la r  e x p o r te rs .  L i t t l e  c o n s id e ra tio n  i s  given to  
the e f f e c t  o f the c o n tro ls  on p a r t i c u la r  in d u s tr ie s  o th e r than those 
in  the m anufacturing  s e c to r  the e f f e c t  on those ru r a l  in d u s tr ie s  
which compete w ith  im ports has been la rg e ly  ignored .
I t  i s  im portan t to  recogn ise  th a t  the im port l ic e n s in g  system
v a rie d  c o n sid e ra b ly  both over tim e and according  to  the  degree o f 
r e s t r i c t i o n  o f im ports th e  system was in tended  to  e n fo rc e . There were 
a lso  many ex cep tio n s  to  most o f the  g en e ra l p r in c ip le s  invoked in  the 
a d m in is tra tio n  o f the system . To enumerate a l l  these  changes and a l l  
the ex cep tio n s  would re q u ire  a volume of i t s  own. I t  i s  necessa ry  
to  r e s t r i c t  the  g en e ra l d e s c r ip t io n  of the system to  the b asic  fe a tu re s  
and th roughou t the  study to  r e f e r  to  g en era l p r in c ip le s  when c le a r ly  
in  p ra c tic e  such p r in c ip le s  w ere, and in  many cases could only be, 
ap p lied  in  a f a r  from uniform  manner, bo th  from case to  case and from 
one l ic e n s in g  p e rio d  to  a n o th e r . Where they  are  known, a t te n t io n  has
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been drawn to  im portan t e x ce p tio n s ; i t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t  o th e rs  which 
have been o m itted  may have been of im portance.
F in a lly  no th ing  in  t h i s  study  i s  in ten d ed  as a judgement o f the  
a d m in is tra tio n  of the im port l ic e n s in g  system . I t  would be im proper 
f o r  me to  a ttem p t th i s  even i f  I  f e l t  competent to  pass such a 
judgement and I  make no claim  to  such competence. The assum ption i s  
made th a t  under s im ila r  c o n d itio n s , s im ila r  a d m in is tra tio n  would 
r e s u l t ,  i . e . s im ila r  in c o n s is te n c ie s  would e v en tu a te , being s im i la r ly  
reco g n ised  as  such by the ad m in is te rin g  a u th o r i t i e s .  The assum ption 
in  b r i e f  i s  th a t  i f  Im port l ic e n s in g  were re in tro d u c e d  i t  would look  
p r e t ty  much th e  same as the system in  the p e rio d  under review , an 
assum ption I  do not co n sid e r un reaso n ab le .
A study  o f t h i s  na tu re  ten d s  to  view i t s  su b jec t m a tte r  in  term s 
o f a com parison w ith  a s ta te  o f p e r fe c t io n .  I  do not co n sid e r t h i s  
a bad th in g . C e r ta in ly  one has to  a c t ,  o r p o lic y  i s  se t, in  term s o f 
what i s  p ra c t ic a b le ,  b u t i t  i s  u s e fu l to  know a t  what economic c o s t  
t h i s  is  being ach ieved . Moreover, p r a c t i c a b i l i t y ,  w hether p o l i t i c a l  
o r a d m in is tra tiv e , i s  a r e la t iv e  concep t, and has i t s e l f  to  be judged 
in  term s of i t s  c o s t .  I f  the  co st can be seen to  be la rg e , then  
perhaps the idea  o f what i s  p ra c t ic a b le  in  th e  p a r t i c u la r  co n tex t 
should  be re c o n s id e re d . While c o n s id e ra tio n s  of what i s  p ra c t ic a b le  
are  e s s e n t ia l  c o n d itio n e rs  o f academic th e o r is in g ,  assessm ents o f the  
im p erfec tio n s  of ach iev ing  m erely what i s  deemed to  be p ra c tic a b le  
are  a u s e fu l a n tid o te  to  judgements which make p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  an a l i b i  
fo r  tak in g  the easy  course of a c tio n .
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Chapter II
The Direct Control of Imports
Wartime Import Controls 1939-1945» *^
With the outbreak of war in 1939,—hewav&r., a licensing system of
2.import controls was introduced on December 1st, 1939* * The restrictions 
were at this stage largely a precautionary measure designed primarily 
to conserve foreign exchange, as a logical complement to the overall 
control on foreign exchange transactions introduced shortly before the 
outbreak of war.
Licensing of imports at this time necessarily involved problems 
of the criteria to be used in determining the essentiality of civilian 
imports, and of the expansion of domestic industry under the incidental 
protection provided* Official policy in the early stages had been that 
the expansion of industry should not be encouraged unless it was 
reasonably certain that such expansion could be maintained after the
1.
For a more detailed description of changes in import licensing 
policy and administration see History of Australia*s Import 
Licensing Measures. December. 1939 to February. I960, Department 
of Trade, Canberra, I960. (Roneod)•
2.
Customs (import Licensing) Regulations; promulgated by Statutory 
Rule No. 163 of 1939. under the Customs Act 1901-1936.
3.
A limited control on payments for imports had been exercised from 
this time by the Commonwealth Bank under its exchange control powers 
to prevent a possible outflow of currency through importing 
transactions.
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war without special protection.^-
The need to intensify these restrictions made itself imperative 
in the second half of 1941 with the deterioration of the war situation. 
Import restrictions ceased to be merely one aspect of exchange control 
but became instead an integral part of a controlled economy established 
on a war footing*
Even so, a relatively wide range of items from sterling sources, 
mainly of a relatively essential nature, remained either uncontrolled 
or on a freely licensed basis during the whole of the war period, 
although the level of imports was limited by lack of availability over­
seas and by shipping scarcity. In the second half of 1944» the first 
relaxations of any significance were made in the import restrictions; 
further substantial relaxations were not made until July 1945*
During the war period the function of the controls on imports went 
further than merely the conservation of foreign exchange. Availability 
of shipping, rationing, price control, supplies of war material and 
equipment, rationalisation of production etc., were all factors inter­
related with the control of imports. Moreover, the existence of price 
and production controls probably offset much of what would normally be 
expected to result from the existence of such controls in the absence of
T. _
Professor Butlin makes the point, however, that "... the Department 
of Trade and Customs was, in accordance with its traditions, actively 
interested in promoting the development of new industries and rather 
disposed to see import restrictions as a glorious opportunity. "S.J. 
Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942. in the War of 1939-1941 series,
Canberra, 1955, p* 209*
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such measures.
The Post-War Period 1945-1952
At the end of the war Australia had what were, for that time, 
substantial sterling reserves in London (£208m.). Although some 
relaxation in the restrictions on imports had been made towards the end 
of the war and in the first few months after the end of the war with the 
acute sterling-dollar position becoming rapidly apparant, many of the 
relaxations - particularly in relation to the dollar area - were 
reversed in 1946* A few controls had been retained to permit the dis­
posal of stocks of commodities built up as a wartime measure e.g. 
cotton. Internally there was a large backlog of demand for a wide variety 
of goods in short supply or simply unobtainable until that time. The 
United Kingdom was obviously not able to meet anything like the potential 
demand for her goods. Had the import restrictions been relaxed immediately 
at the end of the war, therefore, it is probable that much of the 
Australian demand for imports, directly or indirectly, would have gone 
to the United States weakening further the already weak dollar position 
of the sterling area and also helping to increase prices.
IT
But c.f. Dr. Walker’s comment on the effect of the control of imports 
during the war period: ”The considerable reduction in imports during the
war years, and the change in the sources of supply of the goods imported 
undoubtedly had a significant effect on the capacity of local industry, 
and possibly an important effect, initially at least, on the direction of 
demand in the post-war period.” E. Ronald Walker, The Australian Economy 
in War and Reconstruction. New York, 1947, p. 325*
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Controls on imports were therefore relaxed progessively, taking 
account of differing currency situations in the various countries*
From 1946 the import licensing system discriminated against countries 
whose currencies were in short supply within the sterling area as a 
whole. Relaxations on imports from the sterling area were made progress­
ively largely as suppües became available. By January 1947, the bulk of 
imports from the United Kingdom was licensed almost without restriction, 
some 50 items remaining under control; by June 1948, a similar position 
applied to the remainder of the sterling area. Many of the restrictions 
which remained at this time, e.g., on tin plate and newsprint, were not 
to restrict imports but to ensure an equitable distribution within 
Australia of the limited supplies available.
Licences for dollar area goods were tightly restricted, being 
limited to essential goods not available from alternative sources.
With the rapid deterioration of the sterling area dollar position a 
system was introduced in 1948 fixing ceiling levels for total imports 
from the dollar area.
This system of budgeting, under which a monetary ceiling was set 
for each three monthly period from 1st April, 1948, for the issue of 
licences, was continued and was largely maintained for dollar licensing 
for the remainder of the period during which the licensing system 
operated.
Subsequent to 1950, imports from the dollar area were supplemented 
by imports financed under four loans from the International Bank for
17
Reconstruction and Development (i.B.R.D.) which gave rise to additional
imports amounting to some £20 m. per annum. This largely accounts for
the substantial increase in dollar imports in 1951-52.
During this period, goods from other hard currency countries were
licensed on criteria similar to goods from the dollar area, though
gradually it became the practice to license token quantities of imports
of some less essential goods. The question of which currencies should
be treated as hard was largely decided upon advice from the United
Kingdom, but despite frequent variations in these classifications there
was nothing like the "football league" of the United Kingdom Treasury
with countries moving up and down the ladder according to the state of
2bilateral trade, which Leyshon has described.
For a number of countries special trading arrangements between them 
and Australia meant that they were given treatment a little different,
1. e. more liberal, from that of the classification to which their
3currencies would otherwise belong, e.g. Sweden.
When normal commercial trading relationships were again permitted 
with Japan in 1947, her currency was classified as hard for licensing
TT
Part of the increase in value terms from 1949-50 was also due to the 
depreciation of the Australian pound by 30 per cent, in terms of the 
United States dollar in September 1949, (and 10 per cent, in terms of 
the Canadian dollar)•
2.
A.M. Leyshon, "Import Restrictions in Post War Britain", Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. IV, Oct. 1957, p.182.
3.
Nicholson, on.cit. pp.271-2.
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purposes, and as with other hard currency countries only relatively 
essential goods unavailable from other sources were licensed. Some relax­
ations were made during 1951-52 with token shipments of consumer goods 
1being permitted.
By the beginning of 1952, only the dollar area countries remained 
strictly in the hard, currency category; dollar goods were licensed again­
st the overall ceiling set for the dollar budget and were still strictly 
limited. Japanese goods, while licensed more freely than those of a 
truly hard currency, \ ie re limited largely to relatively essential goods.
Goods from the sterling area and f rom easy currency areas were 
virtually free from control. Only two items were controlled when of 
United Kingdom origin and 17 items when from the outer sterling area 
or easy currency countries.
The Control of Imports 1952-60
The regime of direct controls on imports, which began with the 
reimposition of controls on 8th March 1952 over the whole r ange of import 
items and from virtually all sources,^ aud ended with the removal of
*The principal reason for the severe licensing treatment of Japanese 
goods was that Japan, for much of the early post-war period had large 
sterling balances. Had these continued or increased, the United Kingdom 
expected difficulties regarding the conversion of these balances, since 
there was a dollar convertibility clause in the Payments Agreement 
between Japan and the sterling area until August 1951. The licensing 
treatment of Japanese goods was, in later years, eased when these balances 
ceased to be large enough to give cause for concern, although undoubtedly, 
the increasing importance of Japan as an export market, particularly for 
wool, was also significant.
2.The exceptions were goods nthe origin ofM Papua and New Guinea and 
Norfolk Island.
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controls from most items in I960, can be usefully considered as 
consisting of two distinct periods. The dividing line can be placed at 
the beginning of 1955 when the more or less steady movement towards the 
apparent ultimate removal of what was generally accepted as a temporary 
expedient was reversed. The need to reverse this movement, and to 
reverse it with considerable severity, placed the policy of import 
controls into a different perspective both from the viewpoint of the 
authorities administering the system and of business interests directly 
or indirectly affected. The administering authorities - and the 
government generally - appeared prepared to accept some rather ad hoc 
and temporary features of the system in the years from 1952 to 1954» 
simply because it was considered of short term duration and in course 
of removal. Expectations in the industrial sectors seemed both to 
follow and lead this feeling with expectations that the gains or penal­
ties of the system would be rather short-lived. The period after 1955» 
and more particularly following 1956-57, showed both an awareness on 
the part of the government that it was necessary to think more in terms 
of long run policy as far as controls on imports were concerned, and 
expectations on the part of businessmen that controls on imports were 
here to stay - at least for the foreseeable future.
For convenience in describing in a necessarily abbreviated but more 
detailed way the general features of the period, each of these two 
periods has been further subdivided into two. Each of the two broad 
subdivisions we shall call an intensification and a relaxation period.
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Consequently the eight years under consideration have been subdivided 
as in Table II-l.1*
Table II-l.
Import Licensing - Principal Control Periods: 1952 - I960 
First Intensification Period 8*2.1952 to 31.3.1953
First Relaxation Period 1.4*1953 to 31*3*1955
Second Intensification Period 1.4*1955 to 31*7*1959
Second Relaxation Period 1*8.1959 to 22*2,1960
* First Intensification Period
Little effect on the flow of imports was expected from the controls 
during the months remaining in 1951-52. It was initially intended,
however, that imports in 1952-53 should be at about the level of £500m.
2.f.o.b*, or something less than half that of the previous year*
For quota goods importers were generally allowed to import at levels 
either of 60 per cent, or 20 per cent, of their imports in 1950-51* * •
Goods other than quota goods were generally licensed on a basis compar­
able in s everity with the less restrictive quota category, but with wide 
variations between individual items.
1.
Annual import statistics for the period are shown in Table 
together with other relevant balance of payments data.
2.
All import values are f*o.b. (free on board) unlessotherwise stated.
3*
The methods of control and some of the aspects of the administration 
of the import licensing system are described in subsequent chapters*
A summary of the changes in licensing levels for quota goods is given 
in Tables II-2 and II-3.
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In general the internal economic situation was deflationary.
The decline in export income and the large expenditure on imports plus 
high levels of stocks led to a severe shortage of liquidity, while 
competition from imports had reduced activity in a range of industries. 
Stocks of imported goods, while not evenly distributed throughout the 
economy, were high. Consequently the extent to which import demand 
was frustrated by the controls was considerably less than indicated by 
the extent of the reduction in imports in 1952-53 over the previous 
year (see Table 11-4) •
Nevertheless the restrictions were severe and necessarily somewhat 
arbitrary and action was necessaiy to overcome the more severe hardships 
and anomalies. Some of these could be offset by changes in the licensing 
treatment, and many such changes were made in the first months of the 
licensing system. Some £20m, of special licenses to meet particular 
cases of hardship were issued during 1952^* Quota goods on firm order, 
where licensed, were debited to importers1 quotas. For some importers 
their quota entitlements were exhausted for some considerable time into 
the future. These debits were cancelled as from January 1953? adding 
further to the volume of imports possible under the set quota levels. 
First Relaxation Period
On the 1st April 1953? relaxations were made over the whole range
1. ' "
Treasurer (Mr, Fadden), Budget Speech, Parliamentary Debates.
Vol. Hof Reps.I., (9.9.1953), p. 52.
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of imports designed to increase the import rate by some £50m. a year. 
Further relaxations made in July 1953 and in October of the same year 
were designed to add a further £40m. and £45m. respectively to the 
annual rate of imports. Relaxations were again made in April 1954 which 
together with the earlier relaxations were estimated would give an 
import bill in 1954-55 of £730m. One of the features of the relaxations 
of April, 1954 and to a lesser extent those in October of the previous 
year was the transfer of some 400 items - almost entirely specific 
quota items to the no quota restrictions (N.Q.R.) basis.’*'* Imports in 
1954-55 actually rose to £847m., due largely to a much greater increase 
in imports of items in the N.Q.R. categoiy than had been expected.
An attempt to restrain the rate of licence issues which clearly 
contained some speculative stock accumulation either of import goods 
or licences * was made in October, 1954* The items transferred to N.Q.R. 
in April, 1954 were returned to a specific quota basis of licensing, 
though on a higher rate, (100 - 120 per cent of 1950-51), than had 
operated before the April relaxations. The early 1954 relaxations had 
been considered a prelude to the removal of the import licensing system, 
and this move was still largely within the context of a relaxing of 
the system; it has therefore been considered part of the first relaxation 
period.
IT
See Chapter III for a description of the various import licence 
categories.
2.
Discussed in Chapter VII
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Second Intensification Period
The second intensification period began in April 1955 with the 
first real reversal of the process of dismantling the controls These 
further restrictions were designed to give an annual rate of imports of 
£720m. f.o.b. Imports in 1955-56 were £820m., despite the intensifica­
tion of April 1955 and further cuts in October of that year designed to 
reduce imports by a further £80m. in a full year, or to £690-700m. for 
1956-57.
Clearly the estimated level of imports was far below the actual 
imports for 1955-56. The reasons for this seem to be a combination of 
factors such as the increased usage of existing quotas, stocks of lic­
ences being held by importers, issues of special licences made in 
earlier periods and higher than expected imports of exempt goods. These 
factors are considered in more detail below.
The failure to restrain the import rate as effectively as had been 
intended and expected, concern at the considerable number of relatively 
short run changes in the levels of licensing control, together with 
the realisation that having accepted the proposition that the balance 
of payments position should be protected by the direct controls on 
imports these controls were less of a temporary measure than had been 
anticipated, all led to a change in the approach to the licensing of
1.
Chapter VII
imports.^* One important result was the introduction of the "import 
ceiling" from July 1st, 1956. Previously changes in the degree of 
control were made from licensing period to licensing period according 
to the foreign exchange reserves position at the time and in the 
immediate future. Australia^ balance of payments and foreign exchange 
reserves tend to fluctuate widely (See Table II-4); the domestic effects 
of these fluctuations were, if anything, accentuated by the method of 
adjusting the licensing levels on the basis of short term changes in the 
reserves. The introduction of the ceiling was based on the objective of 
making relaxations only when the existing reserves and payments position 
and longer term prospects were such as to give reasonable confidence that 
such relaxations could be maintained. The ceiling was set at £700m. for 
1956-57, involving further intensification of the restrictions as from 
July 1956. Various changes were made in the methods of licensing from 
this time and these are described in subsequent sections.
Some relaxations were announced in January 1957 and in April of 
that year the ceiling for 1957-58 was raised to £775m. The import 
ceiling was again raised in August 1957, being increased by £25m. to 
£S00m. f.o.b., and it remained unchanged at this level until August 1959. 
Consequently it is not until August 1959 that the second intensification
l7 ~~
To what Sir John Crawford (shortly after to become Permanent Head 
of the Department responsible for Import licensing) later referred to 
as "the overhaul and reshaping of import licensing policy". J.C-.
Crawford, "Relations Between Civil Servants and Ministers in Policy 
Making", Public Administration. Vol. XIX, No. 2 (June I960), p. 101.
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period has been judged to have ended. Again, however, increasing 
difficulty was being experienced in late 1958 and early 1959 in keeping 
imports within the ceiling of £800m. in the face of the pressures 
resulting from an increasing level of internal activity. The general 
growth in the economy over the two years of the unchanged ceiling itself 
meant that the level of licensing was probably significantly more 
restrictive towards the end than at the beginning. The experience of 
this period is also discussed in more detail below.1*
Second Relaxation Period
July 1959 saw the end of the second intensification period and the 
second and last relaxation period began with the increase in the ceiling 
from £800m. to £850m. A further relaxation in December of that year to 
an annual ceiling of £875m. was f ollowed shortly after by the announce­
ment that the restrictions would be largely removed from imports into 
Australia on February 20th, I960, only some 200 items remaining under 
a generally less restrictive degree of licensing control. Import 
licensing controls on the remainder of these items were finally lifted 
with effect from 18th October, 1962.^'
1.
See Chapter VIII.
2.
Quantitative controls f or purely protective purposes were retained 
on a small number of items. These were principally aluminium (including 
primary shapes), ball bearings, and secondhand and/or disposals machinery 
equipment and parts; and timber and some chemicals e.g. penicillin and 
streptomycin. Consideration of controls imposed expressly for protective 
purposes is considered outside the scope of this study.
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Table II-2
(a)Principal Changes in Licensing Levels of Category A (Specific 
Quota) Imports k • March 1952 to February 1960
8 March 1952 
1 April 1953 
1 July 1953 
1 October 1953 
1 April 1954
1 October 1954 
1 April 1955 
1 October 1955 
1 July 1956
1 October 1956
1 April 1957
1 August 1957
1 August 1959 
1 December 1959 
23 February I960
Base Year CATEGORY A Quotas
% of Base Year
1950-51 60
" 70
M 80
" 90
ri N.Q.R* or Admin*
Star*
n (Retrospective to 1*4*54) 100
" 85
" 74*4
M Reduced by percentages varying from nil to 90%
(Base year for a no* of A Category items 
changed to 54/55'°'*
Selective increases within 11% increase in 
overall licensing ceiling for category.
Selective increases within 3% increase in 
overall licensing ceiling for category.
10% increase in quotas.
5% increase in quotas.
20% increase in quotas.
(Only 29 items remaining under control).
Notes: (a) Changes shown are those applicable generally to the specific
quota category. Exceptions in respect of individual items 
have been ignored.
(b) The methods of licensing control are discussed in Chapter III*
(c) For a few items, calendar year 1954*
Source: Department of Customs and Excise, (to March 1956, Department of 
Trade and Customs), Licensing Instructions issued under Customs 
(import Licensing) Regulations, op* cit*
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Table II-3
Principal Changes in LicensinrtfQuota) Imports (a)Levels of Category B (Interchangeable March 1952 to February 1960
8 March 1952 
1 April 1953 
1 July 1953 
1 October 1953 
1 April 1954 
1 October 1954 
1 April 1955 
1 October 1955 
1 July 1956
1 January 1959 
1 April 1957
1 August 1959 
1 December 1959 
23 February I960
Base Year CATEGORY B Quotas
% of Base Year
1950/51 20
w 30
" 40
" 50
" 60
" 60
" 40
“ 30
1954/55 (B Category divided into 7 subgroups; inter- )
(changeability restricted to within subgroup )
Either (33 1/3$) A ,. , (c)
or (37^ ) dePendinS on subgroup
(Textiles for manufacturing transferred to 
Bank C«l6ldO
(Subcategories abolished* Full interchange- 
ability restored).
1954/55 Either 55.5% 
or 62.5/S
1954/55 Either 66% or 75%
1954/55 Either 69.1$ or 79$ (approx.)
1959 Either 83$ or 95$ (approx.)
(Only 113 items remaining under control).
Notes: (a) Only major changes are shown.
(b) The methods of licensing control are discussed in Chapter III.
(c) See Chapter III. Not shown here are some minor changes within 
the subcategories. In Januaiy 1957, importers could exercise 
an option to transfer quotas from B(a) Apparel to B(2) Textiles 
on a once and for all basis; subcategories b (T) Various Metal 
Manufactures and B(7) Miscellaneous were amalgamated at the 
same time.
(d) See discussion of Bank C.16 in Chapter III.
Sources: Licensing Instructions, o p. cit., and History of Australia’s 
Import Licensing Measures, Department of Trade, Canberra,
A. G.T. , I960 (roneod). ^
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Chapter III
The Method of Import Control«
General Aspects
On the 8th March 1952, direct controls were reimposed upon the 
whole range of imports from all sources. These controls were imposed 
initially under the same regulations as those of 1939*^*
During the period all imports were subject to quantitative control 
unless specifically excepted by the Minister. Goods so excluded were 
placed in an Exempt category and could be imported without a licence.
At times of the greatest severity of licensing these consisted in the 
main of items such as passengers’ baggage, imports for diplomatic 
representatives of overseas countries etc., plus imports from Australian 
territories, such as Papua and New Guinea. It was not until 1957 that 
other items of significance were placed in this category. Until that 
time the Exempt category comprised items which in .1950-51 constituted 
less than 2 per cent.of total imports.
1.
Statutory Rule No. 163 of 1039. Subsequent amendment of the Customs 
Act, Section 52(g) of which provided the authority for the regulation of 
imports by licence, necessitated amendment to t he Regulations. Statutory 
Rule No. 93 of 1956 (notified in the Commonwealth Gazette. 14.12.1956) 
effectively repealed the earlier Statutory Rule and provided a new set of 
regulations in conformity with the amended Customs Act 1901-1954. The 
only change of substance in these new regulations was the inclusion of the 
power to require the holder of an import licence to furnish a financial 
security for compliance with any conditions to which the licence might 
be subject. The regulations do not lay down the form of any import 
restrictions applied under them, nor do they stipulate any method of 
administration of import licensing.
All items not specifically exempted were controlled by licence; 
once a licence had been obtained, the grant of foreign exchange to pay 
for the imports was to all intents and purposes automatic except in 
special circumstances. The right to refuse foreign exchange or to 
direct in which currency the payment should be made was, however, 
retained by the Commonwealth Bank.
The two principal methods of control used during the period were 
the Quota« generally a proportion in value of imports in some base year 
period; and the Specific Licence for goods in the category classified 
as Administrative, containing those types of imports considered unsuit­
able for quota control.
Quota Control
Two types of quota were used in the operation of the Australian 
import licensing system; the Specific Quota (distinct from the specific 
licence), and the Interchangeable Quota. Under the Specific Quota 
method, a quota relating to a particular item was established in favour
of an importer, who could then obtain licences for that item up to the
- |.value of the quota. In the principal specific quota category, Category 
!A*, the size of the quota e stablished in favour of the importer 
depended in most cases, initially at least, upon the value of that 
importers imports of the particular item in the base year 1950-51.
T.
Since licences were issued on a c.i.f.e. bases, quota values were 
established generally on the basis of base year imports (f.o.b.) 
plus 15 per cent to allow for c.i.f.e. charges.
Quotas in this category represented a uniform proportion of base year 
imports until July 1956; from that date, however, quota levels were 
set and variations in specific quotas made according to the particular 
circumstances of each case* The size of the quotas established for the 
other specific quota categories, of which the Administrative quota 
category, known as Category Administrative Asterisk (or Administrative 
Star) was the principal one, were also related to the value of base 
year imports, but not on the basis of a uniform proportion* From July 
1956 the Administrative Asterisk category was abolished, there then being 
no difference in principle between it and Category ’A 1.
Items in the specific quota categories tended in the main to be raw 
and serai-raw materials, components and replacement parts, and as well 
some consumer goods judged to be of a relatively essential nature.
Under the Interchangeable Quota method, quotas were established
in favour of an importer, again primarily on the basis of the trader's
base year imports of a specified group of items, the resultant quota
2being valid for importing any of the items in this group. This category,
1.
Table VIII-5 illustrates more specifically a number of the items 
included in this category.
2.
Quotas for all quota categories were established in favour of those 
who actually imported goods in the base year period, and this policy was 
adhered to, in general terms, throughout the existence of the import 
licensing system* This was a cause of pressure from manufacturers, 
retailers etc*, who claimed difficulties - real or imaginery - with their 
merchants, and sought licences to import on their own behalf. This was 
particularly the case in respect of textile manufacturers and in the 
first relaxation period manufacturers did receive what were known as 
manufacturing quotas - based on a percentage of their annual raw material 
requirements* However, this practice was in general avoided in later 
periods. (See Chapter XVTl).
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Category ’3 !. consisted largely of consumer goods, p}-us a number of raw 
materials in which there was significant local production: .in other
words, goods judged to have little essentiality either because of
adequate availability from domestic sources, or because of the nature
1of the item*
Although Australia had operated various forms of import licensing
controls from 1939 onwards, the system reintroduced in 1952 was the
2first to make significant use of the interchangeable quota. The intro­
duction of this form of quota was designed to achieve several purposes. 
Although the aim of limiting the protection to domestic producers
3provided by the controls was of importance, its principal purpose seems 
to have been to permit market forces to determine the pattern of imports 
over a wide range of generally less essential goods. This not only 
limited the extent of the interference with consumer choice but simpli­
fied administration considerably. Its flexibility also gave it certain 
advantages over other methods of restriction from the exporting countries
1.
An indication of some of the items actually included in this category 
may be obtained from Table X-2.
2.
A precursor can perhaps be found in the limited experience of what 
were known as the Traders’ General Licences, introduced in July, 1951 
as a means of licensing limited quantities of less essential goods from 
Japan. Existing importers were given these licences up to 5 per cent of 
their imports from Japan in the 6 months to December, 1950 with a maximum 
of £1000. Similar licences were also made available on a specified 
basis to importers who had traded with Japan before 1941» Traders’ 
General Licences were discontinued in May 1952.
See Chapter X.
3.
and hence trade relations point of view.
It was found, however, that the interchangeability of these 
licences also facilitated what became known as ’’trafficking" in
1licences, i.e. buying and selling the use of an import licence.
Partly in an attempt to reduce the extent of this trafficking, and 
partly to ensure that at least some importations were made of items 
which in themselves offered fairly low rates of profit for importers, a 
considerable reduction was made in July 1956 in the interchangeability 
of the Category B items* This category was subdivided into seven sub­
groups and interchangeability was limited to within the subgroup* At 
the same time quotas were re-established on the basis of imports during
1954-55 at two different levels according to the nature of the import
2itene contained within the subgroup* Largely as a result of complaints 
from importers and retailers based on the lack of flexibility that this 
reduced interchangeability provided, and coupled perhaps with some doubts 
as to the efficiency of the action in reducing trafficking, these sub-
1.
Some of the theoretical issues involved in the trafficking in 
import licences has been discussed in Chapter VI* The experience of 
’trafficking1 during the period 1952-1960 is discussed below in 
Chapter XVII.
2 *
Quotas for B(l) Various Metal Manufactures: 33(2) Textiles: 33(3) 
Snorting Goods. Toys: and 3(7) Miscellaneous were established on the 
basis of 3?2 per cent of imports in 1954-55* For B(a) Apparel: BC5) 
Paper: and B(6) Foodstuffs, the percentage was 33g- per cent.Textiles 
for manufacturing were removed from B(2) in January 1957; and importers 
were permitted to make a once and for all transfer of quotas from 33(4) 
Apparel to B(2) Textiles* B(l) Various Metal Manufactures and B(7) 
Miscellaneous were also amalgamated in January 1957.
divisions were subsequently abolished from April 1957 and full inter­
changeability restored.
The (specific) quota Banks, (see below) were of a similar principle,
-|but of a much more limited coverage.
Specific Licences
These related to import items, classified to the Administrative
Category (Admin.) for which application for licences to import were
considered individually, on the basis of predetermined criteria largely
in relation to end use and availability from domestic sources. The
manner in which these criteria were applied varied, however, with the
2circumstances operating at any particular time.
Some flexibility in the use of specific quotas and specific
1.
It is worth noting the slight difference of emphasis in the Australian 
system, as far as the importer is concerned, compared with the practice 
in some other countries operating quantitative restrictions. The quota 
related directly to the importer rather than directly to a commodity 
as was generally the case in the United Kingdom, for example. Overall 
this made little, if any, difference to the total imports of a 
specific oxuota item. It may have affected the pattern of imports of 
interchangeable quota items and may also have affected the distribution 
of imports among importers, depending upon the method used to allocate 
licences.
2.
nAs an example of the policy of the Government to ensure as much 
flexibility in the arrangements as the situation permitted from time 
to time, imports of the nature of capital equipment had not been made 
subject to rigid quota restrictions, but had been placed on an admini­
strative basis in order that full consideration could be given to the 
governmental and private undertakings which were of vital concern in 
the life of the community^ and in the necessary development of 
Australian resourcesM* Srsffi Statement by the (then) Minister for 
Trade and Customs, (Senator 0 !Sullivan)!"Sydney Morning Herald.
^•3.1952, p.i.
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licences was introduced by the increasing use over the period of what 
were termed Banks, an administrative device designed to simplify the 
system both for importers and for the administering authorities. These 
consisted of a grouping of a number of items of a roughly similar 
nature which frequently were receiving different licensing treatment.
All items within the group then received the same licensing treatment.
For the importer the quota Banks had the additional advantage that their 
quota could be used for any item in the bank and thus provided a 
limited degree of interchangeability. Banks were used mainly for items 
such as replacement parts for types of products such as tractors, agri- 
cultural machinery, or components for a particular manufacturing process 
e.g. for the manufacture of agricultural machinery. Motor vehicles were 
imported under the Bank system for most of the period, mainly under 
three separate banks depending upon whether the imports were complete 
vehicles, c.k.d. packs or components for approved manufacturing projects. 
The importance of the Bank system may be judged from the fact that over 
the period they accounted for up to one third of the specific quotas.
Additional flexibility in the relatively rigid quota system was 
provided by the issue of supplementary quotas - permanent additions to 
quotas - and special licences - issued on a once and for all basis. 
Supplementary quotas or special licences were principally to offset
i7~~ ~
Completely knocked down.
See Chapter XIV.
2.
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hardship, anomalies, unforeseen contingencies etc* or to provide addi­
tional licensing facilities for manufacturers, exporters etc. In the 
latter cases requests for special licences were normally related strictly 
to the criteria of end use and lack of local availability. In the case 
of hardship, anomalies etc. more flexibility was permitted.
The f ollowing figures provide some indication of the relative
1importance of special licence issues.
Table III-l
fa)Special Licence Issues 1956-57.
Percentage of Total Issues in Categories.
July/Sept. Oct/Dec. Jan/Mar Apr/June
1956 1956 1957 1957
________ ___%____________________ % _______
3 5 19 1 0 ( 1 ) ^
6 16 16 7(3)
Includes both special licences and supplementary 
quotas. The latter were commonly issued as special 
licences in the first period and then built into 
quotas in subsequent periods.
Category A only.
Figures in brackets relate to special licences 
issued under special Anomaly adjustment1 
provisions. (See Chapter XVTl).
Source: From material made available by the Department of
Trade.
Specific quota^
Interchangeable
quota
Notes: (a)
(b)
(c)
1.
From t he information available at this stage it is difficult to 
obtain satisfactory figures for special licence issues without somewhat 
laborious extraction and compilation of detailed figures.(For some 
years it is not possible at all}* Reference was made above to the 
£20m. of special hardship licences issued in 1952.
The figures are interesting in that they suggest that special 
licence issues were not negligible even at periods of particularly 
restrictive licensing - as in the first two periods shown. The 
figures for the two subsequent periods include substantial issues of 
licences for textiles for manufacturing purposes. (See below).
Other methods of control of importance at particular times were 
the No Quota Restriction and Replacement methods.
No Quota Restriction (N.Q.R.). Goods in this category were 
licensed without restriction apart from limitations on stock accumula­
tion or issues of licences in excess of a level considered reasonable 
in relation to previous import levels.
Replacement. Licences for goods in this category were issued 
fairly freely to replace licences used during the current or previous 
period. The first use of this method was for the licensing of motor 
vehicles early in 1957, with the introduction of a system of control 
whereby licences were issued on the basis of sales in the previous 
period. When the system was extended to other items later in the year, 
the attempt was made to retain the principle of replacement of sales.
This was found to be administratively difficult both for importers and 
for the administrators and within a few weeks it was changed to a 
system whereby licences were issued to establish importers according to 
imports made in the previous licensing period, i.e. it became an import1 
replacement rather than a *sales* replacement method
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1of licensing* Provision was also made for the issue of licences 
for these goods to genuine new entrants into the business of importing*
Accumulation of stocks of goods was not avoided with the Replacement 
method; stocking of licences was. It was for this reason that this 
method was preferred to and subsequently replaced the N.Q.R* method 
after the experience of 1954 and 1955* (See Chapter VTIl)*
Basically these two methods of licensing control were intended as 
preludes to complete removal of licensing control for the items concern­
ed, though such a move did not always follow their use*
The use of quotas was limited for most of the period virtually to 
imports from non dollar sources* Imports from the dollar area were 
almost all controlled by specific licence within the administrative 
category until late in the second intensification period, although the 
Bank system was used for a number of items. In addition, within the 
specific licence category, regular importers were licenced virtually 
on an individual quota basis for some items e*g* dollar area timber 
though it was a 1 quota1 subject to review and variation in each 
licensing period*
One important exception to the principle that licences should be 
made available to importers as a means of involving least disturbance
T7
The change from a bales’ to an import1 replacement basis was 
largely a consequence of the difficulty of substantiating actual sales 
within each licensing period - since these did not coincide with the 
normal business accounting periods. Importers still had to demonstrate 
at regular intervals that the import licences being obtained were not 
simply being used to build up stocks.
to the existing commercial pattern of trade, was the establishment of 
quotas for textile manufacturers. These quotas, established between 
March 1952 and March 1953* were designed to ensure for those manufactur­
ers who sought them sufficient raw materials to maintain a reasonable 
level of output. These manufacturing quotas were issued within the 
interchangeable quota category to maintain flexibility in manufacturers1 
purchasing to meet fashion and technological change and because textile 
piece goods, as well as being manufacturing raw materials, retail 
directly to the public in substantial quantities. These licence avail­
abilities were additional to textile merchants1 existing quotas. The 
identity of these manufacturing quotas was retained through the changes 
in the interchangeable quota category, including the subdivision into
subcategories during 1956-57, until a special Bank - Bank C16 - was
1established as from 1.1.1957.
To avoid undue distortion to normal manufacturer/merchant relation­
ships, in the second intensification period, where further licences 
were to be made available to meet manufacturers1 requirements, manufact­
urers were allowed to nominate merchants who were then permitted to 
import the goods on the manufacturers1 licences. Similarly, merchants 
who wished to establish quotas under Bank Cl6 - i.e. on a more liberal
IT
Fluctuations in the licensing rate were not identical with those 
of the interchangeable quota proper, however j generally variations 
tended, in the early stages at least, to be more closely comparable 
with those of the specific quotas. Consolidated licensing Instructions, 
Department of Customs and Excise, 1.7.1959, C.L.X«, Bank Cl6. pp.69-70
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basis - were permitted to do so subject to the qualification that a 
value of imported textiles, equal to their Bank C16 quotas, had to be 
made available to textile manufacturers.
Tables III-2 and III-3 attempt to give some indication of the 
relative importance of the major methods of import control during the 
eight years under review. Table III-3, and to a lesser extent Table 
III-2, also provide a crude measure of the coverage of the controls.
The assumptions and method of construction of these tables are discussed 
in Appendix IIIA. Two general points need to be made here. First, 
neither table accounts for the effects of discrimination against 
dollar and Japanese goods. Second, Table III-3 is based on the 
assumption that free demand for each import item in each of the years 
1952-53 to 1959-60 would bear the same proportionate relationship to 
the tots.l as in 1950-51. Despite these substantial limitations it was 
considered that together they are useful broad indicators of the 
coverage and methods of import control.
Up to 1955 the noticeable change shown in the tables was the 
reduction in specific licensing and the increase in the N.G.R. (no 
quota restriction) Category.
Imports in the N.ft.R. Category rose substantially in 1953-54 and 
1954-55, mainly as a result of transfers from Category tA t and other 
specific quota categories. The proportion of items in the N.Q.R. 
Category reached a peak in mid-1954> though this does not show up in 
the table since it merely indicates the position at the period ended
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March in each year* The bulk of these items were, subsequent to 1955, 
put into more restrictive categories, a substantial proportion into 
Admin* Asterisk, a few into Category >A t* and the balance into Admin*
The large rise in Category tA t in 1956-57 was due to the inclusion 
in that category of practically all specific quota items. From this 
period Category tA t ceased to be based upon a uniform percentage of 
the base year* For many of the items, particularly those which had 
for periods during 1953-54 and. 1954-55 been licensed on an N.Q.R. basis, 
imports in 1954-55 were taken as the quota base* Percentages of the 
base period varied from 10 per cent, to 120 per cent, or more in some 
cases. Similarly, variations in the licensing levels were not uniformly 
applied to these quotas as had been the case in earlier periods.
The reduction of the size of the specific licence category 
reflected the desire to reduce the area in which individual attention 
had to be given to licence applications both to lessen the administrative 
burden and to reduce the degree of uncertainty which made forward 
planning difficult for traders*
The increase in exempt items in the later years reflects largely 
the removal of petroleum products from licensing control in August 1957, 
although these had, in fact, been licensed more or less without 
restriction during the previous years. When relaxations were made in 
the later period, Replacement licensing was preferred for more or less 
freely licensed items to an N.Q.R. basis for reasons discussed above 
and this is reflected in the figures for the two methods.
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The gradual decline in the importance of interchangeable quotas 
was the result largely of the movement of items out of this category 
into a specific quota to ensure that at least a minimum quantity of 
the particular item was imported.
Neither table reflects the subdivision of the interchangeable 
quota during the period from July 1956 to April 1957 described in 
Chapter II*
One interesting feature of the figures for I960 in Table III-3 
is that while official pronouncement stated, quite correctly, that only 
10 per cent, of current imports remained under restriction after 
February I960, imports of the items remaining under control represented 
some 20 per cent, of the total import bill in 1950-51» For most of 
these items,however, the degree of control was not particularly 
restrictive.
One other factor should be noted. A number of import items were 
controlled on a different basis from that normally applicable when 
imported for a particular purpose. Table III-3 is based on the method 
of control normally applicable to the import item. The only case where 
this would substantially affect the interpretation of the data in the 
Tables is the case of the manufacturing quotas for textiles which, 
subsequent to August 1957, were licenced under a special Bank, Bank C16. 
to which reference was made above. As the following table shows, the 
proportion shorn for the interchangeable quota in Table III-3 overstates 
the degree of interchangeability in the licensing system.
?able III-A
Licences Issues: B Category and Bank C16.
Licensing Period B.
Aug,- Nov, 1957 
Dec.- Mar, 1957/5S 
April-July 1953 
Aug,- Nov. 1953 
Dec.- Mar. 1953/59 
April-July 1959 
Aug,- Nov. 1959 
Dec.- Feb. 1959/60
Category Bank C.16
£m, c.i.f. and e.
23.2 12.6
19.6 10. S
20.9 11.6
22.3 12.7
20.9 12.6
23.5 12.9
32.5 13.3
23.9 12.1
Source: From information made available by the Department of Trade,
To a considerable extent the manufacturing quotas for textiles were 
more in the nature of a specific quota bank after the establishment of 
Bank C16. a fairly close watch being kept on the use to which these 
quotas were put. Prior to this some interchangeable quotas issued as 
manufacturing quotas had been used to import goods other than textiles. 
Discriminatory Aspects 
The Dollar Area
Within the general system of controls designed to protect the 
Australian balance of payments further controls were operated, the 
purpose of which was related to the balance of payments position of the 
sterling area as a whole.
From the outbreak of the war in 1939 Australia had cooperated 
with other sterling area countries in pooling earnings of dollars and
other ’hard’ currencies and restricting expenditure from the pool.
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Until 1947 licensing controls on imports from hard currency sources 
were operated on generally restrictive criteria but without a predeterm­
ined ceiling on overall spending of hard currencies. These criteria 
were tightened considerably in 1947 as a result of the dollar crisis 
which followed the United Kingdom*s attempt to establish full convert­
ibility of sterling, and total licences issued were subsequently 
limited to a set allocation of dollar funds, known as the dollar budget.
This system still operated in 1952 and was continued virtually 
unchanged in the next three years, becoming a separate part of the 
Administrative (specific licensing) area of licensing. To meet the 
targets set at the Finance Ministers * Conference in November, 1951 
for savings in dollar expenditures by sterling area countries, a cut 
of about 20 per cent« was made in the rate of dollar imports. From 
1947 onwards goods from dollar sources were licenced only if they 
consisted of items of capital equipment, replacement parts for existing 
equipment, or raw materials unavailable from alternative sources. 
Inevitably changes in the intensity of licensing in this part of the 
system tended to centre largely on capital equipment items, although 
the loans from the I.B.R.D. in these years overcame some of the shortages 
of capital equipment that this would otherwise have entailed.
The first major change in the method of licensing goods from the 
dollar area, and the first steps in the removal of discrimination on 
a currency basis in the licensing system were made in October 1955,
although, between 1952 and this time, increases had been made in the 
total allocation of dollars available for imports. From October 1955 
a number of basic commodities were placed on what was known as a 
1world1 basis of licensing, the purchase of these items being then 
unrestricted as to source.
Further transfers to a world basis of licensing were not made 
until August 1957 when a further 16 items were freed from restrictions 
on the source of imports.
The August 1957 changes in fact represented the first substantial 
reduction in dollar discrimination; as a result of changes made at
on the source of supply.
Further increases had brought this total to about a third by- 
August 1958, and changes introduced in that month increased it to well 
over 40 per cent. Additional reductions in the extent of discrimination 
were made in April 1959, making some 70 per cent, of actual imports 
obtainable without restriction on the source; this percentage was 
subsequently increased to approximately 90 per cent, in August of that 
year, and to 95 per cent, in December 1959* By this time motor 
vehicles were the major item on which restrictions from dollar sources 
remained in force; the remainder of the 5 per cent, consisted substantially 
of consumer goods on which ceilings on the total imports of the items 
which could be obtained from the dollar area had been imposed.
In February I960, these ceilings were removed, the only items
total imports permitted were free of restrictions
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of dollar origin then remaining subject to restrictions when imported 
from that source being motor vehicles. The removal of these restrictions 
as from October I960 was foreshadowed in an announcement made in 
November 1959 by the Minister for Trade and they were subsequently 
lifted on the date announced.
Japan
Apart from the dollar area countries, the only country against 
which Australian import policy was applied discriminatorily after 1952 
was Japan. It was noted earlier that at March, 1952 the position in 
relation to Japan was that, although token shipments of less essential 
goods had been permitted since July 1951, more essential goods were 
licensed relatively freely. Although after August 1951, with the 
signing of the new payments agreement between the sterling area and 
Japan, no official convertibility clause existed, the United Kingdom 
was still concerned that there should be no material increase in 
Japan’s sterling holdings, and Japan continued to be treated more or 
less as a hard currency country.
The criteria applicable to the issue of licences for Japanese 
goods were tightened from March 1952. From May 1952, with the with­
drawal of the Traders’ General licences, the position was broadly that 
Japan was a preferable source of supply to the dollar area but all 
other sources of supply were preferable to Japan.
Sydney Morning Herald. 30. 11. 1959, p.l.
17
It was not until April 1953? following a consistent fall in 
Japanese holdings of sterling from mid-1952, that the overall currency 
position of Japan was reconsidered, and substantial relaxations made 
within the overall licensing pattern by the extension of the number of 
items which could be imported from Japan. Less advantage was taken of 
these relaxations than had been expected, partly no doubt through 
uncertainty in the importers* minds, and perhaps due to supplies having 
been arranged for some time ahead from alternative sources.
In November, 1954 the discriminatory aspects of licensing Japanese 
goods was considerably reduced, importers being free to purchase from 
Japan a considerable range of items. For some 70 to BO items, consisting 
mainly of consumer goods, however, ceilings were placed upon imports 
from Japan, and these continued to operate, subject to variation in 
proportion tp the variation in overall licensing levels and some 
reduction in the number of items on which ceilings were placed, up to 
July 1957 and the signing of a trade agreement between Australia and 
Japan.^ Under this agreement Australia agreed to remove all remaining 
discrimination in the licensing treatment of Japanese goods.
From July 1958, as far as the licensing of imports proper was 
concerned Japan was treated no differently from other exporting 
countries, although the information available from licensing statistics
TT
Agreement on Commerce between the Commonwealth of Australia and 
Japan. 1957, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra.
proved of considerable use in the operation of the arrangements made 
under the trade agreement to safeguard domestic industry from excessive 
imports of Japanese goods* It was announced in February, I960 that 
some items would remain temporarily under control so that licensing
-jstatistics continued to be available for this purpose. No doubt the
ready availability of a mechanism for swiftly limiting imports of a
particular item was also an important factor in the retention of
controls on these items, which constituted about sc ^ quarters(by number)
of the items remaining under control*
Movements in the volume of total imports during the period under
review are shown in Table III-5, together with movements in some major
import commodity classifications. The relationship of movements in
import levels and the restrictions on imports is discussed below (see
Chapter VIII)• Actual values of licences issued for imports from non
dollar, dollar and Japanese sources over the period are given in Table
IIX-6. Some consideration of the effects of these measures on imports
is given in Chapter IX*
The Administration of Import Controls
It is not proposed to discuss the administrative procedure of
2the import licensing system in any detail. Nevertheless, to conclude
IT
Minister for Trade, (Mr. McEwen), Press Statement. 22*2*1960.
2.
c.f. History of Australia^ Import Licensing Measures, oo.cit*. passim. 
A more detailed description of some aspects of the procedures is given 
in G. Moffat, ’’The Australian Import Licensing System: 1952-1960”,
Australian Economic Papers. Vol.l (September, 1962), pp.119-138.
this description of the licensing system, it would seem useful to 
outline briefly the manner in which the system was operated.
During the war years and in the early post war years, the admini­
stration of the licensing of imports had been the responsibility of 
the Department of Trade and Customs, and it continued to be so for 
the first four years following reimposition of full scale licensing 
of imports in 1952« With the reorganisation in February 1956 of the 
government departments concerned directly or indirectly with trade 
policy, the control of imports fell almost entirely within the province 
of the newly created Department of Trade. The actual administration
of the import licensing regulations, and more detailed functions such
2as the physical issue - though in general not authorisation - of 
licences and collection of licensing statistics were performed by the 
new Department of Customs and Excise.
Decisions had to be made at regular intervals, according to the
3length of the licensing period, regarding allocation of available 
foreign exchange among the various classes of imports. Estimates were
1.
For an interesting study of the background to this realignment of 
departmental functions see R.P. Deane, The Establishment of the Depart­
ment of Trade: A Case Study in Administrative Reorganisation, (to be 
published) •
2.
Some limited authority was delegated to Collectors of Customs and 
wider authority on occasions, e.g. the issue of special ’hardship1 
licences in 1955 (see Chapter VIII).
3 *
The licensing period was of 3 months duration until October 1953; it 
was then made of 6 months until it reverted to 3 months in April 1955; 
it was increased to 4 months in April 1957, no subsequent change being made.
made of licence requirements on the basis of the existing levels of 
quota usage, fluctuations in the cost of freight and insurance etc.
Policy for subsequent licensing periods was then determined largely on the 
basis of the balance of payments position and prospects, with greater 
emphasis being placed on the longer term prospects in later periods; 
the availability of raw materials reflected in information obtained 
from industry and normally reflected in pressures for increased licences 
by manufacturers; of consumer goods, reflected in the suspected level 
of trafficking and pressures from retailers; and the position in 
regard to capital goods and equipment as reflected in the level of 
licence applications. Decisions were then made in respect of the 
overall level of licensing and the allocation of available funds between 
classes of imports.
Once the level of quota issues had been decided upon, applicants
within these quota levels were automatically granted licences up to
the level of established quotas. Difficulties in the administration
of these categories largely arose out of applications from those with-
■]out quotas seeking quotas or licences for quota goods, or quota 
holders seeking additional quotas or licences.
17 ~~
The distinction being that in obtaining a quota, licences were then 
available while licensing remained in operation, unless either the 
basis of establishing quotas was changed or the item for which the 
quota was established was put int© a non quota category; licences 
were a once for all operation - there was no necessary issue of 
licences in subsequent periods.
During the first relaxation period a considerable volume of 
special licences were issued or quota entitlements were granted* The 
unrepresentative nature of the base year for a number of import items, 
particular examples of anomalies, the need to maintain at least a 
minimum level of supplies for manufacturing, were some of the reasons 
put forward - usually with some justification - for the increase in 
import entitlements. Administratively there were good reasons why a 
fairly flexible attitude could be taken towards these applications. 
Import licensing, it was generally accepted at this time, was of only 
a short term duration and was in course of relaxation and ultimate 
removal. The gradual relaxations being made permitted special 
licence entitlements to be granted without reducing licences available 
to existing importers. It was recognised that to some extent the 
practice had disadvantages since it gave a degree of special treatment 
to those who applied for quotas or licences and received them over 
those who did not seek them; moreover, merchants and importers could
with justice object when licences were given to manufacturers to
1import for themselves when normally they would not do so. In fact, 
the merchants and importers at this stage at least appeared not to be
1.
The licensing system operated on the basis that quotas were established 
and licences were issued to those who actually performed the process of 
importation in the base year period; this was regarded both as a matter 
of equity and as a means of distorting as little as possible the 
normal pattern of business. Some cognisance was also given to this 
aspect in the case of specific licence applications, though necessarily 
far more flexibility had to be permitted in these cases.
unduly concerned presumably since they expected the removal of 
restrictions in the near future. For similar reasons anomalies 
caused by issues of special licences could be removed in the process 
of further relaxation or at worst would be relatively short lived.
When, contrary to general expectations, the intensity of the 
restrictions had to be increased substantially in the second intensi­
fication period these anomalies were accentuated and caused some 
difficulties, and merchants and importers became more vocal in respect 
of the issue of licences directly to manufacturers. This in part made
it necessary to take special measures during the second intensification
1period to overcome anomalies in licensing treatment of quota holders.
In the allocation of exchange for the issue of specific licences, 
more detailed administrative procedures were necessary. For dollar 
goods, virtually all of which were licensed on a specific licence basis 
an interdepartmental committee, consisting of representatives of the 
Department of Trade and Customs (later the Department of Trade), 
Treasury and the Prime Minister1s Department had been set up in 1947 
and met quarterly to administer the overall policy set by the Cabinet 
Committee on Import Licensing comprising the Ministerial Heads of those 
Departments. After March 1952 this committee of officials took over in 
addition the function of broad supervision of the licensing of goods
IT
Steps were taken to place the handling of anomalies on a systematic 
basis. See Chapter XVII.
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controlled on a specific licence basis. It continued to meet 
quarterly in the early years-at four monthly intervals from April 1957 - 
and was responsible for determining broadly the allocation of licences 
among the various classes and types of goods; in some cases of more 
than normal complexity e.g* timber, television equipment, and some 
areas of capital equipment, it made decisions regarding the licences to 
be allocated to individual applicants.
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Table III-6
Value of Imnort Licences Issued : 1962-60 : Bv Source of Imnorts
£M, c.i .f. and e.
(~)
Licensing Period' Months Total D o l l a r ^ Non Dollar
in Licenses Licenses Licenses
Period Issued
Oct - Dec 1952 3 158.3 21.5 109.1
Jan - Mar 1953 3 165.7 17.3 119.2
April-June 1953 3 132.8 25.1 I3 2 .4
July-Sept 1953 3 181.1 18.4 135.4
Oct - Dec 1953 3 2 3 9 . 1 22,0 185.1
Jan - Mar 1954 3 168.7 19.2 119.3
April-June 1954 3 321*4 3 9 . 6 247.3
July-Sept 1954 3 251.8 27.5 137.4
Oct - Dec 1954 3 260.5 2 6 . 7 198.2
Jan - Mar 1955 3 226.3 27.3 170.5
April-June 1955 3 251.5 35.2 184.4
July-Sept 1955 3 245.3 3 8 . 2 173.2
Oct - Dec 1955 3 2 1 1 . 8 25.7 145.0
Jan - Mar 1956 3 2 3 0 . 5 24.6 163.1
April-June 1956 3 225*9 27.0 151.3
July-Sept 1956 3 209.5 25.9 131.8
Oct - Dec 1956 3 187.2 24.1 121.5
Jan - Mar 1957 3 220.4 21.7 1 4 8 . 0
April-June 1957 4 306.0 28.7 200.6
July- Nov 1957 4 271.6 3 8 . 6 211.4
Dec - Mar 1957/58 4 24L.7 4 0.S 186.4
April-July 1958 * 4 271.1 43.7 201.2
Aug - Nov 1958 4 275.5 3 5 . 3 180.1
Dec - Mar 1958/59 4 262.3 29.7 1 5 8 . 4
April-July 1959 4 291.5 18.8 1 2 1 . 8
Aug - Nov 1959 4 284-0 (i) (i)
Dec - Feb 1959/60 3 219.2
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Table III-6 (Gont’d)
Value of Import Licenses Issued : 1952-1960 : By Source of Imports
£M. c.i.f. and e.
Licensing Period^ "World"^ Japanese Petroleum
Licenses Licenses Licenses
Oct - Dec 1952 0.5 27.7
Jan - Mar 1953 0.7 28.0
April-June 1953 1.4 23.9
July-Sept 1953 2.8 24* 4
Oct - Dec 1953 4.1 27.8
Jan - Mar 1954 4.0 26.1
April-June 1954 5.0 29.0
July-Sept 1954 6.8 30.2
Oct - Dec 1954 7.8 27.9
Jan - Mar 1955 (f) 28.5
April-June 1955 31.9
July-Sept 1955 33.9
Oct- Dec 1955 9.3 (g) 31.9
Jan - Mar 1956 10.1 32.6
April-June 1956 12.9 34.5
July-Sept 1956 19.6 32.3
Oct - Dec 1956 12.6 29.0
Jan - Mar 1957 13.8 36.9
April-July 1957 24* 3 52.3
Aug - Nov 1957 21.5 (h)
Dec - Mar 1957/58 14.5
April-July 1958 29.2
Aug - Nov 1958 60.1
Dec - Mar 1958/59 74.7
April-July 1959 150.9
Aug - Nov 1959 (i)
Dec - Feb 1959/60
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Notes: to Table III-6
(a) Strictly statis tical period* See note
to Chapter III on length of licensing period.
(b) Excluding petroleum licensed from dollar sources.
Until 30*6.1956 includes licences issued 
separately for goods of dollar Origin on Non-Dollar 
Sources*. These were normally small. In all but 
four periods - from October 1954 to September
1955 - values were less than £lm* During these 
four periods they totalled in va lue £1.3m., £l*lm., 
£3*5m«, and £3*0m., respectively.
(c) Excluding Japan until January, 1955*
(d) No restrictions on source of imports.
(e) Includes petroleum licensed from dollar and non-dollar 
sources.
(f) Separate licenses not issued for Japanese goods from 
22.11.1954«
(g) "World” (no discrimination as to source) basis of 
licensing introduced 1.10.1955*
(h) Bulk petroleum products exempted from licensing 
from 1.8.1957.
(i) With a few exceptions, discrimination against dollar 
removed as from 1.8.1959*
Source: Compiled from data made available by the Department
of Trade.
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Appendix III*A.
Source and Method» Tables III-2 and III-.?,
Table III-2
This table was calculated from details of c.i.f* sind e. values 
of licences issued in the licensing period for imports from all 
sources other than the d ollar area and Japan* Values of issues under 
each major method of control were calculated as proportions of the 
total value of non-dollar licences for the period shown.
The choice of period was determined largely to permit compari­
son to be made with Table III-3* (Licences issued data is not 
available for periods before October-December 1952).
Values of licences issued were obtained from material made 
available from the Department of Trade* It should be noted that 
the table is based on current data and includes the effect of the 
restriction. In the extreme no weight would be given to items for 
which no imports were permitted. This is the familiar problem of 
tariff indexes.
Table III-3
Under the import licensing system, imports were classified by 
Import Licensing Category Items - based on the tariff classification 
of imports but not coincident with it. The licensing methods applic­
able to these category items were published regularly in Import 
Licensing Schedules of Categories issued until 1956 by the Department
of Trade and Customs and Excise. Variations in licensing treatment 
were notified by means of Licensing Instructions issued by the same 
Department(s), in the intervals between issues of the Schedules. In 
the present case considerable use was made of tabulations of changes 
in licensing treatments prepared by the Department of Trade for 
internal use.
Statistics for import clearances on a tariff item basis are 
available from the Bulletins of Imports Cleared for Home Consumption 
(these will be referred to henceforth as Import (Clearance Bulletins) 
issued up to 1958-59 by the Department of Customs and Excise (or its 
predecessor) but issued subsequently by the Commonwealth Statistician.
1950-51 was selected as the base year since it was such for the 
licensing system in the early years in the period and for many items 
continued to be so up to February I960.
In order to reduce the already substantial burden of extraction 
and compilation of data the assumption was made that the restrictions 
on imports in force in 1950-51, almost entirely against dollar and 
Japanese goods, were diversionary and not restrictive, or at least 
that the restrictive effects could be ignored. Clearly for a number 
of items this was not the case but it is not considered that for the 
limited purpose in hand this is too serious a limitation.
Each import licensing category item was given a fixed weight corr­
esponding to the value of imports of that item in 1950-51 (items where 
imports in 1950-51 were less than £1000 were ignored. A certain
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amount of estimation was necessary to obtain base year values 
corresponding to import licensing category items. The total of 
each item under a particular method of control was then totalled 
for each of the periods shown - according to the base year weights - 
and shown as a proportion of the total of these weights (i.e. in 
effect as a proportion of 1950-51 imports).
One period in each year was selected to reduce the volume of 
calculations. The period ended March of each year from 1953 to 
1959 was selected; as a result of changes in duration of licensing 
periods, March was the only month which ended a licensing period in 
each of those years. Use of the period December 1959 - February I960 
reflects the virtual removal of the controls in the latter month.
The assumption implicit in this table is that in the absence 
of controls the proportion of total imports represented by each 
import item would remain constant fo r each year shown. Relative 
import demand is of course highly unlikely to remain constant in this 
way even over a short period, certainly not for a period of eight 
years. On the other hand, this is a common weighting problem and it 
does avoid, at least, the distortions associated with a measure based 
on current weights, as in Table III-2.
Specific notes to the Tables
(a) Bulk Petroleum products (8.5 per cent.) although retained 
in the Administrative Category until August 1957 were in fact licens­
ed more or less freely at all stages of this period.
(b) From April 1957, motor vehicles (10.1 per cent.) began to
be licensed on what was strictly a Replacement basis although retained 
in the Administrative Category for administrative convenience.
(c) Includes items classified to B Categoiy but licensed on a
specific quota Bank basis: See discussion of Bank C«l6 in text
(Chapter III).
(d) It was not possible to take account of special licence
issues. See Chapter III.
Chapter IV
Some Theoretical Considerations« I: Quantitative 
Tmpnrt. Restrictions and the Balance of Payments
In this part of the theoretical discussion, attention will be 
devoted primarily to considering the quantitative control of imports 
as an instrument of balance of payments policy; this involves consid­
ering briefly some more general aspects of balance of payments policy
1and alternative methods for removing a balance of payments deficit* 
More specific aspects of the quantitative control of imports will be 
touched upon incidentally, although the main theoretical discussion 
of these will be dealt with in the next two chapters*
In essence, the contribution of the Mabsorptionn approach to 
balance of payments theory was to bring the emphasis, in discussion
1.
For a general discussion of the subject matter of this section see 
J*E.Meade, The Theory of International Economic Policy.Vol*I. The 
Balance of Payments. London 1951, partic* part III»V; J.Tinbergen,
On the Theory of Economic Policy. Amsterdam 1952; T.W.Swan, "Longer 
Run Problems of the Balance of Payments'1, paper read to Section G 
of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement 
of Science (ANZAAS), August 1955; H*G*Johnson, "Towards a General 
Theory of the Balance of Payments", reprinted in International Trade 
and Economic Growth. 1958, pp*153-168; R*Nurske, "The Relation be­
tween Home Investment and External Balance in the Light of British 
Experience, 1945-1955’*, reprinted in Equilibrium and Growth in the 
World Economy. Cambridge (Mass*), 1961* See also J.Black, "A Savings 
and Investment Approach to Devaluation", Economic Journal. Vol.LXIX 
(June 1959), pp.267-274; I*F.Pearce, "The Problem of the Balance of 
Payments", International Economic Review. Vol*2, (January, 196l) pp* 
1-28; J*M*Letiche, Balance of Payments and Economic Growth. New York, 
1959, particularly Chapts* III and 17; M*F*W* Hemmirig and W*M*Corden, 
"Import Restriction as an Instrument of Balance of Payments Policy", 
Economic Journal. Vol* LXVTII, (Sept. 1958), pp*483-510.
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of measures to improve the balance of payments, on to the relation­
ship between income and expenditure in the economy as a whole. This 
was a welcome reaction to the neo-Marshallian approach which had 
tended to treat the balance of payments as an entity with an existence 
separate from the rest of the economy. The neo-Marshallian approach 
laid emphasis on the interplay of supply and demand in particular 
markets without indicating explicitly how this affected the excess 
of expenditure over income. Aggregative analysis, of the type 
associated with the name of Keynes, has demonstrated this to be a 
necessary concomitant of a balance of payments deficit.
It is not that the latter approach, usually termed the 
"elasticities” approach, did not involve the realigning of real 
income and real expenditure; but that it revealed little of the 
manner in which the realignment occurred. "... the statement that 
the effect of a devaluation depends upon the elasticities boils down
2tot he statement that it depends upon how the economic system behaves".
In framing policy to remedy a deficit in the balance of payments, the 
process of readjustment of the economy is the important factor for 
examination, and the ’elasticities’ approach is of little value in
TT "
Typified, perhaps, by Joan Robinson in her "The Foreign Exchanges", 
Essays in the Theory’ of Employment. 2nd ed., Oxford, 1947, Part III, 
Chapt. I, reprinted in Readings in the Theory of International 
Trade. London, 1950, pp.33-103.
2.
S.S. Alexander, "Effects of a Devaluation on a Trade Balance",
I.M.F. Staff Papers. Vol.2, (1951-52), p.264.
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this respect; it is much more fruitful to consider the real 
income and real expenditure aggregates involved*
A balance of payment s deficit implies an equal excess of invest­
ment over savings in the deficit country* This follows from the fact 
that incomes in any country are derived from the sale of consumption 
or investment goods at home and from the sale of goods to the rest 
of the world. At the same time incomes must either be saved, used 
to buy home produced consumtion goods, or spent on imports from over­
seas. Since any difference between consumption goods produced at 
home and consumed at home reflects itself in either exports or imports, 
or in investment, we can eliminate the common item, i.e. consumption 
of home produced goods. So exports minus imports must equal savings 
less investment, if the balance of payments is to be balanced.
This can be demonstrated simply in the f ollowing manner:
Let pj, p^ be prices and x^, x^ be quantities of exports and imports; 
so
B - P-j-x-j- _  ^ where B is the trade balance.
If we call Yp total income and total expenditure Yg then total income 
equals total production i.e.
Y. = pp(Xp + Xp) + p2(X2“ + P3X3 where X2 ^  X3 are
consumption of exportables, importables and non-traded goods respect­
ively; and
Ye = PjZj 4- P2X2 ♦ p3X3
Subtracting
Yi " Ye = Pl*I - P2X2 = B
1We can see from this expression of the absorption approach that
the balance of payments may be improved either by increasing output
i.e. by increasing Y., or by reducing expenditure i.e, reducing Y •
Output and expenditure will each vary with changes in the other.
Since Y q will increase with output and income Y^, the total returns
to factors in producing total output, will depend upon expenditure,
we need to look more closely at their components.
Income receipts can be used for either consumption and/or
savings i.e. Y^ = C + S; and expenditure is either on consumption
and/or investment goods, i.e. Y = C f I; then0
B = Y. - Y s C  + S -  C -  I s S - I  i e
It is clear that a cut in Y q through a cut in C 'will not help 
the balance of payments unless accompanied by an increase in S, i.e. 
unless Y. stays the same while C falls.
Thus if S stays unchanged, the balance of payments can only be 
improved by a cut in investment I; on the other hand if it is intended 
that I should remain at the existing level while the balance of pay­
ments is improved, savings, S, must increase.
If the deficit country is already at full employment, then by 
definition there is little, if any, scope for increasing output in
TT
C.f. Johnson, otucit., p.lol.
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the short term# If there are unemployed resources then increasing 
output is also a possible course of action - and presumably a 
desirable one#
It follows that in order to remedy a deficit in the balance of 
payments, whatever the form of the remedial action taken, the rela­
tionship between saving and investment must necessarily be altered#
While the particular method used to effect the redirection of expend­
iture which is necessary may itself have the effect of reducing the 
margin by which investment exceeds saving, it will only be in except­
ional circumstances that it will, in fact, succeed in increasing saving 
or reducing investment sufficiently to remove the deficit without 
some additional internal action to increase saving or reduce investment.
It also follows, of course, that anything which affects the relation­
ship between saving and investment will itself affect the balance of 
payments. It is clear, therefore, that a deflationary policy by 
itself will always remove a balance of payments deficit, although it 
may be at the cost of unemployment of resources.
It should be noted at this point that the neo-Keynesian approach 
tended to ignore the role played by shifts in relative prices; yet 
changes in relative prices, whether cost induced or demand induced, 
will play an important part in any adjustment or redirection of 
expenditure . From what has been said above it is clear that the
T.
C.f. Pearce, on.cit.. pp.26-28.
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actual removal of the deficit in any balance of payments deficit 
situation will result mainly from the cut in investment or increase 
in saving, both of which require - under conditions of full employ­
ment such that output cannot be significantly increased - a cut 
in expenditure. Unless the reduced level of expenditure is redirected 
from its previous pattern by some change in relative prices, unemploy­
ment of resources will result. For example, a cut in expenditure 
will affect not only demand for those goods which enter world markets, 
and thus affect the balance of payments, but will also reduce demand 
for those goods which do not enter into international trade. The 
necessary redirection of demand may be effected by a variation in 
the exchange rate, the imposition of tariffs or direct controls, the 
payment of export subsidies etc., policy weapons which are frequently 
thought of as being the means by which a balance of payments deficit 
is removed. If demand under conditions of full employment is redirect­
ed from imports and home produced exportables, or perhaps just from 
imports, by one or other of these measures without a cut in the level 
of expenditure, this simply produces a rise in the price level of 
home produced goods which sooner or later will restore the position, 
more or less, to that existing before the redirection of demand was 
attempted. Some improvement in the balance of payments may have 
resulted, but apart from the initial impact effect due to lags in the 
increase in prices, this is unlikely to be large and would be fortuit­
ous. Moreover, if there exists any significant multiplier effect of
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rising price levels, as there most probably would be, the eventual 
balance of payments deficit could be significantly greater than 
before the redirection of expenditure was attempted.
In this study we are primarily concerned with the effects of the 
redirection of demand which was effected from 1952-1960 by means of 
direct controls on imports. Nevertheless it will be useful - and to 
some extent necessary - for the argument to make comparisons with the 
possible effects of alternative methods of effecting this redirection 
of demand. In order to do this we need to consider below the use of 
quantitative controls on imports for such a purpose in relation to 
alternative methods of achieving similar results in the balance of 
payments.
Broadly speaking the choice of instruments to affect the relation­
ship between exports and imports lies among four alternative methods: 
tariffs (including negative tariffs i.e. subsidies), quantitative import 
controls, exchange rate variation and deflation, or various combina­
tions of these methods.
Before discussing these methods, however, it will be useful for 
what follows to demonstrate that for any quantitative limit on imports 
there is always a tariff which would be equivalent in its effect on 
the quantity of imports and the foreign price of those imports. There 
will be some difference in the effects on the redistribution of income 
and under some circumstances there may also be differences in the 
local prices of the goods
affected* These internal differences will he considered separately 
below*
x
In Fig. I, XY is the transformation curve of country A, 
representing the production possibilities OX of x and OY of y* If 
the international prices of x and y are given by CD (the terms of trade) 
it will pay the country to produce OG of x, OE of y, exporting BD of y
1.
This assumes both methods are used for the same purpose. If, as 
in Australia during the period under review, this is not the case, 
differences in expectations may be important*
and importing BC(=GH) of x* That this position is an optimum in 
terms of welfare is indicated by the tangency of the terms of trade 
line CD with the highest possible indifference curve I* at C.
Suppose now that a limit is placed on imports (LL) so that the 
maximum quantity of imports permitted is Br. The trade possibilities 
of the country are now indicated by the curve YDtC’W, (assuming no 
change in the terms of trade)* At any point on this curve, a line 
drawn between it and the transformation curve XZ, parallel to DC 
will be equal in length to any other line so drawn. Country A will 
now produce at D 1 a combination of 03 of x and OR of y, export B!D’ 
and import B ^ ’ (=Br). This again can be seen to be an optimum, 
subject to the given constraint, since Country A is operating on its 
highest possible indifference curve 1 11. To achieve such a situation 
in the internal economy would require an internal price ratio PP’, 
and its equivalent for the internal price of the traded goods aa1, 
a level which would result from the complete freedom of internal 
prices.
If, instead of imposing a quantitative limit on imports, a tariff 
had been imposed such that the price of imports internally would have 
been represented by the slope of the line aa1, the effect, insofar 
as the quantity of imports was concerned, would have been exactly 
the same. This will subsequently be referred to as the tariff or ad 
valorum equivalent of an import restriction.
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While at any particular time there is always a rate of tariff 
duty which will restrict imports to the same extent as a quantita­
tive limitation on imports, the volume of imports under a particular 
level of tariff duties may change over time as circumstances change.
If relative prices change, because of changes in the costs of domes­
tic production, or the level of internal demand, or because the offer 
price of imports changes, the volume of imports under a particular 
tariff rate or set- of tariff rates will change. In the case of a 
quantitative control there is a fixed upper limit on the level of 
imports which can enter the country.
In the event of an increase in the level of internal activity, 
not offset by increased saving or by appropriate fiscal and monetary 
policies, the existence of quantitative limits on total imports 
means that this increase in demand must be spent entirely on domestic 
production. Where there are unemployed resources the increased size 
of the multiplier - since there is no import leakage - means that 
the response to the stimulus will be more rapid. If resources are 
fully employed - and it may be that the bottlenecks arise in respect 
of imported materials and components rather than in terms of labour 
- the rise in prices will be correspondingly greater. In the case of 
a tariff, the increase in demand will lead to some increase in imports 
which will have some effect in dampening down the rate of expansion 
of the inflationary stimulus, both because of the outflow of spending 
abroad and because of the increase in tariff
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revenue. T a r i f f  r a te s  would have to  be in c reased  to  o f f s e t  th e  
in c re a se d  im port demand i f  th e  predeterm ined  im port l e v e l  were to  
be m ain ta ined . This would r e d i r e c t  some o f th e  a d d i t io n a l  expendi­
tu r e  back onto th e  dom estic m arket bu t any in c re a se  in  t a r i f f  revenue 
would a s s i s t  in  l im i t in g  th e  in f la t io n a r y  p re ssu re  -  ag a in  p rovided  
th e  in c re ase d  t a r i f f  revenue were no t sp en t.
The assum ptions of p e r f e c t  com petition  in te rn a lly  and of no 
change in  the  term s of t r a d e ,  in s o fa r  as th e  l a t t e r  i s  a consequence 
o f com petitive  co n d itio n s  in  supply ing  c o u n tr ie s , a re  of some im port­
ance . For example, q u a n t i ta t iv e  r e s t r i c t i o n  may have d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t s  
on th e  amount paid  to  th e  fo re ig n  s u p p lie r  than  a t a r i f f  i f  th e se  
assum ptions do not h o ld . L et us remove th e  assum ption th a t  overseas 
p r ic e s  remain c o n s ta n t. There i s  reason  to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  im posi­
t io n  of a t a r i f f ,  i f  i t  has any e f f e c t  on th e  term s o f tra d e  a t  a l l ,  
w i l l  move th e  term s of tra d e  fav o u rab ly  to  th e  country  im posing th e  
t a r i f f . '  That i s ,  f o r  a g iven  q u a n tity  of expo rts  more im ports can 
be o b ta ined , o r, a l t e r n a t iv e ly ,  f o r  a given q u a n tity  o f im ports le s s  
ex p o rts  have to  be given up. The term s of tra d e  l in e  CD in  F ig . I  
w i l l  thus become s te e p e r . T his i s  shown in  F ig . I I .  where C’D* i s  th e  
e q u iv a len t o f CD in  F ig . I .
1.
Assuming th e  in c reased  t a r i f f  revenue i s  no t sp en t.
2 .
See below.
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The new price line is now CM D M , a consequence of the restric­
tion of imports at LL* Since the restriction is a quantitative 
restriction, it is necessary to know whether it is in terms of value 
or in terms of volume* If it is in terms of value, the quantity of 
imports could increase relative to the position that would have 
arisen had the terms of trade not changed. In this case the line LL 
is still the relevant indicator of the restriction* If it were
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imposed in terms of volume, however, the money value of this fixed
volume of imports would fall and the relevant indicator of the limit
on imports would be the line L'L1, i*e. a line such that the distance
2 2 1from L to the line D ’G* is equal to the distance from L ! to D'G' •
Consider now the case where the value of imports is fixed, i.e.
LL is the relevant indicator of the restriction. In this case the 
9 3 0
curve ID r'C w l indicates the trade possibilities of the country 
concerned, and the optimum point is that of tangency with the highest 
indifference curve I -'. Imports wall be T ’S* and LG* is the increase 
in the quantity of imports available for the same money expenditure 
due to the favourable movement in the terms of trade. The same 
factors apply to the price lines aa* and pp1 as applied to the 
similar price lines in Fig. I. Although the cut in imports has been 
achieved by way of quantitative restriction on imports, it would also 
have resulted from the imposition of a tariff making internal prices 
those indicated by the slopes aa1 and pp’.
In considering these various methods it is clear as we saw 
earlier that notwithstanding which method is used, one thing is common 
to all. To improve the balance of payments as such there must be
r r '
It should be noted that this is strictly only one possible case 
in terms of the model used here. Instead of the implicit numeraire 
being export goods it would be equally possible to fix any weighted 
index of import and export goods as the numeraire and thus obtain 
an infinity of answers according to the numeraire chosen. Irres­
pective of the particular numeraire chosen the principle will 
remain the same.
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some change in the relationship between saving and investment, 
increasing the former or reducing the latter or some combination 
of the two* The difference in the methods used is related to the 
direction in which the consequent adjustments arc made in the 
internal structure of the economy* These adjustments tend to be 
largely a means of offsetting some, at least, of the real costs of 
improving the trade balance*
It is traditionally argued that an exchange rate variation is 
the appropriate measure to bring about the structural changes necess­
ary to cure a fundamental disequilibrium in the balance of payments 
- i n  fact it is more often stated as requiring a devaluation of the 
exchange rate, on the grounds that this will bring about the necess­
ary worsening of the real terms of trade.
M*re re«eni argument has suggested that the direction of the 
required terms of trade movement is not known until we know the size 
of the relevant marginal propensities to consume importables* 
Depending upon the relative size of the propensities, the terms of 
trade may have to be worsened or improved* Under certain circum­
stances, therefore, the appropriate action to be taken in regard to 
the exchange rate in order to a chieve the required terms of trade 
movement may involve an appreciation of the currency rather than a 
depreciation*
The question of whether appreciation or depreciation is the more 
appropriate in any particular set of circumstances is of no special
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relevance in this context* It will be sufficient to refer to an 
exchange rate variation without being concerned with the direction 
of the change which would be appropriate* We are interested here 
solely with what can be said about the merits or demerits of the 
restriction of imports compared with the variation of the exchange rate. 
In an appendix to this chapter there is an analysis of the relative 
effects on welfare of a set of policies, designed to remove an import 
surplus or to gain an export surplus, in which the necessary adjust­
ments on the balance of payments side are effected by means of an 
exchange rate variation, and the effect of a set of policies designed 
to achieve the same purpose but in which demand for internationally 
traded goods is redirected by means of import restrictions or tariffs 
rather than by varying the exchange rate*
It may be suggested that such an exercise is hardly necessary in 
view of the conclusions reached by Alexander in his work on the 
subject. Alexander’s conclusions was that "If ••• the welfare of a 
dollar*s worth of imports is eoxual to the welfare value of a dollar’s
worth of exports it costs the country less to use import restrictions
rather than devaluation as an instrument for improving the foreign 
2balance.”
IT
S*S. Alexander, "Devaluation Versus Import Restriction as an 
Instrument for Improving Foreign Trade Balance", I.H.F* Staff 
Parers. Vol.I, (1950-51), pp# 379-396*
2.
Ibid., p* 379*
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It was considered useful to present an alternative formulation
to that in Alexander’s model because in his approach there appears
to be a confusion of ends and means. The intention of the foregoing
discussion has been to bring out the point that neither an exchange
rate variation, nor import restrictions, either of a quantitative or
a price nature, can by themselves solve a balance of payments problem.
At the same time, deflation can solve the balance of payments problem
but only at the expense of unemployment. Since Alexander assumes
full employment throughout, this may imply one of two alternatives.
It may either mean that the necessary disabsorpticn is implicit in his
model - which may be the case in view of the nature of the elasticities
in terms of which it is expressed; in this event there would seem to
be considerable advantage in making it explicit. It may alternatively
mean that the controls will of themselves bring about the necessary
disabsorption; at times it would seem that this might be the implic-
1ation to be drawn. Any direct effects on disabsorption that might 
result from the use of import restriction are likely to be short term 
effects and to result from inflexibilities and rigidities (see below) 
and are not included explicitly in the model. If the model is designed
IT
E. g. references to ”an import restriction which brings about an 
improvement in the foreign trade balance”..., (’’Devaluation Versus 
Import Restriction ...” op.cit., p. 383)5 it would also seem to 
be implied in Alexander’s inclusion of import controls within his 
group of ’’domestic measures calculated to change the relationship 
of absorption and income, and hence to affect the foreign balance”. 
(’’Effects of a Devaluation ...” op.cit., p.275.)
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to consider the longer term effects of the use of import restrictions
it excludes these factors. To the extent that it is intended to take
these short term factors into account, his model has little relevance
for the longer term since the parameters will have changed.
This does not, in the event, invalidate the nominal results of
his model, though one could not be sure of this except by reworking the
whole problem to take into account explicitly all the relevant factors,
but it does invalidate the interpretation he places on these results.
The reason his model turns out to be formally correct is that his
method of deriving his results makes use of the "four elasticities”
1approach of Joan Robinson, an approach which has been subjected to
2considerable criticism.
The formulation in the Appendix to this chapter is in terms of 
partial elasticities which are conceivably measurable independently 
of the problem being considered; it also makes explicit the disabsorp- 
tion necessary within the country seeking to remove a balance of 
payments deficit.
In order to make judgements in terms of welfare, for the purpose
1.
2.op.cit.
Perhaps the most serious of the defects of the Mfour elasticities” 
approach is its use of a ’’total” elasticity concept. Alexander, 
himself, was highly critical of the total elasticity in his ’’Effects 
of a Devaluation on.cit.. particularly p.264; Pearce has
commented, "Such an elasticity is meaningless until its elements 
are specified”, arguing that such elasticities are not parameters 
which are independent of the problem, (on.cit. p.10). See also 
Letiche, on.cit.. pp.66-71/
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of this exercise, it is assumed either that income distribution is
always such that all individuals in the community have equal marginal
utilities or that it is appropriate to attach a 'weight1 to each
individual's marginal utility such that with the current distribution
of income, price p^ can be taken as a measure of the 'value' to the
community of giving an increment of the i ^  good to any individual.^
It follows that the sum of price times the change in quantities of
all commodities is a measure of the direction of the change in real
income or welfare to the community. That is, if ip^dX^>C welfare
2is increased; if £p dX <0 welfare is reduced, where p represents 
price, and X represents consumption of good^.
It will be seen from the Appendix that the difference in the 
welfare effects of the series of policies is given by the formula 
U(r ) - U(E) where U(P.) represents the welfare loss associated with an 
improvement in the balance of payments when import restrictions are 
used, and U(e ), the welfare effect of an improvement in the balance
1.
This is essentially the method used by J.M.Fleming in his article 
"On Making the Best of Import Restrictions", Economic Journal. Vol. 
LXI, No. 241, (March 1947;; and constitutes the welfare basis for 
J.M.Meade's Trade and Welfare. Oxford, 1955« It will be apparent 
that this welfare criterion is less ambiguous than that used by 
Alexander - he himself notes that his method leads to the paradox­
ical position where, "a lower real income can have a higher welfare 
value". "Effects of Devaluation op.cit.. p.273.
2.
It is assumed that the changes in total welfare dX will be distri­
buted among individuals in amounts dx^ such that Xpo(24 = 0 for every 
individual. This is clearly possible and is really^a consequence of 
the assumptions made.
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of payments when an exchange rate variation is used. The significant 
difference between the result for U(R) and U(E) is that the result for 
U(R) includes certain variables which are consequential upon the 
difference between the foreign price and the domestic price, which 
are not present in the result for U(E) since there is no difference 
between the two prices. The result which is obtained indicates that 
as a method of redirecting expenditure from imports, import restric­
tions are only preferable to an exchange rate variation up to the 
point equivalent to the optimum tariff; once that point has been 
passed it is preferable to vary the exchange rate.
The equations U(R) and U(E) consist of two parts, the loss of 
welfare due to the change in the amount of goods traded and the 
quantity of imports multiplied by the change in the real terms of 
trade due to the tariff element. It is clear that there is only one 
balance of payments equilibrium, i.e, long term equilibrium for each 
level of import restrictions, including a zero level of restriction.
It is also clear that to ask whether an improvement in the balance 
of payments is best sought by an exchange rate variation or by import 
restrictions is more meaningful when the question is phrased in the 
formi- ’what is the best level of import restriction?’ It can be seen 
both from the model in the Appendix and from Alexander’s model that 
this is basically the question being answered, since in both cases 
the result is that welfare can be increased by imposing import restric. 
tions up to the point of the optimum tariff but beyond that point it
86
p ay s, in  term s of w e lfa re , not to  in c re a se  im port r e s t r i c t i o n s .
T h is  i s  th e  same as th e  optimum t a r i f f  conclusion  as such, s in ce , 
i t  w i l l  always be to  th e  b e n e f i t  o f a coun try , i f  i t s  e x is t in g  t a r i f f s  
o r  q u a n t i ta t iv e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a re  below th e  le v e l  of th e  optimum 
t a r i f f ,  to  in c re a se  th e se  r e s t r i c t i o n s  up to  th e  optimum p o in t .
The conclusion  of th e  model in d ic a te s  th a t  when an im port r e s ­
t r i c t i o n  i s  used as a method of r e d i r e c t in g  demand to  m ain ta in  f u l l  
employment to g e th e r  w ith  such d is a b so rp tio n  as may be n ecessa ry  i n t e r ­
n a l ly  in  o rd e r to  remove a balance o f payments d e f i c i t ,  th e re  w i l l  be 
a  g re a te r  lo s s  of w e lfa re  than  i f  th e  r e d ir e c t io n  of ex p en d itu re , 
i . e .  making th e  n ecessa ry  changes in  r e l a t iv e  p r ic e s , i s  e f fe c te d  by 
means o f an exchange r a te  v a r ia t io n ,  u n le ss  th e  e x is t in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
w hether of a q u a n t i ta t iv e  o r p r ic e  n a tu re  a re  below th e  optimum 
le v e l .
The s iz e  of th e  optimum t a r i f f  w i l l  depend upon th e  s iz e  of th e
re le v a n t e l a s t i c i t i e s ;  th e re  a re  some grounds fo r  su ggesting  th a t  i t
1
mqy reasonab ly  be considered  to  be sm all. I t  would seem th e re fo re
t:- - - - - - - - -
There has been considerable d isc u ss io n  in  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  about th e  
p o ss ib le  s iz e  of th e  optimum t a r i f f .  While th e  tendency has been 
to  su g g es t th a t  i t  i s  l ik e ly  to  he sm all, a t  l e a s t  one w r i te r  has 
suggested  th a t  i t  " . . .  w i l l  o f te n  be f a r  from ’s m a l l* R .F .K a h n ,  
" T a r if f s  and th e  Terms of Trade", Review of Economic S tu d ie s . V ol.15, 
(1948-49), p p .17-18. I .M .D .L itt le  subseq u en tly , in  commenting on 
Kahn’s r e s u l t s ,  d id  no t deny th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  th e  optimum t a r i f f  
might in  f a c t  be la rg e  a lthough  he d id  c r i t i c i s e  th e  p r a c t ic a l  a sp e c ts  
of th e  co n c lu s io n s . "W elfare and T a r i f f s " ,  Review ol Economic S tu d ies . 
V ol.16, (1949-50). Conclusions drawn from a model extended to  th re e  
goods, in c lu d in g  a c la s s  of n o n -traded  goods and expressed  in  term s 
of p a r t i a l  e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  sug g ests  t h a t  u n le s s , in  th e  fo re ig n  coun tiy
(con tinued  o v e r le a f ) .
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that we may argue that on these grounds there is a good case for using 
an exchange rate variation rather than import restriction - either 
tariffs or quantitative controls - as the means of redirecting expend­
iture as part of any action to improve the balance of trade*
Practical difficulties could of course outweigh any apparent 
advantage of exchange rate variation and suggest that some form of 
direct control of imports is more appropriate in avoiding a deficit 
in the balance of payments. Some of the factors which may lead to 
such a judgement will be considered in due course. No conclusion 
is possible without a theoretical comparison of the relative merits 
of the two forms of import restriction, tariffs and quantitative 
controls, and this is what is attempted here.
A diagrammatic treatment will be sufficient for a consideration 
of the principles involved. Consider again the diagram illustrated 
in Figures I and II.
From Figure III, which is essentially the same as in Figures I and 
II, it is clear that, in fact, provided that the price of traded goods 
is allowed to move freely - strictly speaking, if all prices are 
allowed to move freely - there is no difference in the welfare effects
1. (Cont’d from previous page)
(the rest of the world), exportables and non-traded goods are 
consumed and supplied only in fixed proportions, the optimum tariff 
is likely to be small. See I.F.Pearce, S.F.Harris and I.A.MacDougall, 
’’Towards a More General Theoiy of Tariffs”, (to be published). Even 
if not small any attempt to set policy on the basis of a calculated 
level of the optimum tariff is likely to be wide of the mark, and 
a loss of welfare more probable than a gain. C.f. Little, oo.cit..p*70.
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of a quantitative limit and a tariff under the assumption of perfect 
competition and remembering that by assumption redistribution of 
Income effects are ignored.
What it does suggest is that, under the assumptions of the static 
optimum, there is a strong argument for permitting prices of imports 
to be set at what the market will bear under a regime of quantitative 
controls, since only then will the optimum conditions apply. In
8 9
other words, with a tariff or with freely fluctuating prices under 
a system of quantitative import controls, i.e. point C in Fig. Ill, 
the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the ratio of domestic 
prices; and at the point D 1, the price ratio indicated by the line 
pp* is equal to the marginal rate of transformation. Anything which 
prevents this occurring will cause a divergence between the two equal­
ities and thus cause the economy to operate at a position away from the
optimum.
We may now consider the case where the balance of payments is 
restored to balance from a deficit position by means of a deflation of 
income in the domestic economy brought about by some combination of 
monetary and fiscal policies.
In order to illustrate the nature of the processes involved
there are some advantages in using the well known Marshallian offer 
or reciprocal demand curve technique in the Edgeworth box. We shall
There are also certain disadvantages which need to be borne clearly 
in mind* The Edgeworth box diagram can only illustrate to a very limited degree a dynamic process such as we are about to consider.In the following diagrammatic examples, in no case does the sequence 
of actions illustrated purport to do more than show the first stages 
in the process which these actions set off - the process is never 
completed. In each case we are left with what at best can only be 
a snort term equilibrium; thus, in no case does total world supply 
equal total world demand. In effect we need to make the assumption 
that there is no fall in foreign spending, due to a cut in production 
in the foreign country consequential upon the import cuts in Country A.
While these diagrams can, therefore, be misleading if this consid­
eration is overlooked, nevertheless, it was considered that they had 
something to offer in demonstrating the argument.
It should also be noted that the algebraic model in the appendix 
considers the same kind of balance of payments disequilibrium as 
discussed here, and purports to obtain a result (in terms of comparative 
statics) for the whole sequence of the processes involved. The dia­
grammatic formulations here presented should be considered merely as 
special cases of the more general model given in the Appendix.
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postulate a situation where there is a deficit on the balance of 
payments, i.e, the home country is consuming more than is being pro­
duced at home, the difference being accounted for by a transfer of 
reserves from one country to the other.
This situation is depicted in the following diagram (Fig.IV,).
It will be noted that since country A is consuming more than is being 
produced at home, country B (the rest of the world) must be producing 
more than it is consuming. In Fig. IV, total production in country A
Fig. IV
o
Ü
<5
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i s  OA, w hile i t s  consumption i s  OB. There i s ,  th e re fo re , a d e f i c i t  
on the  balance o f payments o f BA ( =• FE -  AC ) which i t  must meet 
e i t h e r  by borrowing o r by d is sa v in g , i . e .  by running down i t s  in te r ­
n a t io n a l  re s e rv e s . Country B (the  r e s t  o f  the world) produces DA 
b u t i s  only  consuming DC and i t  i s  adding to  i t s  re se rv e s  by the 
amount o f i t s  su rp lu s  AC. The term s o f tra d e  are in d ic a te d  by the 
slope of the l in e  BE. The two c o u n trie s  are a t  an eq u ilib riu m  in d ic ­
a te d  by the  e q u a l i ty  o f demand and supply o f im ports and ex p o rts  a t  
E, though t h i s  i s  c le a r ly  a sh o rt run eq u ilib riu m  in  the sense th a t  
th e re  e x i s t s  a d ra in  on the currency  re s e rv e s .
The income consumption l in e  (Engel Curve) i s  rep re sen ted  by the 
d o tte d  l in e  running from 0 through E. We s h a l l  assume i n i t i a l l y  no 
change in  the  term s of tra d e  r e s u l t s  from th e  v a rio u s  changes in  the 
balance o f payments. Suppose, now, th a t  co un try  A d e f la te s ,  i . e .  c u ts  
consum ption to  OA. Then, i f  p r ic e s  rem ain unchanged, Country A w il l  
want to  consume a t  the p o in t  where the  income consumption l in e  01 i s  
c u t by the p ric e  l in e  AM. But a t  th i s  p o in t  the balance o f payments 
d e f i c i t  w i l l  no t have been removed -  a d e f i c i t  o f SF w i l l  rem ain.^
To achieve a balance in  the e x te rn a l  acco u n ts , Country A would have to  
d e f la te  s u f f ic ie n t ly  to  b rin g  t o t a l  consumption down to  OH. The p r ic e  
l in e  then  c u ts  the income consumption l in e  a t  T a t  which p o in t  the
1.
There w i l l  a lso  be a d e f i c i t  in  demand f o r  Country A* s good 
o f  SR which would reduce spending a u to m a tic a lly .
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balance  o f payments d e f i c i t  FE has been com pletely  removed. But a t  
th i s  p o in t  the re so u rce s  o f Country A are n o t com pletely  employed; 
some o f them w i l l  be unemployed, th e  amount o f unemployment being 
in d ic a te d  by AH.
F ig . V.
Suppose th a t ,  in s te a d  of d e f la t in g  the economy, Country A had 
c o n tro l le d  the d e f i c i t  by the use o f im port r e s t r i c t i o n s ;  the  s i tu a ­
t io n  in  F ig . V may be seen to  be e x a c tly  th e  same i n i t i a l l y  as in  
F ig . IV befo re  the d e f la t io n a ry  p o l ic ie s  were in tro d u ced , i . e .  th e re  
i s  a balance o f payments d e f i c i t  FE. In  t h i s  case Country A imposes 
a q u a n t i ta t iv e  l im i t  on im ports ju s t  s u f f ic ie n t  to  remove the d e f i c i t
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PE* I f  no o th e r  a c tio n  i s  taken  in te r n a l ly ,  su p p lie s  o f goods in  
Country A have been reduced by PE which a t  the  e x is t in g  p ric e  le v e l  
(assumed n o t to  change), i s  equal to  UF in  home currency , w hile  t o t a l  
ex p en d itu re  has n o t changed. I f  th e re  i s  no autonomous in c rease  in  
saving eq u a l to  the re d u c tio n  in  su p p lie s , the red u c tio n  in  im ports 
must in c re a se  dom estic p r ic e s  o f goods a v a ila b le  in te r n a l ly .  At the  
ex trem e, the  demand f r u s t r a t e d  by the  im port c u t could  go e n t i r e ly  to  
goods p re v io u s ly  ex p o rted , o r to  goods the p ro d u c tio n  of which re q u ire s  
re so u rce s  to  be withdrawn from the p ro d u c tio n  o f ex p o rt goods; in  the 
absence o f  an in c rease  in  saving t h i s  cou ld  leave th e  balance o f tra d e  
in  e x a c tly  the same p o s i t io n  as i t  was b e fo re  the  im port cu t was im­
posed, i . e .  the  c u t in  im ports would be o f f s e t  by an e q u iv a le n t cu t 
■1
in  e x p o rts .
Even i f  th e re  i s  a low degree o f s u b s t i tu t io n  in  supply .and in  
demand between im ports and e x p o rta b le s , as  in  A u s tra lia , some e f f e c t  
w i l l  be ap p aren t on the  amount exported  th rough the r i s e  in  the p r ic e  
o f home produced goods le ad in g  to  in c re a se d  c o s ts  o f ex p o rt p ro d u c tio n  
o r  to  some t r a n s f e r  o f f a c to r s  from the p ro d u c tio n  o f ex p o rta b le s  to  
the p ro d u c tio n  of im port s u b s t i tu te s  o r no ru trad ed  goods.
A com bination of d e f la t io n  and im port r e s t r i c t i o n  can achieve 
r e s u l t s  which avoid  some o f the problems of e i th e r  method used  
s e p a ra te ly .
In  the absence (assumed) o f an in c rease  in  p r ic e s ,  demand 
fo r  Country A1 s ex p o rts  would exceed s u p p lie s , a s i tu a t io n  
which cou ld  no t p e r s i s t .
We saw in Fig. IV th a t to remove the balance of payments d e f ic it  
FE by means of d e fla tio n  would involve unemployment of AH, w h ilst 
from Fig. V we saw th a t an import re s tr ic tio n  which cuts imports by 
FE could a t the extreme mean absolutely  no improvement in the balance 
of payments.
Suppose now th a t simultaneously Country A defla ted  to reduce consump­
tio n  to OA and imposed an import re s tr ic tio n  which cuts imports by FS. 
There would then be no unemployment of resources and there would be a 
much sm aller amount of demand d iverted  from imports to  home produced
(J5
goods -  in  f a c t ,  j u s t  s u f f ic ie n t  d iv e rs io n  o f demand SR, to  take  up 
any unemployed re so u rce s  which r e s u l t  from the d e f la t io n .  In  any 
a ttem p t to  reduce e f f e c t iv e  im port demand by q u a n ti ta t iv e  c o n tro ls ,  
a c t io n  by way of d e f la t io n ,  in  the absence o f a s u f f ic ie n t  in c rease  
in  v o lu n ta ry  sav in g , must be taken  to  avoid  excess demand w ith in  the  
r e s t r i c t i v e  economy.
I t  may be seen th a t  a lthough  th e re  i s  a d ec lin e  in  r e a l  consump­
t io n  -  w hich th e re  must be to  improve the balance o f payments -  th e re  
i s  a sm a lle r  lo s s  of r e a l  income in  the case o f the combined use of 
im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  and d e f la t io n  ( in d ic a te d  by the p o in t V) th an  in  
the case o f d e f la t io n  u sed  a lo n e , in d ic a te d  by the p o in t T. The 
d e f la t io n  p a r t  o f the e x e rc ise  d e p ic ted  in  F ig . VI has reduced w elfare  
( r e a l  income) by ER. The removal of the d e f i c i t  th en  rem ain ing , by 
the r e s t r i c t i o n  o f im p o rts , involved  the f u r th e r  cu t in  r e a l  income 
H V , which dem onstrates the  f a c t  th a t  although money income has stayed  
the same b efo re  and a f t e r  the c u t in  Im ports, r e a l  income has f a l l e n  
by the amount o f the im ports fo regone.
Let u s  now remove the  assum ption th a t  p r ic e s  remain c o n s ta n t.
Again the  p o s i t io n  i n i t i a l l y  i s  one of a d e f i c i t  o f FE, and im ports 
are ag a in  cu t by im port r e s t r i c t i o n s .  I f  the  cu t i s  in  term s o f v a lu e , 
the movement in  p r ic e s  w i l l  again  reduce the e f fe c t iv e  s ize  of the  c u t .  
I f  the c u t in  im ports i s  made in  term s o f volume, and i s  j u s t  s u f f i c i ­
en t a t  p r e - r e s t r i c t i o n  p r ic e s ,  to g e th e r  w ith  the cu t in  in te r n a l  spend­
ing , to  remove the balance of payments d e f i c i t ,  then  the f a l l  in  im port
9G
p r ic e s  due to  the excess supply of Country B’ s ex p o rts  w i l l  mean 
th a t  w h ile  the  s ize  o f the im port c u t i s  m ain ta ined , Country A w i l l
-l
a c tu a l ly  ten d  to  develop a su rp lu s  on the balance o f paym ents. 
C onsider the  s i tu a t io n  in  F ig . V II.
Country A has d e f la te d  to  OA and a r e s t r i c t i o n  on the value of 
im ports has reduced, im ports by FS. Suppose th a t  th i s  causes the 
term s o f tra d e  to  move to  AS, i . e .  they  improve fo r
1.
S t r i c t l y  speaking, the diagram only in d ic a te s  th a t  Country 
B*s demand fo r  Country A’ s ex p o rts  exceeds Country s demand fo r  
Country H* s e x p o rts . M oreover, Country H  w i l l  be experienc ing  
d e f la t io n a ry  p ressu re  and h e r demand f o r  Country A’ s ex p o rts  may 
w e ll f a l l .
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Country A, This would tend to reduce the effective size of the 
cut in imports, since the restricted value of total imports would 
now purchase a larger volume of imports*
If the cut had been made in terms of volume, the result would 
have been that imports in volume terms would have been cut by FS,
but to pay for this volume of imports required exports of only PA 
the deflationary policy would then have been excessive, in which 
case some reflation would have been called for.
Welfare, or real income, in this case would be indicated by
point R which is clearly superior to the point V, the point at which
2 » 3*welfare stood when there was no price change.
Reference has been made to movements in international price 
levels following the imposition of direct controls on imports. It 
remains now to consider what can be said of the effect of quantitative 
restrictions on the terms of trade, in order to see the extent to 
which the loss of real income incurred in removing the balance of pay-
1.
In the particular situation illustrated the volume of imports 
remains the same, since the cut in the value of imports is just 
offset by the fall in the relative price of imports and the balance 
of payments is balanced. This is purely a fortuitous result of the 
manner in which the diagram is drawn.
2.
These results add little to those reached by Mrs M.F.W.Hemming 
and Dr. W*M.Corden in their excellent article, op.cit.
3.
The reader is again referred to the earlier cautionary footnote 
stressing the fact that these diagrams purport to do no more than 
demonstrate the first steps in the processes set off by the policy 
measures considered.
ments deficit is likely to be offset by a favourable movement in 
the terms of trade.
It has been customaiy since the time of J.S.Mill to accept that
the imposition of a tariff would improve the terms of trade of the
restricting country. One writer, Graaf, has expressed doubts whether
a definite statement regarding the direction of the movement is
possible in a multi-commodity world. A conclusion drawn subsequently
from a three-good model, including a class of non-traded goods, gives
no support to Graaf1s conclusion; it suggests that except under
fairly extreme conditions of complementarity and substitutability
2there will be a positive movement in the terms of trade. There is 
some reason for arguing along traditional lines that the terms of 
trade will move in favour of a country limiting the level of imports, 
whether by means of tariff duties or direct controls. If the assump-
98
1.
Graaf concluded that in a multi-commodity world "... it does 
not seem possible to generalise about the direction of the move­
ment in the terms of trade.” J.De V. Graaf, "On Optimum Tariff 
Structures," Review of Economic Studies. Vol.17, (1949-50), p.51*
He suggested the possibility that the optimum tariff may, in fact, 
be a subsidy (p. 54)*
2.
Pearce, Harris and Macdougall, op.cit. It is necessary to point 
out, in fairness to Graaf, that his doubts were based upon the 
relationships of complementarity and substitution between the 
traded goods. However, it has been argued from the results of the 
model with three classes of goods, some of each good being produced 
in both countries, that while conditions of high complementarity in 
demand and joint supply would lead to a perverse movement in the 
terms of trade, such conditions are sufficiently extreme to make 
it probable that no equilibrium in international trade would be 
possible.
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tion of perfect competition does not hold, i.e. if the export trade 
is organised non competitively to a significant degree, the form of 
the restrictions imposed will influence the nature of the price 
reaction by overseas exporters; the position is not determinate 
except by specifying the particular conditions which apply* Some 
of the factors which may affect the price of imports in this respect 
are considered in the following chapter.
It was noted above that one of the reasons for an imbalance in 
the external accounts is the unattractiveness of prices of home pro­
duced goods relative to imported goods. Since it is argued by many 
economists that a subsidy is preferable to a tariff as a means of 
protection, we should perhaps consider briefly the possibility of 
reducing imports by means of subsidies.
Consider Fig, VIII. Imports are GC and have to be reduced by 
HL to GL, An import restriction at C 1 would reduce imports to the
required level B ’C* ( GL), A subsidy equivalent in its protective
-|effect would be indicated by Q. This, however, would not bring about
1.
Q is not necessarily an indication of the welfare position of a 
subsidy relative to a tariff at C ’, since the effects of raising 
the revenue to pay the subsidy are ignored. The major argument 
for using a subsidy is that the protection provided is under con­
stant scrutiny. (See Reitsma, op.cit.. p,18l). The tariff does 
have an offsetting advantage where demand is at all elastic and 
particularly in respect of final products in that it raises the 
price and reduces consumption of the protected good whereas a sub­
sidy does not. In the case of the tariff less is consumed of a 
product which is economically costly to produce.
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Fig. VIII
J
the required reduction in imports. The diagram does not tell how 
the required cut is made. It does tell us that at the existing 
price level real consumption must fall to the point N for imports 
to be limited to NJ. This is clearly on a lower indifference curve 
than C!. Since its practical relevance is limited we need not 
pursue the analysis further.
So far we have considered import restrictions primarily in 
terms of their use for longer term balance of payments purposes; 
alternatively, these consequences would follow in the short term if 
we assume a more or less instantaneous reaction by the domestic 
economy to the imposition of the restrictions. Swan has argued that 
the use of import restrictions may be a logical procedure when used 
as a short term device Hto buy time for external balance, by econom­
ising on the average level of reserves needed to permit effective
-]long-run relative cost adjustments to be made.M The conditions 
under which this could be justified we re that they should be imposed 
for sufficiently short and isolated periods and be sufficiently moder­
ate in their impact.
”(a) that established trading habits will prevent any great 
element of ’profiteering1 in licences and licensed goods and that 
at the same time problems of the rationing of goods in short supply 
will not become acute;
(b) that recurrent periods of free importation or liberal 
allocation of new quotas will prevent ossification of the importing 
business and of trade connections;
(c) that the prospect of early removal of restrictions will 
prevent any significant long term investment in import-replacing 
industries; and
Swan, op.cit. p. 4*
IG 2
(d) that the margin of uncertainty, as to how serious a
balance of payments deficit has to be before restrictions will be
imposed, can be used to discourage speculative buying in anticipation 
1of restrictions."
Of course, to the extent that the use of direct controls in this 
sense depends upon price inflexibilities and institutional rigidies 
there is no point in attempting to increase the flexibility of the 
licensing system - and a system of direct controls is preferable to 
tariffs.
There are other ways in which direct controls or alternative 
methods of redirecting demand might also contribute to reducing expend­
iture even if there is no inflexibility of prices. Since holding of 
stocks of imported goods is another form of holding international 
reserves, the use of direct controls on imports will prevent further 
switching from monetary reserves to reserves of goods; they will also 
make stock holding less attractive. To the extent that the latter is 
the case, they will, by increasing prices of the stocked goods, have 
repercussions on the longer term cost position of the economy.
The imposition of direct controls on imports may in addition to 
redirecting expenditure from imports to home produced goods have some 
expenditure reducing effects by increasing voluntary saving. If there 
are price rigidities, and consequently rationing of limited supplies,
T. *
Ibid
10 3
consumers may save the amount they are unable to spend on imports
rather than spend it on available alternatives; if there is complete
price rigidity they will be unable to spend all of their income. Even
with complete flexibility of prices some consumers will be unwilling
to pay the higher prices for imported goods and may increase their
saving rather than switch spending elsewhere. Such reactions will be
conditioned by expectations regarding the duration of the controls.
Reduced expenditure may result from a desire to maintain cash holdings
in real terms (cash balance effect) in the face of rising prices; it
may result from reduced spending because of higher prices even though
money income has risen with prices (money illusion). Again, the swing
to profits which arises from increases in prices with lags in wages
and contractual payments may lead to increased saving if businessmen save
more than wage or contractual income earners.
Some of these effects may be perverse; even if not perverse they 
2may not be substantial and in any case are unlikely in general to 
continue beyond the short term. The significance of these various 
factors implying rigidities and imperfections in the economy will 
depend both upon their size and their duration.
IT
E.g. If in the face of increased prices with lagging money 
incomes attempts may be made t o maintain consumption by dissaving 
etc. See Nurkse, op.cit. p.190.
2.
C.f. Alexander, "Effects of a Devaluation..... ", op.cit.. p.27A:
Nurkse, op.cit., pp.189-190.
It may be useful to summarise our general conclusions from 
this examination of the theoretical aspects of the use of quantita­
tive import controls for balance of payments purposes. It has been 
argued that to remedy a deficit in the balance of payments which is 
a result of a structural imbalance requires a cut in the level of 
spending in the deficit country and, in fact, requires that the 
relationship between saving and investment should be restored to 
equality. This, it is argued, is a necessary prerequisite to removing 
a balance of payments deficit; measures of trade restriction or 
exchange rate variation serve only to redirect expenditure at the 
reduced level in order to maintain full employment of resources in 
the new situation and, to some extent, to limit the degree of the loss 
in real income which will normally be incurred in removing a balance 
of payments deficit. It was also argued that, in general, it was pre­
ferable to induce the necessary redirection of demand by means of a 
variation in the exchange rate.
The relative advantage of using tariffs and quantitative restric­
tions were considered. It was argued that in the case of a completely 
competitive system, with prices determined completely by market 
considerations, there was little difference between tariffs and Quanti­
tative restrictions, apart from the question of the redistribution of 
income, so far as domestic and international price levels were concern­
ed. This is, of course, under rather simplified assumptions and the 
relative merits of the two methods in their practical operation will
be discussed more fully below. It was argued, however, that under 
the usual assumptions, the attainment of a welfare optimum under a 
system of quantitative restrictions required that importers should 
charge what the market would bear for the limited quantity of imports 
permitted entiy.
Finally, we noted that there is an argument for imposing direct 
controls on imports even in the event of a structural imbalance, not 
to remedy the imbalance, but to conserve the foreign exchange reserves 
and so provide more time in which to take the necessary remedial 
action. Some short term, effects of the use of direct controls might 
also make some contribution to the restoration of balance. The 
likely significance and duration of these effects is therefore of
some consequence.
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Appendix TV.A,
Comparison of the Welfare Effects of an Exchange Rate Variation 
and an Import Restriction.
1
The method to be used is based essentially on that developed 
by Dr, I.F.Pearce, in his article in which he derives a formula for
2the effect on the trade balance of a variation in the exchange rate.
For reasons of space and to keep the algebra relatively simple 
the model will be restricted to the four commodity, two country case; 
inclusion of a class of non-traded goods, while reducing considerably 
the level of abstraction, gives an analagous, though rather more 
complicated result.
We shall therefore consider the case in which there are:
1) Two countries, Country 1 and Country 2;
2) Two classes of goods, exportables and importables, 
some of both goods being produced in both countries;
3) An initial tariff exists in Country 1, (the home country), 
but there is no initial tariff in Country 2, (the foreign country);
1.
The convention is maintained of referring to a variation of the 
exchange rate even though in models in which supply and demand 
are based on relative prices and full employment is assumed, a mone 
tary exchange rate as such does not exist. Strictly speaking it 
should be considered as a problem of a balance of payment s deficit 
to be manipulated by changes in relative prices. See I.F.Pearce, 
"The Problem of the Balance of Payments", loc.cit.. pp.2-4? T.W. 
Swan, "Relative Prices and the Balance of Payments", unpublished 
paper.
I.F.Pearce, "The Problem of the Balance of Payments", pp.1-28.2. *
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The following additional assumptions are the same as in
1Dr. Pearce’s model.
4) There are no transport costs;
5) Changes in tariff revenue are offset by opposite 
changes in internal taxation so that the overall demand pattern is 
unaffected. It is, of course affected by the change in the trade 
balance, but this change is introduced explicitly into the model;
6) Demand is a function of prices and consumption rather 
than of prices and income, consumption in this sense including invest­
ment expenditure* This implies the further assumption that the 
individual’s stock of wealth will not affect his marginal rate of sub­
stitution between goods currently consumed;
7) Prices are equal to marginal costs, i.e. there is perfect 
competition;
8) Pull employment is maintained in both countries;
9) There are no invisible transactions or capital movements; 
the balance of payments represents simply movements in exports and 
imports;
IO) The elasticity of demand (E^.) for the i'th good with
1.
No attempt will be made here to justify these assumptions. For 
their justification the reader is referred to Dr.Pearce’s article, 
loc.cit.. pp.5-8. The justification for assumption (6) is based 
on an argument in I.F.Pearce, "Demand Analysis and the Savings 
Function", Economic Record« Vol.XXXIV, no*67, (April 1958); that 
for assumption (10) is based on the discussion in Chapter V of 
P*A*Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, 
(Mass.), 1947. "
respect to the j'th price, can be split into a substitution 
elasticity (cr..) and 2111 income effect (p^X^./p^X^)Ch, where X.^  is 
the quantity consumed of the i'th good, p^ is its price, and Ch is 
the marginal propensity to consume the i’th good;
11) Supply is a function of all commodity prices. The 
elasticity of supply for the i’th good with respect to the j’th 
price, S.. ., is, therefore, simply a substitution elasticity;
12) It is assumed that the usual properties of substitu­
tion elasticities hold, i.e.
ot\ is negative
oT . + ot\ equals 0 
is positive
^ i i  +  ® i  i e c l u a ^ s  0
Other notations to be used sre as follows:
X-^ , X^ : Consumption of exportables and importables 
respectively in Country 1;
X^, X^ ; Consumption of importables and exportables 
respectively in Country 2;
x^,x^ ; the home country’s exports and imports respectively;
Y,Y* : money expenditure in Country 1, measured in terms of 
p^, and in country 2, measured in terms of q^;
B ; the balance of payments;
Pj., j absolute prices of exports and imports in
Country 1;
absolute prices (foreign) of exports and imports. 
Since relative prices are used throughout the model, the follow­
ing notation is used to denote the relative prices:
P ~ p2//p 1 ; q = q2^ql ; r = q2//p2* 5 X = p2//q2
Because there is no tariff in the foreign country and no trans­
port costs, p^ ,, which will be used as the numeraire, is equal to q^.
The Import Restriction
In this case the formula is being sought for the change in the 
trade balance due to the imposition of an import restriction or, in 
effect, its ad valorum tariff equivalent.
Differentiating logarithmically (totally) the balance of pay­
ments identity
B = *1 " qx2
gives
Xjdlnq x^dlnx^
tö7p:~ ~ dB7p7
(1)
x^ dlnx^
dB/p1 - 1 (2)
using the convenient form of representing a logarithmic derivative
r
iby din (i.e. din x. = dx,. ).
To avoid unnecessary complication, it has been assumed that the 
balance of payments position was initially one of approximate balance.
1 1 G
It is now necessary to solve for the two terms on the right 
hand side.
From assumption (6)
= f (q, X') - g(q)
Differentiating
dime, = i fi_dq + i. dX'- 1  ~ *1^  dq ..... (3)
6q xn 6Y' x1 &q
Since
Consumption + Investment = Production 4* Imports - Exports, 
(remembering that production of good 1 in the foreign country is 
Consumption less Imports, i.e. (X* - x^) ;
Y* ■ ( q  - Xj) 4. q(XJ, + Xj) 4. B/qr
Full employment is assumed; therefore, the ratio of changes in
production must be equal to the ratio of marginal costs which by
assumption (7) is equal to minus the ratio of prices, i.e*
d(X| - x1) /d(X!. + x^) = -q 
So
dX1 = dq(X£ + Xj) + dB/qx
Substituting in equation (3), and expressing in elasticity notation
(see assumption 10) 
x^dlnx x-jdlnq
dB/Pl _ dB/Pl *1
xi
*1 S11 + CI *°{ (4)
The multipliers h. and T.~ preceding the elasticities
*1 *1
are
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weights representing the proportion of total consumption of import­
ables produced by the importing country. Since in the present case 
these multipliers remain unchanged throughout we shall reduce the
apparent complexity of the formulation by omitting the multipliers.
X.
This means that or. should be read as or., and S .. should be read11 X. 11* 11
By a process similar to that used to obtain equation (4) we may obtain 
x_ dlnxthe formula for T" '*2 ; in this case we have some additional compli-
dB/p,
cations. The major one is that the change in the tariff revenue 
(p^ - q^)x^ has to be included in the expenditure equation, since we 
have expressed Y in terms of money expenditure. This equation also 
has to allow for the necessary disabsorption in order to bring about
the improvement in the trade balance. Thus in this case
dY = dp(X2-x2) - dB/p1 + d(p - q)x^ + (p - q)dx^ ....... (4a)
Substituting these results into the formula, and making use of the 
fact that dlnp = dlnq + dlnX
x^dlnx^ x^dlnq joj,, -^r-Crx^lnX/dB/^) (o~2 -S^) ....(5)
W p~ = dB/pq
The term 1 - - C^r arises because of the initial tariff in
the home country. It will be close to unity since q^ differs from 
p0 by the tariff, and will be less than unity. For the present 
purpose this term will be omitted where it is simply a multiplier of
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of the home country’s elasticities.
Substituting from equations (4) and (5) into equation (2), 
gives the formula for the effect on the trade balance when the 
improvement is accompanied by an import restriction
(6)x-dlnq
d B ^ T
±  + C1 * C2r + “ (°22 - 322}
1 + ° n  " sn  - c{ + °22 ” S22 "
where
rx^dln>v
dB/px
The Exchange Rate Variation
In this case it is possible to use equation (ll) of Dr.Pearce’s
model, with some slight rearrangement. This formula is given as
)’ (X0 _ X0- x, )
' - J L ~ ^  '22!
T'
ß= -
&  _ h l i
(*L *1
s„) t r(?- °22 - s„„)
-) ("2 *2 + 1i + r ' p ^ q  - rc2r *i (7)
where ß =
dlnq
The terms T and Y ’ are the equivalent of the 1 - C 0 - C^r terms 
in the earlier case above, and these will also be omitted here. Dr. 
Pearce has also assumed the existence of an initial tariff in both 
countries, so that a multiplier shows up on the foreign country’s
marginal propensity to consume good 1, c^. As noted above, in the
1.
’’The Problem of the Balance of Payments”, p.13
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model in this appendix, p^  = q^, so the multiplier p1/q-) may be 
omitted. In addition, for reasons already outlined, the weights 
attached to the elasticities will also be omitted. Reversing the 
formula for the sake of comparability, and making the modifications 
outlined gives
x-jdlnq
“5b7p7
1  * V  - 1
1 + °X1 " S11 " ci + °22 - s22 - C2r
(8)
Welfare Changes
In the text it was suggested that the welfare change could be 
given by the sum of price times the change in quantity of all commo­
dities. In this case, dX, + pdX^, since we are only interested in 
the relative welfare changes in Country 1.
Consumption in Country 1, in units of Good 1, is
Y = X1 + pX2
Making use of the relationship in equation (4a)> for the import 
restriction case and differentiating
= flap + *2 flap - *2
6p 6Y 6Y
— ■ ^  ■ dB / p- 
6Y *1
+ “S.
fcY d(p-q) ^ 2
6X
+ B  ( M ) d ^ (9)
and
= P ^-dp + pX2.....^. dp-px^ — £Ldp-p — 2_jiB/pq+ p— (p-q) Xp+
ftp 6Y ^ 6i bY 6Y
PsT(p-q)d:t2 (10)
The theory of demand tells us that, for two goods,1
4- ;.°>v2 = ~X0 ; and ^ 1  + r,^ 2  = 1
6p * 6p bJ bY
and adding equations (9) and (10) together gives
dXj + pdX2 = -X^dp + X^dp-x^dp-dB/p^4- d(p-q)x2+ (p -q )d ^  .
which reduces to
* pdX2 = -1 - *2dljiq + (p-qJ^L.dB/p^  dB/p-^  dB/p^
x_dlnq (r-l) ( x. )
f e y
Welfare Changes: The Exchange Rate Variation
By a similar process, the welfare change in the case of the 
variation of the exchange rate can be obtained, remembering that 
this case there is no change in the tariff.
We obtain
*■ pdX, _ _x
~ W p[
|dlnx^
(
A I S7Plj
Since dlnq =  dlnp in this case it may be written
lIXl * pdX2 = -1 - + (r“l} /dlnx_ *1 l
( ® 7 Pl)
l.
See Samuelson, loc.cit,
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which can be seen to the same as equation (12)
We shall call the change in welfare arising in the case in which 
the redirection of import demand is effected by the restriction of 
imports, U(R), and that arising in the case where exchange rate varia­
tion is used for this purpose, U(e ); then U(r ) - U(E) will indicate 
the difference in the welfare loss in two methods. If the difference
is positive it will indicate that there is a greater welfare loss 
in the case in which the exchange rate variation is used, whereas, if 
the result is negative, that involving the import restriction results 
in the/Sel'Jare loss.
Inserting equations (6) and (8) respectively into equation (12) 
and simplying gives
U(R) - U(E) =
= a(°22 - S22) + (r-l) o(°22 -S22) (l + 0ll' - Sll' - V'*
1 ± °Tl' - Sll' - V + _ a 2 2  -  °2r
It can be demonstrated that the sign of this term will depend 
upon the terms ( r - l )  and 1 + o~j - 3 ^  - . At the point where
(r - l) (l + o“ " - S.^1 - C^*) equals unity there will be no differ­
ence in the welfare costs of the two methods. 1 + o~ ' - S ^ ’ - C^ * 
will almost certainly be negative", while ( r - l )  will always be
The case where it is not negative will correspond with the well 
known situation that when the foreign country*s elasticities are less 
than unity, a tariff will always improve welfare. (See T.Scitovsky, 
"A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs", Review of Economic 
Studies. Vol.9, reprinted in Readings in the Theory of International
/cont*d overleaf...
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positive, unless a negative tariff, i.e. a subsidy, is involved, 
since p0 always exceeds q0 by the amount of the tariff. The term 
°f"' “ ^22 nQSa^ive since, as indicated in assumption (12),
o:r is inherently negative. The denominator will be negative except 
in the case when the sum of the propensities to consume and the elas­
ticities are together less than unity - a case which would require 
them to be almost impossibly small and which may be reasonably ignored. 
The sign of the right hand side of the equation (13) is thus positive 
when (r - l) is less than 1 + o— * - 3^* - C* i.e. it would pay to 
increase the tariff rather than vary the exchange rate. When (l - r) 
is greater than 1 + o“^* - - C^, it would pay to reduce the tariff
and vary the exchange rate.
The formula for the optimum tariff has been shown elsewhere
1to be r - 1 = - 1 + °n ~ sii “ °i
If this is inserted in equation (13), it indicates that the point at 
which there is no difference in the relative welfare effects of the
1. Tcont’d from previous page)
Trade. London 1950. As was shorn by Marshall (Money Credit and 
Commerce. 1923 ed., Appendix J.2, pp.336-7), the offer curve will 
bend backwards when the elasticity of the offer curve is less than 
unity. In this case it is not possible for the foreign offer 
curve to be tangential, at any point along the inelastic part of 
the curve, to the tariff imposing country*s indifference curves; 
their general direction of slope is diagonally opposed and they 
will, in fact, intersect. Of course, the optimum tariff will 
appear to be indefinitely large until imports have been reduced 
to zero, or until the elasticities change. In either of these 
cases the answer in the model will be positive.
1.
See I.A. MacDougall, "Optimum Tariffs Reconsidered", to be 
published.
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two methods is the point at which the tariff or corresponding import 
restriction is at the optimum. Up to the point of the optimum 
tariff or import restriction, it will pay, in terms of the welfare 
criterion used here, to use import restrictions to redirect demand; 
any import restriction imposed beyond this point will result in a 
greater loss of welfare than is involved in a variation in the exchange 
rate.
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Chapter V.
Some Theoretical Considerations* II: Internal Effects 
of Quantitative Import Restrictions
Attention so far has been centred on the use of direct controls 
as an instrument of balance of payments policy. In this chapter, the 
effects that may be expected from the quantitative control of imports 
insofar as they affect the internal economy will be considered.
Consider what happens when a restriction is placed on imports.
This may be seen quite simply in the diagram (Fig. IX). It is assumed 
that no change in the demand for imports on the part of the restricting 
country will affect the world price for those imports, and that after 
the imposition of the controls the price of restricted goods is the 
free market price, i.e. importers and/or processors do not operate 
some form of unofficial rationing, but charge what the market will 
bear. (This assumption will be examined more fully below) •
Before any barriers to trade are introduced, the world price 
and the domestic price (ignoring transport charges etc.) are the same 
and are shown as WP. At this price, OC will be produced domestically
1.
The subject matter of this chapter is discussed generally in:
H. Reuser, Control of International Trade. London, 1939, partic. 
Chapts. XI and XII; J.M.Meade, Balance of Payments: Ibid. The 
Theory of International Economic Policy.Vol. II, Trade and Welfare. 
London, 195$, partic. Part II; Johnson, op.cit.: Hemming and 
Corden, op.cit. For a discussion of the general effects of 
tariff protection on the Australian context see A.J.Reitsma, Trade 
Protection in Australia. Brisbane, I960, partic. Chapt. V.
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and CH will be imported* If imports are restricted to GF (i*e* cut 
by HF), the domestic price initially will rise to DP, (WP, by assump­
tion, remaining unaltered).
In the short run, assuming local industry is operating at full 
capacity, there can be only very limited increases in output* Both 
the local producers and importers will receive a monopoly rent* In 
Fig* IX, the importers1 rent is NQRT, and local producers receive a 
rent of DP.NKWP* Importers are, by definition, unable to influence 
the supplies of imports available; local producers, however, will 
seek to increase their productive capacity and so increase their
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output. As output increases, the price level will fall but, with 
increasing costs, the equilibrium price level in the new situation 
will still be above that which existed before imports were restricted. 
In Fig. IX the price level in the long run, i.e. after local product­
ive capacity has been expanded, is shown as DP1. At this point, 
local output is OS and imports EG (=CF).
The difference between the world price and the domestic price 
of imports is initially NQRT reducing to JKLM as local output is 
increased. It would, if the restriction of imports were by means of 
a tariff, be the amount of tariff revenue collected by the government. 
In the case of the quantitative restriction on imports, however, the 
difference between world prices and local prices is not collected by 
the government (unless, of course, it auctions the licences to 
importers or imposes a tax on importers equivalent to the monopoly 
profits), but is a redistribution of income in favour of importers.
The extent to which prices would rise within the restricting 
country would depend upon the elasticity of demand for the domestic­
ally produced substitutes for the restricted imported item and the 
elasticity of supply of domestic production. The slower the increase 
in the marginal costs of domestic production in a given demand 
situation, the lower the ultimate price rise in the domestic market.
Thus the extent to which the restriction of imports will 
encourage the expansion of local industry will tend to depend, as 
one might expect, upon the rate of increase in marginal costs. In
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Fig. IX a second supply curve SS* has been drawn representing a 
more rapidly rising level of marginal costs than in the case of 
the supply curve SS. The extent to which the cut in imports enables 
the local industry to expand is clearly less than in the previous 
case. With imports restricted by CF (=EG), local production, in the 
case of supply curve SS will increase from OC to OE. In the second 
case with supply curve SS’ the increase would be from OC to OC*. It 
should be noted that, even though the local price has increased sub­
stantially, local production costs will be above the supply price of 
imports at any point above WP, and so local production will not 
increase beyond the point where the full amount of the imports 
permitted is, in fact, imported.
It will be seen that protection from import competition afforded 
by the controls enables domestic producers to increase unit profits 
(raise prices) at the existing level of output, or to increase output 
at the existing unit profit rate - any change in prices in the latter 
case simply reflecting changes in unit costs. Supply is likely to 
be relatively inelastic in the short term; some increase in price is 
therefore probable unless producers are prepared to allocate (ration) 
their output - which, at existing prices, is insufficient to meet 
demand. In the longer term, resources can be attracted to the indust­
ry, capacity can be expanded and output increased. In practice, we 
might expect some combination of both price increase and output expan­
sion. The extent to which producers will expand output rather than
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maintain high scarcity profit rates will depend upon the competitive 
position of the industry.
The situation in Fig, IX relates to the domestic industry as a 
whole; it may consist of one or many producers. It is certain that, 
given the existence of protection under the import licensing system, 
the industry as a whole is able to take advantage of the situation.
The form in which benefits will be exploited, however, will also 
depend upon the market organisation and the degree of competition 
within t he industry.
The manner in which the controls on imports are implemented will 
also affect the supply position of the domestic producer both in res­
pect of production costs and the speed at which output may be expanded. 
Similarly, the extent of the reduction of import competition will 
differ from industry to industry according to the particular method 
of control applied to directly competitive imports. We shall consider 
these and other particular aspects of the methods of control used in 
the Australian system in subsequent chapters.
In the example illustrated in Fig. IX, it was assumed that the 
difference between the marginal costs of imported goods and the market 
price in the restricting country would go to importers and/or process­
ors, and that the supply price of imports would remain unchanged. It 
was seen earlier that, given competitive conditions in the restricting 
and supplying countries, the change in prices, if any, will be in 
favour of the restricting country, i.e. the price of imports will tend
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to become cheaper. If import supply prices fall, or remain 
unchanged, then the margin between supply price and selling price 
will all be taken within t he restricting economy* The market condi­
tions in the two countries and the f orm of licensing employed will, 
in fact, determine in which country the margin between costs and 
prices will be appropriated.
The imposition of the controls may enable exporters to the res­
tricting country to combine; alternatively, quotas may be given to the 
2exporting country, or the operation of country discrimination in the 
licensing system may debar competitors from supplying to the market.
In these circumstances, exporters will be able to appropriate to 
themselves the margin by increasing their selling prices up to the
1
1.
One other argument of relevance in this context should be noted; 
Metzler has argued that the effect of a tariff on the terms of trade 
might be sufficient to more than offset the internal price movement 
caused by the tariff, and suggested that it might have relevance 
for the Australian situation. L.A. Metzler, ’’Tariffs, the Terms of 
Trade, and the Distribution of National Income”, Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol.LVII, Feb. 1949, pp.1-29; Ibid. ’’Tariffs, International 
Demand and Domestic Prices”, Ibid. Aug. 1949, pp.545-551* Reitsma, 
o p .cit.,pp.114-116. pointed out that Metzler was arguing invalidly 
from the elasticities of the offer curve (elasticities of reciprocal 
demand), and it has subsequently been demonstrated that the c onditions 
under which Metzler’s conclusion is true are sufficiently unlikely 
to occur as to be justifiably ignored. I.A.Macdougall, ’’Tariffs 
Protection and the Terms of Trade”, Economic Reoord. Vol.37, No.77, 
(March 196l), pp.77-81. Metzler1s conclusion implied that a tariff 
need not protect. Had his conclusion been valid it may have been 
relevant here; it would have been necessary to consider whether a 
value quota would, in fact, have provided incidental protection.
2.
As, for example, in the case of the current quota arrangements 
controlling imports of butter into the United Kingdom. In this 
case exporters receive the domestic selling price for butter which 
has included a ’scarcity’ element.
level of the selling prices in the restricting country. If the 
limitation is placed on the value of imports, the total value of 
imports will be reduced but import prices will move against the res­
tricting country.
If the elasticity of demand for imports is less than unity and if
the controls are in terms of the volume which may be imported, it is
possible that, not only will the movement in the terms of trade.be
1unfavourable, but that the balance of payments will be worsened.
If the importing trade were monopolisticaHy organised prior to 
the restriction, and assuming profits were being maximised, imports 
would have been restricted to the point where the importer*s marginal 
revenue and marginal cost curve intersected. The imposition of a 
control on imports which reduced imports further would merely reduce 
the monopoly profit being taken although domestic prices would rise.
If importing becomes monpolistically organised as a result of 
the control of imports the intersection of marginal revenue and
1.
This may be illustrated by the following example taken from 
Professor Meade. Assume that the restriction of imports is set 
in terms of the number of cars that may be imported and that this 
number is reduced from a total of five, which were imported before 
the imposition of the restriction at a unit price of £100, to four. 
The demand for cars is assumed to be sufficiently inelastic for the 
domestic prices after the restriction to rise to £133*3 per car.
If exporters of cars to the restricting country combine monpolistic­
ally they will be able to set the price at £133*3 per car hence 
appropriate the full margin of profit. The cost of the reduced 
quantity of motor cars imported is now £533*3 instead of the £500 
which was paid for a larger quantity of cars before the restric­
tion. Meade, The Balance of Payments, p.277.
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marginal cost curves may indicate that increased profits will be 
obtained by importing less than the quantity permitted by the control, 
(This implies that there is no adequate substitute available from 
local production,)
It is possible now to consider in what respects a tariff and a 
quantitative import control differ. When market conditions both 
before and after the introduction of the controls are completely 
competitive, it was seen that there is no difference between the two 
in their effect on the price paid to the exporter. If importers of 
restricted goods are acting as monopolists, a tariff will increase 
the monopolists1 cost curve, reduce the quantity of imports which 
maximises profits and increase the price to local consumers. Under 
competitive conditions, a fee per unit of imports (a tariff or 
licence fee) and a lump sum tax on importers are theoretically equiv­
alent in their effects. When monopolistic importing conditions exist 
this is no longer the case; a fee per unit of imports raises costs so 
that the monopolist will gain by reducing imports and raising selling 
prices. A monopolist, however, would be unable to pass on a lump sum
payment; it would not pay him to vary the total amount of imports
1and he would not gain by raising selling prices.
With quantitative controls there is no automatic mechanism which 
limits the price which might be charged by importers or by domestic
TT —
3,f. Heuser, on,cit.. p.156-7.
producers acting together. Action may be taken to issue additional 
licences where it appears that domestic prices are too high; with a 
fixed import ceiling this can only be done by further reducing imports 
of other items. Alternatively some form of price control might be 
introduced. Under a tariff the price which can be charged internally 
is limited to that of the import price plus duty.
If exporters are not monopolistically organised, the price they 
receive will be the same with either method. Should the exporters 
be in a monopolistic position, however, and able in the case of a 
quantitative restriction, to appropriate to themselves some or all of 
the margin between the pre-restriction import price and the new 
internal selling price, this could be taken back from them by a 
tariff equivalent to the share of the margin going to the exporter.
A major difference between the two forms of import restriction 
is that the direct control of imports by licence redistributes income 
in favour of the holder of the licences. A tariff which restricted 
imports to the same extent as a direct control would redistribute 
income to the government sector as well as to the local producers of 
substitutes for the restricted imports. The desirability of a redist­
ribution of income in one direction or another is largely an argument 
of equity rather than of economics. However, in the case of balance 
of payments difficulties, where a reduction in the level of internal 
expenditure is required, the increase in tariff revenue, providing it 
is not spent or otherwise offset, is one means
9 4
of achieving this* While the importer is thus placed in a
favourable position there are two offsetting factors, First, the
decline in volume of the importer’s turnover will increase the ratio
2of overhead costs per unit of turnover* Second, the importer will
3generally be unable to increase his volume of business* By seeking 
more favourable sources of supply he may increase the volume which 
can be imported under a value quota or the profit to be obtained from 
a fixed volume of imports. Some incentive to increased efficiency in 
purchasing will therefore be present but there will be limited incen­
tive for efficiency in the domestic market* The assured market and 
high profit rate on existing sales may offset any incentive for 
increased purchasing efficiency. In the case of the tariff rewards 
for competitive efficiency in the domestic market would still remain.
The discussion so far has been based largely on the assumption 
that the restricted supplies of imports are sold at their free market 
price, i*e. they are sold at the price which the market will bear.
1
1.
There may be some increase in savings due to the increased 
profits accruing to importers under the direct controls if their 
propensity to save out of increased profits is higher than that 
of the consumers at whose expense the redistribution of incomes 
is made.
2.This may be more important in the short term since labour would 
probably constitute much of the overhead cost. On the other hand 
costs associated with the licensing controls themselves may not 
be small.
3.Of course, in his existing lines it may not pay him to increase 
his volume of turnover but he will also be unable to expand into 
new lines.
12 8
It may be argued that in fact importers and/or processors etc., do 
not raise their prices as a consequence of the shortages brought 
about by the restriction of imports. In a later part of this study 
some attempt will be made to assess what actually happened in the 
case of the restrictions imposed in Australia in the ’fifties. At 
this point all that is being attempted is ihe consideration of the 
theoretical implications of either situation.
If the supply of imports is restricted, i.e. if the controls are 
effective, then prices within a restricting country will either 
increase up to the point where supply and demand are equated or there 
will be shortages, queues, long order lists etc*, i.e. some form of 
official or unofficial rationing scheme is inevitable. This may be 
either on the basis of allocations in proportion to previous sales, 
or on some other basis, such as the quantity of other goods that 
the customer buys from the licence holder. In the latter case the 
price may include an indirect price increase element; to obtain 
sufficient of the goods restricted in supply he may have to purchase 
more than he needs in total or from that supplier of the other goods 
available•
Where a consumer is able t o purchase an imported product at the 
import price plus a normal mark-up, i.e. the mark-up is unchanged 
from that operating before the controls were imposed, the consumer, 
is, in effect, gaining from a redistribution of income in his favour; 
he is able to obtain the goods in question at a price below that which
1 Q* c »  j
others would be preparedto pay. Although the economy as a whole 
has to suffer a cut in real consumption, consumers obtaining imported 
goods at pre-restriction prices would be suffering a proportionately 
smaller loss of real income, according to the difference in the pro­
portion of their total expenditure made up of imported goods in the 
old and in the new situation. Such a situation is not an economic
optimum since all consumers would gain from a further process of
1exchange at this position.
A further point is that prices of home produced goods will rise 
further if prices of imported goods stay unchanged, other than in the 
short term and unless the shortage of imported goods leads to increased 
saving* Since supplies in total are reduced, prices all round will 
increase unless money spending is reduced by an amount equivalent to 
the reduction in supplies - again less any increase in saving. If 
there is no reduction in money expenditure and domestic prices of 
imported goods are not increased as their supply is reduced, the full 
amount of the money expenditure released by the reduction in supplies 
will increase demand for home produced goods. Thus the price of home 
produced goods becomes relatively less attractive compared with 
imports when the implication of the balance of payments position is
I_
In terms of indifference curve analysis, both types of consumers 
are operating at a position off their contract curve; both could 
return to their contract curve by a further process of exchange and 
both would then be on a higher indifference curve, and in this 
sense both would be better off* See G.J.Stigler, The Theory of 
Price. New York, 1946, pp*79-31*
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that home produced goods should be made more attractive relative to 
imports. The necessary reduction in expenditure will therefore be 
correspondingly greater.
A similar situation applies when some imports are not restricted 
and consequently subject to none of the direct price effects referred 
to here. They will become relatively more attractive. Since the 
implication of the controls, other than when used as a short term 
measure, is that the currency is overvalued the absence of restriction 
on some imported items is equivalent to subsidising their consumption.
If the items are of any importance in the economy the distorted/refS- 
tionship between the unrestricted products and domestic products may 
have adverse structural effects on the economy. Moreover, unless 
demand for the unrestricted items is completely inelastic, a greater 
degree of restriction on other items will be necessary.
The imposition of direct controls on imports in Australia in 1952 
was superimposed upon an existing tariff structure. To the extent 
that the controls were effective in reducing imports, the duty on 
that item no longer restricted imports or protected local industry.
Where the tariff was still the effective protecting measure, the 
controls were not effective in reducing demand for imports.
In an imperfect market, whether the imperfections result from 
imperfect knowledge or from distances between different parts of the
17
This would seem to provide further reason for assuming that 
the possibility of the optimum tariff argument being applicable 
in the Australian situation in 1952 or 1955 is fairly small.
(See discussion in Chapter IV.)
market, the tariff may be an important deterrent to one importer so 
that he imports less than permitted under the controls, while for 
another importer of the same product the tariff is not a deterrent 
and he would be willing to import more than the controls permit.
Earlier discussion has emphasised the expenditure redirecting 
function of the controls on imports. We shall now consider the 
nature of the structural shifts likely to have been stimulated by 
the redirection of demand brought about by the controls.
At any one time there will be a variety of influence causing 
changes in the pattern of productive activity within an economy, 
increasing or decreasing the relative importance in terms of final 
output of particular sectors or particular industries within those 
sectors. Many of these influences will be internal, e,g. new products 
or new methods of production. Many will be external; these will 
include, importantly, policy actions by the government impinging 
on particular sectors, as well as others which are external to the 
economy. Of course, internal developments in one sector will be exter­
nal developments to another. The structural impact of any one set of 
government policies will therefore be superimposed on or interrelated 
with a variety of other influences.
While limiting ourselves to arguments of a general nature we shall 
have in mind the particular circumstances of the Australian economy - 
a primary product exporting country with a secondary industry sector 
which is small in absolute terms but large in terms of the domestic
economy
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As a result of the imposition of direct controls on imports demand 
for domestically produced importables will increase and prices (and 
profits) will rise* This will move relative prices internally in 
favour of the non traded goods and export sectors and lead to increased 
demand for these products*
Since factors of production in the export sector are rather spec­
ialised - land and relatively immobile labour - there would probably 
be only a small shift of resources from the export sector* The re­
sources shifts will therefore tend to be primarily from the non traded 
goods sector, including non traded manufacturing as well as construction 
and service industries etc* Similarly, there will only be a limited 
shift in demand from imports to exportables* If total expenditure 
is reduced when the controls are imposed, this will in itself reduce 
import demand and consequently the degree of import restriction required; 
resources will also be released from the other sectors of the economy 
to be absorbed by the import competing sector* This will enable out­
put to increase to meet the redirected demand without inflationary 
competition for labour and other resources. Essentially, this is the 
case for using import controls to redirect expenditure from imports*
In this situation there would be a structural shift in resources to 
the import competing sector* The extent of the shift would depend to 
a considerable extent upon the degree to which non traded goods, 
rather than domestically produced importables, are the next preferred 
substitutes for imports.
There are a great many assumptions in this highly simplified 
analysis some of which, at least, need to be spelled out. It implies 
accurate calculation of the reduction in expenditure which is just 
necessary to maintain full employment; it implies some downward flex­
ibility of prices of non traded goods in response to cuts in total 
expenditure or alternatively no built-in mechanism which increases costs 
- particularly wage costs - in line with an overall increase in prices; 
it implies mobility of factors of production, at least between the 
non traded goods and the import competing sector; it also implies 
that the demand for resources in the import competing sector will be 
sufficient just to absorb the resources made available in the non 
traded goods sector. These assumptions are not, of course, mutually 
exclusive; moreover their importance will vary according to the time 
span involved.
The longer the period during which the controls are in force, the 
less immobile factors will become, but also the less it is likely that 
total expenditure will be contained at a level consistent with inter­
nal balance. With a more or less constant import ceiling an initial 
increase in income will induce a more rapid secondary expansion of 
income since the economy’s effective marginal propensity to import 
is virtually nil. Resulting from attempts to maintain total expendi­
ture at levels sufficient to avoid any significant degree of unemploy­
ment, boom conditions will tend to develop in the import competing 
sector which will spread into the non traded goods sector; prices will
tend to rise through increased factor costs and there will be a 
slowing down in the shift of resources away from the non-traded 
goods sector.
There is no necessary reason why the controls as such should
contribute to their own ultimate removal. The domestic production
of substitutes for imports - whether of importables or of non traded
goods - will reduce the propensity to import provided prices at the
same time move in favour of the domestic products. While the price
of domestically produced importables can be moved favourably relative
to the imported product by tariff duties, this is only indirectly and
1imperfectly the case with non traded goods.
The reduced competition from imports and, possibly in consequence, 
a reduced level of competition domestically, may imply considerably 
less incentive to reduce costs through increased productivity. If 
the licensing system is selective, the most profitable areas of in­
vestment under the controls may not be those which have the least 
comparative disadvantage in the absence of the controls. Alternative­
ly, there may be too great a diversification of investment with
2consequent small scale high cost enterprises.
1.
E.g. If prices of houses rise and demand moves to imported 
textiles, increases in tariffs on textiles might redirect some 
demand back to houses but it might well be switched to some other 
imported product.
2.
G.f. E.Lundberg and M*Kill, ’’Australia^ Long Term Balance of 
Payments Problem1’, Economic Re cord.« Vol.XXXII, No*62,(May,1956),p* 43*
The controls on imports may well worsen the comparative cost 
position of the import competing sector while similarly lowering 
the competitive cost position of the export industries. It is true 
that for some major agricultural exports the cost position is not a 
significant determinant of export performance in the short term; and 
that costs tend to determine income rather than export competitive- 
ness. This would not apply to all primary prod.ucts though to some 
extent it may also have some relevance to some mine product exports. 
It ignores, however, the effect on the potential export competitive­
ness of manufactured products.
In addition to the broad structural shifts in resources and in 
the relative cost position, there may also be intra-sectoral struct- 
ual shifts stimulated by the controls* Shannon has pointed to the 
effect of the Australian policy of protection in inducing structural 
changes within the rural sector away from products with a relatively 
greater wage labour content to those with less, e*g. from dairy pro­
ducts to production of wool. To some extent this structural 
influence may have been reinforced by the controls on imports, though 
in view of the rigidities in the primary sector it is likely that
IT
A reduction in costs would have a limited direct effect on the 
exports of wool, wheat, sugar, butter, cheese, for example* The 
farmer1s reaction to the income on export sales is difficult to 
determine and may well be perverse* The relative profitability of 
particular products, where substitution of resource use is possible, 
may be important, e*g. the recent increased acreage of wheat at the 
expense of wool resulting to a considerable extent from the 
increased relative profitability of wheat.
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Controls on imports will have been of insufficient duration to be of 
real significance in this respect. Similar intra-sectoral influence 
might be expected in other sectors; again it is probable that the 
length of the period in question would be insufficient for these to 
be of major significance. However, since they are related to the 
distribution of income it is necessary to give some consideration 
to this aspect.
Because there are substantial similarities between tariffs and 
quantitative import restrictions, use can be made of the considerable 
body of literature on the subject of the effect of tariffs on the 
distribution of income, particularly the effect on real wages.
Many of these aspects have been discussed in some detail by Dr. 
Reitsma in the context of protection provided by the Australian 
tariff. The parts of his analysis relevant here will be considered 
only in brief.
The current theory of the effect of protection on the real returns 
to factors of production is based substantially upon the Stolper- 
Samuelson development of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, Stolper and 
Samuelson demonstrated that, under certain assumptions, protection 
will always increase the real return as well as the relative share of 
the total product of that factor which is relatively most important in
T.
Reitsma, op.cit.. See also the same author’s ’’Trade and Redistri­
bution of Income - Is there still an Australian Case?” Economic 
Record. Vol,XXXIV, No.68, pp.172-188.
the protected industries* If a country imports labour intensive
goods (labour intensive in the importing country) and exports capital
intensive goods, then protection of local production of the labour
intensive product will shift both capital and labour to the labour
intensive industry* This will reduce the proportion of labour to
capital in both industries, and as a result the marginal product
of labour will rise, and on the assumption that labour is paid the
value of its marginal product, real wages will rise and the real
1return to capital will fall.
Subsequent examination of the assumptions on which this theorem 
is based has made clear the restrictive nature of a number of them. 
Difficulties arise when it is recognised that there are at least three 
broad categories of factors of production and that in the short run, 
at least, a large number of factors of production exist; it is there­
fore frequently difficult, in relating the theorem to the real world, 
to determine just which is the scarce factor. Primary production in 
Australia, for example, is probably more capital intensive and less 
land intensive than is frequently assumed.
Dr. Reitsma has discussed at length the implications of each of
2the eleven assumptions, and their validity in the Australian case;
17
W.F* Stolper and P. A. Samuels on, ’’Protection and Real Wages”,
Review of Economic Studies. Vol.IX. (November, 1941), p p .58-73; 
reprinted in Readings in the Theory of International Trade, p p .333-357.
2.
Reitsma, op.cit.. pp.78-94*
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1it is not proposed to cover this ground again.
In his discussion of the assumption of two factors of production,
Dr. Reitsma suggests that capital is just as likely, if not more so,
to benefit from protection as is labour. He concludes that in theory
2”... anything can happen to labour’s share of the national income.” 
Moreover, one may not accept completely the idea that both of the 
factors - capital and labour - will have gained at the expense of 
land values. It is no doubt true that, to a considerable extent, pro­
tection in Australia has brought about” ... the taxation of rural land
3values for the benefit of other industries”, but some of the benefit 
will have gone to urban land and property.^
1.It is perhaps worth adding that on theoretical grounds the most 
restrictive assumption is that of the constant factor intensities, 
i.e. that the proportions of the factors used in the production of 
a good remain unchanged. It has been demonstrated that relaxing this 
assumption, particularly if the assumption of only two factors of 
production is also relaxed, makes it possible to show that real wages 
could fall as a result of protection. See S.James and I.F.Pearce,
”The Factor Price Equalisation Myth.”, Review of Economic Studies« 
Vol.XIX, 1951-52; also c.f• R.F.Harrod, ’’Factor Price Relations Under 
Free Trade.”, Economic Journal, Vol.LXVTII, June 1958, pp.245-255; 
I.F.Pearce, ”A Further Note on Factor Price Commodity Relationships.”, 
Economic Journal. Vol.LXIX, Dec. 1959, pp.725-731; R.E.Caves, Trade 
and Economic Structure. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, I960, 
pp. 89-92.
2.Reitsma, on.cit., p.87.
3.J.B.Brigden et al., The Australian Tariff - An Economic Enquiry. 
Melbourne University Press, 1929, P«S3*
4*C.f. F.C.Benham, ’’The Australian Tariff and the Standard of 
Living: A Reply”, Economic Record. May 1926.
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Lancaster*s restatement of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
reduces none of the uncertainty surrounding the problem* His own 
claim was that wIt .*• makes a more definite case for the wages argu- 
ments in favour of the Australian tariff.“ If this claim is valid 
then it should have direct relevance in this context.
Lancaster attempted to restate the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
to give it more general validity. He suggested that the statement of 
the theorem, “Protection raises the real wage of the scarce factor“, 
was an incorrect generalisation since it ignored the effect of demand 
in the determination of the initial movement in the production 
pattern - in other words, real wages will not necessarily be higher 
before trade, in the country where labour is scarce relative to capi­
tal, since demand may be relatively low for the good with the high 
labour content relative to capital. As it is possible in this case 
for trade to increase the real wage of the factor, protection could 
have the opposite effect: protection could reduce real wages.
Lancester suggested that if the theorem were restated as, “Protection
raises the real wages of the factor in which the imported good is
2relatively more intensive,“ it does have more general validity.
It is debatable whether Lancaster*s interpretation of the use 
of the term “scarcity“ in the original theorem is valid, i.e. whether
"^*K.Lancaster, "Protection and Real Wages: A Restatement“, Economic 
Journal. Vol.LXVTI, June 1957, p.209*
2.Lancaster, on.cit.
Stolper and Samuels on did not in fact mean '•scarcity*1 to imply rela­
tively dear* It could be argued that this meaning was implied in the 
use of the term by Stolper and Samuelson, and this appears to be in 
part the basis on which Reitsma and Bhagwati have denied the validity 
of Lancaster's criticism of the original formulation of the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem.
It is unnecessary to consider Lancaster’s criticism in detail 
because his reformulation of the theorem is based on substantially 
the same assumption as was the original model. The criticisms which 
apply to those assumptions in the case of the original model apply 
similarly to Lancaster*s reformulation since he retains the assump­
tions of only two factors of production and of constant factor 
2intensities.
It is worth noting the relationship between the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem and the Samuelson factor-price equalisation theorem. 
If the use of the term '• scarcity" can be taken to imply relatively 
expensive, then the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, that protection raises 
the real wages of the expensive factor, is merely a converse way of
1.
Reitsma, "Trade and Redistribution of Income ...." loc.cit.. 
p.184; J.N.Bhagwati, "Protection, Real Wages and Real Incomes, 
Economic Journal, Vol.LXIX, December 1959, pp.741-742.
2.
In fairness to Lancaster it should be noted that he qualified 
his more general statement by observing that he did not claim 
that his conclusion held other than for the two factor, two 
commodity model, op.cit.. p.210
3.
C.f. Bhagwati, op.cit.. p.735
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saying what is implied in the factor-price equalisation theorem - that 
trade will lower the real wage of the relatively expensive factor of 
production. ^
If the factor price equalisation theorem is theoretically in­
valid, then clearly so is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem* The factor 
price equalisation theorem has been extensively criticised and again 
the criticism is that once the assumptions of two factors and constant
factor intensities are relaxed, it is possible that trade will tend
2not to equalise factor prices but to move them apart* Trade could 
further increase the wage of the relatively expensive factor - and 
conversely, protection could reduce the return to the relatively 
inexpensive factor. Lancaster’s modifications thus reduce none of 
the uncertainty as to the effect of protection on factor rewards.
All that may reasonably be concluded from the discussion so far 
is that there will be a redistribution of income in favour of the 
protected sector. Just who gains from that redistribution is theore­
tically indeterminate - in practice it will depend upon a variety of 
factors, of which one will be the factor intensity, but it will 
include other factors such as the possibility of substitution of one 
factor of production for another, and the bargaining power of factor
TT
James and Pearce, ’’The Factor Price Equalisation Ifyth”, 
loc.cit.,p. 12 footnote 1*
2.
James and Pearce, loc.cit.. Harrod, oo.cit.: I*F*Pearce,
"A Further Note on Factor Price Commodity Relationships”, 
loc.cit.
groups. It is quite possible that labour may not, in fact, gain at 
all, but that all the benefit will be received by capital.
In general terms these conclusions may be taken to apply to 
the incidental protection provided by quantitative controls. They 
will be qualified in three respects. First, we may at least conclude 
that there will be a distribution of income in favour of importers, 
but even here we must note the offsetting increase in importers’ 
overhead costs in relation to turnover. Second, the period we are 
considering is of sufficient length for longer term effects - factor 
substitution, increased mobility and greater homogeneity of factors 
etc*, to diminish the importance of short term income redistribution 
effects. At the same time it is insufficiently long for the short 
term effects - such as overaward wages and windfall profits not to 
be important. Third, the overall degree of restriction of imports 
and, consequently, the extent of incidental protection fluctuated 
considerably over the period. There were also fluctuations in the 
extent of such protection provided to individual industries other than 
the general movements in the licensing controls. There will, there­
fore, be a number of ’short terms’; there will also be different 
experiences in different industries within the import competing 
sector* These can only be considered in the context of an examina­
tion of the actual system.
Chapter VT
Some Theoretical Considerations; III - The Method of 
Import Licensing Control
In the two previous chapters we have discussed the more general 
aspects of the direct control of imports. It is necessary now to give 
consideration to some more specific aspects of the methods of control 
used in Australia during the period under review. The discussion in 
this section will be limited largely to the consideration of the 
question of the degree of interchangeability in licence use permitted 
by the system.
It has been shown that, in terms of the criterion of aggregate 
welfare discussed earlier, the econory can be said to be at a position 
of optimum welfare when prices of the restricted supply of imports are 
determined simply by internal supply and demand conditions. It will 
facilitate subsequent a rgument if a simple demonstration is given that 
the optimum position also requires that the rate of importers1 
(monopoly) profit on the restricted supply of imports should be equal 
on all imports.
We know that utility is maximised when prices are proportional to 
marginal cost* We shall refer to the marginal cost of obtaining imports 
as p, i.e. the import price to the importer which we assume remains 
unchanged before and after the imposition of the cut in imports. The 
new internal price, including monopoly profit, we shall call P*
P uThen the condition of maximum welfare is _i. = li. •
P. p.
If imports are restricted to a given value K ( a constant ), 
goods x.,x.,... etc* being valued at prices p.,p.,... etc* then 
then pixi + Pjxj + ......... .. K
so that p.dx. 4 p.dx. + ...... = 0
Only if p = XP ( X. indicating proportionality ) i*e*
if Pi ~ = PJ _ l £ i  = .......... will it also be true
Pi ' Pj
that P.dx. + P.dx. + ......... = 0  i*e. will U.dx. + U.dx. 4i i J J i i J j
.......... = 0  (Where U., U., .... etc. are the marginal utilitiesJ
of the goods x_.,x.., ........etc.)
In other words, only if p = will it be impossible to increase
welfare* It will be noted that Pi ~ i^. , ~ , •••••• etc.
Pa Pj
are the rates of importers* (monopoly) profit on goods i,j, .... . etc
and it is clear that the position is an optimum in terms of welfare 
when the rate of importers* profit is equal on all imports.
This demonstration has been based on an assumption that import 
prices remained unaltered as a result of changes in the quantities 
imported. For most purposes this assumption is probably justified but 
there is some advantage, for the purpose of subsequent discussion, in 
considering the effect on the conclusion of differences in the supply 
conditions of the imports restricted.
The assumption is now relaxed that the terms of trade remain
unaltered, an assumption which is equivalent to assuming that the
supply elasticities are infinitely elastic* Given that the total
amount of foreign exchange to be spent on imports is fixed, it is
possible for the restricting country to gain by reducing imports of
the items for which the supply conditions are inelastic, and by using
the foreign exchange thus saved to increase imports of the items for
which supply conditions are relatively elastic* Restricting imports
of the items in inelastic supply will tend to push down their price,
whereas the price of the items in elastic supply will be relatively
unaffected by changes in the quantities imported* The total volume
of imports will thus be increased* Whether there will be a gain in
welfare depends upon whether the increase in welfare resulted from
the change in the terms of trade is more than sufficient to offset
the loss of welfare within the restricting country due to the movement
away from the equality of profit rates* It is clear that the problem
is closely analogous to that of the optimum tariff in the sense of
being an optimum discriminatory tariff* A condition for the optimum
degree of discrimination in a regime of import restrictions may be
1derived as follows*
_
The following analysis is based substantially on that of 
Fleming and Meade* See J*M* Fleming, ”0n Making the Best of 
Balance of Payments Restrictions on Imports”, Economic Journal.
Vol. LXI, No.241 (March 1951), pp.48-71$ J*E. Meade, Trade and 
Welfare, Ghapt* XXXIV, and Mathematical Supplement, Chapt. XX .
Assume two countries and only two classes of imports. Let
supply be a function of its own price alone, so that
dx^
= s h  ; 11
- dPo .
S — *■ ’ where S. . is the11
pi *2 p2
1 supply elasticity’ in the foreign country of the i’th good.
The condition that the amount of foreign exchange spent on imports 
is fixed gives
P. *i + k (a constant)
Differentiating and rearranging
( dx, dp ) ( dx^
P ( — ‘ + —  ) + Pz3^  J1 1 j *1 Pi j *2
dP2 )) = 0
Pp )
2 )
(i)
A change in welfare will result from a change in the amount traded, 
but since, as shown above, any movement away from the situation in 
which the rate of profit is equal on all imports will result in a loss 
of welfare, the change in the amounts traded has to be weighted by the 
protective effect of the import restriction.,
The change in welfare (dW) is thus given by
dW = V i
dx ( P _ P )
1 ( 1___ I )
( ,Sg. (!2_1
*1 I P1 I + 1,3X2 *2 i
)
!a) ) (ii)
Solving for d£l and ^ 2  in the supply equations and substitut­
ing in (i); the solving for dxu in (i) and substituting in (ii) gives
— Jat
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dw = Plxx Silfuj
*1 ( n )
(p, _ p,)( a., ) (p, _ p,)( s„ ) 
( pi ) r + sn) ( p2 ) r + °22)
At the optimum dW is zero; which means that the term
(l - S-.J
( sxi ) f e ->( P1 K 1 + ^l) ( P2 )(1 + S22)
(iii)
Hence the condition is
(pi - pD (
1 + sn ) = ( P2 - P2 )( 1 + s. (iv)
Thus we c^n see from this condition that if S02 = the margin
of difference between the domestic and the import price should be the 
same for both goods. If S ^  is less than S^, i.e. less elastic, then 
the rate of profit on x^ should be less than that on x^; imports of 
should be further restricted, and imports of x^ relaxed.
In other words, if account is taken of the conditions of supply 
of individual imports, the equality of profit rates should be sought 
only if the supply elasticities are equal* If the supply elasticity 
of one import item is greater than that of another, the profit margin 
of the second item whose supply is inelastic should be allowed to 
increase relative to that of the first item i.e* the second item should 
be licensed more restrictively than the first, the licensing of which 
should be relaxed*
This condition, in the form given here, is useful only as a means 
of demonstrating the principle involved* The assumptions governing
US
the supply ’elasticities’ are sufficiently severe to make it non- 
operational* The assumption that supply is a function only of its 
own price ignores the degree of substituability in the exporting 
country between one export item and another which would tend to affect 
the supply conditions of these other items in a way similar to that of 
the commodity directly affected* A significant increase in the quant­
ity imported of one commodity will tend to increase the supply price 
of that commodity and any other commodity imported with a high substi­
tution relationship to it* This would tend to reduce the likely 
differential between the optimum profit rates.
For most purposes therefore it will be sufficient to assume that 
the optimum condition is given by the equality of the margin of differ­
ence between import and home selling prices* This will in fact be the 
basis on which the next problem will be discussed*
It is now possible to consider the effect of an interchangeable 
quota and the effect of reducing the degree of
1.
For a formulation under considerably less restrictive 
assumptions see Meade, Trade and Welfare: Mathematical Supplement, 
op.cit.. Chap* XX. It would be quite possible to construct a 
formula for the condition in the form of the optimum tariff 
formula discussed earlier (Chapter IV). Since the whole 
notion has only limited practical significance in the present 
context, and has been introduced simply to make use of the 
general principle in the subsequent discussion no attempt 
has been made to formulate a more operational condition.
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interchangeability. Assume first that import licences are granted 
equivalent to the total amount of imports to be permitted, and that 
a licence may be used to purchase any type of import i.e. there is 
complete interchangeability over the whole import bill. Under these 
circumstances, importers will tend to import the lines permitting them 
the greatest profit and the rate of profit will t end to be equalised 
on all lines. Anything which interferes with this tendency tends to 
reduce the total welfare. The exposition may now be amplified without 
affecting the validity of the argument, by assuming that there are, 
under the conditions existing before the introduction of controls, only 
two imports, shoes and furs. If licensing controls are now introduced, 
whichever of the two items ätiows the greater margin of profit will, 
attract the use of importers1 licences, providing there is complete 
interchangeability, until it is no more profitable to import furs than 
shoes.
Suppose now that shoes and furs are put into separate import 
licensing categories such that licences for the category shoes may be 
used to import only shoes and similarly for furs. If we assume that 
demand for furs in inelastic while that for shoes relatively elastic,
IT
This has specific relevance to the subdivision of the inter­
changeable quota category, and the restriction of interchangeability 
of licences to items within the subgroup, in 1956. (See Chapt. Ill)•
One of the purposes of this move was to reduce the extent of buying 
and selling of these licences and - though less specifically - to 
reduce the monopoly profits accruing to importers. The argument 
has more general relevance, however, to the methods of control as 
a whole.
1
the licences of the shoe importer will have been used for importing 
furs* Following the reduction of the interchangeability permitted, 
the licences that the shoe importer previously used for importing 
furs will now be used to import shoes - or possibly not be used at all. 
Imports of shoes will go up and imports of furs down. Prices of furs 
will go up as will the importing profit rate, whereas both will go 
down in the case of shoes* The profit rate will now be different 
between the two goods and welfare will not be maximised*
In practice it may be that the monpoly profits of importers in 
total would have been reduced as a result of the reduced degree of 
interchangeability* In terms of the theoretical argument we cannot 
say whether a reduction in the interchangeability of licences will or 
will not cause a reduction in the total monopoly profits made by- 
importers in the absence of a knowledge of the relevant demand elast­
icities*
Suppose that in a competitive market situation with complete 
interchangeability the fur importer used all of his licences to import 
furs while the shoe importer imported some shoes but also imported furs, 
dividing his available licences between the two until the rate of profit 
on both was the same at the margin. If furs and shoes are now put into
TT
To simplify the analysis we have assumed that the fur importer 
imports only furs rather than both importers some of both furs 
and shoes. It is also implicit that it is still profitable for 
the shoe importer to import some shoes - it would be quite 
conceivable that it would pay him to import nothing but furs.
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separate categories with no interchangeability the fur importers will 
be better off while the shoe importer will be worse off* The gain in 
total profit by the fur importer may or nor not exceed the loss 
incurred by the shoe importer depending upon the relative elasticities 
of the two products.
If the assumption of a generally competitive situation is 
relaxed to allow for rigidities in the business of imparting the shoe 
importer may offer his licences for sale to the fur importer. The fur 
importer may not wish to buy the same number of licences as, in the 
absence of these rigidities, it would have paid the shoe importer to 
use in the importation of furs. He may prefer to act as a monopolist 
in which case the number of licences he would be willing to buy would 
depend upon the point of intersection of his marginal cost curve - 
which would be determined by the price to be paid for the licence - 
and his marginal revenue curve.
Under the competitive situation the value of the licences which 
may be bought or sold will be dependent upon the importer profits 
which are available. If the licences for furs can only be used for 
furs and no other licences can be used to import furs then there will 
be no sales of shoe licences for the import of furs. The fur importer 
will be able to offer a higher price to other fur importers for their 
licences; at a price equivalent to their expected profit on the actual 
import of the furs they will be indifferent between importing and 
selling the licence. In this situation they would in practice be more
likely to import the furs themselves for reasons such as maintaining 
trade connexions both with overseas suppliers m  d domestic distribu­
tors. Therefore some reduction in the volume of licences actually 
sold may have resulted from the subdivision of the interchangeable 
quota. The discussion above suggests that to the extent that the aim 
was to reduce importers1 profits the question of the volume of licences 
which changed hands was largely irrelevant.
There is no difference in principle when the situation analysed 
above: is extended, either to the reduction in the extent of the inter­
changeability in the interchangeable quota, or to the use of the 
specific quota, which pay be considered as an interchangeable quota with 
the degree of interchangeability limited to one type of good.
The results reached so far may be generalised by concluding
(a) that anything which prevents complete freedom of choice as to the 
actual goods imported, or which limits such freedom, will reduce welfare 
in the sense used here.
(b) the less the degree of interchangeability in the quotas, i.e. the 
more specific the use to which the licence may be put, the greater the 
variations will be in level of importers1 monopoly profit from item to 
item, and the greater the divergence from the optimum.
(c) we are unable to draw any conclusions as to which form of licensing 
control will minimise the redistribution of income to importers as a 
whole. Some presumption might be made that the greater the degree of 
interchangeability the less the total importer profits because of the
reduced opportunities for restriction of imports below the quota 
level by the importer acting as a monopolist.
(d) the subdivision of the interchangeable quota in 1956 may have 
reduced the extent of the sale of licences but it need not have 
reduced the profits of importers as a whole.
Chapter I7!I
Empirical Investigation - General Aspects
The analysis in the three preceding chapters was designed to 
show what we may expect, a priori, to result from the quantitative 
control of imports. It was intentionally a highly simplified account 
and deliberately avoided the innumerable qualifications which are 
necessary when relating theoretical argument to the real world. Des­
pite the level of abstraction involved it offers an explanation of 
the direction and nature of the forces set in motion by the controls 
on imports; at the same time it suggests a great many questions to 
which we might attempt to seek answers.
These questions relate to three interdependent but distinct aspects 
of the control of imports. The first concerns the methods of control 
and their implementation. The more general discussion of the theory 
of the direct control of imports has been extensively in terms of the 
price equivalent of a quantitative import control. Consequently, we 
are interested in the extent to which the methods of control employed 
deviated from a form of price adjustment which arguments of economic 
efficiency indicate is preferable. We also need to recognise the limita­
tions of these arguments and consider whether there may not be certain 
advantages in practice attaching to the use of the method of direct 
control which requires us to modify the strict application of the marg­
inal criteria of economic efficiency.
In the three following chapters we shall, therefore, be concerned 
primarily with consequences of the manner in which the import licensing 
system as such was operated. We shall consider the question of the speed 
and accuracy of the controls in Chapter VIII. In Chapter IX we shall 
consider how the selection between sources and classes of imports was 
made, considering particularly the implications for the industries 
producing items directly competitive with imports-. The extent and 
nature of the protection received by the domestic import competing 
industries during the periods when competition from imports was restrict­
ed by the controls will be examined in Chapter X, particularly the extent 
to which this was affected by the manner in which the controls were 
operated. These three chapters, then, concern themselves primarily with 
particular features of the licensing system as such. These are not the 
only aspects of the system with which we shall deal but they are the 
ones to which it will be convenient to give separate consideration.
The second group of questions relates to the longer term, or broad­
ly structural, aspects of import control as such. Basically the question 
may be stated as whether the direct controls on imports made any contri­
bution to their own removal. In the discussion in ChaptersIV and V we 
saw that there was no theoretical reason for this to happen; in terms 
of the static theoretical models the control of imports will make no 
contribution, and it is usual to assume that in practice they are likely, 
if anything, to accentuate the basic problem of imbalance by raising the 
cost level within the restricting economy. On the other hand, we have
-I
seen t h a t  th e  c o n tro ls  have, in  f a c t ,  been removed. We a re , th e re fo re ,  
in te r e s te d  in  th e  e x te n t to  which t h i s  may be a t t r ib u te d  to  the  c o n tro ls  
as such  o r to  o th e r  f a c to r s  which occurred  independently  of th e  e x i s t ­
ence o f  th e  c o n tro ls  on im p o rts . O ther q u estio n s  of im portance r e l a t e  
v a r io u s ly  to  th e  r e a l  co s t of d i r e c t  c o n tro l o f im ports, to  th e  e f f i c ­
iency  of re so u rce  a l lo c a t io n  and to  th e  d i s t r ib u t io n  of income; th e se  
a s p e c ts ,  w hile having an e f f e c t ,  in d i r e c t ly ,  on th e  answer to  th e  b ro ad er 
q u e s tio n  posed above, a re  a lso  o f im portance in  them selves in  th e  p a r t i c ­
u la r  c o n te x ttof th e  A u s tra lia n  economy. These w il l  in c lu d e  th e  re a c tio n s  
o f im p o rte rs  and ex p o rte rs  to  th e  d i r e c t  q u a n t i ta t iv e  c o n tro l of 
im p o rts . They w i l l  a lso  in c lu d e  q u estio n s  concerned w ith th e  e x te n t to  
which th e  e x is ten c e  of t h e  c o n tro ls  f a c i l i t a t e d  m onopo listic  com bination 
and th e  e x ten t to  which dom estic producers were ab le  to  take, and d id  in  
f a c t  ta k e , advantage o f th e  p ro te c t io n  prov ided  by th e  c o n tro ls  in  term s 
of p r o f i t s ,  r a th e r  than  by expanding o u tp u t. To some e x te n t th e se  
q u e s tio n s  ov erlap  w ith  th e  th i r d  broad group of q u estio n s  which r e la t e  
to  th e  sh o r t term  e f f e c t s  o f th e  c o n tro ls  on im ports. Two major 
q u e s tio n s  w i l l  be of p a r t i c u l a r  im portance h e re . The f i r s t  i s  th e  
source  of th e  ou tpu t re q u ire d  to  meet th e  demand re d ire c te d  from im ports
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This i s  no t to  suggest t h a t  t h i s  i s  evidence th a t  th e re  has been 
a s t r u c tu r a l  improvement in  th e  co m p etitiv e  p o s i t io n  of th e  A ustra­
l i a n  economy. O ther p o s s i b i l i t i e s  must be considered  a s , f o r  example, 
t h a t  th e  removal of th e  c o n tro ls  i s  only p o s s ib le  when accompanied 
by a r e l a t iv e ly  h igh  le v e l  o f unemployment; a l te r n a t iv e ly ,  th e  exp lana­
t io n  might be th a t  t a r i f f  d u t ie s  have been in c reased  s u f f ic ie n t ly  to  
have v i r t u a l ly  rep laced  th e  d i r e c t  c o n tro ls  as a means of r e d i r e c t in g  
demand from im ports. These v a rio u s  a sp e c ts  w i l l  be considered  below.
or, alternatively, the nature of the disabsorption which took place 
at the time of the imposition of the controls. The second relates to 
the length of the Tshort term* during which institutional rigidities 
and price inflexibilities make it possible to use import controls 
without consequential effects on the price level.
It is clear that there are a wide variety of questions to which 
answers could be sought. The present chapter will set out the particu­
lar questions to which attention is being given and, in broad terms, the 
way in which we shall approach them.
It would appear necessary to rehearse in a little detail some 
conceptual and practical problems involved in the various possible 
lines of approach, if only to explain why some, superficially more 
practical and useful, did not prove to be so in practice.
In principle we could attempt to find answers to the various 
questions in two ways. Thefirst would be to construct a measure of 
the intensity of the controls and relate it to series showing changes 
in output, prices, profits etc. during the period. Since the factor 
which is important from the point of view of the internal economy and 
which reflects the intensity of restrictions, is the demand for imports 
which is not allowed to become effective, changes in the level of this 
unfilled demand would provide the most satisfactory measure of the 
intensity of import licensing.
In the context of the effect on the local producers of an enforced 
reduction of import competition the term, familiar in discussions of
tariffs, an 1index of protection1, has sometimes been used to describe
such a measure* There is no practical way of measuring this frustrated
demand accurately; to do so it would be necessary to determine exactly
what would be the tariff rate which would restrict imports of the partie­
lular item to the same extent as the control in force at any time.
However, before discussing possible alternative methods by which an 
approximate measure or index of protection may be constructed, let us 
consider briefly what factors will bring about changes in the division 
of demand between imports and domestic production. There are a number 
of major factors influential in determining whether demand for a part­
icular commodity or product is met by imports or from local production; 
allowance will have to be made for changes in any one of them.
Of course, if the item in question is not available from local 
sources it must be imported. It may be unavailable from domestic
sources because it cannot be produced here or because economically it
2is not worthwhile to produce it here. Alternatively it may be because
‘As Professor Arndt has put it, MWhat you really have to do is to find 
out at what premiums the licences would sell in an auction”, Report of 
Proceedings. Research Seminar on Australian Imports, Canberra, University 
College, 2nd-3rd June, 1958 (mimeographed) p*5* Clearly there is no way 
of measuring this when, in fact, there was no open market for licences 
and probably only a somewhat imperfect ’black1 market for a class of 
licence which represented only a part of the total licence issue.
2*‘The distinction between those goods not produced in a country for econ­
omic reasons and those not produced for technical reasons is far less 
clear cut than this dichotomy might suggest* At a price - and it may be 
a veiy high price - virtually anything, or at least a sufficiently close 
technical substitute, can usually be produced* This factor also takes 
into account restrictions on local production provided by monopolistic 
positions as, for example, those due to patent rights* Patent rights 
clearly have an economic price and, excluding non-economic factors ,«*> do 
not represent an impenetrable barrier to local production.
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at any price equal to or below the world price demand is in excess of
production - the latter including what is normally referred to as an
1inflationary "leakage” into imports.
These factors will change over time - oil is found, new mineral 
deposits discovered, new production processes will be invented, or the 
market becomes large enough to make local production worthwhile etc. 
and these will have important effects on the division of demand between 
imports and domestic production. However, once the product is available 
from domestic production it becomes subject to the same influences as 
other importable products.
Demand may change from imports to domestic production or vice 
versa as a result of changes in:
(i) the incidence of any quantitative restrictions, including 
disguised physical barriers to trade such as protectively 
administered quarantine and health regulations;
(ii) the effective level of tariffs on imports, including
disguised tariffs such as sales taxes which apply only to 
imported goods;
(iii) relative prices of imports and substitutable home produced 
goods, including changes in freight rates end other c.i.f.,
!‘The extent of this leakage, while probably of some importance at 
times during the period, is difficult if not impossible to determine. 
It might be thought that to the extent that we are concerned with an 
index of protection, the fact that it is an inflationary ’leakage1 
alone which causes the level of imports to rise means that it is of 
less importance in this context, since the local industry is able 
to sell all that it is able to produce locally* As we have seen, 
however, the benefits of the protection can be taken out either in 
increased output or increased profits. While an increase in the 
degree of protection in this situation would mean no increase in 
output, it could mean an increase in prices and profits.
wharfage charges etc. which vary the landed price 
relative to the domestic price.
A satisfactory index of protection afforded by import licensing 
would need to exclude directly or indirectly changes in import demand 
resulting from any of these three factors. Theoretically such an 
index is not an impossible conception and there are two alternative 
ways in which its construction could be approached. If the data were 
available one measure of excess demand for imports would be the unsucc­
essful applications for import licences. Inpractice the licensing 
system did not work in a way that would provide this type of information. 
Up to a half of total licences issued in any particular licensing period 
were quota licences. There were certainly many applications for addi­
tional licences or enlarged quotas but these would provide only a 
limited and very unsatisfactory basis for such a measure.
Even in the case of the specific licence, which is closer to the 
ideal in the present sense, it would be a very imperfect measure,
particularly in view of the considerable amount of ‘prescreening’ by
1potential applicants.
‘The extent of this prescreening is unknown. It was thought by those 
administering the licensing system to have been quite substantial in 
periods of severely restrictive licensing. It seems reasonable to accept 
this view. The criteria used in considering applications for goods in 
this category became widely known amongst the business community. It was 
not the intention of the licensing authorities to hide from potential 
applicants, for example, that while licensing was at all s tringent, an 
application for an import licence was unlikely to be successful if a 
more or less comparable product was available from local production not 
greatly in excess of the comparable imported one. In many cases, there­
fore, where a local product was available under these conditions the appli­
cant would not find it worth while to apply for an import licence. Any 
incentive that existed would be offset by the knowledge that he would be 
involved in a substantial delay with small chance of s uccess. The practice 
of inflating requests is relevant, though to an unknown degree.
Even with the less ambitious objective of determining which 
domestic items were not protected by the controls on imports, demon­
strated by the underusage of quotas of directly competitive imports, 
the procedure is of only limited use. The restriction may still be 
effective, even though the quota is not fully used. This may be 
because the existence of restrictions on imports enables the local 
producer to exercise some degree of persuasion on the importer; be­
cause the importer finds that he is able to maximise profits by 
importing less than his quota; or it may be that geographical distances 
fragment the market such that some importers have unused quotas while 
others are undersupplied with importing entitlements.
It would be further complicated in individual cases by the sub­
stantial volume of changes of items from one method of control to 
another and by the fact that, at times, up to one third of specific 
quota items were included in ’Banks1 (see Chapter III) with some 
degree of interchangeability in the use of the licence.
Finally, data for specific quotas are, in general, not available
1in a tabulated form for the years before 1957.
‘With the reorganisation of the licensing system, which took 
place in 1956 and 1957, the methods of c ollecting and collating 
licensing statistics were substantially revised and the statistical 
staff considerably enlarged. Consequently, from late 1957 and 
early 1958 more accurate and comprehensive collection and tabula­
tion of statistics was possible. For a summary of some of the 
changes made see Report oT Activities for Collectors of Customs. 
1957,58. Department of Customs and Excise, Canberra, pp.67-8.
A second approach to measuring the extent of the demand for 
imports frustrated by the controls could be through its reflection 
in prices. If for each item on which controls had been imposed, 
prices of both the locally produced and imported article were avail­
able in continuous series, changes in the margin between the two 
prices could represent a reasonable indicator of changes in the inten­
sity of protection being received by local industries from controls on 
imports. The concurrent existence of tariffs would not present partic­
ular difficulties in this case, since the margin then to be considered 
would be that between the local price and the imported price plus the 
tariff.^
There are unfortunately two major disadvantages to this approach. 
The first is that there are only veiy limited sources of price data 
available in a published or otherwise accessible form in Australia.
A certain amount of price data is available in trade journals but 
this tends to be largely related to building materials, domestic
"‘Such an index would have a number of limitations. For example, 
if internal prices were not c ompletely flexible, and shortages, 
unofficial rationing, long order lists, etc., were at all widespread, 
the resultant index could be misleading. Moreover, such an index, 
while it could be reasonably valid as an indicator in the case of 
individual products or industries, would be less valid in the 
aggregate, e.g., the difference in prices may be due entirely to 
higher raw material costs which resulted directly from the controls 
on imports, and in fact such a measure would be subject to the same 
criticisms which have been levelled at the concept of ’’excess costs”, 
in discussions of tariff protection. See M.W.Corden, ’’The Calculation 
of the Cost of Protection”, Economic Record. Vol. XXXIII, No.64, 
pp.29-51; A.J.Reitsma, ’’The ^ Excess Costs’ of a Tariff and Their 
Measurement”, Economic Record. Vol. 37, No.80, pp. 4-42—455•
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electrical appliances, foodstuffs etc., a substantial part of it 
being related to goods which are not important traded items. Series 
in trade journals also tend to be changed to a different basis at 
fairly frequent intervals. Further difficulties arise when attempt­
ing to identify many of the items in the import statistics or in over-
1seas trade journals because of different trade names etc.
More importantly, the second difficulty is that the use of data 
for price changes obtained from such sources could be misleading.
The data provided is normally the official price list of the trade 
association. Frequently competition between sellers takes place on 
the basis of discounts on the list price. Substantial changes could 
take place in the selling price for a product without being reflected 
in the index. For many items, particularly items of machinery and 
equipment, the selling price may or may not include a variety of non 
price factors such as free servicing, provision of technical advice, 
etc. Not infrequently the selling price might be substantially differ­
ent from the economic price. Similarly, comparisons of price movements 
of goods which are not more or less basic commodities can also be mis­
leading because of quality changes, etc. We concluded, therefore, that 
an index of protection was not a practical proposition.
■*'*Unit value data which are available from Secondary Industry Bulletins 
over a fairly wide range of commodities, while generally satisfactory 
for some purposes would not be sufficiently accurate for the purpose 
of comparison of actual prices. This also applies to unit values of 
imports which would necessarily have to be a major source of import 
price data. The problem of identifying sufficiently c©mparable items 
would also arise.
16't
An index of import control in the United Kingdom from 1945 to
11958 has been produced , but this index, sometimes referred to as
2an 1index of control’ , is essentially an index of the coverage of the 
controls on imports and does not measure their intensity. In a more 
detailed way the index reflects data analogous to that in Table 
III-3 except that adjustments have been made for discrimination by 
source of imports. The relationship of movements in the index, and 
its subindexes, generally bear only loose relationships to movements
3in the volume and source of imports". It will be apparent from the 
discussion in Chapters III and IV and in the present chapter that 
such an index would have limited analytical value, at least in the 
context of the Australian licensing system.
The second way in which we could seek answers to the questions 
we are asking and the one we are forced to take is less direct. This 
involves an examination of what happened during the period in which 
the controls were operating and then attempting to assess the extent 
to which the observed changes may be explained by factors other than 
the controls on imports; the presumption may then be made that the 
unexplained part is in some way related to the controls on imports.
"■’M.F.W.Hemming, C.M.Miles and G.F.Ray, MA Statistical Summary 
of the Extent of Import Control in the United Kingdom Since the 
War", Review of Economic Studies. Vol.KXVI (2), no.70, (Feb*1959), 
pp.75-109*
‘National Institute Economic Review. no.S (March I960), p.lB.
o'Hemming, Miles and Ray, op.cit. p.99*
165
In part this is along the lines of the approach suggested by Dr. 
Corden who argued that, since it was not possible to separate the 
effects of tariffs and direct import controls, an approximate measure 
of the extent of protection provided by the two measures together 
would be obtained by observing the extent of output expansion which 
took place while they were both in operation.
There are a number of reasons why this would only be a vexy 
incomplete answer to the question of the effect of the controls on 
imports on the domestic industries concerned even accepting, as did 
Dr« Corden, that we would have to ignore the effects of the controls 
on total demand. Even if we consider only the longer term movements, 
and thereby avoid the problems of the short term inelasticities of 
supply - which may in fact be of fairly long duration - the answers 
such a measure will provide would be very imperfect. First, it 
assumes that in the longer run competition within the industry is 
sufficiently active for the benefits of the reduced competition from 
imports to be taken out in terms of output rather than in higher 
profits per unit. This is clearly an assumption of some importance 
and one to which we shall give some attention.
Second, it assumes a situation in which no other factors of 
major importance change. An industry may, in fact, be prevented from 
declining. Although showing no increase, the level of its output
II ~
Research Seminar on Australia^ Imports, op.cit.« p*5*
may be substantially above that which would have obtained in the 
absence of the controls.
It is also assumed in this type of approach that the important 
effects may be identified in directly competitive industries. The 
argument in Chapter VI will make it apparent that demand is redirect­
ed to all domestic industries; it is not necessarily the case that
an import competing industry is an industry which produces an import- 
1able product. It may be reasonable to accept as a working hypothe­
sis, however, that products which are technically directly substitu­
table are also more directly in the line of demand substitution, but 
it is clearly subject to many qualifications.
Clearly, therefore, we could expect the response of the industries 
receiving incidental protection from the controls to differ from 
industry to industry, even if the protective incidence of the controls 
were more or less uniform. We must expect further differences to 
arise from the variation, from product to product, in the severity of 
the controls on directly competing products. In addition, of course, 
each industry will be affected differently by changes in other factors 
determining the extent to which demand turns to overseas or domestic 
supplies.
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For example, the closest substitute for imported weatherboard 
timber may be bricks or asbestos cement rather than domestically 
produced timber. Producers of woollen textiles would have been 
influenced indirectly by the restrictions on imports of cotton 
textiles and textiles of synthetic fibres.
In Chapters XI and XV we shall consider various aspects of the 
experience of secondary industry during the period. The balk of 
Australian imports are manufactured goods* Imports of goods, which 
if available from domestic sources would be the products of Austra­
lian manufacturing industry constituted about 80 per cent, of total
1imports over the period. Conseo±uently, the immediate effects of a 
general restriction on the supply of imports may be expected to be 
seen in the supply of, and demand for, manufactured goods. Moreover, 
it is inevitable that consideration of the effects of the direct con­
trol on import competing industries must be concerned largely with 
secondary industry. This does not mean that other sectors of the 
economy were not affected in an important way by the controls on 
imports. It simply reflects the fact that we are able to attempt to 
provide answers to only a few of the many questions which arise out 
of the experience of the direct controls on imports.
Before explaining in more detail the nature of our examination 
of the experience of secondary industry under the protection provided 
by the direct controls on imports it will be useful, as a means of 
placing the effects of the controls in perspective, to consider some 
aggregative aspects of controls on imports. It is also hoped to 
obtain answers to some questions which have arisen in our earlier 
discussion.
Table VTI-5« The notes to the table of market shares make it 
clear that this would under-estimate slightly the proportion which 
imports of this nature represent of the total.
No attempt has been made to estimate by how much demand for 
imports was effectively frustrated by the controls on imports. There 
have been no years in the post war period which could be regarded, in 
some way, as normal and consequently satisfactory as a basis for such 
estimates; using the pre-war experience as a guide would be basing 
estimates on conditions in what was virtually a different economy.
Apart from this, assumptions would be necessary regarding the condi­
tions which would exist in the remainder of the economy in the absence 
of the controls. One might expect the controls on imports to have 
been of sufficient magnitude to affect the total level of demand and 
hence the demand for imports. One would, therefore, either have to 
make a ceteris paribus assumption or attempt to take into account the 
effects of all other autonomous and induced changes in import demand.
Any estimates of this nature would clearly be hypothetical. Some 
indication of the probable direction and possible orders of magnitude 
of the effective restriction of imports may be helpful in placing the 
subsequent discussion in perspective.
As we have seen, none of the post war years can be considered 
’normal' since all were affected to a greater or lesser extent by 
import controls, inflationary pressures or depressed demand internally. 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps possible to argue that the effects of import 
controls and the shortages of supplies and shipping space in 1950-51 
roughly offset the effect of inflationary pressures internally. If we 
compare the ratio of imports to G.N.P. in 1950-51 with the same ratio
for 1960-61 we observe that despite some abnormal importing in the
1latter year there was a considerable decline in the ratio, from
some 23 per cent, in 1950-51 to some 17 per cent, in 1960-61. If we
assume the excessive imports in 1960-61 to be about £80m. f.o.b. a
normal level of imports would have been about £1139m. or a little over
215 per cent, of G.N.P. for the year.
Suppose now that we draw a straight line between two points
representing the ratios for these two years. Since the excess of
expenditure of income that gives rise to the deficit on the balance
of payments we shall calculate the level of imports indicated by this
3straight line on the basis of gross domestic expenditure. Subtract­
ing these notional import figures (shown in column (3) of Table VII-l)
1.
It is true that 1950-51 is somewhat higher than comparable figures 
for the only post war years. There were substantial shortages of 
imported goods in many of these years in addition to which the move­
ment in relative prices in the post war period was strongly against 
Australia.
2.
See A.R.Hall, ’’The Full Employment Demand for Imports, 1962-63", 
Economic Record, Vol*3S, No.81, pp.111-113« While Dr. Hall does not 
attempt to quantify the total abnormal importing in 1960-61 there is 
little doubt that, provided one accepts his arguments, the £80n. reduc­
tion made above is a conservative one.
3.
Since in some way the propensity to import is considered to represent 
a structural feature related to income it was thought more appropriate 
to use this propensity in relation to the expenditure data, rather than 
calculate the notional import proportions on the basis of gross domestic 
expenditure in 1950-51 and 1960-61. The results would be little diff­
erent. They would have been different if the notional proportions had 
been applied to gross notional product data which are as one would expect, 
since the expenditure figures take some account of what consumers try 
to do with their income. Notional imports as a proportion of G.N.P. are 
higher in 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1956-57 but lower in all other years.
we o b ta in  th e  r e s u l t s  in  column (5) of Table V II-1 . 
Table V II-1
A ctual and N otional Im port Demand: 1952-53 to  1959-60»
Year Gross Domestic Im ports N otional import D iffe ren ce  between
Expenditure c . i . f . Demand, N otional Im port De-
£m. £m. £m. % mand and A ctual Im ports
c . i . f . <£in# c • 1 • f  •
(1) ....(2) ( 3) ( 4) (5)
1952-53 3956 590 849 21.5 -259
1953-54 4479 755 927 20.7 -172
1954-55 5071 938 1011 19.9 -  73
1955-56 5432 926 1039 19.1 -113
1956-57 5537 825 1014 I 8.3 -189
1957-58 5892 910 1035 17.7 -125
1958-59 6297 911 1055 16.9 -144
1959-60 6994 1075 1127 16.1 -  52
Source: ( l)  White Paper, n a t io n a l  Income and Expenditure
(2) Oversea Trade B u lle t in s
( 3) -  ( 5) See t e x t .
These f ig u re s  bo not p u rp o rt to  re p re se n t th e  e x te n t o f th e  
demand f r u s t r a te d  by im port c o n tro ls . N ev erth e less  th e  d i r e c t io n  of 
th e  y e a r ly  movements shown does accord  w ith  what our i n tu i t i o n  and, 
f o r  some y e a rs , th e  arguments in  subsequent ch ap te rs  su g g est.
The f ig u re s  in  column ( 5) of th e  ta b le  probably  exaggera te  th e  
e x ten t of th e  gap between a c tu a l  im ports and th e  le v e l  which would 
have been reached in  th e  absence of im port l ic e n s in g  d u ring  1952-53?
s in ce  t h a t  y e a r was a f fe c te d  by a r e l a t iv e ly  low le v e l  of in te r n a l
1
demand and a r e la t iv e ly  h igh  le v e l  of s to c k s . I t  i s  p o s s ib le ,
' ‘Which, of course, may have been low er in  th e  absence o f th e  c o n tro ls  
o r some measure having s im ila r  e f f e c t s  in  r e d ir e c t in g  expend itu re  onto 
home produced goods.
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however, th a t  the  •exaggeration may not be s u b s ta n t ia l  s ince th e re  
was a g en era l d ec lin e  in  im port p r ic e s  in  th a t  y e a r , both abso lu te  
and r e la t iv e  to  dom estic p r ic e s .
The f ig u re  f o r  1952-53 i s  perhaps somewhat h igh  in  view of the 
r e l a t i v e ly  low le v e l  of in te rn a l  a c t i v i ty ;  the 1953-54 f ig u re  is  
a lso  p o s s ib ly  a l i t t l e  h ig h . In  g e n e ra l, how ever,the f ig u re s  fo r  
the subsequent y ea rs  r e f l e c t  the d i r e c t io n  o f the movement in  the 
s e v e r i ty  o f the r e s t r i c t i o n  of im p o rts . The n o tio n a l f ig u re  fo r  
1955-56 i s  p robab ly  lower th an  the amount of im port demand re d ire c te d  
in  th a t  y ear in  view of the buoyant c o n d itio n s  in te r n a l ly  during 
1954-55 and fo r  most o f 1955-56. S tock le v e l s ,  ad m itted ly , rose during 
the y ear b u t w hile we are  unaware o f the e x te n t to  which th ese  con -^ 
s i s te d  o f im ported goods, the bulk  of the in c rease  was p robab ly  in  
lo c a l ly  produced goods. D espite the in te n s i f i c a t io n  of the r e s t r i c t i o n s
1.
Lundberg and H i l l  suggested  a f ig u re  o f £100m. f . o .b .  ( £ l l l m . c . i . f .) 
as the  e x te n t to  which im port demand was re s t r a in e d  by the c o n tro ls  in  
1953-54» ( ’’A u stra lia*  s Long-Term Balance o f Payments’1, l o c . c i t ,  p .46) .  
They a lso  e s tim a te d  normal im ports in  1954-55 as  £835m. (£ 9 2 4 & » c .i.f .) 
and £895m. (£ 9 9 0 m .c .i .f .)  in  1955-56. These were e s tim a te d  to  be the 
le v e ls  o f  im ports on the assum ption th a t  th e re  were no im port r e s t r i c ­
t io n s ,  reasonab le  balance in  the in te rn a l  economy and no abnormal 
s to ck  movements. 1953-54 was assumed to  f i t  these  requ irem en ts w ith  
the  ex cep tio n  o f the e x is ten c e  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on im p o rts . The y ears  
o th e r than  1953-54 re p re se n t e s tim a te s  of d i f f e r e n t  m agnitudes, i . e .  
no t sim ply the demand f r u s t r a t e d  by the c o n tro ls ,  s ince th e re  were 
c le a r ly  in f la t io n a ry  p re s su re s  w ith in  the  economy. The e s tim a te  fo r  
1953-54 was based la rg e ly  on an exam ination of movements in  quota 
le v e ls  fo r  non d o l la r ,  non Japanese lic e n s in g  during the y e a r . They 
d id  no t s p e c i f ic a l ly  c o n sid e r the r e s t r i c t i o n s  on d o l la r  im ports -  
presum ably assuming, as we d id  fo r  ano ther purpose , t h a t  the d o l la r  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  were d iv e rs io n a ry  r a th e r  than  d i r e c t ly  r e s t r i c t i v e .  The 
changes in  d o l la r  im ports over th e  p e rio d  suggest th a t  t h i s  assum ption 
may n o t be com pletely  j u s t i f i e d  and th a t  some in c rease  in  t h e i r  
e s tim a te  would be j u s t i f i e d .
17 2
in  1956 the le v e l  of in te r n a l  demand had been s u b s ta n t ia l ly  dampened
down by the economic m easures o f the  'L i t t l e  Budget* o f March o f th a t
y ea r and the f r u s t r a te d  demand in  1956-57 may have been s u b s ta n t ia l ly
g re a te r  th an  in  1955-56. The movement in  1958-59 corresponds w ith
the  in c re a se d  p ressu re  on the l ic e n s in g  a d m in is tra tio n  d iscu ssed  in
the fo llow ing  ch ap te r; the p re ssu re  in  1958-59 which was b u ild in g  up
tow ards the end o f the y e a r  continued  in to  the  fo llow ing  y e a r ; the
e f f e c t  o f the  rem aining r e s t r i c t i o n s  on im ports fo r  the  f i r s t  e ig h t
months o f the y ear was p robab ly  g re a te r  th an  th a t  suggested  by the 
•1
n o tio n a l f ig u r e .
Even though th ese  f ig u re s  have l i t t l e  meaning in  them selves, they  
do su g g es t some o rd ers  o f m agnitude. We know l i t t l e  about the  s ize  
o f the m arg inal p ro p e n s ity  to  im port in  A u s tra lia  -  and i t  i s  problem­
a t i c a l  w hether, even i f  such a p a ra n e te r  were m easurable fo r  some p a s t  
p e r io d , i t  would have much re levance  fo r  any p e rio d  o th e r th an  th a t  to  
which i t  r e fe r re d ;  under a c o n sta n t c o n tro lle d  le v e l  o f im ports, there  
would alm ost c e r ta in ly  be a co n sid erab le  v a r ia t io n  from y e a r to  y ear 
in  th e  le v e l  o f im port demand d iv e r te d  to  dom estic p ro d u c tio n .
S im ila r ly , the somewhat overworked average im port p ro p e n s ity  can 
only  be a very  rough in d ic a to r  -  and to  assume th a t  i t  rem ains f a i r l y  
c o n s ta n t o r moves s te a d i ly  in  a p a r t i c u la r  d i r e c t io n  i s  to  assume an
r........
In  making com parisons between im port and income d a ta  on 
a y e a r ly  b a s is  the e f f e c t  o f the tim e la g  between o rdering  
and re c e iv in g  im ported goods needs to  be borne in  mind.
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absence o f p r ic e  e l a s t i c i t y  in  im port demand. This may be a workable 
h y p o th esis  where th e re  i s  no lo c a l  p ro d u c tio n  o f a p roduct w ith  a 
f a i r l y  in e la s t i c  demand. Where lo c a l  s u b s t i tu te s  are a v a ila b le  th i s  
i s  an in v a lid  assum ption. M oreover, the l a r g e r  the dom estic in d u s try  
producing  im portab les  becomes, the more p r ic e  e l a s t i c  in p o r t  demand 
w i l l  become.
N e v erth e le ss , d e sp ite  the  many q u a l i f ic a t io n s  a tta c h e d  to  the 
f ig u re s  in  Table V II-1 , th e y  do suggest th a t  th e re  has been a declin e  
in  the  Im port p ro p e n s ity  during  the p e rio d . A dm ittedly the  two y ears  
on which th e  a c tu a l im port p ro p e n s i t ie s  were based were abnorm al, y e t 
the e s tim a te  o f the abnormal in p o r ts  in  I96O-6I would seem to  have 
been on the  co n serv a tiv e  s id e . We s h a l l  give fu r th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n  to  
th i s  a t  a l a t e r  s ta g e .
I t  would not seem to  be too  f a r  wrong to  suggest th a t  something 
of the  o rd e r  o f £250-300m. would have been the  maximum in  any one 
y e a r , w ith  the lower f ig u re  being more probable th an  the  h ig h e r.
Since i t  seems reasonab le  to accep t th a t  something o f the o rd e r of 
a t  l e a s t  £100-200m. o f im port demand was in e f fe c t iv e  during sev e ra l 
of the  y e a rs  o f the p e r io d , and p a r t i c u la r ly  during  1952-53? 1955-56 
and 1956-57, we need to  c o n sid e r where the e f f e c t s  of th i s  r e d ire c t io n  
of demand were f e l t  w ith in  the economy. The d a ta  in  Tables V II-2  and
T.
This f ig u re  seems c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  Government’ s own view: "We 
have by v a rio u s  a r t i f i c i a l  o rd e rs  excluded from A u s tra lia  -  what? -  
perhaps £200,000,000 o r  £300,000,000 o f im ports in  any one y e a r ."
Prime M in is te r  (M rM enzies). P a r l i  ament ary  D ebates, H .ofReps. V o l.9 , 
(1 2 .4 .1 9 5 6 ), P .1314.
V II-3  may a s s i s t  in  throw ing some l ig h t  on t h i s .  Table V II-2  
p rov ides some estim a te s  o f n a t io n a l  expend itu re  aggregates in  con­
s ta n t  1960-61 p r ic e s .
Table VII-;
D isp o s itio n  of R esources: A u s tra lia  -  1951-52 to  1960-61 
Constant 1960-61 p r ic e s
Year ended Ju n e :-
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Gross N a tio n a l 
P roduct 5093 4872 5235 5758 5969 5975 6167 6771 7016 7208
Consumption
P erso n a l 3235 3141 3395 3734 3823 3797 4003 4111 4446 4543
Government 601 636 601 617 646 646 660 688 718 739
F in a n c ia l
T“| i . Ö1 59 59 63 68 69 69 71 81 82E n te rp r ise
T o ta l Consumption
3897 3836 4055 4414 4537 4512 4732 4870 5245 5364
Investm ent 
P r iv a te : of 
which 1365 588 967 1234 1198 1026 1092 1272 1396 1511
O ther c a p i ta l  
investm ent 379 303 341 369 374 358 379 385 429 460
Stocks 419 -170 84 211 165 52 40 154 105 183
Government 587 507 509 523 516 501 523 561 579 585
T o ta l in v e s t -
rnent 1952 1095 1476 1757 1714 1527 1615 1833 1975 2066
T o ta l Consumption 
and investm ent
5849 4931 5531 6171 6251 6039 6347 6703 7220 7460
D e f i c i t (- )  o r Surplus 
(+) on C urrent 
Account -756 -  59 -246 - 4I 3 -282 -  64 -180 68 -204  -252
Source and N otes: See over
Notes to Table VII-2
Estimates of gross national product at constant 
prices made up from component expenditure items adjusted 
to 1960-61 prices*
Consumption items: deflated with appropriate sub­
indexes of official price indexes.
Investment items: deflated with price series 
constructed for the purpose.
Stocks: deflated for annual changes.
A comparison between the gross national product 
estimate presented here and an alternative estimate is 
provided in Table VII (Ft.note)-l.
Source: Private estimates kindly made available to me by 
Mr. G. Feirclough, Statistical Officer, Department
of Trade*
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E stim ates of expend itu re  agg reg ates  a t  co n stan t p r ic e s  can only o f f e r
a very  crude in d ic a t io n  of th e  movements o f r e a l  re so u rce s ; a t  th e
same tim e th e re  a re  s u b s ta n t ia l  l im i ta t io n s  a tta ch e d  to  d a ta  on a
c u rre n t va lue  b a s is .  We s h a l l  th e re fo re  d isc u ss  the  p e rio d  b r i e f ly
in  term s of th e  co n sta n t va lue  d a ta  bu t u s in g  th e  c u rre n t va lue  d a ta
1
provided  in  Table V II-3  as a check on th e  conclusions drawn.
One p o in t in  connexion w ith  comparisons between th e  two s e ts  of 
f ig u re s  should be no ted . The d e f i c i t s  shown on c u rre n t account in  
Table V II-2  d i f f e r  q u ite  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  from th o se  in  Table VTI-3, th a t  
i s ,  they  d i f f e r  q u ite  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  from th e  d e f i c i t  a c tu a l ly  experienced  
in  any p a r t i c u la r  y e a r .  This i s  to  be expected s in ce  expo rts  and
1.
Comparison may be made between th e  c o n stan t p r ic e  g ross n a tio n a l 
product f ig u re s  p re sen ted  in  Table V II-2  w ith  CockbuirMs e s tim a te s  
of r e a l  G.N.P. reproduced in  P.H.Karmel end M.Brunt, The S tru c tu re  
of the  A u s tra lia n  Economy, Melbourne 1962, p*8. The fo llo w in g  
Table shows annual changes in  th e  two e s tim a te s  of G.N.P. in  co n stan t 
p r ic e s .  The percen tage  f o r  each y e a r  shown re p re se n ts  th e  percen tage  
change on th e  p rev ious y e a r ;
Table V II (F t .n o te ) -1 :
Comparison of E stim ates of Real G .N .P.: Annual P ercen tage Changes
fe a r  ended June:
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961
Cockbum -1 3 6 6 5 2 2 7 4 2
Table V II-1  . . -4 8 9 4 - 3 10 4 3
The only y e a r  o f s u b s ta n t ia l  d if f e re n c e  between th e  two e s tim a te s  i s  
1952-53; t h i s  i s  perhaps no t s u rp r is in g , bo th  because of th e  ra p id  
p r ic e  movements -  and v a r ia t io n s  in  p r ic e  movements -  du rin g  t h i s  
p e rio d  and th e  la rg e  v a r ia t io n s  in  s to ck  le v e ls  fo r  w hich s a t i s f a c to r y  
e s tim a te s  a re  alm ost im p o ssib le .
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imports are valued in terms of 1960-61 prices; the difference will 
largely represent the difference in the import purchasing power of 
one unit of volume of exports - in other words, the movement in the 
terms of trade.
The data in Table VII -2 suggest that there was a small decline 
in consumption in 1952-53# but the major decline was in gross private 
investment. Some decline in consumption may also have taken place in 
the previous year despite the considerably higher money value of con­
sumption and was less than fully offset by the increase in public author­
ity expenditure on current goods and services. This would seem to 
suggest that the excess of expenditure in 1951-52 was primarily a 
result of the increase in gross private investment, although the 
increase in government investment was also a contributing factor.
The increases as such were not as substantial as the deficit on current 
account might suggest but they were made in the context of a decline in 
output resulting primarily from the fall in export income.
While private investment in fixed capital equipment was at a high 
level in 1951-52, the movements in gross private investment in 1951-52 
included a substantial increase in non farm stocks. In 1952-53 there 
was a substantial running down of these. The difficulties associated 
with valuation of stocks are well known and they apply similarly in 
the case of estimates of stock movement deflated for price changes. 
Moreover, we do not know what proportion of stocks consisted of imported 
and what proportion of home produced goods. However, there was clearly
a considerable increase in stocks of imported goods in 1951-52. 
part of it voluntary accumulation but part of it involuntary.
It is not possible to say how much of the stock accumulation in 
1951-52 was intended; certainly there would seem to have been a sub­
stantial involuntary accumulation of stocks both of imported and 
domestic goods* However, there was probably also a considerable amount 
of voluntary accumulation both of imported and domestic goods* The 
fact that prices were rising fairly rapidly would provide an incentive 
for investing in stocks. Moreover, supplies of many goods were becoming 
available for the first time for many years. The imported goods compo­
nent of the stock figures, however, was probably substantially an unin­
tended investment (See Chapter XVTl). Some involuntary stocking of 
domestically produced goods probably took place in some industries, 
such as textiles, as competition from imports increased towards the 
end of 1951-52.
Similarly, the running down of stocks in 1952-53 probably included 
both intended running down of the present accumulation of stocks of the 
previous year, as well as some forced reduction as supplies were 
reduced as a result of the restrictions on imports. The role of the
#The picture in 1952-53 would vary considerably within the local 
industry. Tightness of credit as well as the abnormal size of stocks 
would have forced stocks to be run down in many cases, the low level 
of demand in many areas would have resulted in involuntary stock 
accumulation by many manufacturers. The pattern is confused by the 
tendency for retailers to reduce their stocks and force the stock 
holding function onto the manufacturers. These features may not have 
been fully offset by the increase in demand in the later part of
1952-53. ‘
control of imports was twofold. It may have forced some reduction 
in stock levels in some areas,* it seems certain, however, that stocks 
would have been reduced considerably in 1952-53 in the absence of the 
controls; their main role was probably to allow stocks to be reduced 
without substantial loss* (See Chapter XVTIl)• Expectations will 
have been improved to some extent by the imposition of the controls 
which may have lessened the incentive to run down stocks immediately; 
the main stimulus to stock liquidation was the limited credit availab­
ility.
Private investment picked up in 1953-54 "but did not reach consid- 
able proportions until 1954-55* Consumption also rose considerably in 
1954-55 and there was a relatively large increase in non farm stocks - 
resulting in a fairly substantial deficit.
The second period of severe cuts in imports was 1955-56 and 1956-57. 
We shall discuss in a subsequent chapter some of the problems which 
were met in reducing imports over this period but reductions of some 
magnitude were enforced in both years* In 1955-56 there was an increase 
in consumption and the main contribution to meeting the demand diverted 
from imports seems to have come from increased output; stoctewere 
increased at a rate not greatly below that of the previous year. Out­
put increased only slightly in 1956-57; while there was some decline in 
personal consumption it does not seem ^o have been substantial. The 
main reduction in this year was in gross private investment where 
stocks increased much less than in the previous year; in addition there
LSI
seems to  have been a low er le v e l  o f investm ent in  o th e r  f ix e d  c a p i ta l  
equipment as w e ll as a re d u c tio n  in  th e  r a te  of p u b lic  a u th o r ity  
investm en t.
One in te r e s t in g  fe a tu re  of the  d a ta  i s  th e  r e la t iv e ly  low le v e ls  
of p r iv a te  investm ent d u ring  1955-56 to  1957-58« P r iv a te  investm ent 
in  o th e r  f ix e d  c a p i t a l  equipment was he ld  a t  a f a i r l y  co n stan t r a te  
w ith  only a sm all in c re a se  in  1958- 59, a lthough  s to ck s  were b u i l t  up 
to  some e x te n t in  th e  l a t t e r  y e a r . We s h a l l  co n sid e r th e  r e la t io n s h ip  
between th e  c o n tro ls  on im ports and investm ent in  a subsequent c h ap te r .
Now l e t  us c o n sid e r b r i e f ly  how t h i s  movement in  re so u rces  was 
brought abou t.
Table V II-A
V o lu n ta ry 1 Saving: 1950-51 to  1960-61
P erso n a l Savings (a) U n d is tr ib u te d  P r o f i t s T o ta l
1950-51 515 187 702
1951-52 436 122 558
1952-53 568 99 667
1953-54 466 207 673
1954-55 432 201 633
1955-56 483 181 664
1956-57 561 188 749
1957-58 29(4 177 471
1958-59 450 199 649
1959-60 389 299 688
1960-61 425 214 639
(a) Savings th rough  in su ran ce  funds and o th e r  p e rso n a l sav ings
Source: White Papers, N a tio n a l Income and E xpenditu re.
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From Table VII-4 we can see that there was a considerable 
increase in the level of personal saving in 1952-53# the net increase 
in saving constituting about a half of the increase in total personal 
disposable income. There was also a fairly substantial increase in 
personal saving in 1956-57 but it represented only about a fifth of 
the increase in personal disposable income. The increase in personal 
saving in 1952-53 was partly offset by a decrease in company saving; 
in 1956-57 company saving rose but the increase was small. It may be 
that the controls on imports in 1952-53 and in 1956-57 caused some, at 
least, of the additional personal saving in those years. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that the major factor was the low level of 
economic activity in those years and perhaps the psychological effect 
of a relatively high level of unemployment. Consumers and wage earners 
in particular tend to defer consumption expenditure and to save when 
the unemployment level rises* This may explain the much smaller 
increase in personal saving in 1955-56 when there were import restric­
tions and full employment; the fact that there was some increased 
saving may support the view that the controls did make some contribu­
tion to the increase in savings. The declining rate of voluntary 
saving, in real terns over the period in general, particularly the 
low level in 1957-5B made little contribution to the reduction in the 
excess of expenditure over income, which was reflected in the balance of 
payments at the time. Since the 1952-53 restrictions were imposed in 
a deflationary situation and the necessary supplies could be made
1.83
available in the short term from stocks, there was little inflation­
ä r  increase in prices and a consequent swing to profits. In fact, 
profits fell substantially as did undistributed profits. The situation 
in 1955-56 was different in that the situation was basically inflation­
ary when the controls were reimposed. While total company income rose 
from £5lSm. in 1954-55 to £547m. in 1955-56 this is not an increase of 
a magnitude to suggest a swing to profits of any significance; 
certainly, undistributed profits rose only slightly.
It would seem that the controls on imports did not lead to signi­
ficant increases in savings £  the time when they were imposed nor at 
times when there were substantial intensifications of the restrictions. 
Nor did they result in any increase in the level of personal saving 
during the period of their operation. The one possible exception to 
this is 1952-53 when personal saving rose quite substantially. While 
this was probably due, in pari:, to the restrictions it is probably 
true that the level of personal saving would have risen considerably 
in that year in the absence of the controls on imports, since personal 
saving seems to be greater when the level of economic activity is rela­
tively low. The contribution of the direct controls on imports to the 
disabsorption of resources in this sense was not substantial. Total 
Company saving increased relatively more than total personal saving 
during the period. While the controls may have contributed to increased 
company income, and we shall suggest in a later chapter that they did, 
1953-54 would seem to be the only year completely within the period of
18 k
the controls in which company saving increased substantially and 
which may, in part, be possibly attributable to the controls.
It seems apparent that, if the removal of the controls on imports 
in 1959-60 signified a structural adjustment of real expenditure levels 
with real income levels over the period, it was not brought about by a 
structural change in the voluntary saving habits of the community* It 
also suggests that the bulk of the redirected demand went into expendi­
ture on domestic goods and services rather than into voluntary saving.
ant
One of the import/beneficiaries of this redirected demand was, of 
course, secondary industry and in the remainder of the present chapter 
and in the following chapters we shall examine the response of 
secondary industry to this increase in demand.
One problem in relating the control of imports to secondary industry 
is the fact that import licensing was applied to commodities, and not 
to industries - certainly not ’industries’ in the statistical sense 
which are more or less arbitrarily defined groupings. Commodity data 
is available for a fairly wide area of secondary industry, although it 
is frequently not available in terns of both quantity and value: more­
over, much of it is in groupings of heterogeneous commodities for which 
unit value calculations are either meaningless or could be misleading. 
More importantly, even were it possible to calculate extensively price
IT
The high level of internal activity in 1959-60 leadsto increased 
company income and a sharp increase in undistributed profits.
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or unit value series, the interpretation of the significance of price 
changes would be somewhat speculative in the absence of a knowledge 
of changes in the costs of production, since the significant aspect in 
many respects is the margin of profit that the price contains* 
Consequently, for the present purpose we decided to work basically in 
terns of statistical industry classifications rather than in terms of 
commodities. While this has considerable advantages - sufficient, it 
is considered, to outweigh the disadvantages - these disadvantages are 
very real and need to be taken fully into account in considering the 
results.
We know that the imposition of quantitative controls on imports 
will have some effect on the total supply of a particular commodity - 
or product of an industry - and, in addition, it will affect signifi­
cantly the proportion of the total supplies of an industry product - 
imports plus local production - that the production of the local indus­
try represents. We can obtain some idea of the general response of 
local industry to the imposition of quantitative controls on imports by 
examining the movements in the shares of the total supplies of an 
industrial grouping of c oramodities represented respectively by the out­
put of the local industry and by imports.
Table VII-5 shows for each industry sub-class over the ten years 
from 1950-51 to 1959-60 the value of domestic output as a proportion 
of the sum of value of domestic output and the value of imports, the 
latter valued on the basis of the equivalent of the landed duty
186
paid price.
In the classification of imports according to competing industry 
subgroups we have included values of all imports which, if they were 
produced locally, would be included in the activities covered by the 
Secondary Industries Bulletin: that is, only those items were excluded 
which were the products of primary, mining or quarrying industries.
This basis was adopted for two reasons; first, the reduction in 
supplies of imported goods would not only encourage increased produc­
tion of existing lines, but also encourage production of lines not 
previously produced here. Second, for many items it is not clear
whether a directly competitive product is being produced locally at
2any particular time. Moreover, the problem of production which 
began during the period is avoided.
Figures were thus obtained for imports competitive with the 
output of a local industry - directly competitive, that is; indirectly 
they would be competitive with a wide range of items produced by other 
industry groups, but it is assumed that this indirect competition is
1.
The construction of this Table is discussed in more detail in 
A p p e n d i x T h e  c.i.f.e. valuation is discussed in Appendix H.A.
2.
With a few exceptions, production of manufactured goods in 
Australia is unregulated; statistical requirements do not include 
the provision of separate data for each product. Detailed commod­
ity data is published for less than one half of total output; 
much of this is in terms of value only or quantity only data.
Even an authority such as the Tariff Board frequently has to rely 
on evidence presented at its enquiries for information as to 
whether an item is being produced in Australia.
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only relevant to the total demand for a product and not for the share 
supplied from the alternative sources.
The market shares data presented in Table VTI-5 conceal some 
important movements in the separate components: thus a rise in the
percentage figure for any industiy could be a result of constant 
imports and increased local production, falling imports and constant 
local production, falling imports combined with rising local produc­
tion, or even rising imports, but a faster rising local production or 
vice versa. For these and other reasons given in the appendix, partic­
ularly that prices and price changes are ignored and that variations 
in raw material imports do not necessarily show up in the figures, 
these tables of changes in local industry*s contribution to total 
supplies cannot be taken to indicate accurately the extent of direct 
import replacement, although they may be a reasonable guide to areas 
where import replacement may have taken place. It must be stressed 
that these figures can only be approximations; the nature of the 
approximation is spelled out in more detail in the Appendix.
The second problem, that of excluding the effects of the other 
significant influences, can generally only be dealt with in consider­
ing individual cases, although the movements in tariff levels in a 
number of industries are dealt with in Chapter XIII, together with more 
general aspects of tariff protection during the period. In Chapter XV 
we also attempt to draw some general conclusions regarding the move­
ment in relative price levels for imported and domestically produced 
goods.
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We have already commented on the fact that prices and profits 
as well as the volume of output may have received protection from 
the controls on imports. It may be useful, then, to consider how this 
aspect of the investigation will be approached.
Available price indexes are insufficiently disaggregated for 
our purposes since we are interested in comparing the behaviour of 
two groups of industries within secondary industry - those in receipt 
of incidental protection from import licensing and those which did 
not benefit directly from the controls.
We shall, therefore, direct out attention to other sources of 
evidence of price behaviour under the shelter of the quantitative 
restriction of imports. In the event, the Tariff Board’s reports on 
its examinations of the protective needs of domestic industries pro­
vided a substantial amount of evidence on a number of aspects of our 
enquiry, including evidence of pricing policies and the level of 
competition within a number of industries. This source of informa­
tion, together with some other sources of relevance to particular 
industries, has the important advantage of overcoming the difficulties 
of interpretation of price data, since it often provides explicit 
information on profit levels and, particularly, profits per unit.
The use of evidence from Tariff Board hearings involves using 
evidence from a somewhat biased sample. A producer who is not only 
willing but able to adjust prices in order to remain competitive with 
imports will probably have no need to seek tariff protection and would
189
not therefore come within the scope of its enquiries. Similarly, the
.whatimplication here tends to be that producers who make no more than/the 
Tariff Board judges to be ’reasonable' profits have not taken advan­
tage of the limitation on imported supplies to raise prices, while 
companies that have made more than 'reasonable' profits have in fact 
'ridden the market'. While this will often be the case - sufficiently 
often it is judged to justify the use of this evidence - it is not 
necessarily the case. There are good reasons why under the same condi­
tions, e.g. levels of tariff protection, severity of import licensing, 
tvjo firms will earn considerably divergent profit rates.
While the evidence from the Tariff Board reports - and from other 
sources - provides some guidance in respect of the response of business­
men to reductions in import competition, this evidence does not enable 
the importance ofthis aspect of the restrictions to be placed in 
full perspective. For one thing, it concentrates on those cases where 
the evidence is fairly clearly indicative of the increases in prices
1.
It is widely accepted that the Tariff Board considers net profits 
on funds employed of up to 10 per cent, as 'reasonable1. This would 
appear to be the implication of the following comment by the Board: 
"Current bounty legislation provides broadly that industries .... 
assisted by bounty will not be paid bounty that will result in 
profits, before tax, exceeding ten per cent, on funds employed ... 
This legislation ... is an indication of the view of Parliament 
on the question of profits in assisted or protected industries," 
Tariff Board, Annual Report 1952-53* p.7. Profits on funds 
employed provide no indication of the profit per unit which is 
reflected in the price of the product.
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which took place under the shelter of the restrictions. Moreover, it 
is limited to consideration of cases where import licensing in fact 
did take or was claimed to have taken, the place of the tariff as a 
means of protecting the local industry from overseas competition.
These two forms which protection under the direct control on 
imports could take, are really only different in degree but are import­
ant in consideration of evidence provided by Tariff Board Reports.
In the first case, protection from overseas competition enables the 
local industry to produce and to earn a normal or reasonable rate of 
profit on its output. This is generally the protection that the 
tariff aims to provide. If additional protection is provided the 
industry is able to produce more or earn higher unit profit on its 
existing production. When the additional protection, provided in 
this case by import licensing, is removed, the local industiy may 
or may not be able to produce at satisfactory output and profit 
levels with the existing tariff protection alone. If it is unable to 
do this it may apply for further tariff protection - these, broadly, 
are the cases from which the evidence to be presented has been taken.
If it is able to operate at a reduced but nevertheless ’reasonable*
(in Tariff Board terms) level of profits, it will be unlikely to go 
to the Tariff Board. No evidence will, therefore, be available from 
Tariff Board reports of the extent to which the licensing of imports 
has merely enabled the local industry to increase its level of 
profits, except where the Tariff Board examination is initiated for
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reasons other than an application by the local industry for
1additional protection*
In practice, of course, the distinction is far less clear cut.
In any particular industry receiving tariff protection where there 
is more than one producer, levels of profit are unlikely to be the 
same. One producer may be in the position where the protection 
afforded to him by import licensing was not necessary for operation 
on a profitable basis, and merely enabled him to operate more profit­
ably* Another firm in the same industry may have found upon the removal
able
of import licensing that it was unable to maintain a profit/level of
operation. Such a situation, of course, implies imperfections in the
system, otherwise one would expect the more profitable firm to expand
its share of the market at the expense of the less profitable firms.
Moreover, it is also the case that in a number of industries
examined by the Tariff Board, no mention is made of the profits earned
2by the applicant industry.'’ In some cases it seems reasonable to infer
*"Since the war, the great majority of inquiries by the Board owe 
their origins to representations made by firms for increased tariff 
protection. The other principal source of inquiries is the Depart­
ment (of Trade) itself. Inquiries originated by the Department 
usually involve By-law questions”• G.J.Hall, The Australian Tariff 
Board, unpublished Master of Commerce thesis, Univ. of Melbourne 1958, 
p.42. Increasingly in recent years, the Board is recommending a 
further review of the protected needs of an industry after two or three 
years. Where the recommendation is accepted these reviews are initi­
ated by the Department of Trade.
2."“'The BoardTs concern with profit levels within applicant industries, 
appears to vary according to the composition of the Tariff Board.
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from the evidence that there is sufficient price competition in the 
domestic market to limit excessive profit taking. In others it is 
not possible to deduce whether the applicants have taken a higher 
profit during the period of the restriction or not. If the profit 
taken were substantially above that judged to be reasonable by the 
Board one could perhaps assume that it would be commented upon by 
the Board in more cases than not. It may be, however, that the rest­
rictions enabled a firm to operate at a reasonable level of profits, 
when in the absence of restrictions it would have earned little or no 
profit. Again, the intensity of internal competition might be such 
that, in the absence of import restrictions, profits were lower than 
the Board’s ’reasonable’ level, but moved up to this level under the 
shelter of the restrictions. In these cases, also, the industry could 
possibly expect to receive some additional assistance from the Tariff 
Board, and so seek a Tariff Board hearing. This discussion is sufficient 
to show that the evidence available from the reports of Tariff enquiries 
covers only a limited field. In an attempt to assess the overall signi­
ficance of businessmen’s pricing policies an examination was made of
1 *“ Often, however, the Board quotes an average level of profits for 
an industry, consisting of a number of producers, which is itself 
’reasonable’ when the implication is clearly that there are quite 
wide variations in individual profit levels. Moreover, the Board 
has noted on occasions that it does not know the level of profits 
taicen at the distribution level by subsidiaries or associate 
companies. (See, for example, Tariff Board Report, Pneumatic Tyres 
and Tubes. 30.3*1962, p.6). Prices in these cases may well be 
notional intercompany transfer prices, and there would clearly 
be an incentive to keep them relatively low.
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the ratios of gross profits to turnover in secondary industries,
The results which this enquiry revealed are presented in Chapter XV,
It may be useful to discuss at this stage some of the theoretical
and statistical considerations involved.
Annual statistics are published by the Commonwealth Statistician 
1 2
of value of output, the value of production and the value of salary
3
and wage payments for each of the industry groups in Table VI1-5,
If changes in stocks are ignored, the value of output can be 
considered equivalent to total turnover of the industry. The value 
of production (net value of output) in turn consists of salaries and 
wages paid plus overhead costs plus profits. Overhead costs in this 
case do not contain the wages and salaries of staff not directly involved 
in production - returns to which are usually considered part of overhead
1.
Defined by the Commonwealth Statistician as ”the value of goods 
manufactured or their value after passing through the particular 
process of manufacture and includes the amount received for repair 
work, work done on commission and receipts for other factory work.
The basis of valuation is the selling value of the goods at the 
factory, exclusive of all delivery costs, and charges and excise 
duties, but inclusive of bounty and subsidy payments to manufacturer 
of the finished article”. Introduction to Secondary Industries Bulletins. 
2.
Defined by the Commonwealth Statistician as ”the value added to raw 
materials by the process of manufacture. It is calculated by deduct­
ing from the value of the factory output the value (at factory) of 
materials used, containers and packing, power, fuel and light used, 
tools replaced and materials used in repairs to plant (but not 
depreciation changes),” Ibid.
3.
Excludes amounts drawn by working proprietors, but includes manager­
ial and clerical staff, chemists, draughtsmen,etc.
costs - since these are already included in the salary and wages item.
It contains items such as maintenance of buildings, depreciation,
insurance, pay roll tax, income tax, advertising, interest payments,
bad debts and similar sundry charges. Movements in these items are
assumed to be random in relation to the purpose of the exercise.
The value of production less salary and wage payments, therefore,
consists of overhead costs plus profit. As a percentage of the value
1of output it is equivalent to the unit gross profit on turnover.
In other than questions of price theory, we tend to think of 
profit in relation to capital funds employed or to shareholders’ funds. 
The principal difference arises from the fact that the capital to 
output ratios differ considerably from industry to industry, depend­
ing upon the nature of the production process, and type of raw mater­
ials used. Other things being equal, Marshall tells us, the rate of 
profit on capital will not differ greatly between industries but 
'profit on the turnover’ may vary widely from one industry to another
1.
Considerable use has been made overseas of this concept, based 
on equivalent statistical data, e.g. S.C.Tsiang, The Variation of 
Real Wages and Profit Margins, London 1947; M.Kalecki, Studies in 
Economic Dynamics. London 1942; J.Steindl, Maturity and Stagnation 
?n American Capitalism. Oxford 1952; J.C.R.Dow, ”An Analysis of the 
Generation of Price Inflation. A study of Cost and Price Changes 
in the United Kingdom, 1946-1954n> Oxford Economic Papers, (New 
Series), Vol.S, No.3 (September 1 9 5 6 9 » The only economist who 
appears to have made significant use of this approach in Australia 
is B.M.Cheek in "Profit Margins and Wage Shares in Australian Manu­
factures 1945-55”* Economic Record. Vol. XXXIII, no.65, (August 
1957), p.191 ff.
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"because it depends upon the length of time and amount of work
1
required for the turnover." There is therefore no basis for compar­
isons of absolute levels of unit gross profits between industries or 
industry groups.
The unit gross profit is, however, determined by the decision of 
the manufacturer when setting his prices, as to the amount which should 
be added to the direct or prime cost to make up the final selling price.
The method by which prices of the products of manufacturing indus­
tries are determined is basic to economic theory generally, and has been
the subject of considerable discussion and controversy in the 
2literature. It is generally accepted that the simple concepts of 
perfect competition theory need to be substantially amended to be 
relevant to manufacturing industry.
Understandably, perhaps, no general theory is satisfactory as an 
explanation of the pricing policies of businessmen. Full cost theories 
have been modified in a variety of ways to fit them into actual patterns 
displayed in the market with the result that, as Cheek has put it, ""full
1.
A.Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed,), London 1947, p.615.
2.
The following are just a few examples of the innumerable articles 
or books which have attempted to consider the subject from an 
empirical viewpoint: R.L.Hall and C.J.Hitch, "Price Theory and
Business Behaviour", Oxford Economic Papers. May 1939; reprinted in 
T.Wilson and P.W.S.Andrews, (Eds.J in Oxford Studies in the Price 
Mechanism, London 1951; A.R.Bums, The Decline of Competition,
New York 1936; P.W.S.Andrews, Manufacturing Business. London 1949*
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cost1 theory ranges from definitional stability of percentage gross 
margins to an explanation of the circumstances in which (the gross
-J
margin) may vary."
In their well known article Hall and Hitch define the full cost 
pricing principle in the following terms: "prime(or direct) cost per
unit is taken as the base, a percentage addition is made to cover over­
heads ... and a further conventional addition (frequently 10 per cent.)
2is made for profit." They ask themselves the question, "What then 
was the effect of ’competition’?" and the answer they give was that 
"in the main, it seemed to be to induce firms to modify the margin
3for profits which could be added to direct costs and overheads ..."
There are some ambiguities in this approach - for example, what 
happens when output expands, involving a change in unit prime costs? 
Nevertheless it is not inconsistent with the idea of prices being 
varied to meet changing demand conditions.
It is customary to refer to industrial prices as relatively rigid 
or inflexible. As a generalisation, however, it needs to be qualified 
to take account of a number of factors applicable to the Australian 
situation in the period under review. To the extent that prices have 
appeared to have remained relatively unchanged, this is in part more
IT
Cheek, op.cit., p.195
2.
Hall and Hitch, op.cit.. p.113*
Ibid.
3 -
in appearance than in reality, since in many cases, while list prices 
have remained unaltered, discounts and other forms of disguised price 
elements leave room for substantial price variations which are not 
easily apparent; again, it is true for many products only to a limited 
degree or for fairly short periods. Similarly;, the evidence of 
rigidity and inflexibility largely relates to the interwar period, where­
as the post war period in Australia has been more closely characterised 
by rapidly changing prime costs, so that even if the businessman’s 
preference were for more or less fixed or steady prices he has been 
forced to consider the price set more often than was probably the case 
in the interwar period in the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America.
After an examination of the pattern of movement in the unit gross 
profits in the United States in the interwar period, Tsiang concluded:
" The movement of profit margins in connection with the 
fluctuations of industrial activities is, therefore, to be 
explained chiefly by the changes in the prevailing psycholo­
gical attitude of the business executives, the policy and 
influence of the trade associations and such like, and the 
degree of tacit or explicit collusion among the firms.^”
In other words, he considers the general level of activity and the
degree of competition to be the major determinants of the movement of
profit margins rather than movements in costs. It will be noted that
1.
E.g., the six monthly intervals at which prices are set by the 
rubber manufacturers. See Tariff Board Report, Rubber Tyres and 
Tubes. 7.12.1955, p.9.
2.
S.C.Tsiang, loc.cit.. p.75
198
import competition is not a factor to which he attributes any
significance in his conclusions. This, it may be assumed, is because
of the limited part played by imports in meeting the market demand for
manufactured products within the United States.
Cheek’s investigations in the Australian market from 1945 to 1955
led him to the conclusion that the ’’balance of evidence would seem to
2lie in favour of demand based pricing." He adds a further conclusion 
on the analysis of the period that,
’There is, however, no evidence that businessmen success­
fully ’rode the market*, in the sense of widening gross margins 
during the years of high demand. That this ’riding’ did not 
occur would seem to be the result not of widespread cost based 
pricing, but of the operation of various supply and demand 
factors which determined the pattern of prices and profit margins 
in manufactures, and resulted in parallel movements in unit 
direct costs and in prices.3 ”
We shall consider this conclusion in more detail after making our 
own analysis in Chapter XV of the movements in unit gross profits for 
the period from 1950-51 to 1960-61.
1.
Of the Bureau of Labour Statistics Interindustry Classification 
of 164 main manufacturing industry subdivisionsfor the United States, 
in the case of only eight did imports represent more than ten per 
cent, of domestic output in 1953* and four of these were industries 
with special factors involved - sugar, lead and sine mining, primary 
zinc and primary aluminium. Some minor items were omitted in the cal- 
culations but would not be sufficient to change the overall picture. 
See W.S.Salant and B.N.Vaccara, Import Liberalisation and Employment, 
Wash.D.C. 1961, Appendix Table B.l, pp.282-5»
2.
B.M.Cheek, oo.cit.. p.204*
Ibid.. p.205
3»
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Table VII-5
Value of Domestic Output as a Proportion of the Sum of Value 
of Domestic Output and Value of Landed Duty Paid Imports.*z.
By Competing Industry Sub-Class 1950-51 - 1960-61.
Glass I
Treatment of Non-Metalliferous Mine and Quarry Products(v)
Code 1. 2. 3* 4* 5. 6. 7. 8» 9. 10,
Year No. % % % % % % % % % %
1950-51 96 (a) (b) 98 (a) 97 89 92 (a) 61
1951-52 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 98 69 85 (a) 57
1952-53 100 (a) (b) 100 (a) 99 92 97 (a) 78
1953-54 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 97 95 100 (a) 73
1954-55 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 97 94 100 (a) 75
1955-56 100 (a) (b) 100 (a) 97 99 100 (a) 76
1956-57 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 98 99 100 (a) 75
1957-58 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 96 99 100 (a) 75
1958-59 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 96 99 100 (a) 75
1959-60 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 95 99 100 (a) 76
1960-61 99 (a) (b) 100 (a) 95 99 100 (a) 78
Class II
Bricks. Pottery. 
s Glass etc.
Class III
Chemicals. Dves. 
Explosives. Paints. 
Oils. Grease.
Code 1. 2. 3* 4. 5. 1/3 2. 4. 5. 6*
Tear No. % % % % % £ % % % %
1950-51 89 39 67 93 (a) 65 81 89 64 28
1951-52 86 34 61 92 (a) 59 82 83 54 29
1952-53 95 65 81 98 (a) 76 87 93 79 29
1953-54 92 47 71 97 (a) 68 84 85 67 34
1954-55 91 42 68 97 (a) 66 80 87 64 53
1955-56 90 45 71 97 (a) 68 79 87 68 67
1956-57 93 55 70 98 (a) 69 82 86 67 79
1957-58 92 56 68 97 (a) 66 79 84 62 82
1958-59 92 57 67 97 (a) 68 84 86 69 82
1959-60 91 61 67 97 (a) 63 85 87 70 84
1960-61 86 58 64 95 (a) 58 84 84 64 84
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Table VII-5 (Cont’d)
Class IIl(conttd) 
Chemicals« Dyes. EhnYLosives.
Class IV
Industrial Metals.
Paints. Oils., Grease.
Year
Code 7. 
No. %
8.
%
9.
%
10.
%
1950-51 74 100 98 91
1951-52 80 100 94 93
1952-53 93 100 99 98
1953-54 89 98 97 97
1954-55 84 97 97 95
1955-56 94 99 96 97
1956-57 90 99 97 95
1957-58 90 98 97 93
1958-59 91 100 97 94
1959-60 87 99 97 97
1960-61 83 93 97 95
Machines and 
Conveyances.
11. 12. 13. 1/2. 3. 4*
% % % % % %
84 99 99 69 68 88
78 97 97 63 63 83
93 100 100 72 67 90
88 100 100 89 70 96
86 100 100 79 71 98
87 100 100 81 72 97
88 100 100 89 74 98
87 100 100 92 73 99
87 100 100 93 74 100
87 99 100 94 74 100
86 99 100 87 69 100
Class IVfcon^d)
Industrial Metals. Machines and Conveyances.
Code 5* 6. 7/8 . 9/11/1 3. 10. 12. 14. 15. 16. 17/18
Year
No. % % % % % % % % % %
1950-51 93 68 84 42 (a) (a) 83 69 (c) 97
1951-52 91 67 82 47 (a) (a) 77 63 (c) 96
1952-53 88 70 81 71 (a) (a) 70 89 (c) 96
1953-54 94 78 86 6 4 (a) (a) 67 77 (c) 92
1954-55 85 80 92 59 (a) (a) 64 79 (c) 91
1955-56 92 78 93 6 4 (a) (a) 6 4 71 (c) 79
1956-57 93 79 93 70 (a) (a) 63 80 (c) 86
1957-58 92 80 97 72 (a) (a) 67 77 (c) 91
1958-59 92 82 99 70 (a) (a) 51 71 (c) 81
1959-60 89 82 98 69 (a) (a) 48 72 (c) 92
1960-61 85 80 97 69 (a) (a) 61 64 (c) 99
Table VII-*; (Contact)
Class IV (co n t!d)
In d u str ia l M etals. Machines. and Conveyances
Code 19. 20. 21/22 . 23/24 . 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
No. % % 1° % % it % % %
Year
1950-51 42 42 78 80 79 64 80 78 97
1951-52 40 43 81 81 72 59 70 80 96
1952-53 63 55 88 97 88 80 90 85 99
1953-54 51 52 90 95 90 90 85 85 98
195V55 50 50 91 91 86 83 81 89 96
1955-56 53 51 92 96 93 84 85 91 99
1956-57 49 52 93 98 93 93 90 90 99
1957-53 51 51 93 98 91 95 89 90 97
1958-59 44 56 94 97 92 96 90 89 99
1959-60 44 53 93 97 93 95 92 87 98
1960-61 37 51 92 97 88 91 90 79 93
Class IV (co n tfd) C lass V ! Class VI
In d u str ia l M etals. Precious T e x tile s  e tc .
Machines, and M etals, (not D re ss )
Conveyances Jew ellery  e tc .
Code 30. 31. 32. 33* 1 /2 . 3. 1. 2 . 3.
No. % % % % % % % % %
Year
1950-51 11 86  95 29 50 (a) (d) 31 91
1951-52 10 88 94 30 47 (a) (d) 27 91
1952-53 • 16 89 94 42 72 (a) (d) 57 97
1953-54 11 94 93 39 53 (a) (d) 36 97
1954-55 10 82 90 38 48 (a) (d) 35 95
1955-56 16 94 86 41 49 (a) (d) 39 96
1956-57 18 95 79 40 60 (a) (d) 44 97
1957-53 19 94 89 38 57 (a) (d) 41 96
1953-59 35 92 92 38 54 (a) (d) 39 96
1959-60 36 94 92 42 52 (a) (d) 39 96
1960-61 26 92 95 37 47 (a) (d) 34 93
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Table VII-5(ContTd)
Class VI (Cont'd) 
Textiles etc, (not Dress)
Code 4* 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. u . (e) 1. 2. 3*
Year
No. % % % % % % % % * % %
1950-51 89 (d) 15 50 96 51 20 38 88 (a) 97
1951-52 86 (a) 13 55 96 47 15 34 92 (a) 97
1952-53 98 (a) 33 83 99 86 36 75 98 (a) 99
1953-54 94 (a) 24 60 98 76 39 50 96 (a) 98
1954-55 93 (a) 18 53 98 71 26 48 94 (a) 98
1955-56 96 (a) 18 60 98 74 32 53 93 (a) 98
1956-57 98 (a) 29 69 98 75 32 65 95 (a) 97
1957-58 96 (d) 26 56 98 76 34 63 94 (a) 98
1958-59 97 (a) 37 63 98 75 36 65 93 (a) 98
1959-60 97 (a) 38 55 95 74 43 66 91 (a) 97
1960-61 96 (d) 42 48 97 79 32 60 89 (a) 95
Class VII
Skins and Leather 
(Not Clothing or 
Footwear)~
Code
Class VlKCont ’ d
Skins and Leather 
(Not Clothing or 
Footwear)
4. 5* 6. 1.
Class VIII
Clothing (Except Knitted)
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
No. % % % % % % % % % % %Year
1950-51 (a) 89 84 95 99 98 (f) 99 99 73 85
1951-52 (a) 90 85 92 98 97 (f) 97 99 68 85
1952-53 (a) 96 97 99 100 100 (f) 100 100 89 93
1953-54 (a) 93 91 99 99 99 (f) 99 99 80 87
1954-55 (a) 87 87 98 99 99 (f) 98 98 80 87
1955-56 (a) 80 88 98 99 99 (f) 98 99 83 87
1956-57 (a) 92 93 99 99 100 (f) 99 100 88 89
1957-58 (a) 88 91 99 99 99 (f) 99 100 87 87
1958-59 (a) 73 90 99 98 99 (f) 99 99 86 89
1959-60 (a) 55 88 98 98 98 (f) 99 98 85 88
1960-61 (a) 37 84 98 99 98 (f) 98 97 84 s %
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Table V I I - 5 (Cont»d)
C lass V III C lass IX
C lo th ing  (excep t K n itte d )(C o n tTd) Food. D rink and
Tobacco
Code 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 1. 2. 3*
No.
Year
% % % % % % % % % %
1950-51 53 95 (a) 98 59 (a) (a) 100 99 (a)
1951-52 49 91 (a) 98 55 (a) (a) 100 99 (a)
1952-53 72 99 (a) 100 8 4 (a) (a) 100 99 (a)
1953-54 49 99 (a) 99 80 (a) (a) 100 100 (a)
1954-55 44 97 (a) 98 79 (a) (a) 100 100 (a)
1955-56 45 98 (a) 99 80 (a) (a) 100 100 (a)
1956-57 58 99 (a) 99 80 (a) (a) 100 100 (a)
1957-58 50 99 (a) 96 84 (a) (a) 99 100 (a)
1958-59 57 99 (a) 94 84 (a) (a) 100 100 (a)
1959-60 61 98 (a) 98 75 (a) (a) 100 100 (a)
1960-61 55 98 (a) 98 80 (a) (a) 99 100 (a)
C lass IX
Food. D rink and Tobacco (C ont!d)
Code 4. 5. 6 . 7 /8 . 9. 10. 11. 12. 13/1-4/15. 16.
No.
Year
% % % % % % % % % %
1950-51 (a) (a) 99 (g) 98 98 100 (a) 100 (a)
1951-52 (a) (a) 99 (g) 97 97 100 (a) 100 (a)
1952-53 (a) (a) 100 (g) 100 100 100 (a) 100 (a)
1953-54 (a) (a) 100 (g) 99 99 100 (a) 100 (a)
1954-55 (a) (a) 99 (g) 98 98 100 (a) 99 (a)
1955-56 (a) (a) 100 (g) 98 98 100 (a) 100 (a)
1956-57 (a) (a) 100 (g) 99 98 100 (a) 100 (a)
1957-58 (a) (a) 100 (g) 99 99 99 (a) 99 (a)
1958-59 (a) (a) 99 (g) 99 99 100 (a) 99 (a)
1959-60 (a) (a) 99 (g) 98 99 100 (a) 99 (a)
1960-61 (a) (a) 99 (g) 97 97 100 (a) 99 (a)
Table VII-;? (C ont'd)
G lass IX
Food. D rink and Tobacco (C ont’d)
Code 17. 18. 19. 20.
No.
Year
% % % %
1950-51 90 99 (a) 75
1951-52 90 99 (a) 70
1952-53 97 100 (a) 92
1953-54 94 99 (a) 79
1954-55 92 99 (a) 83
1955-56 91 99 (a) 84
1956-57 94 99 (a) 88
1957-58 92 99 (a) 84
1958-59 94 99 (a) 87
1959-60 93 99 (a) 86
1960-61 90 99 (a) 87
21. 22. 23/24* 25. 26* 27. 28,
% % % % % % %
99 96 86 (a) (a) (a) 73
99 94 86 (a) (a) (a) 68
100 99 85 (a) (a) (a) 83
100 100 84 (a) (a) (a) 88
99 100 79 (a) (a) (a) 93
99 100 79 (a) (a) (a) 97
100 100 83 (a) (a) (a) 99
99 100 83 (a) (a) (a) 99
99 100 82 (a) (a) (a) 99
99 100 75 (a) (a) (a) 98
99 100 78 (a) (a) (a) 98
C lass IX 
Food, D rink and
C lass X
Sawm ills. Jo in e rv  and
Code 29.
Tobacco (C ont’d) 
30. 31* 32. 33. 1.
Woodworking e tc .
2 . 3* 4* 5* 6. 7.
No. % % % % % % % % % % * %
Year
1950-51 99 (a) 76 (a) (a) 76 87 (a) (a) 98 (a) 79
1951-52 95 (a) 67 (a) (a) 72 63 (a) (a) 97 (a) 72
1952-53 99 (a) 76 (a) (a) 92 97 (a) (a) 100 (a) 89
1953-54 99 (a) 77 (a) (a) 88 97 (a) (a) 99 (a) 85
1954-55 98 (a) 73 (a) (a) 85 91 (a) (a) 100 (a) 84
1955-56 97 (a) 80 (a) (a) 84 90 (a) (a) 100 (a) 83
1956-57 96 (a) 82 (a) (a) 84 88 (a) (a) 100 (a) 85
1957-53 96 (a) 71 (a) (a) 85 88 (a) (a) 100 (a) 84
1953-59 97 (a) 77 (a) (a) 88 88 (a) (a) 99 (a) 85
1959-60 94 (a) 72 (a) (a) 85 88 (a) (a) 98 (a) 86
1960-61 94 (a) 68 (a) (a) 83 88 (a) (a) 97 (a) 84
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Table VII-5 (Cont'd)
Glass X (Contfd)
Savmilling« Joinery« 
and Woodworking etc.
Code 8. 9. 10. 11.
No.
Year
% % % %
1950-51 90 (a) 57 68
1951-52 86 (a) 47 42
1952-53 96 (a) 93 78
1953-54 82 (a) 89 76
1952^55 $0 (a) 83 68
1955-56 76 (a) 86 70
1956-57 82 (a) 91 73
1957-58 77 (a) 90 74
1958-59 68 (a) 97 72
1959-60 60 (a) 98 72
1960-61 44 (a) 96 75
Class XI
Furniture of Wood. Bedding etc*
1. 2. 3. 4* 5.
% % % % %
98 93 75 92 95
97 93 76 90 93
100 100 90 99 99
99 98 76 95 99
99 96 80 95 99
99 97 83 95 99
100 98 90 97 99
100 97 84 97 98
100 97 83 95 98
99 96 84 93 98
98 96 80 93 98
Class XII
Paper. Stationery. etc.
Code 1. 2/3. 4- 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
No.
Year
% % % % % % % % % %
1950-51 (a) 99 85 (a) (a) (a) 99 41 23 78
1951-52 (a) 99 79 (a) (a) (a) 98 29 29 75
1952-53 (a) 100 93 (a) (a) (a) 99 57 59 78
1953-54 (a) 99 86 (a) (a) (a) 99 54 39 79
1954-55 (a) 99 83 (a) (a) (a) 100 49 41 74
1955-56 (a) 100 85 (a) (a) (a) 100 51 41 77
1956-57 (a) 100 88 (a) (a) (a) 100 55 54 81
1957-58 (a) 100 88 (a) (a) (a) 100 57 52 82
1958-59 (a) 100 88 (a) (a) (a) 100 57 57 82
1959-60 (a) 99 89 (a) (a) (a) 100 56 55 86
1960-61 (a) 99 85 (a) (a) (a) 100 50 50 91
Table V I I - 5 (C o n fd )
C lass X III 
Rubber
Code 1. 2 .
C lass XIV
M usical In s tru m en ts
1 . 2* 3*
No. % % % % %
Year
1950-51 83 (a) 60 51 10
1951-52 77 (a) 54 56 12
1952-53 92 (a) 75 84 34
1953-54 94 (a) 63 78 19
1954-55 91 (a) 69 72 13
1955-56 92 (a) 71 72 15
1956-57 94 (a) 85 79 22
1957-58 93 (a) 58 76 14
1958-59 94 (a) 63 73 12
1959-60 93 (a) 63 72 11
1960-61 90 (a) 54 57 14
C lass XV
M iscellaneous Products
Code 1 /2 . 3. 4* 5. 6 . 7. 8. 9. 10.
No.
Year
£ % 2 % % < % % %
1950-51 (h) 72 83 62 48 59 54 73 62
1951-52 (h) 75 81 56 43 58 51 76 57
1952-53 (h) 90 92 82 57 76 89 91 85
1953-54 (h) 83 85 64 49 60 69 78 65
1954-55 (h) 83 87 54 44 50 60 71 69
1955-56 (h) 85 89 62 44 59 61 71 72
1956-57 (h) 89 92 75 50 65 71 81 77
1957-58 (h) 87 91 73 42 56 63 70 76
1958-59 (h) 88 91 76 41 63 60 56 70
1959-60 (h) 85 90 71 47 54 58 33 70
1960-61 (h) 83 88 72 39 58 54 31 70
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Notes to Table VII-ft
(z) Except Distilleries and Wine Making, and Tobacco, Cigars etc. 
for which imports are at landed duty free cost*
(y) See Appendix VTI*A. for the titles corresponding to the subclass 
code numbers*
(a) Imports nil or negligible.
(b) Included with 1-10 (Other).
(c) Included with IV-33 (Other Metal Works).
(d) Included with VI-11 (Other).
(e) From 1957-58 subclass VI-11 (Other) was subdivided, in the 
official classification, into VI-11 (Textile Dyeing, Printing 
and Finishing) and VI-12 (Other). The two subclasses have been 
kept combined for present purposes*
(f) Included with VIII-8 (Hats and Caps)•
(g) Included with X-33 (Other).
(h) Included with XV-10 (Other).
Source: See text Appendix VII*B.
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Appendix VII:A .
The F.o.b. to C.i.f.e. Ratio1 2
It was noted earlier that an average allowance of 15 per cent was 
made on the quotas when established in 1952 to take account of freight 
and insurance charges on imports. In fact, there is a considerable 
variation in c.i.f.e. charges on imports.^ These variations are of 
interest in a number of contexts. In the administration of the system 
of import licensing, variations in the c.i.f.e. costs made estimates 
of the future levels of imports more difficult. In the context of 
protection, the size of the c.i.f.e./f.o.b. ratio gives some indication 
of the possible extent of the natural protection available to producers 
of a particular class of product. From the importer’s viewpoint it will 
be one influence in determining where they will obtain their imports. 
More specifically, in order to compare the value of imports and local
1 F.o.b. - free on board; c.i.f.e. - cost, insurance, freight, 
exchange•
2 It is usual, following Taussig, (F.W. Taussig, International Trade,
New fork, 1927, p.10) who argued that freight charges could be 
ignored in s tudying international trade questions, to either neglect 
the c.i.f.e. charge completely or to make a constant percentage 
addition to the f.o.b. cost as an allowance for freight and insurance. 
This addition is usually of the order of 10 per cent. The results
of the estimate in Table VII A-3 show that this approach could be 
very misleading when considering imports of particular commodities. 
Michael Chisholm, in a study of shipping costs on Australian and 
New Zealand trade, concluded that this procedure was also misleading 
in discussion of aggregate trade trends. "Shipping Costs and the 
Terms of Trade: Australia and New Zealand", Applied Statistics,
Vol. VIII, No.3, (November 1959), p.198.
218
production of comparable items, the f.o.b. price needs to be converted 
to at least the c.i.f.e. price values; this normally constitutes most 
of the difference between the f.o.b. price and the into store price 
which is the price comparable with the ex-factory price of the dom­
estic product.
Official import statistics are recorded in f.o.b. values.^
Actual c.i.f.e. values for imports are not collected in Australia and 
the conversion of the f.o.b. values to c.i.f.e. values presents some 
problems, even though reasonably good estimates of total freight and 
insurance paid on imports are available. Table VII A-1 indicates the 
ratio of total freight and insurance payments to total imports. Freight 
and insurance payments vary substantially from import item to import 
item; applying the ratio of the totals to individual items is unsat­
isfactory if a practical alternative is available.
1 More correctly, value for duty when a duty is imposed according to 
value. The value for duty is defined by Section 154 0) of the 
Customs Act 1901-1959 as the sum of whichever is the higher of:
(a) the actual money price paid or to be paid for the goods by 
the Australian importer plus any special deduction; or
(b) the current domestic value in the country of origin; plus 
all charges payable or ordinarily payable for placing the 
goods f.o.b. at the port of export.
An adjustment is now made in the official balance of payments figures 
to take account of the difference between the f.o.b. price actually 
paid for imports and the value for duty as entered in the statistics. 
This indicates that, overall, the value for duty of imports is some 
3$ greater than the price actually paid. No adjustment has been 
made to individual items here; recorded values have been taken as 
actual f.o.b. values.
Table VII A-1. Freight and Insurance Paid on Imports into Australia
Year Imports
f.o.b.
£m
Total Freight 
and Insurance 
£m
Column (ii) 
as percent of 
%
(i) (ii) (iii)
1950-51 742 97 13.1
1951-52 1051 152 14*4
1952-53 510 80 15.7
1953-54 682 73 10.7
1954-55 847 91 10.7
1955-56 820 106 12.9
1956-57 717 108 15.1
1957-58 791 119 15.0
1958-59 796 115 14.4
1959-60 946 129 13.4
1960-61 1084 151 13.9
Source: The Australian Balance of Payments
The principal reasons for these differences are:
(i) The c.i.f.e. charge will vary according to the country, and 
frequently port, of origin, e.g. east coast or west coast ports 
in the United States;
(ii) As a proportion of the f.o.b. value of the import item it will 
vary according to the value/weight or value/size ratios of the 
item;
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(iii) The nature of the import item may involve additional c.i.f.e. 
charges e.g. inflammable, explosive, or particularly dirty 
substances;
(iv) The c.i.f.e. charge may vary with the size of the shipment;
(v) The type of shipping available may account for variations in 
c.i.f.e. charges; or the time in which the goods have to be 
delivered since this may mean using more expensive shipping 
rather than waiting for cheaper shipping.
In addition, of course, when attempting to estimate the 
addition to be made to the f.o.b. value of imports over a number of 
years in terms of particular commodities or groups of commodities, 
the problem has to be faced of variations for additional reasons:
(i) Changes in any of the basic charges making up the total c.i.f.e. 
charge;
(ii) Changes in the composition of any group of imports being con­
sidered;
(iii) Changes in the source of supply of the commodities or groups 
of commodities;
(iv) Changes in import prices.
Complete accuracy could only be achieved by examining or at 
least sampling individual import entries for all import items of 
consequence in the classification, for each year.
Use was made of the tabulated results of internal samples made 
available by the Department of Customs and Excise; these samples
were made from import entries but were cross checked in a number of 
cases with import licences.^ The two samples from which the present 
estimates were calculated were made in 1958 and 1959* They consist 
of a fortnight’s import entries, covering in each sample slightly 
under 3 per cent of total imports in 1958-59 and show c.i.f.e. values 
of imports f.o.b., classified to the Statistician’s ”100 import 
commodity items” classification by country of origin.2
From these tabulations the average c.i.f.e./f.o.b. relationship 
was calculated for each of the 100 groups and individual relationships 
for the major export countries in each of the groups.
Both sets of calculations were made for each tabulation. Where 
the variation was reasonably small, both between the two amples and 
around the mean, the weighted average of the two tabulations was taken 
to be the c.i.f.e./f.o.b. ratio of the items in that group.
For the remainder of the items, the actual import pattern was 
examined for each of the years to account for recognisable variations. 
Some particular import items, for instance, were apparently recognis­
able from the results, e.g. plate glass from Belgium, watches from 
Switzerland, and enabled reasonably accurate relationships to be
1 .Many items, occasionally goods of a completely distinct nature may
be included on the one import entry; the c.i.f.e. charge may be a 
total applying to the whole group rather than to the separate items.
2 It should be noted that the information given regarding f.o.b./ 
c.i.f.e. relationships is only incidental to the main purpose of 
the tabulations.
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established for particular commodities. For others, country of origin 
by class of import relationships were established, and where possible 
checked from information available elsewhere, e.g. Tariff Board 
Reports. In addition to adjustments for previous years due to the 
changing pattern of origin of imports, adjustments were made where the 
pattern of actual imports within an individual group of the 100 group 
classification had changed significantly.
Thus the percentages shown in Table VII A-3 representing the 
percentage added to f.o.b. imports in each class to bring them to 
c.i.f.e. values are estimates made on the basis of whatever informa­
tion is available and would appear to be as close to an accurate figure 
as is possible with currently available information, though still 
necessarily of a very approximate nature. Further adjustments were 
made to take account of changes in basic charges principally freight 
rates, since 1950-51. As an indicator of the changes since 1950-51> 
the changes in the total freight and insurance payments as ratios of 
total imports have been used; an index of these changes was prepared 
with the three year period 1957-58 to 1959-60 as the base year.^
1 An alternative might have been an index of freight rate changes. The 
estimates made for the item by the Commonwealth Statistician are based 
in part, at least, on shipping freight rates supplied by the shipping 
companies. Freight rate indexes are available for the Baltic Exchange, 
for example, for charter, either voyage or hire charter. These are 
"open market" rates and fluctuate more over time than the ‘administered1 
rates of various shipping companies carrying goods to Australia. In­
formation on these rates in a satisfactory form for measuring changes 
over time is difficult to obtain. Moreover, adjustments would have to 
be made for changes in import prices, whereas the present method accounts, 
at least conceptually, for both freight rate and import price changes.
Table VII A-2. Index o f  Annual Changes in  C . i . f . e .  to  F .o .b .  r a t io
(Base 3 y ears  1957-58 to  1959-60 = 100)
Year Ended June
1251 1222 1221 122A 1222 1226 1222 125§ 1222 1222 1261
92 101 110 75 75 90 106 105 101 94 97
Source: Table VII A-1
The c . i . f . e . / f . o . b .  r a t i o s  a re  thus c le a r ly  su b je c t to  p o s s ib le  
e r ro r  o f  v a rio u s  s tag e s  in  the  c a lc u la t io n s .  N ev e rth e le ss , when y e a r ly  
changes a re  being  co n sid e red , some o f  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  the  e r ro r  
i s  reduced; moreover, the  s iz e  o f th e  e r r o r  in  g en e ra l would seem 
alm ost c e r ta in  t o b e  le s s  th an  u sin g  a f l a t  r a te  p ro p o r tio n .
Table VII(A)3
Estimates of C.i.f.e» Charges on Imports: By Competing Industry- 
Subclass» As Percentage of F.o.b. Value of Imports: 1959-60
Subclass Subclass
No. Short Title C.i.f.e. No... Short Title C,► itf
% %
1-1 Coke 52 IV-17/18 Shipbuilding
4 Lime 27 19 Cutleiy 8
6 Marble 26 20 Agric.mach’y 14
7 Cement 25 21/22 Non-Ferrous metals 7
8 Asbestos Cement 22 23/24 Iron working 10
10 Other 19 25 Pipes, tubes 12
26 Wire 10
II-l Bricks, Tiles 22 27 Stoves 10
2 Earthenware, China 22 28 Gasmeters 9
3 Glass 22 29 Lead Mills 9
4 Glass Bottles 24 30 Sewing mach. 6
31 Firearms 10
III-l Chemicals 15 32 Wireless and T.V. 8
2 Pharma c euticals 6 33 Other 7
4 Paints 21
5 Vegetable Oils 18 V-l/2 Jewellery 5
6 Mineral Oils 37
7 Animal Oils 22 VI-2 Cottons 7
8 Tallow 18 3 Woollens 6
9 Soap 18 4 Knitteds 5
10 Fertilizers 37 6 Synthetics 6
11 Inks. Polishes 19 7 Flax 6
12 Matches 10 8 Rope 16
13 Other 7 9 Canvas 910 Bags 16
IV-l/2 Iron and Steel 13 12 Other 8
3 Machine ly 9
4 Engineering 13 VII-1 Furriers 5
5 Non Ferrous Refin’g 7 3 Tanneries 4
6 Electrical Mach’y 8 5 Machine belting 6
7/8 Rail and Tram 6 6 Leather goods 8
9/11/13 Motor Vehicles 27
15 Cycles 5
• e.
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Table VII(A) 3 (Cont'a)
Subclass Subclass
No. Short Title C.i.f.e* No. Short Title C.i.f.e.
% %
VIII-l Tailoring 7 n-i Furniture 24
2 Waterproof Cloth1g 8 2 Bedding 12
• 3 Dressmaking 7 3 Drapery 7
5 Shirts 7 4 Picture Frames 10
6 Corsets 7 5 Blinds 10
7 Hanks. 7
8 Hats 15 ni-2/3 Printing 9
9 Gloves 7 4 Stationery 19
10 Shoes 13 8 Paper Bags 16
12 1 Access. 10 9 Paper Making 20
13 Umbrellas 10 10 Pencils 6
11 Other 16
IX-6 Biscuits 9
9 Confectionary 14 XIII-1 Rubber Mfrs. 14
10 Jams 9
11 Pickles 9 XIV-1 Gramophones 10
17 Meat Freserv. 11 2 Pianos 13
18 Condiments 18 3 Other 11
20 Salt 26
21 Cordials 20 XV-l/2/10 Other 12
22 Breweries 12 3 Plastics 10
23/24 Spirits 14 4 Brushes 10
28 Tobacco 9 5 Optical 6
29 Dried Fruits 10 6 Surgical 8
31 Sausage skins 6 7 Photographic 58 Sport- ing 14
X-l Sawmills 36 9 Art. flowers 10
2 Plywood 33
5 Cooperage 21
7 Wood turning 17
8 Basketware 19
9 Prams 21
10 Wall Boards 10
11 Other 20
Source: See text Appendix VII(A).
and
Notes:
226
Appendix VII:B.
SOURCE AND METHOD; TABLE VI1-5.
To compare the direct effect of the reduction in import compet­
ition and the expansion of output in domestic industry an attempt was 
made to relate the two statistically.
For this purpose it was necessary to relate imports to the 
industry producing items competitive with those imports. Official 
import statistics are classified on two bases; a statistical class­
ification and a classification by the applicable tariff item. Neither
of these classifications are in any way closely related to the official
1classification used for secondary industry census data. No reconcil­
iation of these classifications exists so far as we are aware; it 
was necessary, therefore, to effect this reconciliation. For this 
purpose the classification of imports by tariff item which is sub­
classified by statistical item was reclassified according to the 170 
or so industry subdivisions in the official secondary industry class­
ification.
2Each item in the Clearance Bulletin was classified to the
1 Commonwealth Statistician, Secondary Industries Bulletin (Annual), 
Canberra.
2 Imports Cleared for Home Consumption, annual bulletins issued by the 
Commonwealth Statistician, Canberra. These statistics of Clearances 
through Customs have the advantage that the classification is on a 
much finer basis than the normal statistical bulletins of import 
statistics since in the former each tariff item is further sub­
divided by statistical item as well as the major country of origin.
The relatively small differences which do occur between the statistics
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industry subclass which would contain that item if it were produced 
domestically. Those items predominantly primary, mining and quarrying 
products, which do not or would not enter into the Secondary Industries 
Bulletin were excluded. Thus raw materials such as crude petroleum 
and crude rubber were excluded, as were logs, but sawn timber was 
included.
Because of the extremely complicated method of tariff classif­
ication used until a year or two ago no satisfactory break up of motor 
vehicle imports between motor vehicle manufacture proper, motor bodies 
and motor accessories has been possible and these three industries have 
been left grouped together.
Similarly a number of subclasses were combined where there was
dLcl'-'Oi Titssubstantial overlapping in the contained in the individual
subclasses. In other cases subclasses had to be combined because for 
some years of the period data for the individual subclasses were not 
published separately.
Some information on the activities contained within the indiv­
idual subclasses is given in The Structure and Capacity of Australia's
2 (continued from previous page).
published in the two bulletins are, if anything, favourable to our 
analysis, since the clearance statistics represent imports actually 
available within the economy. These differences arise from the delays 
in clearing imports through the Customs after they have been imported; 
at the closing date for the statistics some imports, having been landed, 
will enter into the Overseas Trade statistics, but since they have 
not been cleared through customs will not enter the Clearance figures. 
The difference in total is simply a difference between stocks in bond 
at the beginning and end of the period but the composition of these 
stocks could normally be expected to be different.
228
Manufacturing Industry (Division of Industrial Development, Department 
of National Development, Melbourne, 1952)* Assistance was also provided 
bv officers of the Bureau of Census and Statistics.
All import items ,where necessary subdivided by statistical item,
( £/* -'/vOA, —  \
were classified in this way, wh^e- - .manufactured products)
with the exception of one or two basket1 2 items such as 1 other Metal 
Manufacturers, n.e.i.’ or ’Fancy Goods, n.e.i.’ The value of items 
not classified in this way was on average less than 0.2$ of total 
imports.
Total imports relating to a particular subclass in each of the
years 1950-51 to 1959-60 were then related to value of output figures
for the corresponding local industry, the import f.o.b. values being
1converted to a c.i.f. equivalent by adding an estimated percentage
and then to a landed duty paid value by adding on duty collected. The
c.i.f. conversion rate is only an approximate figure but variations
in a relative sense between items are in most cases thought to be of
2little significance at the level of approximation of the results.
The values of imports are then taken to approximate to the ’into store’ 
value which is the valuation comparable with the ex-factory values
1 See Appendix VII:A for a discussion of the manner in which the 
appropriate c.i.f. ratios were obtained and the c.i.f. ratios 
applicable to each industry group.
2 Strictly speaking, a further charge should be included to lake 
account of landing and handling charges but since these are norm­
ally small relative to the values involved they have been ignored.
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of local output as sho\m in the factory census data.
The results of this part of the exercise are given in Table VII-5. 
Table VI1-6 shows the notional landed duty paid prices of imports class­
ified by competing industry subclass.
It must be stressed that these figures can only be of an 
essentially approximate nature. Mich of their approximate nature 
stems from the difficulties of the import classification; possibly 
a greater amount is due to the difficulties faced by the compilers 
of the Secondary Industries Bulletins as a result of inability to 
split production of a number of items by some firms into the correct 
industrial classification. This is a result either of firms being 
able to provide only aggregate figures or to their reluctance to make 
available as much data as would be possible without revealing inform­
ation of a confidential nature.
While the error in the absolute figures is likely to be not 
inconsiderable, the error in the changes from year to year is likely 
to be smaller, and for certain purposes is unlikely to affect seriously 
the overall picture.
It is apparent of course that the price changes have been ignored 
at this stage. Since import prices will have moved in directions 
different to prices of local production over a wide range of items 
the fact that relative price changes have been ignored could tend 
either to undervalue or to overvalue the quantity of imports compar­
able with output in a particular industry .
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Chapter VIII
Economic Implications of the Administration of 
the Controls:
The Import Level:
We indicated earlier that in addition to the economic consequences 
of the restriction of imports as such, these effects could be accentuated 
or mitigated by the method by which imports were restricted. In the 
next three chapters we shall consider those aspects of the licensing 
system of significance from an economic point of view; attention will 
be limited solely to those aspects which may be reasonably judged to 
have had effects of some significance on the pattern of resource 
allocation.
The decision to restrict imports implied a decision to forgo some 
of the benefits of international trade, in order to maintain or to build 
up the foreign exchange reserves. We are consequently interested in the 
level of imports permitted during the period. Given the extent to which 
it was intended to restrict imports, however, it may be argued that 
restriction to a degree above or below that which was judged to be 
necessary would involve greater economic costs than it was thought 
necessary to incur. If the restriction in one period reduced imports
less than had been determined as necessary, a greater degree of restric­
tion would be required in subsequent
periods. Were imports restricted to an extent greater than had been 
considered necessary, the economic cost would also have been greater than 
had been judged necessary. The costs - through disruptions to industry, 
lack of materials etc., might well be considerably more than the volume 
of imports would itself suggest.
On the other hand, it is normally assumed by economists when 
discussing quantitative controls on imports, that it is possible to 
reduce imports rapidly and exactly, and this is usually cited as a 
major practical advantage of quantitative restrictions over other 
methods of reducing effective import demand. These are really closely 
related aspects of the same question - how quickly and accurately were 
imports restricted under the import licensing system?
A rapid and severe induced reduction in imports raises a number of 
problems. Some of these will be conditioned by the level of stocks of 
imported goods held domestically and by the underemployment of resources, 
including the extent of excess productive capacity and unemployment.
Some of these problems, however, concern the exporting country. The 
extent to which account is taken of these various problems will affect 
to a considerable degree the ability to reduce imports to a desired 
level within a fairly short space of time.
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For example, and to oversimplify, if the position of the foreign 
exchange reserves had indicated that the level of licensing should be 
such as to permit imports in the year of, say, £750m., but imports in 
the first six months had been at a rate of £850m. per annum, then 
presumably the second six months licensing rate would need to be 
£6$0m. per annum.
The high level of stocks in 1952 and the excess capacity in many
sectors of industry at that time, in part a result of the previous high
import rate and the existence of some unemployment, simplified the
task of reducing imports in 1952-53 to something less than half the 
11951-52 level* This was not achieved however without imposing substan­
tial costs on some exporters, as well as shortages etc* in some sectors 
in Australia*
At the time of the imposition of import controls in March, 1952 a
considerable volume of orders had been placed overseas and were still 
2outstanding. It had been decided at the time of the decision to re­
impose licensing controls that only goods in transit i*e. actually
shipped, and goods on firm order and accompanied by irrevocable letters 
3of credit would be permitted to enter over and above established
1.
As will be seen later not only did the reduction of imports to such 
a degree enable many industries to recover from a fairly serious posi­
tion but it protected many importers from heavy losses which would 
otherwise have been the consequence of excessive ordering at a time of 
high prices* See Chapter XVII.
2*
Information available to the Department of Trade and Customs at the 
time suggested that excluding motor vehicles, petroleum and tobacco, 
outstanding orders were of the order of £200m. including orders placed 
by State and Federal Government departments and instrumentalities.
3.
No savings in foreign exchange would have resulted from a refusal to 
permit these goods to enter (unless they could have been sold elsewhere 
overseas) since the financial side of the transaction had, in effect, 
been completed. The goods in transit or those subject to irrevocable 
letters of credit were debited to the importers’ present or future 
quotas, or, in the case of items subject to specific licence basis of 
control, were taken into account when considering subsequent allocations 
of licence.
licensing levels.
For quota, goods this meant that in a considerable number of
cases, importers’ quotas were exhausted for some time into the future;
in many cases it was a matter of years.
There were also many protests from exporters, particularly in the
United Kingdom# Many of these claimed to have had orders placed for
goods which had to be specially made, or for which special machinery
had been purchased, and for which there was no alternative market.
In a few cases it was claimed industries in Britain or her colonies
2had been expanded especially to supply the Australian market. Some
relaxations were made in order to avoid undue hardship in genuine 
3cases: quotas were increased in a few cases, while the £20m# of
licences issued to meet special hardship cases in 1952 included cases 
of this nature. In addition, holders of interchangeable licences were 
required from June 1952 to use quotas as they became available, for 
goods on firm order at
1.
Representations were made, for example, by overseas firms making 
cigarettes for the Australian market, including branding the product 
with the name of Australian firms. See Statement by Mr. Eric Harrison 
representing the Minister for Trade and Customs, Parliamentary Debates, 
Vol. 21S (2.9.1952), pp.892-893« Extra licences were granted in these 
cases.
2.
For example, Scottish canned herrings, British coloured ceramic tiles, 
Zanzibar clove oil. The similarity of these claims with those made by- 
Australia in respect of canned and dried fruits etc. in the United 
Kingdom’s negotiations with the European Economic Community in 1961-62 
will be apparent.
A special section was established to consider ’hardship’ cases.
3«
238
-|March, 1952. This meant that the cost was again transferred back to
2the local importer.
Contracts between importers and their suppliers were legally 
voided to the extent that they were not permitted to import. Export 
prices were falling on world markets and Australian importers were thus 
able to purchase more cheaply from sources other than those with whom 
they had lodged firm orders at a time when prices were significantly 
higher. They were in many cases not honouring their contracts even to 
the extent possible. In one sense, of course, it was to Australia’s 
advantage that she should be able to buy in the cheapest market and 
that the limited foreign exchange earnings shouls be used to the best 
advantage. To the extent that this was achieved, it was at a certain 
but unknown cost in terms of goodwill affecting more than the importers 
concerned, whereas while foreign exchange was involved the main costs 
of honouring the original contracts may merely have been that the 
profits available locally to the importers were reduced.
It may be argued with some validity that a restriction of imports 
of the order of the 1952 cuts is unlikely to occur again; certainly a 
repitition of the magnitude of excessive ordering that occurred up to 
1951-52 is unlikely. Against this it should be noted that on a smaller
1.
In October, 1952, however, the requirement was amended so that only 
half an importer’s interchangeable quota need be used for goods on firm 
order in March.
2.
Although because of the restriction of overall supplies he was 
generally in a strong position to bear the cost.
scale a similar situation occurred in 1955-56 and 1956-57* Moreover, 
had the situation in 1960-61 been considered to require reimposition 
of import controls and had less restrictive action been taken to
reduce the level of internal expenditure, the reimposition of the
1
controls may have brought about similar effects.
Table VUE-1 shows target levels of imports for each occasion
on which changes were made in the level of licensing. These are
shown on the chart as monthly import rates together with a moving
average of actual monthly imports during the time period to which
2
the target related, assuming an average time lag of five months.
Because of the frequent changes in the level of licensing in the
early years of the period it is difficult to read a great deal from the
chart for these years* In 1952-53, actual imports were £510m., close to
a projected annual import rate, initially set at £500m. and subsequently
3
raised to between £520-530p. Rapid changes in the following two years,
239
1.
Presumably importers will have learned the lesson of irrevocable 
letters of credit, particularly if anticipating the reimposition of 
import controls.
2.
The time lag data in Appendix VIII.A show that some 60% of imports 
arrive within 4 months of issue of licence. Although imports from 
New Zealand would be part of the reason the volume imported within 
one month indicates some anticipation of quotas. A five months lag 
has been assumed although the general picture would be little diff­
erent had a 4 months lag been used, as previously, or even 6 months - 
which may have been more appropriate at certain periods.
3.
The use of a 12 months moving average to smooth out random fluctua­
tions has resulted in the non random fall in 1952-53 also being smoothed 
out* The charted monthly import figures consequently understate the 
decline in 1952-53*
Table V III-1
240
Changes in  Im port L icensing Levels:
,  (a) 
1952-1960
Time From Which Annual Import Monthly Im port
Change O perated T arget Rate T arget Rate
A fte r Change A fte r Change
£m. f .o .b . £m. f . o .b .
8 th  March 1952 500 41.7
1 s t  January  1953 529 44 .1
1 s t  A p ril 1953 673 56.1
1 s t  Ju ly  1953 717 59.9
1 s t  October 1953 762 63 .5
1 s t  A p ril 1954 787 65.6
1 s t  October 1954 720 60.0
1 s t  October 1955 650 54.2
1 s t  J u ly  1956 700 58.3
1 s t A p ril 1957 775 6 4 .6
1 s t August 1957 800 66.6
1 s t  A p ril 1958 800 66.6
1 s t  August 1958 800 66.6
1 s t  December 1958 800 66.6
1 s t  August 1959 850 70.8
1 s t  December 1959 875 72.9
(a) The f ig u re s  fo r  annual r a te s  p r io r  to  1954 may be su b jec t to  some 
e r r o r .  They were based on e s tim ated  v a lu es  o f re la x a tio n s  made 
b u t i t  was no t always c le a r  w hether the re la x a tio n s  were a d d itio n ­
a l  to  p rev io u s ly  announced le v e ls  o r to  a c tu a l  ra te  o f im porting 
a t  the time o f the announcement. C e r ta in ly  the le v e ls  are 
somewhat h ig h e r th an  would be ob ta ined  sim ply from the  t o t a l l i n g  
of announced r e la x a t io n s .  Subsequent le v e ls  shown are unambiguous. 
I t  should be noted  th a t  in  the case of the le v e l  o f £650 shown f o r  
October 1955 i t  was th e  aim th a t  t h i s  le v e l  should be o b ta in ed  by 
June 1956, i . e .  sane 7-8 months l a t e r .
Source: D erived from in fo rm atio n  made a v a ila b le  by the Departm ents of 
Customs and Excise and o f Trade.
make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  r e la te  performance w ith  in te n t io n ,  though im ports 
of £841m. in  1954^-55 were c le a r ly  w e ll above expected  le v e l s .  1955-56 
and 1956-57, as the c h a r t  shows, were y ears  when, f o r  reasons o u tlin e d
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below, l i t t l e  success was achieved in  reducing  im ports to  the in tended  
l e v e l s .  On the o th e r hand, in  1957-58 and 1958-59 a c tu a l im ports are 
v e ry  c lo s e ly  r e la te d  to  the c e i l in g  o f £800m. s e t  fo r  the two y e a rs , 
in d ic a t in g ,  as d id  1952-53» th a t  a f a i r l y  accu ra te  fo re c a s t  o f the le v e l 
o f  im ports  i s  p o s s ib le .  The experience o f the  l a s t  q u a r te r  o f 1958-59, 
a lso  d iscu ssed  below, su g g ests  th a t  th i s  may n o t have been p o ss ib le  in  
1959l-60 w ith o u t the re la x a t io n s  which w ere, in  f a c t ,  made.
The c h a r te d  d a ta  in d ic a te  two th in g s . F i r s t ,  the le v e l  o f im ports
was s u f f i c i e n t ly  c lo s e ly  r e la te d  to  the  le v e l  o f  l ic e n s in g  to  suggest
th a t  th e  c o n tro ls  on im ports were th e  m ajor d e te rm in an t o f the  a c tu a l 
1
le v e l  o f im p o rts . Second, i t  suggests  th a t  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  p re d ic t  
a c c u ra te ly  the  le v e l  o f im p o rts; a t  the same time i t  shows th a t  accu ra te  
p re d ic t io n  was n o t u n ifo rm ly  su c c e ss fu l du ring  the p e rio d . Since i t  
may n o t be im m ediately obvious why th e re  should  be d i f f i c u l t y  in  p re d ic t ­
ing the le v e l  of im ports under a s e t  o f d i r e c t  c o n tro ls  -  a t  l e a s t  as 
a maximum -  i t  may be w orth examining in  more d e t a i l  the e s tim a tio n  o f 
im port le v e ls  in  the l i g h t  o f the experience o f  the p e r io d .
1.
Of c o u rse , the two were n o t unconnected. For example, an in c rease  
in  e x p o rt income would n o t on ly  in c rease  th e  le v e l  of in te r n a l  a c t i v i ty  
and so in c re ase  im port demand, i t  would a lso  in c re ase  the  le v e l  of 
exchange re se rv e s  and p erm it the c o n tro ls  on im ports to  be re la x e d .
In  a d d itio n  the degree o f r e s t r i c t i o n  w ith  any given  le v e l  o f l ic e n s in g  
v a rie d  c o n sid e ra b ly  and the le v e l  o f in te r n a l  demand was a f a c to r  
in flu en c in g  the le v e l  o f im ports  p e rm itte d  e .g .  in  1959 the l e v e l  o f 
demand f o r  im ports v i r t u a l l y  d ic ta te d  the (unannounced) in c rease  in  
the c e i l in g  from £800m. to  £830m. (see below) •
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1 F i r s t ,  l ic e n c e s  were is su e d  on a c . i . f . e .  b a s is ,  whereas the
-1
im port c e i l in g s  were s e t  on an f . o . b .  b a s is .  Consequently e s tim a te s  
had to  be made of the  expected  r a t i o  o f c . i . f . e .  to  f . o .b .  v a lu e ; the 
d isc u ss io n  o f th i s  r a t i o  in  a d i f f e r e n t  co n tex t above^ in d ic a te s  th a t  
th i s  i s  a f a r  from simple p ro ced u re . **
b  Second, n o t a l l  quo tas were used  a l l  the tim e .^  This was no t a 
m ajor problem since any p a r t  o f  a quo ta  n o t used  a t  the end of a 
l ic e n s in g  p e rio d , w hether o f th re e ,  fo u r o r s ix  months was au to m a tica lly  
c an c e lled ; i t  was on ly  the  underusage in  a l ic e n s in g  p e rio d  which ran  
over the months re le v a n t  to  the  im port t a r g e t  p e rio d  th a t  had to  be 
e s tim a te d  in  advance. This was su b je c t to  co n sid e rab le  v a r ia t io n s ,
1 .
No doubt i t  would be p o ss ib le  to  issu e  l ic e n c e s  on an f . o . b .  b a s is ,  
b u t th i s  would only  be s h i f t in g  the problem since  sep a ra te  fo re ig n  
exchange a l lo c a t io n s  would th en  have to  be made to  meet the c . i . f . e .  
ch arg es . On the o th e r hand, th e re  may have been some advantages in  
s e t t in g  the  im port c e i l in g  in  c . i . f . e .  r a th e r  th an  f . o . b .  te rm s. This 
would have meant a l l  owing the c o s t  of f r e ig h t  and insu rance  to  determ ine to  
some e x te n t  the le v e l  o f im ports -  b u t th i s  was no t ab sen t from the 
e x is t in g  system in  the  case o f  quo ta  goods, (see foo tn o te  below ).
2 .
See Appendix V II.A . (C hapter V I I ) .
3 .
The e f f e c t s  on the  achievem ent of a ta r g e t  le v e l  of im ports f . o .b .  
would d i f f e r  between quo ta  and non-quota goods. Assume th a t  an e stim ate  
o f the f . o . b . / c . i . f . e .  r a t i o  proved to  be wrong because of a g en era l 
in c rease  in  f r e ig h t  r a t e s .  An in c rease  in  the  c . i . f . e .  charges fo r  quo ta  
goods tended  to  mean a reduced  value o f im ports f . o . b . ,  i . e .  the im porter 
met th e  e x tr a  c o s t o u t o f  h is  f ix e d  fo re ig n  exchange a l lo c a t io n s .  In  
the  case o f s p e c if ic  lic e n c e  goods p a r t i c u la r ly  fo r  goods o f f ix e d  value 
the  tendency was fo r  any v a r ia t io n  in  c . i . f . e .  c o s ts  to  be met by supple­
m entary l ic e n c e s .  In  the  case of a d ecrease , more im ports would e n te r  
under q u o ta s , whereas f o r  s p e c i f ic  lic en ce  goods, some p o r t io n  o f the 
im port lic e n ce  would be -unused.
4.
I . e .  l ic e n c e s  were n o t tak en  o u t to  th e  f u l l  value o f the qu o ta .
depending upon the in te n s i ty  o f the r e s t r i c t i o n s  and upon e x p ec ta tio n s  
reg ard in g  the fu tu re  tre n d  o f the r e s t r ic t io n s *
3 T h ird , the 1wastage* r a te ,  i , e .  the value o f l ic e n c e s  is su e d  b u t 
n o t used , had to  be e s tim a te d . This was r a th e r  more d i f f i c u l t  since 
l ic e n c e s  were v a l id  fo r  12 months from date  o f  is s u e ;  i t  was th e re fo re  
n o t p o s s ib le  to  judge the  accuracy  o f the e s tim a te  fo r  some consid erab le  
tim e . F a s t p a t te rn s  cou ld  be u n re l ia b le  i f  c ircum stances changed o r 
were expected  to  change s ig n if ic a n tly *  U nderestim ation  o f t h i s  item 
meant t h a t  the l ic e n s in g  system was more r e s t r i c t i v e  th an  n ecessa ry  -  
an o v e re stim atio n  le d  to  ex cessiv e  lic e n c e  is s u e s .
'»Fourthly, in  the ev en t o f changes in  th e  le v e ls  o f l ic e n s in g  
e s tim a te s  had to  be made o f  the la g  between is su e  of the lic e n c e  and 
im port o f the goods. Although the o v e ra l l  average tended n o t to  vary  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  in  the second in te n s i f i c a t i o n  p e rio d , i t  was more v a ria b le  
in  the e a r ly  years  when supply  co n d itio n s  and sh ipp ing  f a c i l i t i e s  were 
more u n c e r ta in . Moreover th e re  were, as the d a ta  in  Appendix V III«A 
show; co n sid e rab le  v a r ia t io n s  between c a te g o r ie s  of goods, and changes 
in  l ic e n s in g  le v e ls  were seldom even ly  d i s t r ib u te d  over the  m ajor 
c a te g o r ie s .
5 F in a l ly  e s tim a te s  had to  be made o f the  le v e l  o f u n c o n tro lle d  
im p o rts .
D espite  favourab le  f a c to r s  o p e ra tin g  in  1952, in c lu d in g  the  f a c t  
th a t  im ports were a lre ad y  tre n d in g  downwards and the s tro n g  s tan d  
taken  i n i t i a l l y  on goods on firm  o rd e r, the  re d u c tio n  in  the m onthly
r a te  o f im ports to  one c o n s is te n t  w ith  the  o v e ra l l  le v e l  o f im ports 
proposed fo r  1952-53 took some time to  achieve as i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in  
Table V I I I - 2.
Table V I I I - 2 .
Monthly M erchandise Im ports ( f .o .b . )  : 1952
Mar. Apr* May June Ju ly  Aug.
£m* f*o*b*
S e p t. O ct. Nov. Dec.
85 .4 81 .5 75.3 54.9 4 9 .9  3 9 .6 42.3 44 .8 35.5 38.5
S ource: Oversea Trade B u l le t in s *
A m onthly im port r a te  c o n s is te n t  w ith  the  i n i t i a l  t a r g e t  ra te  o f 
£500m. fo r  1952-53 im ports i . e .  about £42m. p e r  month was n o t reached 
u n t i l  August 1952, some f iv e  months a f t e r  the im p o sitio n  of the  co n tro ls*  
Nor as we have seen was i t  p o ss ib le  to  m ain ta in  w ith o u t m o d if ic a tio n  the 
system i n i t i a l l y  p u t in to  o p e ra tio n . D espite the  ad justm ents which were 
made, d e sc rib e d  above, the le v e l  of im ports in  1952-53 was v i r t u a l l y  
th a t  sou g h t.
The s i tu a t io n  in  1954-55 and p a r t i c u la r ly  1955-56 was s ig n i f ic a n t ly  
d i f f e r e n t ;  the e s tim a te d  im port b i l l  f o r  1954-55 was £730m. w hereas 
im ports i n  f a c t  rose  to  £847* This was due la r g e ly  to  unexpected 
in c re a se s  in  the N.Q.R. category* The f ig u re s  fo r  l ic e n c e s  is su e d  in  
the  r e le v a n t  q u a r te rs  f o r  im ports o th e r  than from the d o l la r  a rea  and 
Japan , give some id e a  o f the  in c rease  in  the r a te  o f  im p o rta tio n  o f
N.Q.R. goods 1
Table V I I I -3
Value o f L icences Issued : N.Q.R. and th e  S p e c if ic  Quota 
C a teg o rie s , Q u a rte rly  L icensing  P erio d s:
(1) N.Q.R.
(2) 1 A 1 C ategory
(3) O ther S p e c if ic  
Quota
(4) T o ta l (1) to  (3)
($) T o ta l l ic e n c e s  
is su e d
(6) (5) ex p ressed  as 
an annual r a te
l??3 ■- 1955
£m. c . i  • f  *e.
m i mk 1955
Ju ly - O c t,- J a n .- A pr.- Ju ly - O c t.- J a n .-
S e p t. Dec. March June S e p t. Dec. March
Q tr. Q tr . Q tr . Q tr . Q tr. Q tr. Q tr.
11 .1 29.7 32.1 114.0 126.9 43 .3 50.6
17 .3 25.9 11 .1 _ _ 17.9 24.1
23.3 33.8 14.1 42 .8 9 .8 36 .9 22.8
52.1 8 9 .4 57.3 156.8 136.7 98 .2 97 .4
181.1 239.1 163.7 321.4 251.8 260.5 226.8
724.4 956.4 647.8 1285.6 3007.2 3042.0 907.2
Source: D erived from d a ta  made a v a ila b le  by the Department of
Trade.
For purposes of com parison, t o t a l  l ic e n c e s  is su e d  fo r  im ports 
from a l l  sou rces  have a lso  been shown f o r  the same p e r io d s .
1.
I t  w i l l  be r e c a l le d  t h a t ,  p r io r  to  being p u t onto a N.Q.R. b a s is ,  
the item s invo lved  had been s p e c if ic  quo ta  ite m s . To avoid  the  lab o rio u s  
ta s k  o f e x tra c t in g  d e ta i l s  o f a c tu a l  im ports f o r  those item s invo lved  
in  the  N.Q.R. re la x a tio n s  a l l  s p e c if ic  quo ta  l ic e n c e  is su e s  have been 
shown, a lthough  some s p e c if ic  quota item s were n o t t r a n s fe r r e d  to  the 
N.Q.R. b a s is  o f  l ic e n s in g .
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The figures in Table VIII-3 indicate that the level of licence 
issues reached very high levels in the peak of the relaxation period; 
for th is one quarter rate of issue of Import licences represented an 
annual rate of imports f .o .b . in excess of £1000m.
A second feature of the licence issue figures may be noted. If 
we assume an import lag of three months  ^ actual imports in  1954- 55 should 
be fa ir ly  closely related to import licences issued during the la s t four 
quarters shown in Table VIII-3 i*e* from the April-June quarter of 1954 
to the January-March quarter of 1955« In fact, the licences issued 
figures would seem to be well in  excess of actual imports in 1954-55 of 
£847m. f .o .b . Licences issued for imports from a ll  sources during these 
four quarters to ta lled  £1060.5m. c . i . f .  Approximately £91m, was payable
pfor freight and insurance on imports in 1954-55. I f  these charges are 
deducted from the to ta l of licences issued th is suggests that licences 
were in fact issued equivalent to £970m. f .o .b . Exempt imports i .e .  
those for which no licence was necessary amounted to less than £10m.
This leaves over £HQm. to be accounted for by 1 wastage* and by the 
error arising out of the assumption of a three month time lag* The
1.
For convenience since we are working with quarterly licensing s ta tis tic s  
i t  should not be too inaccurate for the present purpose. The alternative 
is  to subdivide a licensing period -  i t  then becomes necessary to assume 
that licences are taken out a t a uniform rate during the period.
The Australian Balance of Payments* 1952-53 to 1956-57, Table I I ,  p.3*
2.
2V8
wastage rate, although of the order of 10 per cent, in earlier years, 
was substantially below this figure in 1954- 55 and was closer to five 
per cent, in 1955-56, The difference could possibly arise from the 
error in the assumption of an import lag of three months.^ On the other 
hand, the figures are clearly consistent with a substantial stocking up 
in licences, an explanation which not only accounts for the excess of 
licences issued in 1954^55 compared with imports in that year but also 
explains in part the difficulty in reducing the actual level of imports 
in 1955-56 and 1956-57.
In October 1955 reductions in imports were announced which were 
designed to reduce the annual rate of imports to £650m, f.o.b. by June 
1956. Prior to this date the objective of the authorities had been to 
reduce imports to an annual rate of £720m. f.o.b. The implication of 
the reductions in imports announced to apply from October 1955 was that 
the monthly rate of imports had to be reduced to an average of about 
£54m. f.o.b. by June 1956. The monthly import figures indicate that not 
only was this figure not reached by June 1956 but was unlikely to have 
been reached for some months after that time. In the event the permiss- 
able import rate was increased from the 1st July by an annual value of 
£50m. f.o.b, (or just over £4m. f.o.b. on a monthly basis).
T7
History of Australia^ Import Licensing Measures, p.33.
2.
While it is possible it is not likely that there would be an equivalent 
compensating error at the end of the period.
Table VIII-4
Monthly Merchandise Imports : 1956 
£nu_J?*ojD.
Jan. 63.4 July 57.3
Feb. 59.1 Aug. 78.3
Mar. 80.5 Sept. 53.7
Apr. 68.0 Oct. 57.1
May 71.6 Nov. 59.7
June 63,4 Dec. 52.1
406.0 358.7
Source: Oversea Trade B ulletins.
Actual imports in 1955-56 were £821m. f .o .b .  of which almost half 
were imported in the s ix  months January to June 1956.
There were a number of reasons for th is  fa ilure of the in ten sific ­
ation of the restrictions to nb ite M. An important one undoubtedly was, 
as suggested above, that there had been a banking up of licences during 
the period from April to October 1954 when large numbers of sp ecific  
quota items were transferred to anN.Q.R. b asis. Many importers had
-I
obtained licences at th is time in excess of normal requirements. Sane 
used them to build up stocks of imported goods; others merely held the 
lic en ces . When, in April 1955 a l l  debits to quotas were cancelled,
1.
wIn the current export year, since the 1st April 1954> when many 
imports were licensed v irtu a lly  without restr iction s, some importers 
took out licences for goods far in excess of their normal requirements. 
These importers have thus obtained an advantage over other importers 
who took out licences to a value not greater than their current require­
ments. This had the e ffe c t  of building up a large potential commitment 
against our international reserves . . . M Mr. (la ter  Sir) Eric Harrison, 
Parliamentary Debates, H. of Reps. Vol. 5 (12.10.1954)> p .lS 6 l.
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im p o rte rs  ho ld ing  lic e n c e s  from th i s  p e r io d  were able to  take  ou t new
ones and h o ld  them, in  th e  meantime using  t h e i r  o ld  l ic e n c e s .^  J u s t
how s ig n i f ic a n t  the e f f e c t  o f th i s  was i s  no t c le a r .  There seems l i t t l e
doubt th a t  th e  volume o f lic e n c e s  is su e d  b u t not used  im m ediately  was
s u b s ta n t ia l ,  and i t  was suggested  th a t  goods im ported on th e se  l ic e n c e s
2
were s ig n i f ic a n t  in  the second h a l f  o f 1955-56. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
i s o la te  the  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  f a c to r  in  the absence o f  s a t i s f a c to r y  s t a t i s t i c s  
o f quo tas e s ta b l is h e d  and l ic e n c e s  is su ed  fo r  each  commodity.
To some e x te n t one would expec t the  e f f e c t s  to  show up p r im a r i ly  in  
1955-56 and perhaps in  1956-57 in  term s o f a c tu a l im p o rts .
Table V III -5 a ttem p ts  to  r e la te  a c tu a l changes in  im ports from 
1955-56 to  1956-57 w ith  th e o r e t ic a l  changes fo r  the  same p e r io d  f o r  a 
number o f s p e c if ic  quota  item s which had been l ic e n se d  on an N.Q.R. 
b a s is  du ring  1954«^ The s u rp r is in g  fe a tu re  in  the ta b le  i s  th a t  fo r
1.
This was p o ss ib le  because d e b its  to  q u o ta s , which were a p p lie d  r e t r o ­
s p e c tiv e ly  to  A p ril 1954> were f o r  a c tu a l l ic e n c e s  is su e d  w hether goods 
had been im ported  o r  n o t .  Since l ic e n c e s  were v a l id  f o r  12 months 
l ic e n c e s  is su e d  during  A p ril to  September 1954 were v a l id  u n t i l  some 
time between A pril^Septem ber 1955*
2.
H is to ry  o f  A u s tra lia * s  Im port L icensing  M easures, p.34»
3.
The th e o r e t ic a l  le v e l  was c a lc u la te d  from quota  le v e l s  e s ta b l is h e d  fo r  
the  item s and assuming a fo u r  month la g : im ports from 1 s t  J u ly  to  30 th
June depend upon quota  a v a i l a b i l i t y  1 s t  March to  28th F eb ru ary . I t  a lso  
assumes quo ta  usage i s  e q u a lly  d i s t r ib u te d  in  the  months o f a l ic e n s in g  
p e rio d  -  an assum ption l i k e l y  to  be su b je c t to  co n sid e rab le  e r r o r .  The 
sample was s e le c te d  la r g e ly  on the b a s is  o f ease o f s t a t i s t i c a l  e x tra c ­
t io n  -  a f t e r  exclud ing  item s w ith  changed lic e n s in g  tre a tm e n t du rin g  the  
two y ea rs  -  and re p re se n ts  l e s s  than  one te n th  o f the p o ss ib le  item s by 
number b u t about a th i r d  (£27m.) by v a lu e .
2rol
more than half the items, imports in 195^-57 were above those in  1955-56 
despite the lower quota levels in the f  omer year; almost three-quarters 
were in excess of theoretical quota levels* This may be explicable in 
terms of importers using the ir stocked’ licences in 1956-57 rather than 
in  1955-56. On the other hand where licences had been taken out in 1954 
at rates substantially in  excess of the previous quota levels, no quota 
licences were issued from October 1954 to April 1955. Consequently 
imports in these cases would be relatively  low in 1955-56 except to the 
extent that stocked* licences were used instead of the normal quota 
licences. Other factors are clearly involved but i t  does suggest the 
possib ility  that the 1 stocking* of licences was as significant -  i f  not 
more so -  in 1956-57 as in 1955-56.
I t  seems not unlikely that the major factor involved in the under­
estimate of the import rate was that the rate of licences taken out but 
not used, i .e .  licence Wastage1, had in the past averaged about 10 per 
cent, of the value of licences: consequently in issuing licences, an 
allowance of about 10 per cent, had been made for th is ’wastage1 i .e ,  
additional licences valued at about 10 per cent, of to ta l licences issued 
were granted. In actual fact the extent of the wastage of licences was 
much closer to 5 per cent, in  the 1955-56 and 1956-57 periods. Such a 
change would, on an import b i l l  of £600m. f.o .b . make a difference of 
about £30m.
-jOther factors of importance were imports made by government 
authorities which were substantially in excess (over £2Dm. in 1955-56)
i7Government authority imports were dealt with separately within the 
specific licence category.
of the  e s tim a te d  le v e l ;  and a s im i la r ly  unexpected in c rease  in  im ports 
o f  f r e e ly  lic e n se d  im ports -  m ainly  p e tro le u m ,”* (a ls o  over £20m. above 
the e s t im a te ) .  As w e ll as some s p i l l  over in to  1955-56 o f the  h igh  
ra te  o f l ic e n s in g  in  1954? th e  e f f e c t s  were a lso  f e l t  o f the r e l a t i v e ly  
generous tre a tm e n t a ffo rd e d  a p p lic a tio n s  f o r  s p e c ia l  l ic e n c e s  and supple­
m entary q u o tas  during  the  f i r s t  r e la x a t io n  p e rio d , p a r t i c u l a r ly  during 
the p e r io d  A p ril to  Septem ber 1954 when a u th o r i ty  fo r  approving th ese  
was g iven  to  the  C o lle c to rs  o f Customs in  each S ta te .  W ith th e  conjunc­
t io n  o f a l l  th ese  f a c to r s  a t  once the s ize  o f the  e r r o r  in  the  im port 
le v e l a t  t h i s  time becomes e x p lic a b le .
However, th e  f a i lu r e  to  achieve the  le v e l  s e t  f o r  1956-57 can 
only  p a r t l y  be a sc rib e d  to  th e se  ’uncontro lled*  fa c to rs*  The l i f t i n g  
o f the  c e i l in g  from £650m. to  £700m. in  J u ly  1956 was on ly  s u p e r f ic ia l ly  
a r e la x a t io n ;  i t  was accompanied by f u r th e r  re d u c tio n s  in  v a rio u s  item s 
and was la r g e ly  a re c o g n itio n  th a t  in  the c ircum stances a t  the  time a 
le v e l  of im ports o f £650m. cou ld  only  have been achieved a t  th e  expense 
o f s e r io u s  in te r n a l  d is lo c a t io n .  One consequence o f the tem p o ra rily  
’u ncon tro lled*  elem ents in  the  l ic e n s in g  system ,how ever, was th a t  the 
in te n s i ty  o f  the r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  t h a t  p a r t  o f the  system n o t a f fe c te d  
by th e se  f a c to r s  had to  be in c re a se d  beyond th e  a lre ad y  t i g h t  l e v e l s .  
This f u r th e r  r e s t r i c t i o n  f e l l  h e a v ily  on the  s p e c if ic  lic e n c e  s e c to r
T7 "
E stim a te s  o f the le v e l  o f petro leum  im ports were based la r g e ly  on 
e s tim a te s  su p p lied  by the  in d u s try .
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1and particu larly  on imports of machinery and capital equipment.
The difference in the degree of d ifficu lty  in maintaining a 
constant import ceiling under changing internal conditions is  illu stra ted  
by the experience from August 1957, when the import ceiling was set at 
£800m. f .o .b ., u n til August 1959, when i t  was raised o ffic ia lly  to £85Om. 
During 1957-58 the pressures on the licensing system were not particular­
ly  severe and hopes were held that control on imports could be removed 
in the near future. With the continued growth of the economy and the 
increased level of internal activ ity , maintenance of the ceiling at the 
unchanged level of £800m. for the two years meant that unsatisfied demand 
was much greater at the end than in the beginning of the period. I t  was 
becoming increasingly d if f ic u lt to hold the level of licensing down to 
£800m. in  the second part of 1958-59* In the event the ceiling was 
raised during the la s t few months of 1958-59 to £830m.'/ This may be
1.
Some indication of the severity of the licensing system at th is  time 
is  given by the following comment by S ir John Crawford: ’’You would be
shocked to know . . .  how nearly we have been forced to allow our 
industries to run down. In 1956 -  one of the black years -  we went 
close to saying: »You can’t  develop*.” Comments given informally to
a group of businessmen, reported in Observer. 20.2.1960, p.32.
2.
”We were very close to getting out of import licensing in April 1958 
. . .  ”, S ir John Crawford, ’’The Alternatives to Import Licensing”,
Address to Australian Council of Retailers, 8.5*1958, Notes kindly made 
available to me by the author.
3*
As in 1955-56, a greater than expected increase in imports of (now 
offic ially ) exempt petroleum products was a complicating factor.
seen from Table V III -6 , which shows l ic e n c e s  is su e d  in  each of the  
l ic e n s in g  p e rio d s  from August 1957 when th e  £800m. was announced u n t i l  
J u ly  1959, when the  (announced) in c rease  in  the c e i l in g  came in to  fo rc e .
Table V I I I - 6
T o ta l L icences Issu e d  -  1 s t  August 1957 to  3 1st Ju ly  1959
Licensing: P e rio d 1957-58
£m, c , l  • f  •
1958-59
1 s t August to  30 th  November 271,6}. 2 275,530
1 s t  December to  3 1 s t March 241,722 262,772
1 s t  A p ril to  3 1 s t Ju ly 271,134 291,476
3 ource: -Appendix Table J J J - 6
I t  seems v a l id  to  conclude from the  d is c u ss io n  o f the experience  
o f the  p e r io d  from 1952-1960 th a t  the speed and c e r ta in ty  of d i r e c t  
im port c o n tro ls  to  which econom ists are fond o f r e fe r r in g  are su b je c t
p
to  some q u a l i f i c a t io n s .
U ndoubtedly, a re d u c tio n  in  im ports to  below a p redeterm ined  le v e l  
can be made and achieved w ith in  the time taken  f o r  goods in  t r a n s i t  -  
and perhaps a lso  those s u b je c t to  ir re v o c a b le  l e t t e r s  o f c r e d i t  -  to
1.
I t  i s  re le v a n t  th a t  a number of item s re p re se n tin g  im ports o f about 
£5m, f . o , b ,  had been exempted from im port c o n tro l during the  p e r io d , 
in c re a s in g  a c tu a l  im ports r e l a t iv e  to  l ic e n c e s  is su e d ,
2.
Sane co n firm a tio n  o f t h i s  i s  g iven  by B r i t i s h  ex p erience : H, , , , t h e r e  
are a d m in is tra tiv e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  o b ta in in g  quick  r e s u l t s  because o f 
the need to  honour c o n tra c ts  a lre ad y  made. The im port cu ts  in tro d u ced  
in  the  postw ar p e rio d  may have helped  to  re a ssu re  overseas o p in io n  th a t  
the s i tu a t io n  was in  hand, b u t o f te n  f a i l e d  to  become f u l l y  e f f e c t iv e  
u n t i l  the exchange c r i s i s  was p a s t , ” R eport o f the Committee on the  
Working o f th e  Monetary System , (R a d c liffe  R ep o rt) , H.M.S.O* Cmd, S27, 
August 1959, 262*
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a r r iv e ,  p rov ided  a l l  o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s  are ig n o red . I f  i t  i s  d e s ire d
to  im port as much as p o ss ib le  w ith in  t h i s  t a r g e t  le v e l  the ta s k  becomes
•1
more d i f f i c u l t .  P a r t i c u la r ly  i s  t h i s  so when in te r n a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  
r e l a t i v e ly  h igh  -  a t  which time an o v ercau tio u s  approach in  the estim a­
t io n  o f fu tu re  im ports i s  econom ically  even le s s  d e s ir a b le .
When account has to  be taken  of avoid ing  p o l i t i c a l  u n p o p u la rity  
a r i s in g  from the d isappearance of an item  from the m arket, o r even the 
reduced  supply of an item  such as  p e t ro l  o r te a ;  when account has to  
be tak en  o f the  need to  supply  lo c a l  in d u s try  w ith  i t s  requ irem en ts  to  
keep an in c re a s in g  la b o u r fo rce  f u l l y  occupied; when allowance has to  be 
made to  s e t  ru le s  to  avo id  hardsh ip  to  lo c a l  im p o rte rs , p ro d u cers  o r  to  
o v e rseas  e x p o rte rs ; when some a ttem p t has to  be made to  ensure  im p o rte rs  
do n o t use the c o n tro ls  to  avoid  t h e i r  normal b u s in ess  o b lig a t io n s ;  when 
f a c to r s  such as these  have to  be tak en  in to  account the c e r ta in ty  and 
speed o f the d i r e c t  c o n tro l on im ports i s  somewhat le s s  a ssu red .
I t  i s  c e r ta in ly  v a l id  to  argue th a t  the le v e l  of in te r n a l  a c t i v i t y  
i s  a ls o  a re le v a n t  f a c to r ,^  and even the  b a s ic  f a c to r .^  In  1952-53 the 
economy was ex p erien c in g  a number o f d e f la t io n a ry  in f lu e n c e s , the  le v e l  
of im ports in  1951-52 and the e x is ten c e  o f la rg e  s to ck s  o f im ports goods
T7
I . e .  i f  the t a r g e t  i s  £800m. i t  i s  much sim p ler to  achieve 
an in p o r t  le v e l  of £750m. th an  one o f £790m.
2 .
C . f .  M.W.Corden, »»The C on tro l o f Im ports: A Case S tu d y .” M anchester 
School,Vol.XXVI, No.3 (September 1958), p .3 3 .
3
G .M o ffa tt, '»The A u s tra lia n  Import L icensing  System: 1952-1960” , 
A u s tra lia n  Sconomic P a p e rs , September 1962, p.133*
being an important deflationary influence. By comparison the experience 
of 1955 and early 1956, and again to a lesser  extent early 1959, was one 
of sign ifican t inflationary pressure.
On the other hand, of the d if f ic u lt ie s  in achieving the desired
cuts in  imports in 1955-56, two factors, the increase in government
*1
authority imports and the increase in petroleum imports were only 
marginally related to the lev e l of internal activ ity; the stocking up 
of licences and the reduction in the wastage rate, while sign ifican tly  
affected by the lev e l of internal a c tiv ity  were in part a resu lt of the 
re imposition of the restr iction s and expectations regarding the future 
severity of the cuts.
Moreover, the important aspect of the lev e l of internal activ ity  
is  the relation i t  bears to the target lev e l of imports. I f  imports 
f a l l  in relation to the lev e l of internal a c tiv ity  whether through 
increased comestic a c tiv ity  or through a reduced target leve l of imports 
the d iff ic u lty  of achieving that target i s  increased -  in the context of 
the constraints we have discussed, In many ways i t  is  more d iff ic u lt  in 
the immediate sense to reduce imports in relation to a given leve l of 
internal a c tiv ity  because of the problem of reducing employment; in the 
case of rising  internal a c tiv ity  i t  may be more frequently a case of 
inhibiting expansion. Even were employment reduced in certain areas
TT
The increased imports were largely  associated with stockbuilding in 
newly set up refineries and an increase in exports of over £5m.
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through reductions in imports of raw materials and components, it 
could be argued that it would be a matter of less concern at a time 
of a high level of internal activity since adequate alternative employ­
ment opportunities would exist. Consequently in some respects severe 
cuts in imports would be administratively simpler, even though econom­
ically more undesirable, with a high level of internal activity.
There may be a good case for avoiding the disturbing effects on 
business that frequent changes in the import level would involve, and
for seeking to hold the licensing ceiling at a constant level over a
•1relatively long period.1
Rigidity in this respect under changing circumstances may be 
dictated by political necessity or may be necessary to demonstrate 
administrative efficiency. If maintaining stability in the Import 
level means holding the relationship between Imports and internal activ­
ity constant (in some sense), then this is not what holding the level of 
imports at £800m. throughout 1957-58 and 1950-59 would have meant.
A price adjustment which would have succeeded in holding imports 
within the ceiling of £800m. in 1957-53 would not have done so in 1958-59. 
It would have needed increasing, otherwise additional imports would have 
come in, The latter would itself be desireable as a means of tempering
While there are clearly some advantages in providing some stability 
in the import level in this way, it could be argued that some uncertain­
ty in respect of the future level of protection afforded by direct 
controls on imports may also be desirable.
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the expansion of activity. In addition the advantages of stability 
to domestic producers and consumers are not lost if, as an alternative, 
a price adjustment were used which remained constant.
The objection to avoiding domestic disturbances, in this sense, 
by means of an unchanged price adjustment may be that the objective 
of direct controls on imports is to maintain a predetermined level 
of imports, which would not be achieved with a price adjustment. The 
lessons of the period 1952-60 seem to be that, given the political and 
economic constraints which exist, the difference between the two methods 
in this respect may be considerably less than might otherwise be 
thought.
Appendix VIII.A
The Import Time Lag
Three sample surveys of imports were made by the import licensing
authorities which attempted to give some idea of the import time lag.
In some respects the most useful measure would be the time lag between
the date the order was placed and the date of a ctual delivery. It
was not possible to obtain data on the time of the placing of the
order; consequently the results are in terms of the time lag between
the date of the issue of an import licence and the time the value of
1the imports was debited against the licence.
The summarised results of three surveys for which results are 
available are given in Table VTII.A-2. Table VTII.A-1 provides a 
summary of the last and largest of the surveys.
In each case, roughly 60 per cent, had been imported by the end 
of four months; in the case of the third - and by far the largest - 
sample BO per cent, had been imported by the end of six months, though 
in the two previous samples only 70 per cent, had been imported 
within six months.
Overall, the May 1958 sample survey showed a decrease of about a 
month in the t ime lag. Many reasons can be adduced to explain this
T.
Normally the difference between the time of actual importing and 
the time the value of imports is debited against the licence would 
not be large and would have a negligible effect on the results.
Not infrequently, however, goods are left in bond for longer periods.
difference. First, it was a larger sample than the others, and may 
thus have been less subject to the effects of unrepresentative 
importations.
Second, it would seem from the higher proportion of imports
entered within one month that a greater number of orders had been
lodged in anticipation of the issue of the licence. While some of the
imports entering within one month of licence issue could be accounted
-|for by imports from neighbouring countries, such as New Zealand, the 
fact that they occur under each licensing category suggests this is 
not the whole answer.
Third, licensing on a Replacement basis was introduced in August,
1957; Replacement category items appear to have a shorter time lag
than the categories from which the replacement category items were
2transferred, i.e. specific quota and specific licence items.
Fourth, many importers were expecting import licensing to be 
intensified in April, 1958 and this could be reflected in the shorter 
time lags in the latest of the surveys.
Many other factors could, of course, influence the results suffi­
ciently to account for the differences noted, and to suggest some
il
Goods whose origin is New Guinea and other Australian territories 
are not included since licences were not required for these goods.
2.
In the early period following the transfer of an item to the 
Replacement category the importer has an incentive to hasten 
delivery of imports in order to build up the total level of 
licences available to him, since subsequent issues of licences 
are dependent upon his previous rate of importing.
.able VIII.A-1
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Time Lag Between Issue of Licence and Actual Importation: 
Summary of Results of Sample Surveys.
Cumulative Percentagesof Imports in Each Month
Time Lag Time Las Sample Survev Made:
(Months) Mav 1958 Mav 1957 Nov/Dec 1956
% % %
0 9 1 _
1 21 12 12
2 34 27 30
3 52 42 43
4 63 61 59
5 74 64 65
6 80 70 71
7 83 73 82
8 88 81 85
9
•
92 84 89
•
12 98 95 96
Maximum Lag: 17 months 17 months 19 months
or over or over or over
Size of Sample (£m.) 52*5 9.0 12.9
Source: Derived from information made available
by the Department of Trade.
caution in applying these results to periods when conditions are 
substantially different* These would include variations in conditions 
of supply, availability of transport, the composition of imports, the 
source of imports, the nature of the relationship between exporter and 
importer and the level of domestic demand. For example, when internal 
demand is high relative to the level of imports permitted greater 
emphasis may be placed on early delivery than at times when there is
a greater availability of imports in relation to demand.
Broadly speaking, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the assumption of an average time lag for imports of about four - five 
months would be satisfactory for most purposes.
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Notes to Table VIII,A-2
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(a) Actually time läge between date of issue of licence 
and date of debiting value of imports against the 
import licence.
(b) Includes a small quantity of other specific quota 
imports in addition to the three quota items shown.
(c) Licences issued where no payment of foreign exchange 
is involved. These are discussed in more detail
in Chapter XIV.
(d) Separate details for time lags of over 17 months 
not collected.
Source: Derived from information made available by the
Department of Trade.
Chapter IX
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Economic Effects of the Administration of the Controls: 
Discriminatory Aspects
Discrimination in the import licensing system was of two kinds. 
First, the system discriminated against dollar area and Japanese goods. 
Second, it discriminated between particular classes of imports. These 
two aspects of discrimination are distinct in their nature but not 
unrelated in their effects as we shall see below« They are sufficiently 
related to make it convenient to consider them together in the present 
chapter.
Discrimination on a Country Basis 
Table IX-1
(a)Percentage Shares of Imports from *DiscriminatoryT Sources 
and Other Major Suppliers; 1950-51 to 1961-62
Year United States.Canada.Japan.New Zealand.Germany.United Kingdom
_ % _ % % ofJQ * g
1950-51 8.2 2.3 2.1 0.4 2.0 48.1
1951-52 10.4 2.2 4.1 0.6 3.1 44.2
1952-53 16.7 3.8 0.9 0.7 2.7 42.1
1953-54 10.8 2.8 1.0 0.9 3.2 <48.9
1954-55 12.1 2.8 2.2 0.9 3.7 45.1
1955-56 12.1 2.9 2.8 1.0 4.3 43.5
1956-57 130 3.1 1.8 1.6 4.3 41.4
1957-58 13.2 2.9 3.0 1.6 5.2 41.1
1958-59 13.7 2.9 3.3 1.6 5.4 38.6
1959-60 16.2 3.2 4.5 1.7 5.3 35.6
1960-61 20.0 4.3 6.0 1.6 6.1 310
1961-62 19.7 3.9 5.6 1.5 5.9 30.0
(a): Imports from dollar sources other than the U.S* and Canada, 
were small.
Source: The Australian Balance of Payments(various years).
There were considerable changes in the shares of the import 
market obtained by particular supplying countries during the period.
(See Table IX-1). The United Kingdom1s share of toal imports into 
Australia shows a generally declining trend with a more rapid decline 
in the second half of the period. The United States’ share, and to a 
lesser extent that of Canada, shows clearly the effects of the relaxa­
tion of dollar discrimination. The relatively high share for the 
United States in 1952-53 reflects the less severe cuts made in 
’’essential” items to which imports from dollar sources were limited at 
that time.
The Japanese share in 1951-52 reflects the relaxations in the
licensing from this source in that and the previous years; the intensity
of the reversal of the previous relaxation of discrimination against
Japanese goods is exaggerated in t he low share of the import market
2obtained by Japan in 1952-53*
With subsequent relaxations in the discrimination against Japan, 
particularly following the signing of the Trade Agreement with that
1.
The later application of the cuts to dollar goods, imports under
1. B.R.D. loans and the generally longer time-lag for ’specific licence’ 
goods (See Appendix Chapter VIII) may also account in part for the 
relatively lower cut in the U.S. imports in 1952-53*
2.
The cut in licences for essential goods was designed to reduce 
imports of these goods from Japan to one-third of 1951-52 levels, 
whereas imports from Japan fell by over 90 per cent., a difference 
not accountable by the reduction in the relatively small level of 
consumer goods imports. Increased availability of essential goods 
including steel, at lower prices elsewhere, and under-usage of 
licences for some items would seem to be part of the explanation.
C.f. History of Australia’s Import Licensing Measures, p. 30.
>
*
icountry, Japan substantially enlarged her share of the market.
It seems apparent that the United Kingdom and possibly other
non-dollar, non-Japanese exporters received a considerable amount of
2protection from the discrimination in the licensing system, although 
the increase in the market obtained by Germany probably reflects more 
the limited export availability at the beginning of the period and a 
relatively favourable movement in export prices over the period.^
The protection given to suppliers outside the dollar area and 
Japan may have been accentuated by a lack of competition among 
importers, and hence less need to seek new and cheaper sources of 
supply, and by the r elatively low incentive to dollar area and Japan­
ese exporters to develop markets in Australia. The declining share of 
the United Kingdom in the Australian market may also have been acceler­
ated by direct private investment by British manufacturers in Australian 
production of goods previously exported from the
1.
Assisted also by the accord to Japan of (lower) most favoured 
nation (m.f.n.) tariff treatment under the Trade Agreement and 
relative price movements in favour of Japanese goods (See Table XV-IO).
2.
This gain was not necessarily a one way effect. Australia may have 
gained from other countries' discrimination against the dollar. The 
extent of this was probably not large. In the case of Britain most 
of Australia’s exports were in the ’essential' category - given fairly 
liberal dollar licensing treatment e.g. U.K. imports of dollar wheat, 
v. Perkins, oo.cit.. p.51«
See Table XV-10.
3.
2 6 9
-|United Kingdom.
In Chapter V we discussed theoretical arguments which could be 
adduced in favour of discrimination according to t he elasticity of 
supply of imports. Discrimination against the dollar in the post-war 
period was normally based on general arguments of a currency nature in 
the interests of the sterling area. The assumption in the case of 
Australia would seem to have been that she could afford to pay in terms 
of excess costs of imports in order to avoid purchasing in the dollar 
market; and in addition that the pooling of Australia’s dollar earnings 
and, to the extent that they were dependent upon these arrangements, 
the other benefits to be derived from membership of the sterling area 
were worth these added costs.
The benefits derived from membership of the sterling area are 
difficult to determine since they depended upon a variety of indeterm­
inate factors. It is certainly not self evident that, despite her 
strong external position prior to 1951-52, had she left the sterling 
area she could have maintained non-discrimination against the dollar. 
Australia normally is in current account deficit with the dollar area; 
non discrimination would have been dependent upon the extent to which
1.
See Chapter XIV. It is clear that the explanations give less than 
the full reasons for the decline in Britain’s share of Australian 
total imports. For an examination of Britain’s export performance 
in sterling area markets including Australia, since 1954? and for 
further possible explanations of her declining share in these markets, 
see ’’Britain’s Falling Share of Sterling Area Imports”, National 
Institute Economic Review. No.14* March 1961, pp. 18-35.
convertible currency could have been earned from other trade - the 
strength of her export position, the extent of discrimination against 
her goods, the extent of dollar borrowing etc. - in relation to the 
unfilled internal demand for dollar goods.
Subsequent to the imposition of general restri ctions in 1952 the 
costs of discrimination were increased considerably in view of the 
increased domestic value of a unit of imports. To the extent that the 
case for discriminating against the dollar remained, that for not 
discriminating against non sterling countries which had creditor
■y
positions in the European Payments Union (E.P.U.) and later - as 
convertibility was gradually ext ended - all non sterling countries, 
was reduced.
As we saw in Chapter III, by 1959 a considerable reduction in 
dollar discrimination had been made, there then being no need to 
maintain discrimination on sterling area balance of payments grounds.
1.
It is not intended to consider in any detail the general merits of 
Australia’s policies of discrimination against the dollar and for 
Japanese goods. This has been considered extensively in the literature. 
For a discussion of dollar discrimination and the sterling area 
giving particular emphasis to t he situation of outer sterling area 
countries see J.O.N. Perkins, Sterling and Regional Payments Systems. 
Melbourne 1956, partic. Chaps. IV and V. Dr. Perkins deals with 
arguments against Australia’s dollar import policies put forward in 
D.B. Copland, Inflation and Expansion. Melbourne 1951, pp. 40-44*
For a general discussion of the rationale of dollar discrimination, 
see Donald MacDougall, The World Dollar Problem, London, 1957, partic. 
Chap. XVI. For varying periods from 1952 to 1958 the sterling area had 
deficits with the E.P.U., substantial proportions of which had to be 
settled in gold or convertible currency.
However, measures to conserve expenditure of dollars had by this time 
been in force for 20 years and the delay in removing the remaining 
discriminatory restrictions at this time would appear to have been 
largely a matter of giving local industry time to make the necessary 
adjustments. ^
Although the argument for dollar discrimination was based on
sterling area balance of payments grounds, ore economist argued in 1951
against removal of quantitative controls on d ollar goods on the grounds
2that this would worsen the non dollar countries’ terms of trade and 
later explained the adverse movement of the United States1 terms of 
trade in the post-war period as due in part to t he discrimination
3against her exports. To the extent that this was so it would appear 
to have been an offset to the costs of dollar discrimination.
The theoretical principle behind discrimination in tariff or 
quantitative import restriction policy is that demand for an imported 
product, the supply of which is relatively inelastic, is reduced 
causing its price to fall, and there is a welfare gain from importing
1.This was specifically stated by the Minister for Trade in his 
announcement of the intention to remove discrimination on motor 
vehicle imports. Preps Statement. 29.11.1959.
2.
T. Balogh, ’’European Unification and the Dollar Problem”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. Vo. 65 (l95l), pp.111-113* Balogh argued that 
such reduction would only tend to worsen the terms of trade of the non 
dollar countries, in view of the dominant position of the United States 
in world markets.
3*
T. Balogh, ’’The Dollar Crisis Revisited”, Oxford Economic Papers.
Vol. VI No. 3, (September 1954)? p* 24S.
the reduced volume at a lower price. This effect is complicated in 
a fragmented market where direct controls merely divert demand from 
one source to another. Prices would tend to fall in the market from 
which demand has been diverted and to rise in the market to which demand 
has been redirected. Dollar discrimination would therefore tend to turn 
the terms of trade against the country redirecting demand in non dollar 
markets, and in that country*s favour in the dollar area markets.
To the extent that demand was diverted away from the dollar area no 
advantage would be obtained from the lower prices. Two qualifications 
are necessary here. First, price would clearly be a factor influencing 
the degree of discrimination. Consequently with the widening of the 
gap between prices in the two markets some countries would revise their 
policies. To the extent that demand reverted to dollar sources of 
supply, the gap would be reduced. Second, the difference between the 
two prices would not represent the cost to the discriminating country 
since in the absence of discrimination the price of the dollar goods 
would be higher. The case of cotton will serve to illustrate a 
feature of this situation. The Australian cotton textile industry was 
obliged to purchase a substantial proportion of its raw cotton from 
nondollar sources until 1955* British exporters had available to 
them substantial quantities of dollar cotton and this improved their
1.
As it was in the sterling area countries. See Perkins 
op.cit.. p. 5 *
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1competitive position in relation to the Australian industry. Not 
only was Australia’s greater discrimination against the cheaper 
cotton giving the British exporter a competitive advantage but through 
the terms of trade effect it was also influencing the extent to which 
dollar cotton was cheaper.
While the sterling are was in deficit with Japan, and while this 
was convertible into dollars, or may have given rise to further demands 
for convertibility rights, there was the same justification for 
discriminating against Japan as against dollar area countries.
This justification ceased to exist once the sterling area deficit 
on Japanese account was removed, and there were good reasons why the 
discrimination against Japan should have been removed. It worsened the 
terms of trade, not only through preventing imports being obtained 
from the cheapest market but on the export side as well. Sterling 
availability influenced the amount of foreign exchange made available 
in Japan for imports of particular commodities and to some extent from 
particular countries. For example, the decline in Japan’s wool and 
wool tops imports from Australia in 1954 may be largely attributed to 
the sterling crisis experienced by Japan in that year. Among the causes
’’The Australian spinner*s proportion of (cotton) requirements which 
the Australian spinner can obtain from non-sterling sources is much 
smaller than that of the United Kingdom spinner.
Evidence was given ... that during 1952 readier access to dollar 
cotton resulted in a margin of lOd. to 13d. sterling in favour of the 
United Kingdom spinner.” Tariff Board Report, Cotton Sheetings. 
Sheets and Pillow Cases, 31.12.1953» p*lS.
2 7 7
of this crisis was the tightening of restrictions by sterling area
countries against Japanese imports. Australia’s part in this, though
1.2.relatively small, was undoubtedly a contributing factor.^”''*
The relatively slow removal of Australian discrimination against 
Japan became rather a protective issue with certain rather emotional 
overtones and consequent political difficulties.
Apart from discrimination against dollar area and Japanese goods 
the import licensing system introduced in 1952 was virtually non discrim­
inatory as to source. A number of reasons can be suggested why Australia 
decided to operate the controls non discriminatorily. First, a general 
desire to purchase imports in the cheapest market, strengthened by the 
knowledge that for many goods, dollar discrimination had meant paying 
higher prices than from dollar sources. Secondly, Australia was a 
member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) which 
provides that quantitative restrictions imposed for balance of payments 
reasons should be applied with discrimination as to
"^*P.R. Narvekar, "The 1954-55 Improvement in Japan’s Balance of Payments",
1. M.F. Staff Papers. Vol. VI, No.l, (November 1957), pp.l43> 160-161;
The Wool Outlook. (November 1953)> Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
Canberra, p.33. The decline in Japan’s wool imports from Australia was 
not offset by increased imports from other countries though the reduc­
tions in imports from Latin America were proportionately much smaller, 
because of bilateral arrangements with Argentina and Uruguay.
2.
From the earlier reference to underusage of quotas for imports from 
Japan for some items, it will be apparent that other factors were of 
importance (c.f. Narvekar, op.cit.). The general point, however, 
remains valid.
1source. Thirdly, non discrimination would avoid, or at least reduce,
the likelihood of retaliation. Finally, a non discriminatory system
would be much simpler to administer.
A decision to avoid discrimination on a country basis would
probably not have been quite so clear cut as these reasons would appear
to indicate and there were suggestions at the time implying that the
2system should have discriminated in favour of sterling countries.
The G.A.T.T. obligation with respect to the non discriminatory 
application of quantitative import restrictions imposed for balance 
of payments reasons was not absolute. Escape provisions permit limited 
discrimination in certain circumstances* It may have been possible 
for Australia to have gained acceptance in the G.A.T.T. of discrimination
*Article XII of the Agreement. Vide Contracting Parties to the 
G.A.T.T. Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. Vol. Ill, Text of 
the General Agreement, 1958.
2.
For Example, Dr. Evatt (then Leader of the Federal Opposition) 
reported in the Sydney Morning Herald. 14.3*52, p.3*
3 ^
Exceptions which were permitted to the general rule of non discrimin­
ation, as set out in Article XIII, are provided for in Article XIV of 
the General Agreement. Under paragraph l(b) of this Article, a contract­
ing party to the G.A.T.T. applying import restrictions under Article 
XII (for balance of payments reasons) was permitted to use discriminatory 
restrictions to the extent that those restrictions had an effect 
equivalent to exchange restrictions which the country would be authorised 
to operate under Article XIV of the International Monetary Fund Agree­
ment. (This article relates to restrictions on payments and transfers 
for current international transactions). Paragraph l(c) of Article XIV 
of the G.A.T.T. provides that a country could discriminate to a greater 
extent than would be allowed under paragraph l(b), were such discrimin­
ation a continuation or adaptation to changing circumstances of 
discrimination which was, in fact, operating on 1st March, 1948.
in  favou r of s te r l in g  a re a  c o u n tr ie s  under those escape p ro v is io n s , 
though much le s s  l ik e ly  on a b a s is  invo lv ing  d i f f e r in g  trea tm en t from 
co u n try  to  co u n try . Even so , d is c r im in a tio n  simply in  fav o u r o f 
s t e r l i n g  a re a  c o u n tr ie s  and a g a in s t non s te r l in g  non d o l la r  c o u n tr ie s  
would have provoked co n sid e rab le  o p p o sitio n  in  the G.A.T.T. bo th  from 
c o u n tr ie s  co n sid e rin g  them selves ad v erse ly  a f fe c te d  and from the U.S.A. 
to  whom non d is c r im in a tio n  had been a firm  a r t i c l e  of f a i t h  fo r  some 
c o n sid e rab le  tim e . The a p p lic a tio n  of d is c r im in a to ry  p r in c ip le s  to  
th e  o p e ra tio n  o f the l ic e n s in g  system may have weakened the  G.A.T.T. 
as a g en e ra l in strum ent designed  to  in tro d u ce  a semblance o f  order in to  
in te r n a t io n a l  tra d e ;  i t  would c e r ta in ly  have weakened A u s t r a l ia ’ s own 
s ta tu r e  and in flu en ce  in  th a t  body.
The d isc r im in a to ry  a p p lic a tio n s  o f the c o n tro ls  would in e v ita b ly  
have meant b i l a t e r a l  b a rg a in in g  on the a p p lic a tio n  of the r e s t r i c t i o n s  
to  p a r t i c u la r  c la s s e s  o f goods from p a r t i c u la r  c o u n tr ie s  an d /o r 
r e t a l i a t i o n  by a f fe c te d  c o u n tr ie s .
P rim ary  ex p o rtin g  c o u n tr ie s  ten d  to  be a t  d isadvantage in  such 
b i l a t e r a l  b a rg a in in g  because o f the i n e l a s t i c  supply co n d itio n s  of 
t h e i r  e x p o r ts . Moreover in  a tra d in g  w orld in  which non d is c r im in a to ry  
a p p lic a t io n  o f t a r i f f s  i s  g e n e ra lly  accep ted  p ra c t ic e  in  re s p e c t  of
T
I t  would have been n ecessa ry  to  take account o f t h i s  o p p o s itio n , 
p a r t i c u l a r ly  th a t  of the U .S .A ., no t only in  i t s  tra d e  a sp e c ts  b u t in  
a w ider sp h ere , in c lu d in g  i t s  in flu en ce  on the I.M .F . and the I.B .R .D . 
and the  co n seq u en tia l e f f e c t  on the r e la t io n s  o f those o rg a n isa tio n s  
w ith  A u s t r a l ia .
manufactured products, but in which tariffs are not the widely used 
instrument of protection for primary producers in importing countries, 
disguised retaliation is a simple procedure. Moreover, it could be 
argued that Australia's dependence on wool exports could place it in 
a somewhat vulnerable position - in a political sense even if not in an 
economic sense - in any bilateral bargaining of this nature.
The operation of a discriminatory licensing system would be much 
more complex than one operated without discrimination between sources 
of imports. Moreover, it seems reasonable to suggest that a discrimin­
atory system would not only have been more open to pressures from export­
ing countries to provide bilateral concessions, but it would have been 
subject much more to internal pressures to use the licensing controls 
for directly protective purposes.
In addition, a system which discriminated on a c ountry basis would 
have facilitated the organisation of exporters such that they could, 
by raising their export prices, appropriate part of the margin between
the pre-restriction price and the ’scarcity' price within the
1restricting country.
1.In the pre-war experience of quantitative import controls operated 
on a d iscriminatory basis, a number of examples of such behaviour by- 
groups of exporters may be found. For example, quotas were imposed 
on imports of Danish bacon into the United Kingdom in 1933* The Danish 
exporters acting together raised their price and were consequently 
more than compensated for the reduction in the (quantitative) size of 
their market. See Quantitative Trade Controls: Their Causes and Mature. 
League of Nations, Geneva, 1943> p*25*
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Finally, in view of the magnitude of the reductions in imports 
required in both intensification periods, and the large proportion of 
the total import bill which derived from sterling area - particularly 
British - sources, it would have been very difficult to avoid cutting
1imports from these sources to a very substantial degree.
Summed up, it is clear that many other factors need to be taken 
into consideration in examining the r elative merits of discrimination 
and non discrimination than the simple elasticies of supply and demand.
It is not the intention here to weigh the balance of advantages and 
disadvantages of a policy of non discrimination in the non dollar, non 
Japanese sector of import licensing. It seems reasonable to suggest 
however that there were substantial offsets to any advantages attached 
to the alternative policy of discrimination by country.
While the import licensing system was administered on a non 
discriminatory basis so far as origin of imports was concerned, this
did not mean that the effects of the controls applied with equal force 
to all exporters to the Australian market.
*C.f. Macdougall, op.cit., pp.3ol-362, MacDougall, though arguing the 
general benefits of limiting restrictions on trade within the sterling 
area when restrictions are placed on non sterling trade, made the same 
point. Discrimination in favour of the sterling area would no doubt 
have bound Australia’s trading relationships even more closely to 
Britain. In view of subsequent developments in Europe, including - in 
spite of the present impasse - Britain’s possible accession to the 
European Economic Community, such a closer binding would have made even 
more difficult the problems for Australia’s exports that such an 
accession would involve. (This assumes, of course, that in the event 
of these closer trading ties, Britain would still have sought closer 
association with Europe)•
One complaint from Britain was that when imposing the cuts in 
1952, the Australian Government, in refusing to allow goods on firm
order to be imported except where the order had been accompanied by 
an irrevöcable letter of creit, was in fact indirectly and unintentionally 
discriminating against British exporters* The not unreasonable argument
was that because of the closer and longer standing trading relationships
with Britain, Australian traders were less frequently required to
accompany their orders with irrevocable letters of credit than in the
case say of European countries. The more formal system of trading with
other European countries consequently gave exporters in those countries
a considerable advantage over those in Britain*
More importantly the method of applying restrictions on imports
with greater or less severity according to the essentiality of the item
involved itself tended to make for considerable difference in the
impact of the controls on particular supplying countries. We shall
return to this aspect after we have considered in more detail some of
the questions which a rise out of the concept of essentiality.
Discrimination Between Glasses of Imports*
For the purpose of licensing imports, each import item was
1
classified into categories, partly according to its nature, but
1 *
For example, items where demand was intermittent, or where demand for 
particular types or by individual importers fluctuated sharply, were 
recognised as inappropriate for quota control and were licensed on a 
specific licence basis*
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primarily according to its relative essentiality. The relative
essentiality of an item generally determined the extent to which
imports were restricted; an item with a high degree of essentiality
being licensed fairly liberally, whereas fairly restrictive treatment
was applied to less essential items.
In the classifications of the various categories of imports, all
import items in which close substitutes were available from local
production in adequate quantities were judged to be relatively inessential.
This classification was not so clear cut in practice since just what
constituted an adequate local substitute was frequently a matter of
2some judgement, and consequently a source of conflict.
In the administration of import licensing the first criterion for 
an essential import was that it, or an adequate substitute, was not 
available in sufficient quantity from domestic sources. Where this was
1.
Import licensing categories were largely based on the existing tariff 
classification. In many cases import category items were synonymous
with tariff items; in others import category items were either combin­
ations of tariff items or parts of such items.
2.
Limited assistance could be obtained by basing a judgement on the 
existence or otherwise of a protective duty; for many items this would 
have been an inadequate or imperfect indication. Comparison of tariff 
rates and import licensing category items in 1952-53 suggests the 
probability that initially the existence of a protective tariff rate 
may have been used as a rough guide to the existence of local production 
and may consequently have resulted in the item being placed in the inter­
changeable quota category; the absence of a protective tariff on the 
same basis would appear to have suggested the use of the specific quota 
category for those items. In the case of ite^i9as machinery where by­
law admission could invalidate this approach, the question whether a 
locally produced item is an adequate substitute is of course a familiar 
problem to those administering by-law entry.
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not the case the choice of import to be permitted was based on five 
further criteria. First, items having a defence or strategic signifi­
cance, imported primarily by government departments or at their insti­
gation; second, items deemed essential largely for political reasons, 
(petroleum products were perhaps the best example; although in part
essential raw materials, restrictions of these items would have implied
1unofficial, if not official, rationing to customers. Tea also met this 
criterion of essentiality); Third, items related directly to the mainte­
nance of employment, such as raw materials, and replacement parts for 
plant and machineiy; fourth, items deemed necessary for the efficient 
operation of export industries, principally items required for primary 
industry; the fifth criterion was concerned with the desirability of 
imports from the viewpoint of the economy in the longer term. (Plant 
machinery and equipment rated high in the list of essential imports
while most luxury consumer goods rated very low; plant and machinery for
2
certain types of productive activity rated more highly than others."')
3In broad terms items in the specific licence and specific quota 
categories consisted of goods classified as relatively essential 
while the interchangeable quota items were largely items which, because
IT
This would have been a reversal of an important election pledge of 
the government in power. The alternative of letting the price mechanism 
allocate the restricted supplies would probably have been equally 
unacceptable politically.
2.
See Chapter XIV.
In the case of specific quotas this was less the position after 1957-
3-
282
of adequate local production or for other reasons e.g. luxury consumer 
goods, were considered relatively non-essential.
These criteria demonstrate that although we are considering the 
essentiality of imports, i.e. in the relative sense, this did not obviate 
the need to set scales of essentiality in an absolute sense for the wide 
range of items where there was inadequate or no local production. The
question of determining essentiality - in the sense used here - of 
imports, implied weighing these various criteria. From the employment 
aspect, almost everything can be said to have some essentiality, since
even finished consumer goods give employment to importers and distribu­
tors: Cigarette lighters might reasonably be judged non-essential,
but parts and materials for their manufacture, because of the effects 
on employment may, on this criterion, have a fair degree of essentiality.
In economic terms, an essential item tends to be one with a low 
demand elasticity whereas a high demand elasticity tends to characterise 
less essential goods. To this extent the term essentiality reflects the
1.
Colin Clark has described earlier difficulties of determining non­
essentiality: an expert committee appointed in late 1939 to list non-
essential industries eventually produced a short list of non-essential 
industries of very minor significance e.g. producers of bird cages.
The Department of War Organisation tried again two years later. 
Eventually production of 24 items such as Christmas cards, cake 
ornaments, photograph frames etc., was ordered to cease. Fur coats, 
initially listed, were removed from the list shortly after, subject to 
production being of utility fur coats. Sydney Morning Herald, 28.2.1952,
p.2.
ZH3
1the real need of consumers. Nor is this consideration affected by
the classification of items as non-essential where substitutes were 
available from local production since this would increase the elasticity 
of demand for imports. To the extent that the licensing system attempted 
to permit imports of essential goods and reduce imports of non-essential
that because essential goods are permitted relatively freely while non-
essential goods are severely restricted, it tends to stimulate expansion 
in non-essential industries while providing no protection to essential 
industries; such criticisms have been levelled at the Australian system.' 
Arguing that there is a case for protective measures in respect of 
essential items as a form of insurance against a sudden and drastic 
deterioration in Australia’s trading position, one writer has claimed
•Such a definition ignores the effects of inequality of income which 
would tend to result in such items as fur coats, big American cars being 
classified as essential items since the elasticity of demand for these 
items tends to be low. A similar difficulty would arise if the attempt 
were made to define essential items as those for which no close substi­
tute is available for it is arguable whether there is an adequate 
substitute for a fur coat.
2.
It is necessary to recognise that the definition of an item as 
’essential’ in practice reflects significantly social and political 
factors - or definitions of community needs - irrespective of any 
economic meaning given to it.
3*
C.f. K.J. Hancock, ’’Australia’s Balance of Payments Problem.11 Sixth 
Summer School of Business Administration. University of Adelaide, 1961, 
pp.26-27; M.W. Corden, ’’Import Restrictions and Tariffs: A New Look at 
Australian Policy”, Economic Record. Vol. XXIV, No.69, pp.332-3* Dr# 
Corden’s view is implied rather than stated directly and he recognises 
the offsetting features of the interchangeable quota system.
goods it was attempting to do what a price adjustment would have done. 
A common criticism of the quantitative control of imports is
2
1.
"The tendency of import controls, as administered in Australia, was
1in precisely the opposite direction".
As suggested above, use of a price adjustment to select imports
would to some extent lead to a similar pattern of imports because of
2the inelasticity of demand for essential goods. Nevertheless, a price 
adjustment would give some encouragement to all forms of industry 
including essential industries, and would provide encouragement to
industries whose expansion involved least economic cost to the economy. 
It will be useful to examine further the criteria upon which
discrimination of imports was based. In the present chapter we shall 
merely consider the principlesinvolved and the likely effects on the 
pattern of resource allocation. In the subsequent chapter we shall 
consider any necessary qualifications to the conclusions drawn here 
after examining the manner of implementation of these criteria in 
practice.
The policy of licensing most restrictively those items where ade­
quate local production existed would tend to give existing industries 
substantial added protection. In this way it would tend to assist the 
maintenance of the existing pattern of industry irrespective of the 
economic nature of this pattern, and to limit the rapidity of struct­
ural change.
Hancock, oo.cit.. p.27.
2.
To make his argument for encouragement of essential industries 
consistent with his advocacy of the use of a price adjustment,
Hancock suggested corresponding sales taxes on non-essential goods. 
Ibid.
Selection of imports on the basis of essentiality implies that 
expenditure on imports differs from expenditure made internally. If 
there are unemployed resources within this may be valid; at a time of full 
or overfull employment there is little validity in such a distinction.
In these circumstances if it were accepted that scarce resources 
should be devoted to uses according to their importance to the econony, 
there would seem to be advantage in not limiting this merely to imports, 
but also to the use of domestic resources. Assuming that certain 
consumer goods ranked low in terms of importance to the economy and 
that whether available from local sources or not, their importation is 
to be severely restricted, then in the circumstances of full employment 
of resources, there is an equally strong case for limiting any expansion 
in this line of activity internally. Otherwise, local producers of the 
severely restricted inessential goods would have greater opportunities 
for expansion and would be able to compete away resources from uses 
which, in terms of the valuation made, would be more desirable. In the 
case of direct controls or of a differential tariff adjustment, the
expansion of domestic inessential production could be discouraged by
1imposing a sales tax on the locally produced article. This is not to
1.
C.f. Hancock, on.cit.« p.27. A point which Hancock omitted to make 
was that some - admittedly limited - action was taken along these lines. 
For example, in March 1956, the government increased indirect taxes on 
a number of items either because expenditure on them promoted high 
levels of imports e.g. motor vehicles, petrol; or because of their 
inessential nature e.g. jewellery, radio and television receivers. See 
Statement by the Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies), Parliamentary Debates.
H. of Reps. Vol. 5, 14.3.1956, pp.786-797. Moreover to the extent that 
the expansion of productive activity in inessential lines was dependent 
upon imported machinery, this was itself subject to import licensing 
control. This aspect we shall consider in Chapter XIV.
imply, however, that production of consumer goods is necessarily a 
less preferable line of activity than that of any other type of product.
The employment criterion for imports would tend to perpetuate the
existing pattem of productive activity. Assuming that there is some
basis on which scales of essentiality can be drawn up, the judgement
that raw materials for an existing productive process are essential
leads to a situation noted above where materials and parts of an item
are considered essential when the final product would rate low on almost
any other criterion of essentiality. On the other hand, this criterion
is probably less necessary than its use suggests - on other than equity
(or political) grounds - since the imposition of import restrictions will
lead to a strong internal demand position and adequate alternative
employment opportunities. Even if total spending is reduced, spending
will still be redirected to the import competing sector. Of course,
given administrative control of imports it was inevitable that existing
1manufacturers should have been given access to raw materials. The 
argument is simply that resource allocation would have been improved had 
the relative strength of their claim been determined by the price 
mechanism.
The employment criterion could therefore be expected to have a
1.
In the short run there is an economic argument for allowing existing 
manufacturers their full requirements of raw materials since it is a 
quick way of achieving the additional output required to meet the 
demand redirected to the import competing sector.
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tendency to slow down desirable structural changes in the economy*
In addition, to the extent that production of raw materials, components, 
etc*, is considered to be essential, its effect would tend to be in the 
direction opposite to that which should be preferred to be consistent 
with the community’s valuations in the longer term. In other words, 
essential goods vould be licensed more liberally, giving local produc­
tion much less assistance.
Finally, it may be argued that in the case of items, imports of 
which are not restricted, their consumption is encouraged. In the case 
of petroleum products, for example, the discrimination in favour of 
imports of these products, in effect subsidised petrol users and may 
have been economically expensive in both the short and the long run.
Some restriction of imports of petroleum products or a price adjustment 
by way of an increase in excise duty would have reduced the consumption 
of petrol for purposes of pleasure, and may perhaps have reduced some of 
the drain on resources that arose in other ways from the automotive and 
allied industries; in addition the absence of some price adjustment, 
direct or implied, probably distorted the relative price relationship 
between petroleum and diesel oil and fuels such as coal, which may have 
been placed in a worse relative position than justified by long term
1.
See reference above to increased tax on petrol imposed 
in March 1956.
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The basis of discrimination between classes of imports which was
employed in the Australian import licensing system would seem to imply
certain distorting effects on the pattern of productive activity in the
2Australian economy, and any evidence of such effects will be considered
3later. Assuming the existing relative cost and price situation can be 
taken as a satisfactory indication of the likely pattern of comparative 
advantage in the future,^ there is a strong case for arguing that to 
avoid an uneconomic pattern of resource allocation in the longer term, 
discrimination among classes of imports should be purely on the basis 
of existing relative costs and prices* If the price mechanism were used 
to restrict imports, rather than administrative decision, the choice
1.
It should be noted as a factor limiting this argument, that imports of 
fuel oil - imports of which were restricted firm 1956 - were one of the 
few mineral oil products for which the restrictions were effective. 
Restrictions on fuel (residual) oil imports were retained when virtually 
all other petroleum products were exempted from licensing control from 
August, 1957.
2.
The tendency to restrict less severely, or not at all, items deemed 
to be ’essential’ or ’basic’ is a common feature in the use of quantita­
tive import controls* Perkins refers to the effects of similar criteria 
in the sterling area’s discriminatory import controls against dollar 
goods in the post war period, and the probably effects this had on the 
pattern of production in non-dollar countries, particularly the United 
Kingdom. Perkins, oo.cit*. pp.50-54*
3.
See Chapter XV.
4*
There are some qualifications of substance to the validity of this 
assumption in a dynamic situation. These are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter XIV where it is argued that, despite these qualifications, 
planning on the basis of this assumption may be preferable to the 
alternatives.
would lie between a price adjustment which discriminated between classes 
of imports and one which, excluding any terms of trade considerations, 
raises all import prices by a uniform amount. In the former case there 
would be, from this particular aspect, no particular advantage in either 
method since they both require an administrative judgement on the 
relative desirability of the importation of each class of goods. In 
the second case, a price adjustment applied uniformly over all imports 
would tend to reduce considerably imports of those items with an elastic 
demand and would ensure that the incentives to expansion of output are 
given to those industries which are able to do so with least cost.
In the light of the preceding discussion it may be useful to 
examine the pattern of importing during the period to see whether it 
enables conclusions to be drawn with respect to the incidence of the 
controls on particular classes of imports. Tables IX-5 and IX-6 present 
some basic data of imports by economic classes and by degree of manu­
facture .
Some warnings need to be made in attempting to draw conclusions 
from this evidence. First, variations in the proportions of total 
imports represented by particular classes will be the result of many 
factors, of which the direct controls on imports is only one. Second, 
and unrelated to the first, the incidence of restriction can only be 
considered meaningfully in relation to the unfilled demand at any point 
of time. Only limited meaning can be given to the term in respect of 
actual import data. Finally, it will be apparent that conclusions
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drawn from this evidence can relate in the main only to essentiality 
in the absolute sense. These qualifications severely limit the con­
clusions which may be drawn from the data. Even in this limited sense, 
however, an examination of the pattern of imports should be useful. 
Substantial variations in the incidence of the controls among the 
various classes may be expected to be reflected in the proportions 
these classes represent of total imports, and will have some relevance 
to the subsequent discussion of the protective effect of the controls 
on imports.
If the absolute essentiality of a product were the determinant of
the degree of restriction, one would expect inessential imports, i,e.
finished consumer goods, to fall substantially as a proportion of
total imports; the share of essential imports might be expected to
increase significantly. A subdivision of imports on this basis has
been made in Table IX-2. It is of interest that the share of imports
of inessential goods stayed surprisingly stable - with the exception
of 1952-53, and to a lesser extent 1954-55* This may perhaps be even
more noteworthy in view of the fact that the long term trend of
1imports of finished consumer goods appears to be downwards. Motor 
vehicles have been shown separately both because they are not unambig­
uously essential or inessential and because the subdivision between 
completed vehicles and materials is not available before 1955-56.
IT
C.f, R.S.Gilbert, "Structural Trends in Australian Imports",
Economic Record, vol. XXXV, No.70, (April 1959), p*13*
Table IX-2 291
Imports By Decree of ’Essentiality1: As Proportions of 
Total Value of Imports - 1950-51 to 1960-61.
Finished (a)Consumer Motor Fuels and Lubri- D •’Essential”
Goods Vehicles cants; Munitions Goods (exclud-
and War Stores ing Motor 
vehicles).
Year a) (ip (iii) (iv)
1950-51 17.2 15.0 9.1 58.7
1951-52 16.1 12.5 8.8 62.6
1952-53 11.2 8.3 15.9 64*6
1953-54 17.4 10.2 12.2 60.2
1954-55 19.0 10.5 11.2 59.3
1955-56 17.0 10.9 12.7 59.2
1956-57 16.9 8.8 13.2 61.1
1957-58 18.0 8.8 12.8 60.4
1958-59 17.8 9.2 13.4 59.6
1959-60 17.6 9.9 12.0 60.5
1960-61 17.9 9.5 12.0 60.6
(a) includes both completed vehicles and materials and components.
(b) the classification Fuels and Lubricants has been adjusted to 
include crude petroleum which has consequently been excluded 
from column (iv).
(c) includes the following groups shown in Table III-5i Producers1 
Materials excluding Materials for use in Motor Vehicle Assembly 
(see note (a)) and crude petroleum (see note (b)); Aids to 
Production; Producers’ Equipment; Transport Equipment 
(excluding motor vehicles).
Source? Derived from d ata in Monthly Reviews of Business Statistics 
and Import Clearance Bulletins.
Fuels and Lubricants and Munitions and War Stores have similarly been 
shown separately because, although normally considered essential, they 
were subject to little restriction.
The proportion of essential imports i.e. those included in Column 
(iv) was also stable over the period* The major exception was 1952-53 
where clearly imports of inessential goods were reduced relatively much 
more than imports of essential goods; in 1956-57 the table reflects the 
relatively severe cuts on consumer goods and on motor vehicles in that 
year. The relatively stable proportion represented by essential goods 
is in contrast to the upward long term trend discernible in Gilbert’s 
data for the same items.
The data in Table IX-5 however indicate that, of the items included 
in column (iv) of Table IX-2, there was a downward trend in Producers’ 
Materials for Manufacturing (excluding crude petroleum), in Aids to 
Production and possibly in Producers’ Materials for Building and Con­
struction. There is no apparent trend in Transport Equipment; a slight 
upward trend in Producers' Materials for Rural Industries, and a 
distinct upward trend in Producers’ Capital Equipment. The latter is
probably to be expected as a normal feature of an expanding manufactur- 
2ing industry. The declining trend in the proportion of total imports 
represented by Producers' Materials for Manufacturing is perhaps the 
most interesting. Although the exclusion of crude petroleum must be 
borne in mind it suggests the possible replacement of imports by local
rr
At least since the early 1930's. Oo.cit.. p.132.
2.
The data on market shares (Chapter VTl) suggests that local industries 
producing these types of items have in general increased their share of 
the total market during the period.
production on a significant scale. Again, if materials for motor 
vehicle manufacture are excluded, there appears to have been a down­
ward trend in the crude (excluding crude petroleum) and elaborately- 
transformed types of producers’ materials with an upward trend in 
simply transformed materials offsetting this slightly.
The restriction of imports of more elaborately transformed products 
would presumably provide for a greater expansion of domestic manufact­
ure, other things being equal, than the restriction of items less 
elaborately processed. In Table IX-3 imports of finished consumer 
goods are shown subdivided according to the degree of manufacture. The 
series presented there do not suggest that the incidence of restriction 
on elaborately transformed consumer goods was greater than that of other 
less highly processed finished consumer goods, again with the exception 
of 1952-53 and perhaps to a lesser extent 1956-57.
Irrespective of the degree of manufacture, imports of finished 
consumer goods have little relevance to the employment criterion of 
essentiality discussed above. This is not the case with imports of 
essential items particularly those in Column (iv) of Table IX-2. These 
items, classified on the basis of degree of manufacture are presented 
in Table IX-4# As in Table IX-2 the figures have been adjusted to 
exclude crude petroleum and materials for motor vehicle construction. 
Consequently the figures do not strictly represent the total of 
essential items as that term is being used here. The proportion of 
elaborately transformed items does in fact show a movement in direction
Table IX -3 2 9 rt
(a)Im ports of ’I n e s s e n t i a l1 Goods: By Degree of M anufacture: 
As P ro p o rtio n  of T o ta l Value of Imports* 1950-51 to  1960-61»
E la b o ra te ly Simply Crude T o ta l F in ish ed
Transform ed Transformed Consumer Goods
% % % %
Year a) d i ) ( i i i ) (iv )
1950-51 14*2 2 .6 0 .4 17.2
1951-52 14*1 1 .6 0 .4 16.1
1952-53 7 .3 2 .8 0 .6 11.2
1953-54 14*1 2 .6 0 .7 1 7 .4
1954-55 1 5 .4 3.0 0 .6 19.0
1955-56 14*7 1 .7 0 .6 17.0
1956-57 13.7 2 .4 0 .8 16.9
1957-58 15 .1 2 .0 0 .9 18.0
1958-59 14.6 2 .3 0 .9 17.8
1959-60 14*7 2 .0 0 .9 17.6
1960-61 15.7 1 .7 0 .9 17.9
(a) F in ish ed Consumer Goods.
Source: From d a ta  in  Monthly Review of B usiness S t a t i s t i c s  ♦
c o n tra ry  to  t h a t  which would be expected were th e  ab so lu te  p r in c ip le  
o f e s s e n t i a l i t y  being  fo llow ed . There i s  soms.- tre n d  downwards in  th e  
im ports o f crude e s s e n t ia l  goods and an upward tre n d  in  th e  sim ply
transfo rm ed  goods of th i s  ty p e . I t  i s  no t c le a r  what in te r p r e ta t io n
1
can be p laced  on th e se  movements w ith in  th e  t o t a l .
1.
An im portan t f a c to r  which could account fo r  much of th e  d e c lin e  in  
th e  p ro p o rtio n  of raw m a te r ia ls  im ports i s  th e  s u b s ta n t ia l  d e c lin e  in  
p r ic e s  o f b a s ic  m a te r ia l  im ports over th e  pe rio d  (a 22 p e r c e n t, f a l l  
compared w ith  a t o t a l  im port p r ic e  r i s e  of 16 p e r c e n t. See Table 
XV-1 4 ). Since G i lb e r t ’s f ig u re s  do n o t exclude crude petroleum  i t  i s  
no t easy  to  d is c e rn  w hether th e se  correspond w ith  th e  long  term  tre n d .
Table IX-/.
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’Essential' Imports bv Decree of Manufacture: Proportions
of Total Value of Imports: 1950-51 to 1960-61
fa)Elaboratelyv ' 
Transformed.
Simply
Transformed
Crude^ Total,’Essential' 
Items'0'
Year a) (ii) (iii) (iv)
% % % %
1950-51 4 0 .6 7*5 1 0 .6 58.7
1951-52 45.3 8.6 8.2 62.6
1952-53 47.7 7.4 9.5 64*6
1953-54 430 7.4 9.5 60.2
1954-55 / a .  2 8.9 9.2 59.3
1 955 -56 4 1 .6 8 .4 9.4 59.4
1956-57 4 1 .6 9.8 9.7 61.1
1957-58 4 1 .4 10.1 8.9 60.4
1958-59 4 1 .6 9.2 8.8 5 9 .6
1959-60 4 2 .3 9.4 8.8 60.51960-61 44*7 10.1 5.9 60.6
(a) Adjusted to exclude materials for manufacture of motor vehicles
(b) Adjusted to exclude crude petroleum
(c) Adjusted to exclude materials for motor vehicle manufacture and 
crude petroleum.
Source: Basic data from Monthly Review of Business Statistics and
Import Clearance Bulletins.
Insofar as the extent of the restriction of imports can be observed 
from the data presented, there is no evidence to suggest that discrimin­
ation between classes of goods had the effect of restricting inessential 
or consumer type goods in total significantly different to that of 
essential goods, ’essential1 here being used in the absolute sense.
The evidence seems to suggest therefore that the general tendency 
of policies of control of imports to restrict inessential goods 
severely and to permit essential items to be imported relatively freely 
with consequent significance for the structural developments thereby
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encouraged was not discerned in the Australian experience.
Although the licensing system was administered in a manner which 
largely avoided discrimination as to source apart from the dollar area 
and Japan, the discrimination between classes of goods affected export­
ing countries differently according to the composition of their exports 
to Australia. This is illustrated in Table IX-7.
Table IX-5
(a)Effects on Main Supplying Countries ' : Percentage Reductions 
in Exports to Australia: 1952-53 and 1953-5A.
Change on 1950-51 Change on 1951-52
1952-53 1953-5A 1952-53 1953-5A
% % % %
Italy -69 -33 Italy -81 -60
Sweden -58 -37 Belgium -80 -74
Belgium -52 -38 Sweden 75 -63
France -43 -28 France -58 -47
United K/d<cm -40 -29 Germany -58 -34
Germany - 8 46 United K/d<cm -54 -45
Indonesia - 1 1 Indonesia -15 -14
Japan -70 -58 Japan -92 -85
Canada 15 10 Canada -17 -21
U.S.A . 40 20 U.S.A. -22 -33
(a) Countries supplying over £10m. f.o.b. in 1950-51.
Source: Oversea Trade Bulletin.
The predominance of consumer goods in Italian exports accounts 
for that country’s experiencing a more severe proportionate cut than 
the other exporting countries. Indonesia’s untypical showing is due 
to the fact that virtually all that country’s exports to this country 
consisted of petroleum products. Germany shows a different pattern
2 9 7
according to which base year is taken; this is explained by the sharp 
increase in German exports to all sources including Australia which took 
place in 1951-52 compared with 1950-51»
The reduction in the case of the United Kingdom was in absolute 
terms by far the largest - £250m. from 1951-52 to 1952-53 - but in 
proportionate terms was less severe than in the case of most of the 
other suppliers.
It is apparent that although imports from other than dollar and 
Japanese sources were controlled on a global basis, discrimination 
between classes of imports affected supplying countries differently 
according to the type of goods which predominated in their exports to 
Australia. This suggests that had Australia applied the restrictions 
in a discriminatory manner she may have been forced to assume commit­
ments on goods which under the existing system were those in general 
considered less essential. The extent to whidh this would have been 
at the expense of other more essential goods would depend upon the 
nature of the concession gained and the ability to exploit these con­
cessions i.e. whether an increase in export receipts resulted and the 
size of this increase. In the longer term a different pattern of imports 
permitted under the controls would have resulted in a different alloca­
tion of resources internally.
Even within a non discriminatory system, discrimination could be 
effected by means of variations in the level of licensing particular 
commodities or classes of commodities. To the extent that variations
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in licensing levels of classes of goods were influenced by the expected 
effect on exporting countries, and there is some evidence that it may 
have been a factor of some importance, it may explain in part what 
appears to have been a degree of restriction of inessential consumer 
goods not greatly in excess of that applied to essential goods. It is 
not, the intention to pursue this point further in this study since it 
would involve a detailed examination of Australia’s economic and trading 
relationships with other countries. That there are a number of other 
explanations may be seen from the discussion in the following chapter.
1.
As suggested in the following statement by the Prime Minister (Mr. 
Menziesj announcing relaxations in April 1957: ”We have been very
conscious of the interest of many ’good customer’ countries in these 
relaxations, and particularly in consumer goods”. Press Statement 
1.4*1957. Examination of changes in licensing treatment applied to 
particular commodities over the period suggests that in some cases a 
possible explanation may be that the changes were to provide more 
favourable treatment for exporting countries e.g. the establishment 
of quotas under Category Item 513 (Fish, fresh, smoked, dried or 
preserved) on the basis of 1949-50 imports for imports from New 
Zealand, v. Licensing Instruction No. 91 of 1953; the movement of 
canned fish (Category Item Ex 51c) from the interchangeable to a 
specific quota basis from October 1953*
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The A d m in is tra tio n  o f the C on tro ls: P ro te c tio n  
o f Domestic In d u s try
P ro te c tio n  a ffo rd ed  by d i r e c t  c o n tro ls  on im ports en ab le s  the 
lo c a l  p roducer b ro ad ly  speaking to  do e i th e r  o f two th in g s : (a) to  
in c rease  o u tp u t w ith o u t in c re a s in g  u n i t  p r o f i t  r a t e s ,  a lthough  in c re a s ­
ing  t o t a l  p r o f i t s ;  o r (b) to  m ain ta in  o u tp u t a t  roughly  the  same le v e l  
as in  the p r e - r e s t r i c t i o n  p e rio d , b u t to  in c re a se  both  u n i t  p r o f i t  
r a te s  and t o t a l  p r o f i t s .^
I t  may be expected  th a t  in  the  sh o rt run  the tendency w i l l  be f o r  
p r ic e s  (and u n i t  p r o f i t s )  to  r i s e  u n le ss  th e re  i s  a s ig n i f ic a n t  degree 
o f underemployment o f re so u rc e s ; in  the l a t t e r  case o u tp u t may be i n ­
c re a sed  f a i r l y  r a p id ly  w ith  p r ic e  in c re a se s  more o r l e s s  l im ite d  to  any 
in c re a se  in  c o s ts  a s so c ia te d  w ith  the  in c re a se d  o u tp u t. In  the lo n g e r 
run th e re  w i l l  ten d  to  be some com bination o f both  u n i t  p r o f i t  and ou tp u t 
in c re a s e s ;  the  e x te n t to  which one o r  the o th e r  predom inates depending 
upon the  degree o f co m p etitio n  which rem ains w ith in  the in d u s try  where 
co m p etitio n  from im ports i s  reduced . In o rd e r  to  in c re a se  p r ic e s  and
1.
R eferences to  in c re a se s  in  t h i s  co n tex t shou ld , o f c o u rse , be taken  
to  mean in c re a se s  in  r e l a t io n  to  the  s i tu a t io n  which would have e x is te d  
in  the  absence of the c o n tro ls  and n o t in  r e l a t i o n  to  the p o s i t io n  which 
e x is te d  before  the c o n tro ls  were a c tu a l ly  imposed.
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consequently unit profits rather than increasing output implies, in 
the longer run, some restriction on the level of competition within 
the industiy including restrictions on the freedom of entiy into the 
industry.
An industry or firm protected by controls on imports competing 
directly with its own product will not necessarily retain the whole 
of the benefit which the protection implies. To the extent that 
competition for resources already fully employed is increased as a 
result of the effect of the controls some part of the benefit of 
the protection will pass to the suppliers of raw materials and compo- 
nents and to labour. For raw materials and components this will be 
particularly so where the supply is itself restricted by the controls 
on imports.
It follows that to say that output is protected in the sense used 
here does not mean that the output - and the employment associated 
with it - is necessarily dependent for its existence upon the restric­
tion of imports. In the Australian experience of import licensing 
from 1952-1960 it was true for some industries and at certain times 
that had the controls been removed, output would have contracted and 
employment have been reduced. For other products had the removal of 
the controls been limited to directly competing imports, all other
T.
Further appropriation of the benefits of the protection may be 
possible. For example, as a result of its employer's increased profits 
labour may decide to make greater use of its bargaining power; the 
size of the profits may correspondingly reduce employer resistance.
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c o n tro ls  in c lu d in g  those on t h e i r  raw m a te r ia ls  rem aining, a s im ila r  
re d u c tio n  in  a c t i v i t y  would have occu rred . A lte rn a tiv e ly , however, 
removal o f the p ro te c t io n  from im port c o n tro ls  may m erely have meant 
t h a t  in  the  absence o f  the r e s t r i c t i o n s  on im ports the le v e l  of p r o f i t s  
a n d /e r  over-aw ard wage payments would f a l l .
We argued in  Chapter V II th a t  i t  was n o t considered  p ra c tic a b le  
to  e s tim ate  the e x te n t  to  which the  demand f o r  im ports exceeded th e  
value o f im ports p e rm itte d  under the  lic e n s in g  system e i th e r  in  t o t a l  
o r fo r  the  bulk  o f in d iv id u a l in d u s t r ie s .  Even so , i t  w i l l  be u s e fu l  
to  c o n sid e r how any given  re d u c tio n  in  t o t a l  im ports was d is t r ib u te d  
between d i f f e r e n t  c la s s e s  o f goods and consequen tly  how in  g en era l 
term s the re d u c tio n  o f im port co m petition  a f fe c te d  in d u s tr ie s  producing 
these  goods.
We no ted  in  e a r l i e r  ch ap te rs  th a t  d i f f e r e n t  methods of l ic e n s in g  
c o n tro l were ap p lied  to  d i f f e r e n t  c la s s e s  o f com m odities. In  a d d itio n  
we in d ic a te d  th a t  the  p r in c ip le s  upon which the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were 
a p p lie d  to  p a r t i c u la r  c la s s e s  o f goods were designed  to  reduce c e r ta in  
types o f im ports to  a degree d i f f e r e n t  to th a t  o f o th e r ty p es  and th a t  
t h i s ,  to  a co n sid erab le  b u t vary ing  e x te n t ,  determ ined the  p a r t i c u la r  
method of c o n tro l to  be ap p lie d  to  a p a r t i c u la r  im port item .
In  term s o f  the s t r u c tu r a l  changes which m ight be expected  to  
fo llow  from the p ro te c t io n  p rov ided  by the c o n tro ls  on im ports -  o th e r  
th an  th a t  towards the  im port competing s e c to r  as a whole -  the r e l a t iv e
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degree o f p ro te c t io n  p rov ided  to  each in d u s try  i s  of some
i
im portance.
In  one sense the equ ivalence  of the re tu rn s  to  the  f a c to r s  of
p ro d u c tio n  in  each avenue o f p roductive  a c t i v i t y  would suggest i t s e l f
as the c r i t e r io n  o f  e f f i c i e n t  resource  a l lo c a t io n  under the p ro te c t io n
from im port l ic e n s in g .  This a f t e r  a l l  i s  what p ro te c tiv e  t a r i f f  seeks
to  ach iev e . I f  we exclude from c o n s id e ra tio n  a t  th i s  stage  arguments
such as the  * in f a n t  industry*  argument fo r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t a r i f f  r a t e s
th e re  are few economic arguments fo r  su ggesting  th a t  d i f f e r e n t i a l
le v e ls  of p ro te c t io n  w i l l  a l lo c a te  re so u rces  in  a way b e t t e r  th an  th a t
which would have been ach ieved  w ith  a le v e l  o f p ro te c t io n  app ly ing  w ith
2
b ro ad ly  e q u iv a le n t in te n s i ty  to  a l l  item s.
In  g en era l term s the  n a tu re  o f the c r i t e r i a  u sed  to  determ ine the  
e x te n t to  which im ports were p e rm itte d , the  obverse o f  which i s  the 
e x te n t to  which the im port com petition  fac in g  the dom estic p roduct i s  
reduced, do n o t suggest th a t  they  tended e x p l i c i t l y  o r im p l ic i t ly  to  
invo lve a re d u c tio n  o f im port com petition  ju s t  such as to  p ro v id e  a
1.
I t  w i l l  be convenien t fo r  most purposes to  use the term  p ro te c t io n  
to  inc lude  bo th  the encouragement g iven  to  expansion  o f in d u s try  and 
the p ro te c t io n  g iven  to  e x is t in g  in d u s try  (o r  discouragem ent to  
c o n tra c tio n  of in d u s t r y ) • Where u s e fu l  the d is t in c t io n  w i l l  be made 
e x p l i c i t l y .
2 .
One im portan t argument f o r  le v e l s  o f p ro te c tio n  d i f f e r in g  from product 
to  p roduct has been p u t forw ard  by Dr. Reitsm a, based on the expec ted  in c id e  
-nee  o f  e x te rn a l econom ies. See Reitsm a, o p . c i t . , p .1 8 5 . T his argument 
w i l l  be d iscu ssed  f u r th e r  below (C hapter X V III). I t  should be no ted  th a t  
we are  d e fe rr in g  c o n s id e ra tio n , fo r  the p re s e n t , of what i s  im p lied  in  
the term  ‘eq u iv a len t le v e l  o f p ro te c t io n ’ .
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uniform  le v e l  o f p ro te c t io n  to  the output of each in d u s try  
a f fe c te d .
The s t a t i s t i c a l  evidence p re sen ted  in  C hapter IX in  the course 
of the  exam ination o f  th e se  p r in c ip le s  a c tu a l ly  suggested  th a t ,  in  
t h e i r  p r a c t ic a l  a p p l ic a t io n , th ese  genera l p r in c ip le s  may have been 
q u a l i f ie d  to  a co n sid erab le  degree o r th a t  o th e r  f a c to r s  became o f  
r e l a t i v e ly  g re a te r  im portance over the p e rio d . A c lo s e r  exam ination  
o f the  a p p lic a tio n  o f these  p r in c ip le s  in  p ra c t ic e  i s  th e re fo re  
w arran ted .
In  co n sid erin g  the  im portance of the p ro te c t io n  prov ided  by the 
c o n tro ls  on im ports in  the lo n g e r term the s ize  o f the red u c tio n  in  
im port com petition  was n o t the only  a sp ec t o f re le v an c e . Perhaps 
alm ost as im portan t in  t h i s  re sp e c t was the degree o f c e r ta in ty  o r 
u n c e r ta in ty  a sso c ia te d  w ith  the  p ro te c t io n . This would be a f fe c te d  
by a t  l e a s t  th re e  f a c to r s :  f i r s t ,  the  ex p ec ta tio n s  reg ard in g  the
fu tu re  e x te n t of in p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n  in  t o t a l ;  second, the p a r t i c u la r  
method o f  l ic e n s in g  c o n tro l a p p lie d  to  d i r e c t ly  com petitive  im ports; 
t h i r d ,  the manner in  which the c o n tro ls  were o p e ra ted . This p ro v id es  
a f u r th e r  b a s is  on which to  examine the p r a c t ic a l  a p p lic a tio n  o f  the 
c o n tro ls .
We suggested  above th a t  in  judging the e f f ic ie n c y  of the  p a t te r n  
of resource  a l lo c a t io n  induced by the  c o n tro ls  on im ports in  the  pro­
te c t io n  th ey  a ffo rd ed  the  dom estic im port competing in d u s tr ie s  the 
e x te n t to  which the e f f e c t iv e  p ro te c t io n  p rov ided  d i f f e r e d  from p roduct 
to  p roduct was an in d ic a t io n  o f the divergence from an economic optimum.
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In  e f f e c t  we su g g ested  th a t  the e x te n t to  which the p ro te c t io n  
d if f e r e d  from th a t  which would have been p rov ided  by a uniform  ad 
valonj(m t a r i f f  i s  a guide to  the divergence from an optimum. One 
fu r th e r  q u a l i f i c a t io n  i s  n ecessa ry .
I t  cou ld  be argued w ith  some v a l id i ty  th a t  the community had -  
through the  government -  made a c o lle c t iv e  d e c is io n  th a t  the a l lo c a t io n  
o f re so u rce s  which would be optimum in  the term s o f the  more o r le s s  
s t a t i c  sense used  here was n o t an optimum in  term s o f i t s  own system 
o f v a lu a tio n ; t h a t  th e  community had in  e f f e c t  determ ined th a t  c o n s id ­
e ra t io n s  such as defence s ig n if ic a n c e , o r reduced dependence on overseas 
su p p lie s  fo r  c e r ta in  b a s ic  p ro d u c ts , were of g re a te r  value th an  p u re ly  
economic c o n s id e ra tio n s . I f  the p ro te c t io n  a ffo rd ed  by the c o n tro ls  
had achieved  the  o b je c t iv e s  im p lied  in  th i s  argument i t  m ight s t i l l  be 
p o ss ib le  to  argue th a t  the a l lo c a t io n  was n o t an optimum b u t t h i s  would 
be a measure o f the  economic c o s t  o f th ese  non economic f a c to r s ,  no t a 
c r i t ic is m  o f the  c o n tro ls .
The argument in  C hapter IX would suggest th a t  in  term s o f such 
lo n g e r term  o b je c t iv e s , the  sh o r t term c o n s id e ra tio n s  im p lic i t  in  the  
p r in c ip le s  o f d is c r im in a tio n  between c la s s e s  of goods were in  c o n f l ic t ;  
again  however th e  q u a l i f i c a t io n  a p p lie s  th a t  w hether t h i s  was in  f a c t
TT
As, fo r  example, the  p r i o r i t i e s  s e t  by the N a tio n al S e c u r ity  Resources 
Board fo r  the purposes o f the government c o n tro l o f new p r iv a te  c a p i ta l  
r a i s in g s .  See w r i t t e n  re p ly  by the  Prime M in is te r  to  a p a rlia m e n ta ry  
q u e s tio n . P a rliam en ta ry  D ebates. V ol. 217, (14-15*5*1952), p*359.
the case depends upon th e  manner of t h e i r  o p e ra tio n  in  
p r a c t ic e .
A part from n o ting  th a t  the  community’ s schedule of v a lu a tio n s  
changed over the p e rio d , c e r ta in ly  in  in te n s i ty  and to  some e x te n t in  
content,w e are unable to  pursue t h i s  p o in t excep t to  recogn ise  i t  as 
a q u a l i f ic a t io n  to  be co n sid e red  in  any conclusions we may draw.
Given a r e s t r i c t i v e  c o n tro l o f im ports , th e re fo re ,  tie e x te n t to  
which com petition  from im ports was reduced f o r  any p a r t i c u la r  in d u s try  
a t  any p a r t i c u la r  tim e was determ ined b road ly  by the method of c o n tro l  
ap p lied  to  com petitive  im p o rts; the  s e v e r i ty  o f th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  
a p p lie d  g e n e ra lly  to  goods in  th a t  ca teg o ry  o r , where not ap p lie d  
un ifo rm ly , the  b a s is  upon which the r e la t iv e  degree o f r e s t r i c t i o n  of 
goods w ith in  th a t  c a teg o ry  was determ ined; and by a number o f ways in  
which the a u th o r i t ie s  cou ld  a f f e c t  th e  inc idence  o f p ro te c tio n  o f any 
p a r t i c u l a r  form of c o n tro l .
In  a d d itio n  each o f th e se  f a c to r s  w i l l ,  to  a g re a te r  or l e s s e r  
e x te n t in flu en ce  e x p e c ta tio n s  reg ard in g  the  d u ra tio n  o f p ro te c t io n  from 
the l ic e n s in g  of im p o rts . In a more general sense bo th  the immediate 
degree o f p ro te c t io n  and e x p e c ta tio n  reg ard in g  i t s  d u ra tio n  would be 
in flu en ced  by the s ta te d  and a c tu a l a t t i tu d e  tow ards the p ro te c t io n  
a ffo rd ed  by the r e s t r i c t i o n s  on im p o rts .
In  a sta tem en t made s h o r t ly  a f t e r  the im p o sitio n  o f the c o n tro ls  
in  March 1952 the Prime M in is te r  (Mr. Menzies) appeared le s s  concerned
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w ith  th e  p ro te c tio n  th i s  gave to  e x is t in g  industries** -  presum ably 
because on ly  c e r ta in  s e c to rs  were thought to  be a f fe c te d  -  than  w ith  
the  e f f e c t  o f competing re so u rce s  away from in d u s tr ie s  judged to  be 
more e s s e n t ia l :
n . • .th e  most strenuous e f f o r t s  w il l  be made to  d iscourage the
growth of tem porary and uneconomic in d u s t r ie s  during the p e rio d
o f im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  and e s p e c ia l ly  to  avoid  the  d iv e rs io n  o f
2
re so u rce s  away from the prim ary  and o th e r b a sic  in d u s t r ie s " .
Let u s  co n sid e r the  form th ese  ’ s trenuous e f f o r t s ’ to  which th e
Prime M in is te r  r e f e r r e d ,  took , or a t  l e a s t  those  o f immediate re lev an ce
3
to  th e  p re s e n t d isc u ss io n .
F i r s t  th e re  were re p e a te d  w arnings th a t  im port r e s t r i c t i o n s  were 
tem porary and th a t  anyone in v e s tin g  re so u rces  in  o rd e r to  take advantage 
o f the  sh o rtag es  which n e c e s s a r i ly  ensued d id  so a t  t h e i r  own r i s k .
1.
"We b e liev e  th a t  the d r a s t ic  c u rta ilm e n t o f t e x t i l e  im ports now 
o p e ra tin g  w i l l  give adequate support to  t e x t i l e  employment in  A u s tra l ia " ,  
P ress  S ta tem en t, 28 ,3 .1952 .
2 .
I b id .
3 .
A number o f o th e r methods were a v a ila b le  a t  the time in c lu d in g  f i s c a l  
m easures ( in d i r e c t  ta x e s ) ,  c a p i t a l  is su e s  c o n tro l ,  and q u a l i ta t iv e  
bank advance p o lic y . C ap ita l is su e s  c o n tro l which had been re s u r re c te d  
in  1951 proved to  be f a i r l y  s h o r t  l iv e d .  Q u a lita tiv e  bank advances 
p o lic y  (th rough  d i r e c t iv e s  by the C en tra l Bank) are  no t com pletely  
i r r e le v a n t  i n  th i s  co n tex t s in ce  a d ire c t iv e  n o t to  p rov ide  f u r th e r  
funds fo r  im ports ex tends some p ro te c t io n  to  dom estic p ro d u ce rs .
A d ire c t iv e  o f t h i s  na tu re  was is su e d  to  the Trading Banks in  
September 1955 (See H.C. Coombs, "C onditions o f M onetary P o lic y  in  
A u s tra l ia " ,  R.C, M ills  Memorial L ec tu re , Univ. o f Sydney, 1958,
P .3 5 ) .
The following is a not untypical example:
’•Industry should realise ... that the import restrictions are 
intended only to be temporary ... Therefore industries would be 
courting loss if they were to invest capital in new or expanded 
lines of production and to rely only on the chance that import 
controls would continue..,
Second, and designed more to limit the protective effect on exist­
ing industry, was the general policy that the restrictions should not be 
applied in a way which in effect prohibited imports of any items.
Third, the use of the interchangeable quota method of licensing 
which had, as one of its prime purposes, the limitation of the protec­
tive effect of the controls.
Finally, the authorities were able to maintain some control over
the expansion of industry through the control on imported raw materials
2and components and on imported plant and machinery.
Naturally, while the licensing system was in operation there were 
continuing pressures either for the general use of the controls for 
protective purposes or more generally for its use to this end for particu­
lar industries. These were normally resisted
'• ... we are under an international obligation not to use import 
restrictions to protect any Australian industry. Notwithstanding
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1.
The Treasurer (Sir Arthur Fadden), Parliamentary Debates. Vol.217 
(6.5.1952), p.40.
2.
The control on raw materials and components was more limited than that 
over investment goods since much of the former was imported by merchants 
in one or other of the quota categories. Virtually all of the invest­
ment goods items however were controlled on a specific licence basis. 
This aspect is discussed in Chapter XIV.
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that obligation, I still believe that it would be improper, 
unwise and unsound for us to use import restrictions to 
protect Australian industries ..."
While these representations were normally resisted, there were 
some exceptions; in addition, it seems that in some cases the principle 
of no prohibitions was adhered to while the effect was nevertheless
virtually to exclude all competing imports.
'•Under the import licensing controls there are no prohibitions 
on the importations of any goods. In the administration of 
the controls, however, account is taken of the availability 
of suitable alternative supplies from local production. It is 
for this reason that the licensing of tyres, since 8th March 
1952, has been on a greatly reduced scale in comparison with 
importations in similar periods over the last few years. 
Licences are in fact only being issued for minimum quantities 
consistent with the general policy that there should be no 
prohibitions.
The practical effect in implementing such a principle would 
clearly differ according to whether it was applied to a class of 
imports or to a particular type, grade and size of importable product. 
For example, it could be applied to the class of goods, rubber tyres 
or to rubber tyres of a particular size. In the f ormer case it would 
be possible to licence only those tyres not made locally, such as 
certain sizes and types of aircraft tyres, for which no local production 
existed and so effectively to protect the items produced locally by 
excluding import competition without contravening the principle of no 
prohibitions.
!.
Senator O'Sullivan (Minister for Trade and Customs), Parliamentary 
Debates. Vol.219, (8.10.1952), p.2653.
2.
Mr. (Later Sir) Eric Harrison, Parliamentary Debates. Vol.220, 
(29-30 October 1952), p.3956.
o
{4
The fo llow ing  case in  re sp e c t to  tim ber im ports appears to  be 
an example o f t h i s .
”So f a r  as the Government i s  able to  re g u la te  im p o rts , i t  pe rm its  
the  im p o rta tio n  o f only  s u f f ic ie n t  tim ber o f  p a r t i c u la r  v a r ie t i e s  
to  supplem ent th e  inadequac ies of our own p ro d u c tio n .’*!
On the o th e r  hand i t  would have been v i r t u a l l y  im possib le to  
a d m in is te r  the system on the b a s is  o f g iv ing  a t  l e a s t  some lic e n c e s  
f o r  each  grade type and s ize  o f each im port item . In  the s p e c if ic  
l ic e n c e  s e c to r  of im p o rts , p a r t i c u la r ly  w ith  re sp e c t to  c a p i ta l  equip­
m ent, s t r i c t  adherence to  t h i s  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f the p r in c ip le  of no 
p ro h ib i t io n s  would have made i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  re fu se  l ic e n c e s  over a 
wide range of m achinery and equipm ent.
There were o th e r  examples where i t  appears th e re  was a p ro te c tiv e  
in t e n t  in  the  l ic e n s in g  o f im p o rts . In  the fo llow ing  case i t  could  be 
argued th a t  th e re  was no p ro h ib i t io n  of the g en era l c la s s  o f goods, 
a lth o u g h  the in te n t io n  c le a r ly  seems to  have been to  p ro h ib i t  im ports 
o f the  item s m entioned:
” 1 am now in  a p o s i t io n  to  inform  the  honourable gentlem en th a t  
in  view o f the  f a c t  th a t  su p p lie s  o f A u s tra lia n  grown cordage and 
bedding c o tto n  a re  a v a ila b le  fo r  pu rchase , the is su e  o f im port 
l ic e n c e s  fo r  th ese  types of c o tto n  has been s to p p e d .”2
The fo llow ing  example suggests  more d i r e c t ly  a  p ro te c tiv e  in te n t
in  th e  c o n tro l o f im p o rts . In  re p ly  to  a q u e s tio n  regard ing  the f e a r
1.
S en a to r 0!S u ll iv a n , P a rliam en ta ry  D ebates. V ol.220, 
(1 6 .1 0 .1 9 5 2 ), p .3209 .
2.
Mr. McMahon (A cting M in is te r  f o r  T rade, P a rliam en ta ry  D ebates, 
H, o f Reps, V o l . l l ,  (7 .6 .1 9 5 6 ) , p.2995*
of unemployment in the Governments ammonium sulphate plants resulting
from imports of ammonium sulphate, Mr. Harrison replied:
"I have taken steps, together with the Minister for Trade and 
Customs ... to ensure that no action shall be taken that will 
materially affect employment (in these factories). ”1
The examples quoted relate mainly to the early period of the
licensing controls under review. There are clearly more difficulties
in making exceptions of this nature in a system which is expected to
be in operation for some time, since pressures will build up for
further exceptions which will be the more difficult to resist the more
2the exceptions which are made. In the second intensification period
the general policy on protection from the controls was reaffirmed:
"The controls are not • • • designed as measures to protect 
local industries and it is not intended that they should be 
used for that purpose.’'^
In 1956,however, concern was expressed in Parliament at what was 
referred to as the overlapping of t he functions of the Tariff Board 
and the import licensing authorities, demonstrated by the removal to 
a specific licence basis of control of items which were the subject 
of applications to the Tariff Board for increased protection.
1.
Mr. Harrison, Parliamentary Debates. H. of Reps.
Vol.l (25.9.195377" p.694.2.
Moreover, e:xporting countries can be expected to protest (and 
perhaps retaliate) more if their exports are shut out completely 
than if some exports are made.
3.
Minister for Trade (Mr. McEwen), Parliamentary Debates.
H. of Reps., Vol.9, (22.3.1956), p.1115.
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The licensing treatment applicable to the various category items 
was continually being changed as circumstances changed and it is not 
possible to determine the reasons for many of them. Some of the items 
quoted in the present instance were certainly changed for reasons other 
than that claimed though in others the reasons given may have been the 
correct one. 1
In the same year (1956) the Australian Association of British
Manufacturers expressed its concern at the alleged use of import
2licensing for protective purposes.
There were certainly occasions when the licensing system was used 
to limit imports while a Tariff Board examination was in course; as for
1.
Items to which specific reference was made were: cotton sheeting,
cellulose wadding, woven artificial silk piece goods, flannelette, 
floor covering, galvanised iron, iron and steel pipes and wire netting# 
Mr. McLeay, Parliamentary Debates. H. of Reps., Vol.9, (12.4*1956), 
pp.1280-1281. In some of these cases, references to the Tariff Board 
had been made at the time e.g. woven artificial silk piece goods. In 
others no reference was made then or subsequently e.g. galvanised iron. 
Galvanised iron was in fact transferred to an alternative specific 
quota basis (Admin.Star), largely it would seem from the import statist­
ics because of underusage of quotas. The reason for placing cellulose 
wadding on a specific licence basis was to increase the allocations for 
this item to meet increased requirements of manufacturers of sanitary 
napkins.
2.
nIn a number of cases in recent months, articles of types produced 
to some extent in Australia, previously included in a broad group of 
commodities in which quotas were interchangeable had been isolated and 
subjected to special treatmentM. Australian Association of British 
Manufacturers, Bulletin. Vol.l, Ho.II, 19*12.1956, Examples quoted 
were: Table and dessert knives, engineers’ files and woodworking chisels 
which had been moved from the interchangeable quota to a specific quota 
basis of licensing at relatively low quota levels. It should be noted 
that a large number of hand tools were at this time placed ina 
specific quota bank and there was no assurance that protection was 
increased by means of this transfer. (See below)•
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example, in the case of printed piece goods and casual footwear - and
2it may well have been true on a number of other occasions.
Irrespective of the validity or otherwise of these assertions, it 
has to be recalled that the degree of licensing restriction was at this 
time (1956) severe and difficulty was being experienced in reducing 
imports to the ceiling set. There was thus little if any room for 
increasing the availability of goods in short supply by increasing 
allocations for particular items or groups of items. The only way in 
which this could be achieved was by further limiting imports for which 
local substitutes were available. This necessarily increased the pro­
tection accorded to the local producers of the items removed from the 
interchangeable quota whether this was the intention or not.
Nevertheless the authorities administering the controls on imports 
had occasion to warn the government at various times that particular 
industries were dependent upon the controls on imports at least for 
their continued operation at a profitable level and perhaps even for
1.
The action in these cases was taken under Article XIX of the 
G.A.T.T. (which provides for the imposition of quantitative restric­
tions for protective purposes in the event of a large and unexpected 
increase in imports) pending consideration of the Tariff Board’s 
report. They were largely designed to protect the local industry 
from substantial imports of Japanese origin following the signing in 
1957 of the Trade Agreement with that country.
2.
This is a possible explanation of the placing of tinned tuna on a 
specific quota basis in April 1955 at levels corresponding to the 
general (and relatively low) level of the interchangeable quota; 
tinned tuna was referred to the Tariff Board in 1955*
their continued existence. These included the production of aluminium, 
ball bearings and linseed oil which were probably the items to which 
the Minister for Trade, when announcing the general lifting of the 
controls in February I960, referred/as ’’having special problems assoc-
iiated with them”, Controls were retained on these items after
2February I960 pending examination by the Tariff Board.
Thus there would seem to be a number of exceptions to the policy •
that the import licensing system should not be used for protective 
3purposes. Yet the number of instances where this was the case appears 
relatively small; in fact remarkably small in view of the opportunities 
and pressures which undoubtedly existed. It also seems clear that in 
most cases items were removed from restrictive licensing categories as 
soon as the opportunity arose; in some cases, such as motor vehicles, 
to a replacement basis of licensing that reduced some of the protection 
afforded by the controls.
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1.
Press Statement. 22.2.1960.
2.
The protection afforded the production of aluminium is discussed 
in Chapter XI; that of linseed oil is discussed in Chapter XII.
3.
It should be noted that we are not intending to include here 
reference to emergency action (taken under Article XIX of the G.A.T.T.) 
to protect local industries, whether taken as a result of the safe­
guard procedures under the Australian/Japanese Trade agreement of 
1957, e.g. casual footwear, or as a result of a recommendation by 
the Special Advisory Authority under Part V of the Tariff Board Act, 
1921-1962 (Sir Frank Meere), e.g. timber. We are concerned here 
only with the licensing controls imposed for the purpose of conserving 
expenditure of foreign exchange.
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In Chapter III it was indicated that there were essentially 
three different forms of licensing control which actually restricted 
imports: the s pecific quota; the interchangeable quota; and the speci­
fic licence* We shall therefore consider each of these methods in the 
light of the general protective effect of the method of control and also 
of the qualifications which applied to the method in practice*
The specific quota may be considered as the equivalent - to the 
protected industry - of an ad valorum duty on the particular item 
which is controlled* However it would be a duty with differential 
rates from product to product* Because it is applied as a control on 
the quantity of imports, however, the industry as a whole would be 
aware, broadly, of the additional demand it had available to it as a 
result of the fixed value of imports. In particular where there was a 
reduction in the level of imports of the item permitted, in relation 
to a previous year or period, it would be able to gauge roughly the 
extent of the additional demand to be met.
For those specific quota items for which quota levels were not 
set as a uniform percentage of base year imports, which from 1957 
became the position for all specific quotas, the criteria upon which 
the size of the quota was determined, and the extent to which these 
criteria were known or could be influenced, became of importance in
_
There would of course be some effect on total demand for 
the product as a result of the increase in prices.
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relation to expectations about the continuing nature of the protection 
being received. Since these criteria were broadly the same as applied 
in the specific licence category we shall consider this aspect of the 
two methods together.
The extent of this protection would be less clear cut for items 
included in specific quota banks. As noted earlier, a significant 
proportion of specific quota items - up to roughly a third - were 
included in banks which offered to importers some degree of interchange- 
ability among items to be imported. The extent of this varied according 
to the content of the Bank. Banks were variously defined - some 
consisting of items which when used for a specific purpose were 
included in a bank e.g. Bank Cl3 (Material used in the manufacture of 
corsetry), but when used for other purposes may be licensed on some 
other basis. Others consisted of a particular type of goods. Again 
these could be fairly specific in content, e.g. Bank CIO (Replacement 
parts for propelling pencils and fountain pens other than ball points), 
or fairly broad in coverage e.g. Bank A19 (Hand tools).
In Banks such as Bank CIO transfer of licence use was determined
more by technical factors whereas in the considerably fewer Banks like
1Bank A19 economic factors were of greater significance. Even in the
T.A company producing chisels, in an application before the Tariff 
Board, claimed that the inclusion of chisels in Bank A19 (Hand tools) 
operated to its detriment since ”... importers have used their quotas 
more heavily for chisels than for other tools in the Bank”. It 
admitted, however, that in the absence of licensing imports would have 
been substantially greater. Tariff Board Report, Woodworking Chisels. 
3.4.1959, p.6. Bank A19 consisted from 1956 of items, imports of which 
in 1950/51 were of the order of £3m. Imports of woodworking chisels 
from 1952-53 to 1957-53 in no year exceeded £70,000.
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former type, however, some scope existed for using licences according 
to the cheaper source* To import, rather than obtain materials and 
components from a local source even though less expensive would 
normally restrict total output of the final product* Since the final 
output was itself normally protected the general tendency was to use 
licences for goods not available from local sources to maximise the 
volume of output. Some restraint in profit taking by the local pro­
ducers of materials and components may have resulted in these cases, 
however*
The interchangeable quota extended over the commodities which it 
covered an approximation to a uniformly applied price adjustment.
Had the interchangeable quota method been applied to all imports and 
had the market for licences been perfect, it would have given the 
same results, so far as the protected industry was concerned, as a 
uniformly applied ad valorun tariff surcharge.
The degree of approximation actually involved depended upon the 
extent to which importers (a) charged the market determined price for 
the limited supplies of imports; and (b) the extent to which the sale 
of licences or its approximate equivalent, the sale of the use of 
licences, occurred in practice. While it is not possible to adduce 
statistical evidence of this, the discussion in Chapter XVII suggests
that the degree of ’perfection* was by no means insignificant*
In the case of t he interchangeable quota the local industry would 
only, in a qualified sense, be aware of the size of the increased 
market available to it; it would be subject to the further constraint 
that if prices rose above those of imports to an extent significantly 
greater than those of other products some shift in the use of inter­
changeable quotas could result. It might be expected that industries 
facing competitive imports subject to severe restriction would be less 
inclined to expand as rapidly as would otherwise be the case if they 
were unable to judge accurately the extent of the import competition 
they would face. Local production plans would tend to seek those areas 
where the level of profit is greatest; importers holding interchangeable 
quotas, however, would also be seeking out the same profits. Imports 
of the more profitable products would increase, profits would be 
reduced and it would consequently be less attractive for the local 
producer. On the other hand, it could be argued that after a period 
of adjustment following the initial imposition of the licensing controls
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1.
Tables III-2 and III-3 show t hat while t he interchangeable quota
did not cover a major pari) of the import bill, its coverage was not 
insignificant. Table III-3 (base year weights) is probably more 
meaningful in this context; to the extent that there was a greater 
restriction of interchangeable quota goods in general a low weighting 
is implied in the figures based on actual licence issues. The 
qualification regarding the inclusion of Bank Cl6 items, and the 
manufacturing quotas which preceded them, discussed in Chapter III, 
needs to be noted. While interchangeability was not meaningless in 
regard to these items the *perfection’ of the market in this sense 
was certainly quite low.
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and any substantial subsequent changes in licensing levels the system
would settle down and the local producer would then know, within
limits, the extent of the competition to be faced in any direction in
which he is contemplating producing - possibly with only little less
certainty than a producer facing competitive imports licensed under 
1specific quotas* This raises the question of whether the pattern
of importing under the interchangeable quota system did settle down
to a fairly predictable pattern or whether it tended to move from item
to item as profit opportunities developed from area to area, or as a
result of changing tastes, changing patterns of local production or
simply as a result of imperfections in importers’ buying patterns.
The following tables are an attempt to examine the behaviour of
importers of the interchangeable (B category) quota items* Table
II-3 (Chapter II) sets out the major changes in the licensing levels
for quota items over the period. If it is assumed that the average
2import lag for ’B ’ Category items is 4 months the annual change in 
the level of imports under interchangeable quota treatment should be 
approximately as in Table X-l.
1.
Still subject, of course, to the qualification that any significant 
price rise locally, not accompanied by a similar rise in the foreign 
price of competitive imports could lead to an unknown increase in 
imports.
2.
See Chapter VIII and Appendix VIII.A*
Table X-l 322
Notional Annual Changes in Level of Imports Permitted 
Under Interchangeable Quotas
Year °!o Change Over (Related Year)
1952-53 -SO 1950-51
1953-54 100 previous year
1954-55 48 «1 f t
1955-56 -36 n  n
1956-57 -60 to -62 1954-55
1957-58 37 to 43 previous year
1958-59 3 t i  ti
1959-60 13 11 it
Source: Calculated from information in Table II-3«
A number of factors suggest that it is unlikely that any close
relationship would be expected between movements in imports in this
category and the theoretical movements for any series of years* In
the first few years of the period covered, there were substantial
issues of special licences, both as supplements to an import’s quota
•]or addition to quotas. Effectively from 1958 onwards, more general
increases in quotas were granted to all importers who fitted certain
specifications* These were by way of anomaly adjustments, adjustments
2related to the expansion of retail businesses etc. The use of yearly 
changes, however, reduces the effects of any large individual movements
1.
The former were once andf or all issues; in the case of the 
latter these were built into the quota on-a continuing basis.
2*
See Chapter XVII.
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such as substantial increases in importers1 quotas in years other than 
that in which the increase in quota was granted*
In the following Table X-2 the theoretical changes are set out for 
a number of interchangeable quota items.
From the results of the table it is not possible to draw more than 
some fairly tentative conclusions. It is obvious that a variety of 
factors will at any time determine t he level of import demand for a 
particular item, some of which relate directly to the relative profit­
ability of imports and domestically produced substitutes, e.g* changes 
in import prices; or to the protective incidence of existing tariff 
rates, e.g. changes in tariff rates; and some which vary the relative 
profitability of the item to other items, e.g* rates of change in 
total demand. As earlier discussion has suggested, the results will 
also show to some extent, additions to quotas and issues of supple­
mentary licences. From the point of view of an intending producer 
trying to estimate the extent of future import, competition,however
1.
Imports of all the items selected exceeded £10Cp00 f.o.b. in 1950- 
51. The selection was largely based upon the ease of statistical 
extraction, i.e. they consist largely of items where no significant 
tariff or statistical item charges were made. This ensures that the 
statistics are consistent over the period. It does not mean that 
there were no tariff rate changes. In addition the items were within 
the 1B1 category for the whole of the period. In total the value 
of the items included in the table represented about 2$ of total 
imports in 1950-51. In most years they represented little more than 
10$ of total interchangeable quota items. They represent substantially 
more than 10$ of items in this category if textiles are included.
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it does not matter whether his projections were wrong because of a 
redirection of an unchanged volume of licences; or because of an 
increase in the volume of licences.
The results of the table seem to suggest that there was in fact 
a considerable transfer of licence usage from year to year. Although 
the theoretical movement is no more than an approximation to what 
should be expected, few items followed it at all closely over the whole 
period.
Overall, it would seem reasonable to argue that there were 
sufficiently significant shifts in the pattern of use of interchangeable 
licence to have provided some mitigation of the protective effect of 
a system of controls which restricts most severely imports of non- 
essential items.
Two factors suggest that this may be an optimistic assumption.
First, the local producer may expect the pattern to vary much less than 
in fact it did. His decision to invest may well have been taken on 
the basis of the effect that he expected to occur and his investment 
plans may have reached the point of no return before he could recognise 
that his estimates were wrong; in fact, many of the changes from year 
to year in this table may have resulted simply from changes in local 
production of the article. Second, an importer holding an interchange-
17
When the manufacture of Hoover vacuum cleaners was begun in Australia, 
Hoover (Australia) Pty.Ltd., was able to use its interchangeable licneces 
which had previously been used to import vacuum cleaners for the import­
ation of floor polishing machines. This had meant an increase in the 
volume of imported units competing with local production of floor 
polishers. See T.B.R. Floor polishing Machines. 23.10.1957, p.7.
able quota may be concerned with maximising not profits per unit but 
overall profits by obtaining what may be a lower rate of profit per 
unit on a larger turnover. If a particular item were available from 
local production, or became available locally, it may have paid him 
to obtain that item locally and to use his limited supply of licences 
to import alternative items even though the unit profit on the altern­
ative item was lower. In this way he could gain a greater overall
profit. This appears to have happened in a number of cases, e.g. with
1 2  3towells and towelling, with gloves and with men’s hats • The
importance of this factor would depend upon the degree to which import­
ing was merely one aspect of the quota holder’s business - e.g. if he 
were a general wholesaler or merchant - rather than constituting his 
only occupation. In the latter case he would of course be more 
concerned with the lines of greatest profit.
The subdivision of the interchangeable quota for nine months in 
1956-57'4 and the consequent reduction in the degree of interchangeability
1.
’’Evidence was given at the enquiry to the effect that importers whose 
quotas would permit them to import towels tended to use their quotas 
to import goods less readily available from Australian sources.” T.B.R. 
Towells. Towelling and Textile Articles Made from Towelling, 5*1*1959,
p.7.
2.
See evidence of Mr. G. Rawson, before the Tariff Board, T.B.R.
Fabric Gloves. 3*2.1954* p*6.
3*
See Tariff Board Report, Hats. Cans and Bonnets. 24*9*1957, p.7.
See Chapter III.
4*
328
was basically an attempt to limit further the degree of perfection 
in the market for interchangeable quota licences. The extent to which 
it increased or reduced the protection to an industry producing goods 
competitive with imports licenced in this category would depend 
effectively upon whether it increased or decreased the licences used 
for importing competitive goods* To the extent that licences were 
used for the lines of greatest profit competition would be reduced in 
the industries in which competition was most desirable since less 
licences could now be used for items for which demand was high.
The extent of the protection afforded to industries competing 
with imports subject to specific licence control was determined by the 
criteria on which the licences were issued. As we noted in the 
discussion in Chapter IX the basis of discriminating between different 
imports in this category as between broader classes of imports, was 
the relative essentiality of the item.
A major criterion of the essentiality of an import item - as we 
have seen - was that it or a reasonable substitute was not available 
from domestic production. In the consideration of individual licence 
applications the licensing authorities normally only approved the 
issue of licences for goods for which reasonable substitutes were not 
available from local production.
1.
The argument on which this is based is contained 
in Chapter VI*
ö  f* ü
In practice this criterion was subject to a number of qualific­
ations. First, it was a general principle that some imports should be 
licensed in each category. We have already commented on the difficulty 
of applying this principle to the type of goods which constituted a 
substantial proportion of the items in this category. Second, in 
deciding whether a locally available article was a reasonable substi­
tute some consideration was given to differences in the price and in 
the quality of the local and the imported goods. There was no uniform 
application of the rule that when a certain difference between the 
two prices existed in favour of the imported article it was not consid­
ered a reasonable substitute though a more uniform application of such 
a rule was attempted in the latter stages of the second intensifica­
tion period* Moreover even when the price disadvantage of the local 
article was considered unduly high it was frequently practical only
to increase the value of the imports permitted on a pro-rata basis to
1importers with the aim of reducing the average of their costs.
1.
Weight was also given in deciding the level of imports 
to be licensed for any particular product (including, in 
the case of quota goods, the special licences to be issured), 
to the extent of profit taking under the protection from the 
controls, whether by importers or by local producers. How much 
weight is difficult to determine nor is it possible to say how 
significant it was overall. It seems probable that, while it may^ 
have been of significance in some particular (and perhaps extreme) 
cases, in general the extent to which substantial action of this 
kind was practicable for much of the period was severely limited.
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The e x te n t to  which th e se  o th e r f a c to r s  o f f s e t  s ig n i f ic a n t ly
th e  e f f e c t  o f th e  lo c a l  a v a i l a b i l i t y  p r in c ip le  v a r ie d  co n sid e rab ly
over th e  p e rio d  and depended la rg e ly  on th e  s e v e r i ty  o f th e  c o n tro ls .
They a lso  r a r ie d  to  some e x te n t between p a r t i c u la r  c la s s e s  o f goods;
in  th e  case o f c a p i t a l  equipm ent, raw m a te r ia ls  and components they
*1
were a f fe c te d  by th e  e s e e n t i a l i ty  o f th e  p roduct invo lved .
D esp ite  th e se  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  th e  tendency to  r e s t r i c t  im ports 
most sev e re ly  when an adequate s u b s t i tu te  was a v a ila b le  from lo c a l  
p ro d u c tio n  provided e x is t in g  producers w ith  s u b s ta n t ia l  p ro te c t io n  
from im port co m p etitio n . In  one sense t h i s  tended to  p e rp e tu a te  th e  
e x is t in g  s t ru c tu re  of p ro d u c tio n , but i t  was th e  s t r u c tu r e  of le s s  th an  
th e  complete im port competing s e c to r .  VJhile th e  p r in c ip le  of lo c a l  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  ap p lied  g e n e ra lly  ac ro ss  th e  whole range o f im ports and 
to  a co n sid erab le  e x te n t  d ic ta te d  th e  e x te n t of im ports of a l l  item s, 
i t s  most immediate im pact would appear to  have been in  re sp e c t of 
goods in  th e  s p e c if ic  lic e n c e  s e c to r , and t  o a l e s s e r  e x te n t to  goods 
in  th e  s p e c if ic  quota c a te g o r ie s .  The in c id en ce  of t h i s  was in c re a se d  
f o r  c e r ta in  c la s s e s  o f goods in  th e  s p e c i f ic  l ic e n c e  ca tego ry  p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y  c a p i ta l  equipment, machines e tc .  where th e  p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of 
ap p ly ing  th e  ’no p r o h ib i t io n ’ ru le  was l im ite d .
1.
Producers of le s s  e s s e n t ia l  goods seek ing  im ported m a te r ia ls  
e tc .  were more l ik e ly  to  be fo rc e d  to  use  lo c a l  s u b s t i tu te s  w ith  
a r e l a t iv e ly  h igh  p r ic e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  o r o f le s s  s a t i s f a c to r y  
q u a l i ty  than  producers of goods considered  more e s s e n t ia l .
In addition to providing substantial protection to existing 
producers of goods in this category, it would also have offered a 
considerable incentive to existing producers to expand production 
and for new firms to enter into production of goods licenced in this 
category to the extent that the criteria upon which approval or 
rejection of licence applications became widely known - and there can 
be little doubt that they did. ^
A somewhat negative conclusion to be drawn from the discussion 
so far is that it is difficult to generalise with respect to the 
incidence of protection from import licensing in particular areas or 
on particular classes of goods produced within the economy.
On a priori grounds it would have been possible to generalise 
by saying that, had the control of imports by the three methods 
discussed been of more or less equivalent severity, it could be expect­
ed that the interchangeable quota would have offered less predictable
protection for local industry than the other two forms of licensing 
2control. This apparent disadvantage from the viewpoint of the local
1.
There was no a ttempt by the authorities to disguise this; it was 
frequently stated explicitly as a reason for refusing a licence 
application* Moreover, for many commodities where only the shortfall 
between production and demand was licensed e.g. copper and products, 
aluminium, discussions were held with both producers and users 
to determine the extent of the shortfall.
2.
In the absence of any other strong determining factors some 
weight was given to allowing imports for items in the specific licence 
category to be at roughly the level of similar goods in the specific 
quota category.
producer was offset to the extent that the severity of restriction 
on interchangeable quota items was greater by the opportunity 
which the interchangeability offered to importers to maintain or 
increase their total turnover by making use of locally produced goods, 
despite the reduced volume of import business. Wftiile the criteria 
upon which specific licences were issued were unknown the specific 
quota would be expected to offer more predictable protection although 
the specific licence would, in fact, have afforded in many cases more 
effective protection to the local producer. The wide variation in 
later years of the degree of restriction on specific quota items means 
that it is not possible to generalise in the case of specific quotas 
regarding the protection given to local industry.
In addition, although at certain times it seems clear that the 
interchangeable quota items were most severely restricted, at other 
times it is not clear that this was the case. The specific licence 
category was the most completely controlled category and tended to 
bear the brunt of any underestimate of imports in the quota categories. 
In 1956, for example, as we observed in Chapter VIII, the excess of 
imports in the quota categories meant more severe licensing in the 
specific licence sector. Since postponing imports of capital equipment 
tended to cause less immediate disruption to domestic production it
was on imports of this nature that additional pressure was 
placed,^
Similarly at times of high domestic demand the relative 
essentiality of investment goods tended to decline; finished consumer 
goods tended to become less inessential, with consequent implications 
for the relative severity of restriction. We also noted in Chapter 
X that trade relations considerations may have dictated a less severe 
restriction of consumer goods than strict adherence to the principles 
of essentiality would suggest.
These various factors tend to confirm the tentative conclusion 
of the previous chapter that there was considerably less bias in the 
restriction of imports towards the relatively free importing of 
essential goods and the severe restriction of consumer goods than 
might have been expected. The fact that the local availability 
principle had much more impact on goods in the specific licence cate­
gory and, to a lesser extent, the specific quota category, i.e. princi­
pally goods with a higher degree of essentiality, would seem to be the 
principal explanation of this although other factors were important at 
particular periods.
1.
It seems probable that demand for dollar area goods is more 
for plant, machinery and basic raw materials than for consumer 
goods. To the extent that this is so, and to the extent that the 
restrictions on dollar goods were not merely directional this may 
also imply a greater degree of restriction of this type of import. 
Whether this was in fact the case would also depend upon whether 
the virtual prohibition of consumer goods was restrictive or 
directional.
Changes in the intensity of the restriction from licensing 
period to licensing period, changes in the relative intensity of the 
restrictions applied to goods within the particular control categories, 
extensive transfers of items from category to category and a variety 
of factors which make for different degrees of effective restriction of 
different products within the same control category make generalisation 
about the nature of the protection provided to particular products or 
classes of products difficult if not impossible.
There is at least nothing to suggest that within any of the three 
restrictive categories significant groups of items were not effective­
ly restricted at times of overall restriction of imports. It remains 
therefore to consider briefly the coverage of items not contained in 
these three restrictive categories.
Tables III-2 and III-3 indicate clearly that the area of imports 
exempt from licensing control was small until fairly late in the period. 
The inclusion of bulk petroleum products during 1958 increased the 
volume of exempt imports considerably but substantial additions of 
further items did not take place until 1959-60* During the first year 
of licensing the exempt list contained no items entering into commer-
cial import trade. Even by 1958, the commercially imported items
2exempt from import control were relatively few in number.
"'*I.e. it consisted of goods such as passengers’ effects, catalogues, 
price lists, trophies, etc.; fresh fish caught in Australian ships 
tTariff Item 51A) was included but is not considered to be commercially 
imported in the sense used here.
o“'■’The principal items at this time were: bulk petroleum products, nickel 
ingot s^  and shot, narcotic drugs, books and printed matter, rock phosphate 
and manures n.e.i., ferrous alloys, industrial diamonds, crude abrasives, 
mercury, razorite, cryolite and vermiculite ores.
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Apart from the period from October 1953 to April 1955 during 
which many items were transferred to the N.Q.R. category, only a 
relatively small area of commercial imports were controlled under 
this licensing method* Excluding special purpose imports , few comm­
ercially imported items were controlled by this method prior to 
2October 1953 > and only a few additional commercially imported items
3were being licensed under this method in 1953 ; from this time its 
place was gradually taken by the Replacement method of licensing*
In the extension of Replacement licensing in 1957-53 again only 
a limited number were items subject to a protective tariff or where 
it is otherwise known that there was significant local production.^ 
Despite continuing transfers of items to Replacement licensing 
substantial numbers of items competitive with local production were 
not put onto a Replacement basis of licensing until 1959; some banks
1.
Such as Manilla paper for braille books, articles for deaf, dumb 
and blind institutions etc.
2.
Stud sheep and cattle, certain pasture and vegetable seeds, plati­
num, bullion, were the only substantial ones.
3.
Additional items of this nature at June 1953 were trochus and 
pearl shell, maps and charts, geographical globes and films when 
for exhibition to children.
4*
Carbide tool tips, titanium dioxide, some dry colours, whiting 
and synthetic oils and resins for paint manufacture, optical lenses, 
vitreous enamels, copying apparatus for duplicating typewriting, 
granulated cork, some types of surgical equipment and thermostats 
for use in domestic appliances.
were placed on a Replacement basis in 1958 and more were added to
1this category in 1959»
Some items in the specific licence category were licensed with 
limited restrictive effect; the usual practice, however, was to move 
these items out of this category where practicable into either the 
exempt or N.Q.R* categories* Items licensed more or less freely but 
not included among either of these categories or later the Replacement 
category would not be significant overall*
Restrictive licensing controls thus applied to most import items 
for much of the period. For some part of the period from October 1953 
to April 1955, the range of items to which restrictive controls did 
not apply was substantially enlarged, but seems unlikely at most to 
have covered more than about a quarter of the total range of imports.
It is possible that at certain times available specific quotas 
were in excess of demand; this was certainly the case &  r a few items, 
mainly for limited periods only* There is no evidence to suggest 
that this was extensively the case for any length of time.
Moreover, there is evidence in a number of cases where quotas 
were not fully used that this was a result of agreements with local 
producers to take up the whole of the local output before seeking 
imported supplies. That such agreements were a consequence of the
1.
Particularly banks of component parts and materials for 
specific lines of production.
controls on imports is shown fairly clearly by the return to importing
all requirements when the controls were removed.
The degree of certainty or uncertainty of the protection
afforded by the controls, while being associated to some extent with
the method of licensing control used for competitive imports was also
affected by the manner in which the controls were administered. In
addition it was affected by the relationship between local producers
and their customers and the pressure which the controls enabled the
2producers to bring to bear.
It would also have been affected by the movements in the general 
level of control; particularly by the fact that the warnings in 1952 
and 1953 that the controls were temporary and would be removed at the 
earliest opportunity were borne out for many items in 1954* In the 
second intensification period there was probably less uncertainty in 
general, although the relaxations in 1957 when internal activity was 
not at a particularly high level gave some producers a fresh taste of 
import competition. Similarly the change in licensing treatment 
applied to particular classes of goods meant a decrease in the uniform­
ity of experience among producers competing with imports controlled by
TT
For example, See Tariff Board Report, Tvre Cord and Cord 
Tyre Fabric, 20.12*1961, p*8*
2.
It would also be influenced by the attitude of the Tariff 
Board to developments which had taken place under the 
protection provided by the controls. See Chapter XIII.
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the same method. At the same time the effect of the administration ' 
of the controls seems to have tended towards reducing the differences, 
in the aggregate, among classes of goods.
The difference in the experience of individual producers or
industries was accentuated in the longer term by a variety of other
factors such as movements in import price levels, changes in tariff
rates. It was also accentuated in some industries where capacity
increased rapidly in relation to demand consequently reducing the
1intensity of the existing level of protection.
While it is clear that the extent of the protection provided by 
the controls varied extensively both over the period and f rom product 
to product there seems little doubt that for much of the period some 
degree of incidental protection from import competition was provided 
to virtually the whole range of domestic industry actually or 
potentially subject to such competition.
1.
This would appear to have been the situation in the 
synthetic textile industry for example.
CHAPTER XI
IMPORT Ru&TRiCTIUNS AND SECONDARY INDUSTRY. I.
The earlier theoretical discussion of import controls was based 
primarily on assumptions of flexible prices and mobility of resources. 
The effect on domestic industry was largely considered in terms of the 
redirection of demand from imports and little explicit attention was 
given to the effects of the controls on supplies of raw materials and 
components."1 2 In the absence of mobility of resources and flexible 
prices, including wages, the effects of shortages of supplies on 
employment could become important.
Lundberg and Hill listed as a major objection to the quantit­
ative control of imports, the probability that bottlenecks in supplies 
of raw materials would arise causing unemployment. As a result, they 
argued, these problems would be solved on an ad hoc basis with an 
increasingly chaotic pattern of import controls. On this score, the 
licensing system seems to have avoided any serious problems.<
Shortages of imported materials and components could be expected 
to arise mainly in periods of tight licensing control - relative to 
internal demand - i.e. 1952 and 1953, 1955 to 1957 and 1959« Persist-
1 Some attention has, of course, been given to this aspect in relation 
to the licensing system, particularly in Chapter IX.
2 Lundberg and Hill, op. cit., pp.42-43«
ant or recurrent shortages of a number of basic materials were exper­
ienced in the early years of the period, but in most instances the 
shortages were largely unconnected with import licensing. Shortages 
of steel, aluminium, nickel, certain types of paper, newer synthetic
yarns and textile materials were due principally to world wide 
1shortages.
Some shortages of particular textile materials licensed on a 
quota basis were experienced both in 1952-53 and in 1955-56 and 1956- 
57, and increased allocations of licences, including dollar licences, 
were made on both occasions. However, there appear to have been only 
isolated examples of firms having to reduce output sufficiently to 
affect employment because of shortages of imported supplies.^ Large 
stocks of imported goods certainly lessened the impact of the restric­
tions on the availability of imported manufacturing requirements in 
1952 and 1953. During the 'tight1 23 period of 1956 there were " ... 
virtually no interruptions to manufacturing a ctivity for lack of basic 
imported materials ... though it was observed that " ... cuts in 
import quotas have exerted a painful squeeze on availability of
1 Other factors may have been of importance at times e.g. "Unwilling­
ness of some users to accept the need to import is responsible for 
the severity of the immediate shortage (of steel)". Survey of 
Manufacturing Activity. October, 1954* p.ix.
2 See generally reviews of individual industries during the period 
in Surveys of Manufacturing Activity.
3 Survey of Manufacturing Activity. October 1956, p.x.
numerous minor materials and components”.^  Many firms, of course, 
had built up stocks during the first relaxation period, particularly 
in 1954 and 1955> in anticipation of the reversal of the relaxations 
made.
There were again no general shortages of supplies causing cut 
backs in activity in 1959; the position in this period differed from 
that of earlier severely restricted periods as the import ’ceiling* 
was relatively high; pressures at this time arose principally from 
the expansion of internal demand.
Users of imported materials and components were not unaffected 
by import controls. The criterion of local availability meant that 
manufacturers were forced at times to use substitute materials -
either more costly or of inferior quality - in order to maintain
pproduction. In addition stocks of imported materials were generally 
substantially below normal ’precaution* levels, making manufacturers* 
production programmes more susceptible to hold ups through interrup­
tions in supplies due to dock strikes, breakdown in exporters* factories 
etc. The control of imports also reduced flexibility in purchasing 
offering less opportunity for taking advantage of particularly favour­
able prices, or for obtaining discounted prices for large purchases.
1 Ibid.
2 Survey of Manufacturing Activity. March 1953> p.114
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While production cut backs appear to have been few, expansion
1of production was frequently inhibited by lack of imported supplies.
In many cases these shortages simply accelerated plans for local 
manufacture of materials or components. The situation then becomes 
one form of the straightforward redirection of demand.
The Lundberg-Hill fears of spotty unemployment and increasingly 
chaotic administration of import licensing would appear not to have 
been realised in the period under review; certainly not to any 
significant degree.*^ Moreover, in the period when such spotty un­
employment may have arisen because of the severity of import licens­
ing and, to the extent that it was spotty, pressure of demand would 
have led to competition for any labour which became unemployed in 
this way.
This argument is clearly closely linked with the discussion 
of the criteria for selection of imports in Chapter IX; we observed 
there that high priority was given to imports of raw materials etc*, 
necessary to maintain employment.3 Certainly, ad hoc action was taken
1 In the early years of the period expansion of output was also 
limited by general and relatively severe shortages of skilled 
labour. Unskilled labour was more freely available except at 
times of high levels of internal a ctivity.
2 Industries may have retained labour even when not fully used 
because of difficulty in replacing it when raw material supplies 
improved. To this extent it may have been economically wasteful 
in the short term; in the longer term either supplies would 
become available or the underemployed labour would be released. 
Of course, there may have been a number of short terms.
3 Reference is also made to the discussion in Chapter IX of the 
adverse consequences of the policy.
by the authorities to ensure minimum requirements, of materials were 
met; the manufacturers’ quotas issued for textiles in the first 
years of the licensing system would come under this head. It is 
true that in this case, they resulted in problems of some magnitude 
in the second intensification period; but the experience of the 
latter period suggests that such problems can be handled without 
disrupting the system.**
The problem of maintaining imports of minimum requirements 
of essential (for full employment) raw materials etc. is clearly 
related to the absolute levels of foreign exchange available for 
imports* It may be reasonable to argue that without the relaxations 
of the restrictions in 1953 and 1954, or again in 1959, problems 
may have arisen in regard to the supply of essential raw materials. 
Alternatively, had the level of imports in 1956-57 been brought 
down to the target levels set, this would probably have implied 
further cut3 in already low levels of raw material imports, and 
some unemployment. More generally it concerns the assumption widely 
made that increased domestic production of importable goods means 
reduced dependence upon imported goods. The data in Table IX-4 show 
no general trend but they certainly provide no evidence to support 
this assumption.
1 "Import controls can be administered with a view to hampering as 
little as possible the raw materials, components and capital equip­
ment needs of a growing industrial structure". J.G. Crawford, 
"Relations Between Civil Servants and Ministers in Policy Making", 
loc* cit.» p.105.
In considering the effects of the redirection of import demand 
on the secondary sector we have to face the problem of summarising the 
experience of a substantial number of widely divergent industries over 
a period of some years.
In the calculations of market shares (Table VII-5) we are 
already summarising to a considerable degree in that they are based 
on statistical industrial classifications which in most cases contain 
within them a number of distinct industries’ in the economic sense. 
Moreover, as we have noted, the controls on imports were applied to 
commodities rather than to industries; consequently the relationship 
between industries subclasses and particular effects of reductions in 
import competition resulting from the controls becomes even less 
distinct.
Aggregate statistical presentation is limited in the degree to 
which it can indicate causal influences; to gain insight into the 
factors resulting in movements in the aggregates it is necessary to 
examine individual cases. Considerations of space and of manageab­
ility limit the extent to which details of such an examination could 
be presented here. While there is some case for examining a few 
industries in detail, the difficulty of obtaining industries which 
in number were manageable and in nature could be considered ’repre­
sentative’ in any sense of that term, suggested that a more limited
1 In the sense of groups of firms whose products are highly substit­
utable in demand.
coverage of a wider group of industries would be preferable as a basis 
for drawing more general conclusions.
In the present chapter, and in Chapter XII we shall discuss 
certain aspects of a number of particular industries; in a later 
chapter, (Chapter XV), we shall consider whether features important 
in particular cases are of significance in the aggregate. For this 
purpose a group of the industry subclasses has been selected in which 
production is predominantly import competing;** a further characteristic 
of the industries included is that they should be ones for which we 
have no reason to believe that competition from imports was not reduced 
by the controls on imports. The aggregate pattern of behaviour of this 
group of industries will then be compared with that in the remaining 
subclasses.
Table VI1-5 presented data on the shares of the total market
t
supplied by domestic industries with the secondary industry sector.
A measure of the variability in these market shares during the eight 
years 1953-54 to 1960-61 is given in Table XI-1. Since the market 
shares data conceal directional movements of the components - only 
the relationship between the movements in these components is indicated 
by the ratios - the subclasses have teen shown in Table XI-2 according
1 Unless expressly stated to the contrary, we shall use this term to 
mean directly import competing in the sense that the products are 
technically substitutable as well as substitutable in demand.
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to the growth in the market in relation to import growth.
It is hardly necessary to emphasise the statistical limitations
2of the data; these have already been discussed at length. The 
limitations of using value data, particularly, are well known. It is 
worth observing, however, that demand is a monetary as well as a real 
concept; while it would be useful to know what the actual demand 
demonstrated represented in real terms, lack of knowledge of this does 
not make the exercise valueless.
Comparison of the industries listed in Table XI-1 with those in 
XI-2 will indicate the omission of a number of subclasses where inform­
ation on activities contained within them is particularly unsatisfactory 
or where it is known that the activities covered have changed signif-
1 For the purpose of Table XI-1 the years 1950-51 to 1952-53 have been 
excluded. 1950-51 was excluded to avoid the need to explain factors, 
particularly movements in stock levels, which made that year abnormal 
for a number of industries and which have only limited relevance in 
the present context. 1951-52 and 1952-53 were excluded because the 
rapid changes in imports in those two years make for extreme move­
ments in ratios. The remaining 8 years cover two periods of control, 
one year of substantially relaxed licensing and the first year of 
virtual freedom from imports. Since we are dealing with a series, 
the inclusion of 1960-61 while it may involve explanation of abnorm­
al factors does not unduly affect the results. This would not be 
the case with comparisons from one year to another. For this reason 
the years 1953-54 and 1959-60 have been used for the comparisons 
made in Table XI-2. This has the advantage that there were many 
similarities between the Xjo years, including a relaxed level of 
licensing of imports. It should be noted that demand in the sense 
used here is widely defined to include tdemand! for stocks (invol­
untary as well as voluntary) and for exports. These factors will
be discussed further below).
2 See Chapter VII, and particularly Appendix VII:B and the further 
footnoted comments earlier in the previous chapter.
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icantly over the period.
In one sense we axe less concerned with movements in total
demand than with relative movements of imports and domestic output.
2However, comparisons with movements in -«lue of output over the
period show that the substitution of ribmestic production for
imports enabled five industries to expand output at rates above
3the average&r secondary industry as a whole, although total 
demand increased less than the average: II-2 (earthenware, China,
etc.), IV-27 (Stoves, Ovens, etc.),^ VI-11/12 (Textile Dyeing and
1 Those excluded were: 1-6 (Marble), 1-10 (Other of Class I), III-13
(Other of Class III), IV-33 (Other Metal Works), VI11-12 (Shoe 
Accessories), X-5 (Cooperage), X-7 (Wood turning, Woodcarving etc.), 
X-8 (Basketware etc.), X-11 (Other of Class X), XI-3 (Furnishing 
Drapery), XI-4 (Picture Frames), XII-11 (Other of class XII), XIV-1 
(Gramophones), XIV-2 (Pianos etc.), XIV—3 (Other Musical Instruments), 
XV-10 (Other of Class XV). In total the value of output of these 
subclasses represents less than 0.2$ of the total value of output
of Classes I-XV.
2 The conceptual limitations of using value of output (gross product­
ion) data rather than value of production (net production) data for 
such comparisons were discussed in Appendix VII:B, where it was noted 
that in practice the difference was not substantial during the period. 
Value of output of Classes I to XV inclusive increased by 63% from 
1953-54 while the movement inralue of production was 68%» For con­
sistency with market share and market demand data, goss rather than 
net production data are used here.
3 As in earlier discussion, secondary industry in this context excludes 
Class XVI (Heat, Light and Power).
4 The statistical coverage of this industry group is not precise. Stove 
manufacture is frequently carried on in the same establishment as that 
of sinks and baths. At the same time some solid fuel stoves are pro­
duced by firms included in the Ferrous Foundries subclass; some gas 
stoves are produced in establishments included in Sheet Metal Working, 
Pressing and Stamping; while some electric stoves are included in 
Electrical Machines, Cables, Apparatus subclass. We have consequently 
excluded it in subsequent analysis.
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Printing etc., and Other of Class Vi), XII-10 (Pens, Pencils etc.), 
and XV-5 (Optical Apparatus). On the other hand, in the case of 
five subclasses total demand increased faster than average while 
domestic output expanded less than the average for secondary 
industry as a whole: II-I (Bricks and Tiles, IV-14 (Aircraft),
IX-23/24 (Wineries and Distilleries), XV-8 (Toys etc.) and XV-9 
(Artificial Flowers).**
The major reason for using *industry* rather than commodity 
data in our study of the effects on secondary industry was to enable 
something to be said about secondary industry in the aggregate, and, 
in particular, to attempt to examine variations in the economic 
behaviour of different sectors of secondary industry. It is hoped 
that the examination of the pattern of response of the group of 
import competing industries will assist in this purpose. In deciding 
which industries to count as import competing, in this sense, we 
shall be guided basically by the data in Table XI-2. However, to 
limit to some extent the influence of other causal factors operating
1 On a strict reading of the statistical data, XIII-1 (Rubber) would 
also be included in this latter group. Its inclusion would be in 
part due to statistical accident and would in any event be placing 
too much weight on small differences in what are essentially very 
approximate figures.
Total value of output of secondary industry expanded marginally 
faster than total demand as calculated here. Thus while the 
increase in the value of output of the subclass was &out the 
same as the increase in demand, it was less than the increase 
in output.
during the period in our consideration of gross profit margins, we
need to exclude two types of subclass: those where the g*oss profit
margin is likely to be influenced significantly by prices determined
by non economic factors and those influenced by conditions in markets
unaffected by the controls on imports.
In a number of industry subclasses decisions whether to
import or to obtain locally items available from the domestic industry
were made extensively on political rather than economic grounds.
These subclasses are: IV-7/B (Tram and Rail), IV-14 (Aircraft),
IV-17/18 (Shipbuilding), IV-31 (Arms and Ammunition), and IX-2/3
(Printing), all of which include a substantial number of establish-
2ments run by Federal State or local government authorities. This 
does not mean that the licensing of imports is irrelevant to these 
industries. First, the existence of import licensing in the political
1 Output of government printing is relatively small compared with 
general printing, but it was not found practicable to $parate the 
two subclasses. Import competition is relatively unimportant over 
much of the private printing trade, but may be important in special­
ised lines. For example, see reference to the virtual cessation
of printing and publishing of comic books in Australia following 
the removal of the import controls. Observer, 10.12.1960, p.5»
2 Imports of ships, aircraft and a number of items produced by sub­
class IV-31 (Arms and Ammunition) are also subject to the Customs 
(Prohibited Imports) Regulations. While these regulations are 
concerned largely with non economic aspects of imports - also 
included are narcotic drugs and obscene literature - it is under­
stood that in the case of ships for example, that the foreign 
exchange position was one factor considered by the Minister for 
Shipping and Transport when considering an gpllication for a 
licence to import under these regulations. Builders of small 
boats and small ships probably benefitted substantially from the 
controls.
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sense - that the government had to take certain action to reduce 
imports - may have been a significant factor influencing the 
(political) decision to obtain supplies from the local industry. 
Second, not all the establishments in the subclass are government 
controlled or dependent upon government (politically determined) 
ordering. For example, subclass IV-31 (Arms and Ammunitions) 
contains, in addition to Federal Government ordinance establish­
ments, some smaller factories producing sporting guns which appear 
to have received protection from the controls on imports, particularly 
those from the dollar area.
The non economic aspects of demand may be of some importance 
in other industries, such as the production of electrical power 
generation and transmission equipment where demand is substantially 
that of governmental authorities. In the present context we are 
not concerned with total demand as such but with the relationship 
between imports and domestic production; the extent to which this 
is influenced by such non economic factors is difficult to assess. 
There is evidence that certain States Government authorities,
1."There appears tote increased competition from imports originating 
in the United States of America. This is likely to increase because 
of the recent relaxation of controls on imports from that source". 
Tariff Board Report, Firearms. 28.6.1960, p.70. The Board recomm­
ended a protective duty and this recommendation was accepted by 
the Government.
356
notably in New South Wales and to a lesser extent in Victoria give 
a margin of preference to the domestic supplier but the evidence 
does not suggest that this has increased over the period.
Another factor relevant to the consideration of a number of the 
subclasses is the extent of export trade in the value of output.
Where this is at ail significant it would seem to exclude them from 
further consideration since, not only would ability to export suggest 
ability to compete without assistance on the home market, but the 
returns to the industry would also be significantly determined by 
export prices which are unaffected by controls on imports into 
Australia, For the bulk of the manufacturing industries, exports 
of their output are small. Of the industries in Table XI-2 those in 
which exports as a percentage of output normally exceed 10 per cent, 
are III-7 (Animal Oils), III-8 (Tallow), IV-5 (Non Ferrous Metal 
Refining), VI-3 (Woollen Textiles), VIII-3 (Tanning), IX-1 (Flour), 
IX-10 (Jam, Fruit and Vegetable Canning), IX-13/14/15 (Butter, Cheese
1 "In New South Wales, it is statutory for Local Government Author­
ities to allow financial preference to the Australian manufacturers 
,,, However, the Electricity Supply Association of Australia has
no specific policy in relation to preferences". Tariff Board Report, 
Circuit Breakers and Switch Units for Use at Voltages of 1000 or 
Over, 4*2.1954* "••• it appears that the only effective
preference given to local cable makers operates in New South Wales," 
Tariff Board Report, Covered Cable and Wire Classifiable Under 
Tariff Item 181(a) (1) (a), 11.3.1955, p.13.
2 "The (State Electricity) Commission (of Victoria) observes a policy 
under which, all other things teing equal, it allows goods of 
Australian manufacturer a preference of about 10 per cent on the 
price tendered". Tariff Board Report, Circuit Breakers etc.,
jOp^^CILt, , p.S.
Condensed Milk), IX-17 (Meat and Fish Preserving), IX-23/24 (Wineries 
and Distilleries), and IX-31 (Sausage Casings). Since 1956-57 sub­
class IV-1/2 (iron and Steel) has also generally exported more than 
10 per cent of value of output.
Many of these subclasses are processors of primary products 
and the fluctuations in export prices are experienced largely by
1the producers of the primary commodity rather than the processors. 
Nevertheless, these industries may be expected to show a different 
pattern of financial performance than those merely selling on the 
domestic market; these industries will consequently be omitted in 
considering the question of gross profit margins. On the other hand, 
this did not necessarily mean that these subclasses were unable to 
obtain benefits from the reduction in import competition in the dom­
estic market. In some instances not all products of the industry 
are exported; in others some of the production of an exported 
product is sold on the domestic market. We may illustrate this with 
a few examples.''
1 As for example, butter factories, lead and zinc smelters.
2 In the discussions of individual industries, in the present chapter 
and in the one following, references to levels of imports etc. will 
be based generally on the information in Tables VII—5 and VII-6. 
Information on movements in tariff rates for a number of industries 
is provided in Chapter XII.
358
Table XL-3: R e la tiv e  P rice s  o f Copper 1952-60
A u s tra l ia  U nited Kingdom Excess o f A u s tra l ia n
P rice  over U.K,
_______________  P rice  a t_______
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
£ ton £ ton £ ton
1952 285 350 284 359 1 -9
1953 300 350 267 356 33 -6
1954 300 350 269 284 31 -34
1955 359 498 362 505 -3 -7
1956 357 538 328 546 29 -8
1957 330 357 220 341 110 16
1958 285 337 201 324 S4 13
1959 290 346 262 333 28 13
1960 290 357 272 349 18 8
Source: From d a ta  in  The A u s tra lia n M ineral In d u s try  Review. Bureau
of M ineral R esources, C anberra, (A nnual).
Table XI-4: R e la tiv e  P rice  o f Zinc 1954-1960
A u s tra l ia U nited Kingdom Excess o f A u s tra l ia n
P rice  over U.K.
P rice  a t
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
£ ton £ ton £ to n
1954 90 105 87 105 3 0
1955 105 125 105 127 -2
1956 115 131 114 131 1
1957 79 130 76 132 3 -2
1958 90 100 77 97 13 3
1959 100 120 89 122 11 -2
I960 101 119 96 120 5 -1
Source: From d a ta  in The A u s tra lia n M ineral In d u s try  Review
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The data in Table XI-3 show clearly that domestic prices of 
copper were maintained at levels above comparable import levels 
during a number of the years shown. Domestic copper prices were 
under price control until October 1954* In April 1953 the domestic 
price was reduced from £350 per ton to £330 per ton and was main­
tained at that level despite further declines in world prices
until October of that year when a further reduction was made to
1£320 per ton to producers and £300 per ton to fabricators. The
dual price system, according to one source, was designed "to enable
the Mt. Lyall Mining and Railway Co., a high cost producer working
2on low grade ores, to stay in production".
Price control was lifted when world prices rose above the 
domestic price level, in October 1954 and low world prices were 
not experienced again until 1957. Again because of restrictions on 
imports, the Australian Copper Producers* Association was able to 
maintain the domestic price "at considerably higher levels than
3those prevailing overseas". Following a Tariff Board recommendation,
1 The difference was met from the Copper Equalisation Pool which 
received funds when prices in world markets were above the fixed 
Australian price.
2 Survey of Manufacturing Activity. October 1953, p.10.
3 The Australian Copper Industry. Department of Trade, Melbourne, 
April 1958, p.26; Tariff Board Report, Copper. 22.11.1957,
pp. 11, 22.
3 GO
tariff and bounty arrangements were introduced in 1958 to provide for
fixed domestic floor prices to consumers and producers.*^
This was clearly a case where the producers of the raw materials
were the major beneficiaries of reduced competition from imports for
2the processed product.
A 1 23floor1 domestic selling price was similarly maintained at
above comparable world levels for zinc with the assistance of the
3restrictions on imports, and these are reflected in Table XI-4. 
Subsequently world prices have been followed in setting the domestic 
price, although world prices have not returned to the levels of 
1958 and 1959. All zinc refining in Australia is carried out by
1 C.F. Tariff Board Report, Copper, op, cit.: Survey of Manufacturing
Activity. April 1958, p.27. Subsequently amended to raise the dom­
estic and producer and consumer price and reduce the bounty. C.F. 
Tariff Board Report, Unwrought Copper. 20.5*1960; Australian Mineral 
Industry Review. 1960, Bureau of Mineral Resources, Canberra, 1961, 
P.79.
2 The copper smelting and refining industry was probably protected
more by the controls on exports of copper concentrates which were 
not removed until 1959* This applied particularly to the one customs 
smelter. Electrolytic Refining and Smelting Company of Australia 
Pty. Ltd. (E.R. and S). Their company admitted in 1954 that its 
refining costs were substantially above those overseas. Tariff 
Board Report, Copper, 15*10.1954? P*32. Following the removal 
of export controls on copper concentrates, exports of these rose 
substantially while E.R. and S.f refining activity declined sub­
stantially, Australian Mineral Industry Review. 1960, p.83.
Protection to the other smelters and refiners would result f rom 
their direct association with copper producers.
3 Australian Mineral Industry Review. 1958, p.212.
1 2one o f the  zinc p ro d u ce rs . ’
Dangers o f s u b s t i tu t io n  o f aluminium fo r  copper were o f f s e t  by 
th e  f a c t  th a t  the  p r ic e  of lo c a l ly  produced aluminium has b een con­
s i s t e n t ly  above the  landed p r ic e  o f im ported aluminium s in ce  lo c a l  
3
production  began, a s  may be seen  f rom Table XI-5* From 1955 onwards, 
im port l ic e n c e s  were g ra n te d  f o r  the  s h o r t  f a l l  between demand and 
lo c a l  p ro d u c tio n . I t  was recogn ised  by the  a u th o r i t ie s  th a t  w ith  
no t a r i f f  p ro te c t io n  on unwrought aluminium from B r i t i s h  P r e f e r e n t ia l  
so u rces , the  p ro d u c tio n  o f aluminium was dependent upon the  p ro te c t io n  
provided  by im port l ic e n s in g , and the  l ic e n s in g  a u th o r i t ie s  on a number 
o f occasions drew a t te n t io n  to  th i s  a sp e c t of the  s i tu a t io n .  With the 
v i r t u a l  removal o f the  im port c o n tro ls  in  1960, q u a n t i ta t iv e  r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  on aluminium and aluminium shapes were r e ta in e d , the  Commonwealth 
Government having accep ted  an o b lig a t io n , expressed  in  the  te rm s o f 
s a le  o f th e  p u b lic ly  owned B e ll Bay p la n t  to  a p r iv a te  co n ce rn ,^  to  
prov ide p ro te c tio n  to  the  in d u s try  fo r  fo u r years  from th e  d a te  o f s a le
1 Ib id . 1960, p .1 2 6 .
2 Lead and zinc ten d  to  be considered  to g e th e r . A lthough the  dom estic 
p r ic e  o f re f in e d  le ad  was f ix e d  a t  £100 per ton  in  December 1958, 
i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f th e  w orld p r ic e ,  and in  th i s  re s p e c t  has s im i l a r i t i e s  
w ith  copper and z in c , th i s  a c tio n  appears to  have been taken  independ­
e n tly  o f th e  c o n tro ls  s in ce  i t  rem ained unchanged a f t e r  th e  rem oval
of the  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  Again, th e  one le ad  r e f in in g  company i s  d i r e c t ly  
a s so c ia te d  w ith  th e  producing companies.
3 At the  A u s tra lia n  Aluminium P roduction  C om m issions p la n t  a t  B e ll 
Bay, Tasmania which commenced p roduction  September 1955. See 
Survey o f S e le c ted  M a te r ia ls . Department of N a tio n a l Development, 
January  1956, p .3 2 .
4 See Schedule to  Aluminium In d u s try  A ct. 1960.
(3rd January 1961), and the question of the Tariff assistance required 
by the industry was referred to the Tariff Board for enquiry and report. 
Table XI-5: Prices of Aluminium Ingots; C.i.f. Ma.ior Australian Ports.
£ per tona
As at 30th June 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961
Australian origin 260 268 278 271 271 271 271
Canadian origin 219 253 261 228 228 233 233
U.K. origin 205 237 247 226 226 233 233
Source: Tariff Board Annual Reports 1958-59. p.26 and 1960-61. p.31
a To nearest £.
It is traditional to refer to prices of Australian iron and steel 
as being among the lowest in the world, and this seems to be confirmed
-j
by comparisons with (domestic) prices in other countries. Certainly
the bulk of the imports during the period represents items for which
local production was inadequate; moreover, imports in 1951-52 would,
2had it not been for the restriction of imports, have been excessive;
and again in 1954-55 and 1955-56 much of the iron and steel imported 
3went into stocks. The enforced disposal of these stocks at low
1 See Tariff Board, Annual Report. 1961-62, (28,8.1962), p.30 for 
comparisons of domestic prices in Australia, United Kingdom,
United States of America and Japan for a number of major iron 
and steel products. Of the five products included, only in the 
case of tin plate is the current (March 1962) Australian price 
above the domestic price in any of the other countries listed.
2 See Survey of Selected Materials. Department of National Develop­
ment, January 1956, p.10.
3 See Steel Industry of Australia. Department of Trade, November
1958, pp.15-16.
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prices may have affected employment in some sectors of the steel 
industry.*^
Prices of steel products increased rapidly in the period
2under review, more rapidly than costs. Imports increased sub­
stantially in 1960-61; demand for steel products in 1960-61 was 
high, outrunning domestic production for many items, and there was
3an element of restocking involved. Imports in that year do not 
reflect the competitive position of imported steels. Yet world 
prices of steels vary considerably over time, and fluctuate more 
on the export market than the domestic market, export prices of 
steel frequently being much lower than the domestic market prices 
of the exporters.^ The fact that the producers are able to continue 
to maintain higher domestic prices despite the absence of import 
controls suggests that other factors, possibly the strong monopol-
1 See statement by Mr. Davies that men at Port Kembla Steel Mills 
were being put out of work by imports of steel, Parliamentary 
Debates. Vol.221, (12.3.1953), p.950.
2 ”... the financing of such a heavy programme (of expansion) out
of internal reserves has maintained some degree of upward pressure 
on steel prices ...” is how it is referred to, somewhat euphemistic­
ally, in Steel Industry of Australia, p.36.
3 See Survey of Manufacturing Activity. June 1961, p.13.
4 In October-November 1961 a witness before the Tariff Board sub­
mitted into-store price, Australia, quotations from local and 
overseas agents from 10 types of steel used in cutlery manufacture. 
Of the eight types for which local prices were given, seven could 
be obtained more cheaply from imported sources:
istic position of the industry, were far more important than the 
controls on imports as such. Here again, however, the existence, 
and particularly the possibility of a recurrence of controls on 
imports, will have strengthened this monopolistic position. Some 
direct relief from import competition would appear to have been
4 (Continued from previous page).
Table Xl(Ft.)-1.
Grade of Steel Local Price Cheapest Im­
port Price 
(into Store)
Source
s. d. s. d.
16 Gauge Sheet 6. 1 3. 7 Japan
17 Gauge Sheet 6. 1 3. 7 Japan
18 Gauge Sheet 6. 3 5. 8 U.K.
13/32" Bar 2. 10 2. 8 U.K.
15/32" Bar 3. 1 2. 8 U.K.
11/32" H.I. Bright Bar 5. 11 3.5 Japan
3/8" H.I. Bright Bar 5. 11 3. 5 Japan
a, Australian Currency.
Source: Tariff Board Report, Cutlery. 18.6.1962, p.13.
Clearly therefor, the fact that domestic prices in Australia are 
lower than domestic prices in overseas supplying countries does 
not mean that there is no possibility of import competition. Of 
course, the domestic industry would have resort to anti-dumping 
action under the Customs Tariff (Industries Preservation) Act, 
if it were being seriously affected by those imports. Moreover, 
the domestic prices quoted earlier are list prices - they may 
not be the price at which steel is actually sold.
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received, however, on stainless steel sheets and strip, and on some
2types of structural sections and merchant bar.
Benefits may also have been received from the general shortages 
of steel products which existed for most of the period, in part a 
result of the controls on imports. For example, local hot dipped 
tinplate probably was demanded by some users who would, in the ab­
sence of the controls, have imported electrolytic tinplate; in 1956, 
part of the fall in the production of transformer grade electrical
steel sheets was attributed to imports of grain-oriented electrical 
3sheet.
1 Price cuts for certain qualities of stainless steel sheets were 
noted for the previous 12 months in the April 1959 Survey of 
Manufacturing Activity, p.19. Again in 1960-61, the price of 
some grades of stainless steel sheets was reduced ”... to meet 
lower prices of imported steel of similar grades”, June 1961,
Survey of Manufacturing Activity, p.18. In evidence before the 
Tariff Board, the Commonwealth Steel Company Ltd., indicated that 
its selling prices ”... were fixed in order to be competitive with 
the price into store of Australian agents or large users for com­
parable imported products”, Tariff Board Report, Hoop and Strip of 
Iron and Steel. 2.11.1960, p.9.
2 ”Low world prices during the past year enabled importers to land 
light merchant sections more cheaply than the ex-mill prices quoted 
by the re-rollers”, Survey of Manufacturing Activity. April 1959, 
p.19; "Prices for light merchant sections have been reduced 
appreciably in an effort to counter the effect of lower import 
prices ... " Ibid, p.19; ”The domestic demand for locally produced 
merchant bar has fallen f airly sharply, because of large imports
in 1960-61 and some reduction in local usage”, Survey of Manufact­
uring Activity. June, 1961, p.16.
3 Survey of Manufacturing Activity. October 1956, p.17.
We noted in the case of stainless steel, that prices were
reduced to meet import competition. The Tariff Board, in the
report referred above, commented cn the relatively high level of
1profits being made by the applicant for tariff protection.
Exports in the subclass VI-3 (Woollen Textiles) are almost
entirely of wool tops. For wool textiles proper it is far from
easy to disentangle the various factors affecting the position
of the local industry. Undoubtedly there is reason to suggest
that competition from imports in at least some sectors of the
2industry1 23s market was reduced by controls on imports, even though
the claims of industry spokesmen appear to have exaggerated the 
position.v
1 "Current profit margins on total unit costs suggest that the 
industry, if required to withstand competition from imports at 
prices somewhat lower than at present, could do so and still 
earn reasonable profits of funds employed", loc. cit..p.9.
2 For example, moquettes in 1952-53 Tariff Board Report Moquettes, 
23.2.1955, p.8; possibly woollen yarns 1952-53 to 1954-55 Tariff 
Board Report Wool Tops. Woollen Yarns. Woollen Piece Goods. Blankets 
and Rugs. 15.2.1956, p.14; blankets in the same period, ibid, p.IB; 
See also Survey of Manufacturing Activity. April 1955 p.96-97, 99; 
Ibid. October 1956, p.73. However, in March 1962 the Board, in a 
reference on woollen yarns said that since 1939 the industry had 
suffered virtually no competition from overseas yarn producers.
"While this would have been due in recent years to some extent to 
the operation of import licensing, it would also appear that the 
rates of duty ... have afforded the industry at least adequate 
protection". Tariff Board Report General Textiles Reference:
Interim Report on Yarns. Woollen or Containing Wool. 26.3.1962. p.13.
3 The Tariff Board in its summing up of the 1955 enquiry referred to 
the fact that "Almost without exception, recently published annual 
reports of woollen mills have disclosed a reduction in output and 
profit, placing the blame on inadequate protection. It is the Board’s 
opinion that the most important factor contributing to this position 
is over capacity in Australian mills". Tariff Board Report Wool Tops. 
Woollen Yarns etc.. 15.2.1956, p.19.
In view of its excess capacity to which the Tariff Board
referred, the industry may, nevertheless, have been able to operate
at a more profitable level than would have been the case in the
1absence of the controls. The fact that the industry in general
has sought increased tariff protection twice during the period and
a major section of the industry sought, and obtained, temporary
protection in 1961, all at periods of relaxation of the level of
import licensing, would also suggest that the relaxation meant
competition where competition did not exist before. This need not
necessarily follow, however, in view of the conclusion of the Tariff
2Board referred to above.
1 ”... net profit on funds employed ... and on turnover (of the 
nine local woollen mills which gave evidence) had reflected an 
increasing trend over the three years ...". While the Board 
commented that this profit level was not an unreasonable one,
(it is not clear whether unreasonable for consumers or producers) 
it also noted that in cross costings submitted in evidence, "the 
provision for profit by the local industry was, on average, at a 
much high-level than that provided in the United Kingdom costing Ta­
riff Board Report, Woollen Goods. 5*1*1959, p.13* Moreover, this 
may have been in the Board*s mind when it said that "On yarns it 
would appear that the s elling prices of local manufacturers would 
approximate 15 per cent above the landed duty free cost of compar­
able United Kingdom yarns notwithstanding the fact that the pro­
duction costs in Australia only averaged 12-§- per cent above the 
costs in the United Kingdom", even though on the basis of com­
parison used the British manufacturers had, in addition, to meet 
considerable costs in packaging and freights. Ibid.
2 It is also relevant that the Board*s recommendation for some 
increased protection in its 1956 report was not adopted by the 
Government with the exception of a recommendation for the 
deletion of a provision f or by-law entry of certain woollen 
piece goods. In its 1959 report the Board recommended no 
increase in protection and in fact made some slight reduction 
(through removal of the primage duty) on items covering blankets 
and rugs, and wool tops. Again, in its 1962 report the Board 
recommended no change in the level of protection on woollen yarns.
There are some grounds for thinking that, even though the 
variations in the levels of imports were not large, the effect of
these variations may have been greater than their size indicates*
There is also some suggestion that the impact of the controls may
have been greater than the direct severity of the controls would 
2suggest. This may explain in part why imports in 1958-59 in the 
absence of an intensification in licensing showed, in money terms, 
a decrease corresponding to that of the output of the local industry 
though they increased more rapidly than local production in 1959-60 
and 1960-61.1 23
At the request of the industry, temporary duties were imposed 
on imports of woollen piece goods in 1961 largely because of increased
1
1 ’’For almost all sectors of the industry, manufacturers claimed that 
there had been a substantial increase in imports directly or indir­
ectly competing with local wool fabrics. Import statistics indicate 
however, that the increase in imports of wool fabrics and of cloth­
ing was only marginal ... I has \b come evident from the present 
survey that the low prices of many of the goods imported since 
September 1960 have caused uncertainty in the trade out of all 
proportion to their volume and have resulted in deferment and 
reduction of ordering with local mills”. Survey of Manufacturing 
Activity. June 1961, p.64.
2 ’’Import licensing, although it has not imposed severe restrictions 
on the volume of imports of woollen goods could have been a material 
factor in restricting imports in that its very existence may act as 
a deterrent to local users changing their source of supply”. Tariff 
Board Report Woollen Goods. 5.1.59, p.l6#
3 ’’The Board knows of no reason why, at the present time, import 
licensing should be regarded as having a restrictive effect on 
the importation of wool tops and yarns”. Tariff Board Report 
Woollen Goods. 5.1.1959, p.10.
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imports of Japanese and Italian low priced woollen piece goods.
In other substantially exporting subclasses, particular products
marketed domestically appear to have received substantial protection
from import competition, e,g. Australian whisky, in IX-23/24 (Wineries
and Distilleries), and ox casings, in IX-31 (Sausage Casings), though
in the latter case, on the basis of unit value and production data,
this appears to have been reflected in production increases rather
2than price increases. Production of whisky reached a peak in
31957-58, at the same time as a substantial increase in unit values, 
and although it declined substantially in the following year, rose 
again in 1959-60 to a relatively high level. Production of ox 
casings declined steadily from 1957,
1 The Italian movement into the Australian market with low priced 
woollen piece goods may also have reflected, in part, the impact 
on Italian exports of the change in U.S. import policy on woollen 
textiles from a tariff quota to a tariff in December 1960. Be­
cause of its combination of specific and ad valorum duties, the 
duty tended to be more protective to lower priced woollen piece 
goods than more expensive lines,
2 C.f. Tariff Board Report, Ox Runners, Surgical Sutures and Sausage 
Casings. 16.12.1958, pp.7-8. See also the Board!s comments on 
distribution of imported hog casings in Chapter XVII.
3 Unit value data indicate a rise from 17s. (to nearest s.) in 
1956-57 to 29s. in 1957-58. While the size of the increase 
suggests some statistical error, the unit value data for adjacent 
years tend to support the approximate accuracy of the data. The 
unit value has declined slowly but steadily since 1957-58; it 
was slightly under 25s. in 1960-61.
In  a d d itio n  to  the  two types o f su b c la ss  which we have a lre a d y  
seen , need to  be excluded from our R e p r e s e n ta t iv e 1 2345group i t  w i l l  o f 
course be necessa ry  to  exclude any su b c la ss  where d i r e c t ly  co m p etit­
ive  im ports were n o t in  f a c t  r e s t r i c t e d  by the  c o n tro ls .  On th i s  
b a s is  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  exclude su b c la ss  I I I - 6  (M ineral O ils ) ,  
s in ce  th e re  was no e f f e c t iv e  r e s t r i c t i o n  on im ports o f the major
item s produced, w ith  the  ex cep tio n  o f f u e l  o i l .  Produced la rg e ly  
2
as a by-product and im ported f r e e ly  in  the  e a r ly  y ears  o f the  p e r io d ,
fu e l  o i l  im ports were r e s t r i c t e d  from 1956 onwards, lo c a l  p ro d u c tio n
3
having reached o r exceeded lo c a l  demand a year o r two b e fo re . Some
in d iv id u a l r e f in e r ie s  may have b e n e f i t te d  from  th e  reduced im ports,^"
b u t com petition  to  d ispose  o f excess p ro d u c tio n , "one o f th e  l a r g e s t
and p o ss ib ly  one o f the  l e a s t  v a lu ab le  o f the  p roducts  o f th e  re f in e ry "
on the  dom estic m arket had reached  th e  stage  by 1959 where dom estic
5
p r ic e s  were below  im port p r ic e s .  Any b e n e f i ts  to  lo c a l  in d u s try
1 Fuel o i l  re p re se n te d  some 15-20$ o f t o t a l  va lue  o f o u tp u t o f th i s  
su b c lass  in  the  l a t e r  y ea rs  o f th e  p e r io d . The only  o th e r item  
of any im portance lic e n se d  r e s t r i c t i v e l y  was bitumen which re p re ­
sen ts  l i t t l e  more than  2% o f va lue  o f o u tp u t o f th e  su b c la s s ,
2 Though n o t e n t i r e ly ,  s in ce  o u tp u t f r a c t io n s  may be v a rie d  w ith in  
l im i t s .
3 See Survey of S e lec ted  M a te r ia ls . Department o f N a tio n al Development, 
Melbourne, January  1956, p .7 4 .
4 some r e f in e r ie s  a re  ex p o rtin g  fu e l  o i l  and in c u rr in g  s u b s ta n t ia l  
c o s ts  w hile  s ig n i f ic a n t  im ports o f f u e l  o i l  a re  s t i l l  o c c u rr in g " , 
T a r i f f  Board R eport, Motor and A v ia tio n  S p i r i t s . 7 .6 .1 9 5 6 , p .1 0 .
5 T a r i f f  Board R eport, Petro leum  R efin ing  In d u s try . 26 .3 .1959 , p .1 3 .
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from the restriction of imports of crude oil are likely to have been 
slight and to have been obtained indirectly by the coal industry 
rather than by the petroleum refining industry, since it appears 
the price of coal rather than competition from imports determined 
the selling price of fuel oil. Specific licence control was retained 
on this itme after February 1960.
Doubts regarding the statistical coverage or knowledge that an 
industry subclass had undergone a substantial structural change 
resulted in the omission of a number of other industries which rank 
relatively high in terms of variability of market shares. These 
include III-5 (Machine Belting), IV-27 (Stoves, Ovens, Ranges), IV-32 
(Wireless, Amplifying Apparatus) and IX-20 (Salt).
Others were omitted where it was judged that, despite variations 
in market shares, a substantial part of the output of the industry was 
unaffected by import competition. In some, output consisted primarily 
on non traded goods; in others, tariff protection was sufficient 
throughout the period to provide, in general more than adequate 
protection. These include II-1 (Bricks and Tiles), IV-20 (Agricultural 
Machinery) IV-26 (Wire, Wire working), VI-10 (Bags and Sacks) and 
IX-28 (Tobacco, Cigarettes).
1 "Contracts (for fuel oil) are made determining the price of fuel 
oil at some fixed percentage on amount below the price of coal", 
evidence given on behalf of Coal Industry, Ibid, p.5*
It will be apparent from the previous examples considered that
exclusion of a subclass does not mean that the reduction of import
competition effected by the controls was unimportant. In some
instances particular commodities were importantly affected; in
others it is probable that more widely spread benefits were received.
Both situations, in respect of the subclasses referred to above, are
illustrated in the following examples.
The major items produced in this industry subclass, II-1 (Bricks
and Tiles), clay bricks and roofing tiles, were not directly affected
by the restrictions. Variations in market shares for the subclass as
a whole were due almost entirely to variations in imports of firebricks
and of wall and floor tiles. In the case of firebricks technical
considerations are normally more important than price as a determin-
1ant of the source of supply.
In the case of floor and wall tiles, the following table shows
movements in unit values of glazed floor and wool tiles.
Despite the limitations of unit value figures, the differing
movements seem so marked as to suggest that the maximum tariff,
2which was stated by the industry tote insufficient in 1953 and
1 However, Newbold General Refractories Ltd., the largest Australian 
producer of refractories, refers to the development of competitive 
pressure from largely European exporters of refractories in its 
annual report for 1961-62, reported in Bulletin. 6.10.1962, p.58.
2 See Tariff Board Report, Flooring and Wall Tiles. 22.12.1953.
Table XI-6: Glazed Floor and Wall Tiles: Unit Values
(1950-51 = 100) 
Year ended June
1952 1953 m k 1255 1256 1252 1958 1252 I960
115 109 118 119 129 118 117 113 115
158 115 168 173 212 212 234 220 . »
all Sources
Domestically 
Produced
Source: Imports - calculated from Imports Clearance Bulletins:
Domestic - calculated from Secondary Industry Bulletins, 
which remained unchanged over the period, continued to provide inade­
quate protection and that its place was taken by the controls on 
imports. This is confirmed by the conclusion reached by the Tariff 
Board in 1961. It is interesting to note the rapid rate of expan­
sion of production of these items; in 1958-59 the output (in square 
yardage) of glazed floor and wall tiles was 340 per cent of its 
1950-51 level.1 2
Protection of local manufacturers from import licensing was
1 ,f... the Australian industry has had the protection of the existing 
duties and until February 1960, was also assisted by the restriction 
of imports under the import licensing system11. Tariff Board Report, 
Ceramic Tiles and Tile Blanks. 27.10.1961, p.9.
2 Floor and wall tiles represent only a small proportion of total 
value of output of the industry subclass, even though this propor­
tion increased from 1.1^ in 1950-51 to 4*7% in 1958-59.
accentuated by a price equalisation arrangement operated by the tile
merchants in co-operation with the producers. This arrangement was
ostensibly designed to provide for the equitable distribution of
tiles during the period of shortage caused by the import controls.
Under these arrangements, the tile merchants maintained prices
1for all tiles at the levels agreed for local tiles. For coloured 
tiles - white tiles were not produced locally - this meant a markup
of 33 per cent on local tiles compared with 70 per cent on imported
2tiles. The higher markup on the imported tiles provided an incentive 
for merchants to sell more of these at the expense of local tiles, 
when imported tiles became available. Some producers were in fact 
claiming - in 1961 - that the merchants were not living up to their 
agreement.
Expressing dissatisfaction with these arrangements the Board 
noted that, while it was contended that they had been designed to 
allocate supplies of local tiles under the licensing system, and 
" ... notwithstanding an increase in the proportion of sales of
1 In New South Wales, the Wall and Floor Tile Association agreed to 
buy a certain quantity of local tiles at specified prices. A 
similar arrangement existed in Victoria except that producers 
retained the right to sell direct to users, ^n South Australia 
the arrangement was based on a retail price order of the Prices 
Commissioner. This order provided for a common retail price for 
imported and locally made tiles, on the understanding that tile 
merchants in that State purchased specified quantities from the 
local manufacturers. Ibid.« p.B.
imported tiles as compared with locally produced tiles in the period 
since licensing was removed, there has been no general decrease in 
the retail prices of tiles in Australia.
It was suggested that it had been possible to continue these 
arrangements after the removal of import licensing controls because 
the United Kingdom suppliers had agreed to supply only members of 
the Australian merchants* associations. This suggestion was strongly 
denied by the Glazed and Floor Tile Export Association of the United 
Kingdom.^
The activities contained within the Wireless and Amplifying
Apparatus subclass have changed substantially over the period with
3the introduction of television.' By 1957-58, in which yearTalue of
1 Ibid., p.10.
2 Ibid., p.11. The continuation, after the import controls had been 
removed, of the arrangement under which manufacturers agreed to 
supply on merchants* associations which restricted their member­
ship, tended totackfire on the manufacturers to some extent. n...
I was informed by one New South Wales buyer that he was forced
to import because, as a non-member of an association, supplies 
of tiles were not made available to him. He stated that he had 
applied to become a member but, although he was able to comply 
with all conditions of membership, his application was refused”. 
Report of Special Advisory Authority, Glazed Ceramic Tiles. 
15.8.1962, p.3.
3 This subclass is limited largely to raido and television apparatus. 
Telephone and telegraph apparatus is largely in subclass IV-6 
(Electrical machinery and Equipment), as is recording equipment. 
There is some overlap, however, for example, in 1948-49 (the last 
year when this information was provided) something over 10% of 
all radio sets were produced in factories not classified to this 
subclass. In the same year this subclass was responsible for a 
significant proportion of the output of telephone and telegraph 
apparatus, small transformers, intercommunications systems, as 
well as some switch gear.
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output of the subclass was double that of the previous year, value 
of output of television sets was over £34m. compared with total 
value of output of the subclass of £5Sm. This excluded parts for 
television sets which together with parts for wireless receivers 
amounted to another £12m.
In the Tariff Board!s review of the protection needs of the
radio and television industry in 1959, the protection given by the
import controls was claimed by those seeking increased protection
to have been important to the industry, and by those opposing
increased duties to have been a means of keeping in business and
1sheltering the less efficient producers.
From the evidence presented in the Tariff Board1 23s report, it
is apparent that some reduction in competition from imports was
2experienced in a result of the controls on imports. Moreover, 
with the introduction of television, and the licensing of parts
3and components for television sets on a specific licence basis,
1 Tariff Board Report, Radio and Television Equipment. 30.6.1959, 
pp.6-7. The Tariff Board commented that "Import Licensing must have 
afforded some protection to Australian manufacturers but the inform­
ation available to the Board is not sufficient to enable it to 
measure its extent. Ibid., p.B.
2 See, for example, loc. cit., p.9 (resistors), p.11 (condensers), 
p.16 (receiving valves), p.21 (tape recorders).
3 In the early developmental stage some items were on a quota basis, 
but because of the relative size of these items compared with quotas 
established, most of the potential importers sought special licences 
which made the process more or less equivalent to a specific licence 
application.
*_> rj n
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the limited supplies of imported components induced manufacturers
to enter into or accelerate local production of parts and compon-
1ents. At the same time, however, tariff rates on radio equipment
2at this time were relatively high, and this may have been a sig­
nificant incentive in addition to the pressure from the import 
controls.
In the following chapter we shall examine particular features 
of the experience of some of the industries which we have included 
in the ’sample* group of import competing industries. The discussion 
in the present chapter will have made it clear that this ’sample* 
group of industries by no means contains all the industries (in the 
economic rather than statistical sense) in which competition from 
imports was significantly reduced by the controls on imports.
1 The political decision to permit the introduction of television 
in Australia, implemented by means of the licensing of trans­
mission stations, was, of course, largely a decision to make 
available sufficient foreign exchange to enable the provision 
of television transmission and receiving services.
2 The bulk of items produced in this subclass would have been
protected by duties which comprised a specific duty or an ad 
valorum duty, normally British Preferential 27ig$ or Most 
Favoured Nations the higher being applicable.
So long as no local production of an item was in existence, of 
course, the importer would probably be able to obtain by-law 
admission on which duties, if any, would be much lower.
CHAPTER XII
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AND SECONDARY INDUSTRY. II.
In the present chapter we shall consider some aspects of the 
control of imports on particular manufacturing industries. The 
industries, and the evidence, have been selected with the purpose of 
illustrating certain features of the response of the industry to the 
reductions in import competition brought about by the controls. It is 
not intended to present a detailed, nor for that matter, completely 
balanced, examination of the industries to be dealt with; nor is it 
intended to consider all the possible effects of the controls. For 
these reasons we shall avoid, as far as possible, reproducing statistical 
information presented elsewhere in this study.
The industries for which evidence will be presented are among those 
included in what we shall use as a sample or ‘representative’ group of 
industries protected incidentally by import licensing; for convenience 
we shall refer to this selection of industries as Group A.
It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that we were taking 
as a starting point for the consideration of the impact of the restrictions 
on secondary industry and for the selection of the industries to be 
included in Group A, the actual fluctuations in imports, relative to 
domestic production, which occurred during the period. We noted that 
this method had a number of imperfections, including the fact that changes 
in the level of the protection available to an industry from the controls
on imports need not follow closely changes in the level of imports.
This is so even if there were no other factors affecting relative 
demand for imported and domestically produced goods; it is even more 
the case when allowance is made for the influence of the many other 
factors affecting this pattern of relative demand. Nevertheless, we 
have considered it useful as a point of departure.
The three characteristics of the subclasses included in Group A, 
which are shown in Appendix XII. A, are (i) that the bulk of the goods 
produced within each subclass are import substitutes, i.e. they are 
importable goods; (ii) that there is no evidence to suggest that 
competition from imports in the domestic market for the products was 
not at certain times reduced by the controls on imports; and (iii) that 
decisions regarding output levels and prices in each subclass are 
determined primarily on the basis of economic criteria.
For some of the industries included there is substantial evidence 
that the industry was being protected by import licensing; in others 
there is little or no reliable evidence. The absence of evidence to this 
effect has not in itself led to the omission of a subclass, providing the 
other characteristics are fulfilled; for example, this is broadly the 
situation for XV-4 (Brooms and Brushes).^
1 In fact, the largest individual import item classified to this subclass 
is coir matting; domestic production of this is small (normally less 
than 2% of value of output of the subclass) and largely takes place 
within special institutions, such as those for the blind. The remaining 
items of output, however, would appear to have been experiencing some 
competition from imports.
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This method obviously has considerable limitations. These arise 
not simple from the limited availability of statistical (or other) 
information; they also arise from the conceptual problems associated 
with the notion of competition. Assessments of the significance of any 
limits to competition, whether from imports or among domestic producers 
must be largely qualitative even with considerably more information than 
in the event proved to be the case for many of the industry subclasses. 
This has some importance in this context since one of the aims of this 
section is to present such evidence as is available regarding factors, 
other than the controls on imports, which may have been of importance in 
reducing import competition in particular industries.
In the consideration of these industries we are concerned less with 
demonstrating the fact of protection as such than with illustrating what 
happened in industries where there is either evidence or a strong pre­
sumption that there was such protection from the controls. Alternatively, 
we are interested in any factors which offset the expected effects of the 
restriction of imports. In some cases we shall be able to say something 
about the indirect effects of the controls, which we are unable to do 
simply on the basis of the statistical material presented in this study.
In addition to factors directly affecting the industry in total, we 
are interested in the situation within the particular industry. Since 
the level of internal competition will largely determine the levels of 
prices and profits within the industry, we are interested in the extent to 
which competition was present or absent in the industry and the extent to
which it was affected by the reduction in import competition m
The industries for which we shall present such evidence as is 
available on the points to which we have referred are: chemicals, 
vegetable oils, motor vehicles, cotton and synthetic textiles, timber, 
paper, rubber goods and artificial flowers.
Chemicals
It appears to be widely accepted that the chemicals industry 
received considerable protection from the direct control of imports.^ 
Evidence from the numerous Tariff Board examinations of particular 
sections of the industry supports this view as a broad generalisation, 
though there were wide variations in intensity between products and, 
of course, over time.
Over a wide range of products of the industry there is a lack of 
price competition and the Tariff Board has had occasion to refer to the 
industry’s monopolistic character. Substantially this is due to the 
predominance of a few large producers but the multi-product nature of
1 ’During the last decade, the chemical industry in Australia has been 
... sheltered by import licensing”, D.W. Finlay, (Director, Chemical 
Industry Research Institute), ’’The Possibilities of the Development 
of a Petrochemical Industry in Australia and New Zealand”, paper 
presented to Society of Economists, Wellington, (N .Z . ) ,  9*2.1962, p.S; 
’’High tariffs and import restrictions have played a major role in the 
development of certain chemical industries in Australia”, S.B. Dickenson 
’’Present Costs and Prices in the Chemical Industry”, in R.H. Buchanan 
(ed.), Costs in the Australian Chemical and Coal Industries, Sydney,
1960, p.54*
2 Tariff Board Report, Alkali. Chlorine and Chlorine Products. 30 .7*1954> 
p .1 4 . Finlay (loc. cit.) has also described the chemicals industry as 
”... almost entirely monopolistic or oligopolistic”.
much of the production largely rules out simple cost based pricing. In 
these circumstances, prices may be demand based^ but the industry is 
likely to be characterised by price collusion and a tendency for small 
producers to follow prices set by the major firms in the industry.^
The movement of the price indexes shown in Table XII-1 for two 
important basic chemicals, caustic soda and soda ash, would seem to 
reflect the level of import competition in the industry^. The series 
for polyvinyl chloride is of interest in that, although it does not 
follow the neat pattern of the other two, the low level to which it 
had fallen in 1960 still represented a satisfactorily profitable priced.
1 "When several products are made simultaneously, the separate costing 
of each product is impossible. Prices have to be related to the 
market place", Finlay, op. cit.» p.10.
2 See, for example, Tariff Board Report, Diphenylamine and Phenothiazine» 
29.5.1959, p.7.
3 There was no change in tariff rates on these two products during the 
period.
4 "On the basis of production and sales for the six months ended 30th 
September, 1960, and cost information relevant to that period which 
was submitted by I.C.I.A.N.2. (Imperial Chemical Industries of 
Australia and New Zealand Ltd), the profit on funds employed appeared 
reasonable "Tariff Board Report, Vinyl Monomers &c., 29.6.61, p.12.
TABLE XI1-1 PRICE INDEXES : SELECTED CHEMICALS : 1950-51 to 1960-61
o
Ö
31st March 1951=100
Soda Caustic Polyvinyl
Ash Soda Chloride
As at 31st March (i) (ii) (iii)
1952 120 128 145
1953 143 133 126
1954 133 129 130
1955 138 129 100
1956 138 129 100
1957 143 133 101
1953 145 137 91
1959 151 137 91
1960 151 127 89
1961 139 120 74
Source: Tariff Board, Annual Reports: converted to base period as above,
/9sy-
In the comments made by the Board in another report in the^saae 
year, the implication is clearly that the existing selling price included 
a profit margin higher than the Tariff Board would have considered as 
reasonable:
»»The applicant ••• did not base its request for protection on its 
current selling price ... but instead used a figure representing 
actual cost of production plus a certain margin of profit. On 
this basis the duties required would be about 20 per cent ad 
valorum lower than shown,1 2»’
Similarly, in another report, some years later
'»The fact that there is little competition from imports is indicated 
by the comparison the Board was able to make between costs of pro­
duction and the industry’s selling prices. The margin between costs 
and prices was much higher than would be expected if some of the 
manufacturers in the industry were meeting effective price
competition, 2»»
1 Tariff Board Report, Phthalic Anlydride, 22,9*1954> p*6,
2 Tariff Board Report, Diphenylamine and Phenothiazine, 29,5*1959> p.7.
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In the case of another group of chemicals where the applicant 
sought protection, not on the basis of comparisons with existing prices 
but on indicated possible future selling prices, the Board commented 
that the manufacturer’s ability to increase production despite the high 
prices "must be largely attributed to the protective incidence of 
import licensing on these chemicals .
That the movements in the prices of caustic soda and soda ash were 
influenced by demand rather than costs is confirmed by the Tariff Board*s 
comment, in 1954> that the local producer’s ’’profit margins and thus the 
final prices were excessive”.^
Table XI1-2, while it concerns a product which in itself was not 
particularly important, illustrates an aspect of wider relevance in the 
chemical industry.
1 Tariff Board Report, Thiocarbamyl Chemicals» 19*11.1959* p.7.
2 Tariff Board Report, Alkali, Chlorine and Chlorine Products, p.17
TA3LE XII-2. DOMESTIC SELLING PRICES : ASCORBIC ACID (Vitamin C) O
AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1952 to 1960.
£. per lb• (Australian Currency)
Australia U.S.A.
£. s • d. £• s• d»
1952 5.17. 6 4. 5. 3
1953 5.10. - 4* 5• 3
1954 3. 8. - 3. 5. -
1955 3. 8. - 3. 5. -
1956 3. -« 6 2. 8. 9
1957 3. -. 6 2. -. 7
1958 3. -. 6 2. 7
1959 2. 9. 6 2. -. 7
1960 1.19. 6 1. 9.10
Tariff Board Report, Vitamin C (Ascorbic Acid), 9.12.1960, '
the U.S . prices may be taken as a ’world’ price it suggests
the domestic production may have been competitive for some years in the 
period; in its report in 1960, however, the Board found the industry 
uneconomic.^ World prices of chemicals have fallen substantially in the 
last few years and to meet this, Australian chemical prices have also 
been considerably reduced^, although as the example of polyvinyl chloride
1 Tariff Board Report, Vitamin C (Ascorbic Acid), pp.8-9. The Board found 
that a duty of approximately 100$ would be required. On this basis the 
industry was probably“ making abnormal profits from 1956 on; the industry 
was probably kept in existence by the licensing of imports.
2 Commenting on the extensive reductions in basic chemical prices in I960, 
the Industries Division of the Department of Trade said the lower prices 
1 have countered potential competition from imports and have enabled the 
local industry to hold its position in the Australian market”. Survey 
of Manufacturing Industry. June 1961, p.24.
shows, not necessarily to an unprofitable level.
Vegetable Oils
In its examination of the vegetable oil industry in 1960, the Tariff
Board noted that import licensing had, since 1953, preserved the secure
*1position of the local linseed crushers in the market. Under import 
licensing, linseed oil was imported only in sufficient quantities to 
meet the shortfall between demand and local production,^ and this was 
effected by issuing licences only to members of the Linseed Crushers 
Association (L.C.A.).^ In its pricing of linseed oil the Linseed 
Crushers Association indicated that the costs of imported and local 
linseed oil were averaged out to arrive at a common selling price for 
all its members.4 In part, however, these licensing arrangements were 
designed to assist the local linseed growing industry by protecting the 
guaranteed price offered to growers by the crushers.^
1 "There has been little change in the structure of the linseed oil 
producing industry since 1953. Import licensing has continued to 
operate in such a way as to preserve the secure position of the 
crushers in the marketing of linseed oil in Australia." Tariff 
Board Report, Animal and Vegetable Fats and Oils, 16.12.1960, p.12.
2 Ibid., p.10.
3 "The Australian linseed crushing industry has had no competition from 
imports for a number of years, because it has been the only organisation 
which has been granted licences to import linseed oil", loc.cit.» p.12.
4 Ibid., p.11.
5 "... import licensing has assisted the L.C.A. to maintain its guarantee 
of a price of £70 per ton to growers.,.", Ibid., p.12.
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Protection received directly by the peanut crushing industry may 
not have been substantial, although some indirect protection was received 
from the restriction of imports of substitute oils such as palm oil.^
The Tariff Board noted that arrangements, similar to those for linseed 
oil, applied in the case of safflower oil, i.e. licences were granted to 
the Linseed Crushers Association,2 (who also produced safflower oil).
In addition, licences for soya bean oil, which is not produced in 
Australia, but which is a substitute for safflower oil in many of its 
uses, were restricted to the local producers of safflower oil? As with 
linseed oil, these arrangements were designed to assist the local seed 
producers,^" though at the same time they had the effect of protecting 
the crushers.
There is also evidence to suggest that olive oil production received
1 The present growing industry also seems to have received some benefit 
both from the direct restrictions on imports of peanut oils and on 
substitute oils. See Report of Deputy Chairman of the Tariff Board, 
Peanut Oil and Substitute Oils, $.3.1962, particularly p.3.
2 Op. cit., pp.18-19.
3 "Under the present licensing treatment, the importing and when required, 
refining and marketing of soya bean oil ... are carried out by members 
of the L.C.A. in conjunction with their marketing of linseed and 
safflower oils." Op. cit., p.16.
4 "A firm price for the 1939-60 (safflower seed) crop was not announced 
by the crushers until after prolonged duscussion with the Department of 
Trade on licensing treatment of soya bean oil. As part of an arrangement 
with that Department under which importation of soya bean oil was 
restricted to crushers, the L.C.A. undertook to purchase up to 3>000 
tons ... of safflower seed from the 1959-60 crop at £4$ per ton 
Ibid.. p.1$.
• • •
some assistance from the licensing of imports.^
Motor Vehicles
The situation in respect of the motor vehicle industry in general 
differs from that of other industries in that there has been a long 
established government policy of direct encouragement to the production 
of motor vehicles in Australia.  ^ More specific encouragement was given 
to the motor vehicle industry, however, under the import licensing system.'
It is fairly clear that the controls on imports had a considerable
1 The evidence indicates that during the period of import licensing, 
before olive oil was placed under the import replacement scheme, 
prices of olive oil in Australia were relatively high.1 Ibid., p.31.
It noted that prices fell from 45s. per gallon on 1.7.1958, to 35s. 
per gallon on 1.10.1958 and again to 30s. per gallon on 1.1.1960, 
ibid., p.30.
2 For a broad outline of past government policies in respect of the 
motor vehicle industry see The Australian Motor Vehicle Industry. 
Department of Trade, Melbourne, March 1959, pp.19-20; Tariff Board 
Report, Automotive Industry, 13.6.1957, pp.7-9. The industry has 
been assisted by quantitative controls on two other occasions before 
1939* These were the restrictions on motor bodies, imposed in 1917 
to save shipping space, and the Trade Diversion measures of 1936.
3 Because of the costs of motor vehicle imports, "... the Government
in recent years, had employed a policy of increasing the local content 
of motor vehicles.”, Minister for Customs and Excise (Mr F.M. Osborne), 
Australian Financial Review, 9.8.1956, p.3*
o 89
influence on the pattern of development of the local industry,^ just as 
had the existence of restrictions on imports from the dollar area in the 
earlier post-war period.
1 From July, 1952, Banks (see Chapter III) were formed for licensing 
imports of motor vehicles, parts and accessories. Bank A,9# covering 
components for approved manufacturing programmes, was divided into a 
non dollar and a dollar section, the dollar part being carried over 
from pre-1952 dollar licensing. Imports were licensed on a more or 
less quota basis within the specfic licence category. Bank A, 10 
covered c.k.d. (dompletely knocked down) vehicles; and Bank 16, fully 
assembled motor vehicles were put onto an interchangeable quota basis, 
(20 % of 1950-51 imports); c.k.d. packs were licenced on a specific 
quota basis (60 % of 1950-51 imports). Importers with quotas for 
fully assembled vehicles were permitted to use their quotas for 
c.k.d. packs. Since the c.i.f, value of an average c.k.d. pack at 
the time was about two thirds of the built up vehicle, importers were 
able to increase their total of motor vehicles available for sale by 
about 50 Bank A.5»« Replacement parts for motor vehicles, was 
licensed on a quota basis. Importers* existing quotas were 
amalgamated when the Banks were formed and operated on a specific 
quota basis, the level of licensing varying more or less in accord 
with that of the major specific quota category until 1957.
2 The Tariff Board in 1957 noted that the "development of manufacturing 
of motor vehicles of United Kingdom design in Australia has not been as 
spectacular as that of vehicles of North American origin. Restrictions 
of dollar imports and the tariff preference to motor vehicles of 
United Kingdom origin contributed largely to this position. In the 
last few years, however, possibly due to the general restriction of 
imports, there has been evidence of greater United Kingdom interest
in developing production in Australia". Tariff Board Report,
Automotive Industry, p.9# Of course, in so far as the trend from 
fully assembled vehicles to c.k.d. packs is concerned, the lower 
duties on motor vehicles in an unassembled condition were a major 
factor.
In 1952 the four companies manufacturing motor vehicles in Australia^ 
were subsidiaries of companies in the dollar area, and were producing 
American type vehicles, though two of the parent firms also had 
subsidiaries producing European type cars,1 2 3 Subsequent to 1952, European 
based companies established plants in Australia for the production of 
motor vehicles with varying but generally increasing degrees of incorpora­
tion of locally made components. While there is little doubt that the 
development of Australian manufacture of motor vehicles was hastened by 
the restrictions of imports^, it is probable that at least to the local 
assembly of imported components stage much of the development would 
eventually have taken place as a result of the tariff, and the savings
1 General Motors Holdens Ltd, Chrysler Australia Ltd, Ford Motor Company 
of Australia Ltd, and International Harvester Co, of Australia Pty Ltd, 
See Structure of Australian Manufacturing Industry, pp,210-211, It is 
not easy to define what constitutes manufacture, but these four firms 
were producing motor vehicles with a substantial quantity of Australian 
made components and were operating approved manufacturing projects for 
purposes of licensing of components from dollar sources,
2 General Motors and Ford,
3 This was also the conclusion of the Industries Division of the 
Department of Trade. The Australian Motor Vehicle Industry, p,19*
The Tariff Board in its 1957 report on the industry did not attempt to 
judge the effect of any one of the factors influencing growth of the 
industry. "Past, expansion has not been related to duties alone. Dollar 
restrictions, war time and post war shortages, general import restrict­
ions, the enterprise of local manufacturers and changing policies of 
overseas manufacturers, have all played a part ...", (loc. cit., p,6$). 
Previously, the Board had commented that "it was not unlikely that if 
import restrictions were lifted in the near future ••• the number of 
vehicles imported in an assembled condition would be large enough to 
affect Australia’s balance of payments position as well as limiting to 
some extent local output of vehicles . Ibid, p.59.
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-ion freight in importing in a c.k.d. condition.
The development of the industry during the period was characterised 
by many manufacturers establishing production facilities, often on a 
relatively small scale and with varying degrees of local content, but 
with strong pressure, at least until 1956 or perhaps early 1957 to 
increase local content. While licensing of motor vehicles and components 
was restrictive in total and as long as a new manufacturer was able to 
obtain sufficient licences to maintain a minimum economic output, which 
under the general policy of equality of treatment were difficult to 
refuse, the encouragement to new manufacturers remained. In 1955 and 
1956, and at times in the earlier restrictive periods, manufacturers of 
less popular models benefitted from the fact that the quotas of manu­
facturers of more popular models were insufficient to enable them to 
meet demand, while their own quotas were more than sufficient. The 
ability to offer immediate delivery gave assistance to these manu­
facturers in competition with the more popular makes, for which, at 
these times, there were long waiting lists.
Concern at the tendency for the licensing system to encourage 
establishment of further manufacturing capacity - particularly by small
1 It seems probable that the relaxation of the controls on imports together 
with the tariff on fully assembled vehicles stimulated the local assembly 
of the American Motors Ltd Rambler motor vehicle by Australian Motor 
Industries Ltd. Moreover, referring to the earlier period, the Tariff 
Board commented n... in certain cases the effect of import restrictions 
results in insufficient quota to provide sufficient volume to justify 
assembly operations in Australia ...n Tariff Board Report, Automotive 
Industry, p.60.
manufacturers - in an industry in which capacity in existence or being
-1installed already appeared excessive in total , together with a recognition 
of the imbalance of existing quota allocations, were the main reasons for 
the introduction in 1957 of a system whereby licences were issued according 
to sales performance. It was possible in this way to allow the pattern of 
subsequent development in the industry to reflect, more clearly, market
pinfluences.
There were certainly real economic costs involved in the proliferation 
of manufacture in the industry, although this is not uncommon in new, or 
rapidly growing, industrial development. A less apparent cost is that it 
denied to the supplying industries much of the economies of scale production 
which would have been derived from less diverse demand for components.^
1 The Tariff Board in its 1957 report had also asked ’Whether we are not 
approaching the limit of economic development in complete or substantially 
complete production of motor vehicles?" (Loc. cit.« p.38). By 1959, 
capacity of the industry was about 335,000 vehicles, with expansion pro­
jects then in course designed to raise it to 375,000 within a few years. 
(The Australian Motor Vehicle Industry, p.11 -)- Demand, (registrations), 
in the record year 1960 was only 310,000 while in 1961 it fell to 
238,000. (Commonwealth Statistician, Monthly Bulletin of Registration
of New Motor Vehicles.)
2 The replacement control of motor vehicle imports was kept under adminis­
trative control. While it substantially reduced the distorting effects 
of the previous quota allocations, it did not permit the manufacturers 
the freedom of the full Replacement type of control. It therefore con­
tinued to provide protection to component manufacturers and to encourage, 
though to a lesser extent than previously, manufacturers to increase 
their local content.
3 Of course, this also results from the variety of models which some manu­
facturers produce. Some incentive both for numerous models and for rapid 
changes in models may be provided by the by-law provisions of the tariff 
which permit concessional duty entry for goods not reasonably available 
from domestic sources - the more models or the more rapid the changes, the 
less the components are likely to be available from local sources.
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In the case of automotive parts and accessories, the influence of 
the controls on imports was probably as great if not greater than that on 
the manufacture of bodies, although the tariff increases in 1957 were 
probably important to some producers at the time and more generally when 
controls were removed in I960. Moreover, the benefits from the control 
on imports were not unalloyed particularly in the early years insofar as 
the controls limited imports of components and hence hindered expansion of out­
put.1 2
TABLE XI1-3. IMPORTS AND LOCAL OUTPUT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, PARTS AND
ACCESSORIES 1957-58 to 1960-61. (Landed duty paid basis).
Year Imports Local Output
£m £m
(i) (ii)
1957-58 72.4 185.4
1958-59 85.3 198.3
1959-60 109.3 235.7
1960-61 112.8 253.8
Source: (i) Table VI1-6.
(ii) Secondary Industries Bulletins.
1 Of this period it was noted "indirectly, in that it was not intended as 
a matter of government policy, the imposition of import restrictions 
proved to be a great influence on the development and growth of the parts 
Industry". The Australian Automotive Parts Industry. Department of 
Trade, Canberra, 1962, p.S.
2 The manufacturers of transmission equipment gave as one reason for needing 
additional tariff protection the fact that expected volume of output had 
not been achieved. "Reduction by restrictive quotas, of importation of 
original equipment, much of which when assembled in Australia would 
incorporate locally produced transmissions." Tariff Board Report, 
Automotive Industry, p.54.
There is little evidence regarding internal pricing policies, largely 
because of the lack of comparability of the extensive range of products.
In the case of motor vehicle lamps, the Board concluded that the 
applicants' "... profits, especially for the last two years, have been 
higher than the Board frequently finds in the case of firms seeking tariff 
assistance".
'Deletion allowances'^ have been a continuing source of complaint on 
the grounds that the overseas supplier frequently makes an allowance for 
non supply considerably less than the value of the item omitted; the Board 
suggested in 1957 that the position had improved and that the improvement 
in this respect may have been in part due to the restriction of imports.*^ 
The Tariff Board however referred in 1957 to excessive prices being 
charged both in respect of locally manufactured and imported motor vehicle 
parts.4 While this may have been facilitated by the controls on imports, 
it is also, no doubt, attributable to the lack of interchangeability 
between parts for different models and the ties between manufacture of
1 Tariff Board Report, Electric Filament Lamps, 10.9.1958, p.12.
2 Allowances made by overseas suppliers of motor vehicles in respect of 
the non supply of motor vehicle components normally part of the motor 
vehicle 'pack'.
3 Ibid., p.62.
4 "In the case of Australian manufactured parts it was shown that the parts 
passed through too many hands after leaving the local factory, and 
generally excessive profits were being taken at each point of handling.
In the case of imported parts ... an excessive margin is usually added 
by the Australian subsidiary or associate company of the overseas 
supplier." Tariff Board Report, Automotive Industry, p.45*
motor vehicles overseas and the local firms
The increase in imports in 1959-60 and 1960-61, shown in Table XII-2 
would appear to be largely of component parts and accessories rather than 
assembled vehicles, suggesting that some local production may have been re­
placed by imported parts and components following the removal of the contrdLs.1 23
Cotton Textiles
The numerous tariff hearings associated with the cotton textile 
industry leave no doubt that competition from imports was severely limited 
for much of the period by the restrictions on imports,^ and that the level 
of import competition was an important determinant of the level of pro­
duction in the industry. Other factors were important, however particularly 
in the later years of the period.^
1 "Local manufacturers presented evidence which showed that some local users 
of original equipment components, formerly supplied by the local manu­
facturers were now drawing their requirements from overseas sources",
Report of the Special Advisory Authority, Automotive Electrical Components, 
22.5.1962, p.2; Mr L.B. Archer, (Executive Director of the Federation of 
Automotive Manufacturers), complained that "... some manufacturers had 
reverted to importing complete vehicle assemblies which meant that a lot 
of parts were now being imported which were previously bought from local 
sources.", reported in Sydney Morning Herald, 6.11.1962, p.6.
2 See, for example, the following Tariff Board Reports: Furnishing and 
Upholstery Piece Goods. 7.12.1955* p.11; Cotton Yarns. 19*3.195Ö, p.11; 
Cotton Canvas and Duck. 19.9*1958, p.11j Towels. Towelling and Textiles 
made from Towelling, 5.1.1959, p.10*
3 The ability of cotton yarn producers to sell at uniform high prices to non­
spinning weavers and cost similarly in their own production (partly to 
bolster their case for higher tariffs on woven products) was ascribed by 
the Tariff Board to excess protection on cotton yarns rather than to pro­
tection from import controls. Tariff Board Report, Cotton Piece Goods 
Drill. Denims etc.) 29.6.1956, p.16. The Tariff Board suggested that 
excess capacity rather than increased imports following relaxations in 
licensing of textiles was the problem in 1958. Tariff Board Report,
Cotton Piece Goods (Denims, Drills, etc.), 19.9.1958, p.7.
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The licensing of textiles on an interchangeable quota basis meant 
that initially, at least, imports were severely restricted. Although the 
interchangeable quota system would have enabled some transfer of licences 
to textile imports, the extent to which this would have reduced the gap 
betv/een demand and supply in the absence of price changes was limited by 
the size of the textile element of this quota. 1 There is some evidence of 
movements in quota usage for some items: a producer of cotton textile sheet­
ing claimed imports of competitive sheeting had been maintained because of 
transfer of quota usage to these i t e m s i n  the case of towelling^ and 
cotton canvas and duck4 the movement of quotas was in the opposite 
direction-to imports of items not produced locally.
For most items demand was strong for much of the period and despite 
considerable series of special licences and quotas, serious shortages were 
apparent at times of rapid increases in demand for finished clothing^ giving
1 Cotton textiles alone, on the basis of 1950-51 imports, represented some 
16-17 % of total interchangeable quotas in the first year of licensing.
2 Cotton Piece Goods (Drills. Denims etc.), op.cit., 29.6*1956, p.13.
3 Towels. Towelling ... etc., op. cit,, 5.1.1959, p.7.
4 Cotton Canvas and Duck, op. cit., 19.9.1953, p.11; Tariff Board Report 
Waterproofed Cotton Piece Goods and Waterproofed Canvas and Duck, 
24.10.1958, p.8.
5 See Survey of Manufacturing Activity, October 1956, p.68; History of 
Australian Import Licensing Measures, p.38.
rise to a strong demand situation for cotton piece goods.
Although the textile industry is normally considered a fairly com­
petitive industry there is some evidence that, at least for certain pro­
ducts, the level of internal competition was limited, and that prices, at 
least in part, reflected demand conditions. The Tariff Board in 1954 
commented on the high level of profit margins being taken on locally 
produced cotton canvas and duck.^
In a report on cotton yarns the Board, noting that profit margins on 
the Australian produced yarns were ”somewhat higher” than the profits taken 
by the United Kingdom manufacturers^, referred to uniform selling prices-  ^
and lack of price competition in the market^; earlier it had indicated that 
locally produced yarn prices contained a profit margin above what it 
normally considered Reasonable’, and that profits in the cotton weaving 
industry had been ’very satisfactory’ in recent years.^
1 ’’The Australian manufacturers are at present taking a somewhat higher level 
of profit than their United Kingdom competitors. There was no evidence to 
show that the level of profit taken by the United Kingdom manufacturers 
was considered unsatisfactory ,., there are grounds for acceptance of a 
somewhat lower rate in an industry which seeks to operate under the level 
of tariff indicated as necessary ...” Tariff Board Report, Cotton Canvas 
and Duck. 2.4.1954* p.12.
2 Tariff Board Report, Cotton Yarns, 19.3.1958, p.11. But see the reference 
above to possible excessive tariff protection on yarns.
3 Ibid, p.10.
4 ’’The prices charged by the leading Australian manufacturers indicate the 
existence of some pricing arrangements between them and that there is no 
local competition on a price basis.” Ibid, p.11.
5 Tariff Board Report, Cotton Piece Goods (Denims, Drills etc.) 19.9.1958, 
p.11.
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Until I960 there was only one producer of cotton sheetings in 
Australia and witnesses before the Tariff Board complained that the company 
restricted competition by selling certain lines only to appointed dis- 
tributors ; another witness at the same enquiry suggested a common pricing 
policy among cotton weavers, and discriminatory pricing to garment 
manufacturers.^ There were also some claims that distributor margins also 
reflected the high demand situation.3
Despite a considerable increase in tariff rates on cotton textiles 
shown in Table XIII-2, imports of cotton textiles rose substantially in 
1960-61.
Synthetic Textiles
The price policy of the man-made fibre weaving industry’s major trade 
association implied that prices set by its members were to a considerable 
extent demand based:
"The selling price to manufacturers is usually fixed by negotiation 
and varies considerably according to overseas competition ruling at 
the time ... the selling prices to wholesalers are generally fixed
1 Tariff Board Report, Cotton Piece Goods (Drills. Denims etc.), 29.6.1956,
p.10.
2 Evidence given by Mr K. Allen (Melbourne Chamber of Commerce), Ibid., p.34.
3 "There is ample scope for reduction in retail margins in those States 
where price controls has not already brought this about. Part of any 
increased duty could also be absorbed by wholesale margins." Evidence 
given by Mr Menz, (Australian Cotton Textile Industries Ltd,), Tariff 
Board Report, Cotton. Place Goods (Drill, Denims, etc.), 29.1.1956, p.29. 
Of course, it is not uncommon for applicants for tariff protection to 
suggest that the burden of any increased protection should be borne by 
the distributors.
by the state of the local market, the state of overseas competition 
and the ability to correctly forecast fashion trends.'^
Demand for domestically produced synthetic textiles fluctuated con­
siderably over the period largely in line with the level of import com­
petition which was significantly reduced on various occasions by the 
controls on imports. Rapid increases in domestic capacity in the face 
of only slowly increasing demand^ reduced substantially the intensity 
of the restrictions in the later years, however, considerably less effect 
being observed from restrictions on import competition provided by the 
controls.
To some extent this was replaced by increased tariff protection and 
for a short period by a voluntary restraint by Japanese exporters,3 sub­
sequently replaced by further tariff increases in 1960.4
For most of the period there was one producer of^synthetic fibre 
yarns and some protection was afforded by means of a bounty.5 Import
1 Evidence given by Mr Flanders, President of the Rayon and Cotton Weavers 
Association of Australia, Tariff Board Report, Artificial Silk Piece 
Goods, 24.4.1958, p.9.
2 In 1958-59, total demand for synthetic piece goods actually declined due 
to a swing in demand to natural fibres. C.f. Survey of Manufacturing 
Activity, April, 1958, p.102.
3 Survey of Manufacturing Activity, (Consumer Goods Industries), 1960, 
p.38.
4 Not shown in the index in Table XIII-3.
5 Courtaulds (Australia) Ltd, under the Rayon Yarn Bounty Act, 1954-1959*
controls provided additional protection.1 2345 Commenting on claims that high 
prices of orlon yarns had been obtained under import restrictions the 
Deputy Chairman of the Tariff Board offered his impression that despite 
appreciable reductions in prices the assistance being sought was " ... 
largely for the purpose of supporting a price structure".^
Similarly the Tariff Board commented on the high profit margins 
charged by processors of synthetic yarns,3 and by a producer of nylon 
filament yarn, 4- in the latter case even after price reductions following 
the removal of import controls.^
Synthetic textile yarns were retained under licensing control on a 
specific licence after February i9 6 0.
Timber
The industry, in its four appearances before the Tariff Board over 
the period, claimed on each occasion that it was being protected by the 
import licensing system. In 1955 it asked that "the present import
400
1 An arrangement, under which the company's tyre fabric output was taken up 
by the tyre manufacturers, was discontinued by the tyre companies in 
February, I960. See Tariff Board Report, Tyre Cord and Cord Tyre 
Fabrics. 20,12.1961, p.S.
2 Report of Deputy Chairman of Tariff Board, Acrylic Yarns. 22.3.1961, p.4* 
C.f. also Tariff Board Report, General Textile Reference. Interim Report 
on Discontinuous Man-Made Fibre Yams (Not Containing Wool), 18.5*1962, 
pp.13-14*
3 Tariff Board Report, Artificial Silk Yarns (Other Than Staple Fibre Yarns) 
4.5.1959, p.15.
4 Production of nylon yarn was protected by patents until 1961. British 
Nylon Spinners (Australia) Pty Ltd,’s nylon patents expired in Jan. 1961.
5 Tariff Board Report, Continuous Man-Hade Fibre Yarns, 5.2.1962, p.12.
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licensing system be permanently applied as a means of protection . .."^
The Tariff Board tended to discount the effect of the licensing controls.
In its 1955 report the Board indicated that it thought import controls had
0had only a small effect on the industry. In its 1958 report there was 
virtually no reference to the existence of import licensing.^ At the 1960 
enquiry the industry expressed its fear of the consequences of the removal 
of restrictions, particularly on Oregon (Douglas Fir) imports from the 
dollar area. Again, however, the Board expressed no view directly except 
to suggest that increased competition could be expected in New South Wales 
where prices were high due largely to high freight rates and royalties 
charged by the State Government
In 1962, however, the Government accepted the recommendation of the 
Special Advisory Authority that import licensing should be reimposed on 
most imports of sawn timber.^ It has to be recognised however that the 
terms of reference of the Special Advisory Authority differ from those 
of the Tariff Board.^ Consequently the need to reimpose import licensing
1 Tariff Board Report, Timber, 17.2.1955, p.45.
2 "Import restrictions possibly provided some slight stimulus to local 
production but the effect was not great." Ibid., p.16.
3 Tariff Board Report, Timber, 22.4*1958.
4 Tariff Board Report, Timber, 20.12.1960, p.23.
5 Report of Special Advisory Authority, Timber, 27.6.1962, pp.6-8.
6 In effect he has merely to demonstrate that in the circumstances operating 
at the time increased imports are adversely affecting the local industry. 
In his report the Special Advisory Authority suggested that the main pro­
blem of the industry was the decline in building activity. Ibid., p.3.
in tihe circumstances operating in 1962 need not imply that the industry 
was being protected by import licensing in the period from 1952 to 1960.^ 
The generally tight licensing of dollar area timber suggests that 
demand for imported timber was not being met to the full, and there were 
not infrequently reports of shortagesMoreover there were some 
pressures at various times for increased licences for timber from non 
dollar sources, pressures which were generally resisted. We also noted 
above a ministerial statement to the effect that only timber necessary 
to supplement local production was being imported,^ and the Minister for 
Trade referred to the changed competitive situation which removal of the 
restrictions on dollar area timber would entail.^-
Price data is of only limited value in this context because of the 
wide variations between states and between varieties and because of 
variations in important elements making up these prices - such as royalty 
and freight charges. In addition, changing competitive conditions tend
1 That at least in one State the lifting of the controls had an adverse 
effect is suggested by the following comment by the Queensland Conservator 
of Forests. "During the past year the sawmilling and plymilling indus­
tries in Queensland were very seriously affected by the policy of the 
Federal Government in regard to credit restriction and the lifting of 
import controls ..." Queensland Department of Forestry, Annual Report,
1960-61. p.5»
2 "The supply position of imported timber is causing some concern to 
merchants in South Australia where it is reported that Oregon is very 
scarce," Survey of Manufacturing; Activity. April 1959, p.9*
3 Chapter X.
4 Minister for Trade (Mr McEwen), reported in Sydney Morning Herald. 
30.11.1959, p.1.
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to he reflected in movements around list prices rather than, or at least 
as much as, movements in list prices.
Evidence given in opposition to the increased duties in the I960 
hearing before the Tariff Board claimed that "prices have been increased 
not only to cover increased costs but to give added margin of 
profitability"
The Board commented that "... the profit position of the industry 
reflected the generally buoyant conditions under which it is operating".3 
In the following year prices in New South Wales were reduced "in face of 
competition from imported timbers (mainly "oregon") and between loca.1 
millers seeking to retain a share of the reduced demand".^
The price picture is also clouded by the existence of actual or tacit 
price control on timber over much of the period. Price control was 
reimposed on timber in N.S.W. in 1955. Price control was lifted officially 
in South Australia in 1956, but surveillance of timber prices was main­
tained by the Prices Commission in that State. In Queensland, Victoria 
and New South Wales the State government forestry authorities operated 
some control on prices. In Queensland, the Forestry Department had
1 "In other States (other than Queensland and Western Australia) sawmillers 
were able to obtain listed prices for a greater proportion of their 
output than previously or to approach more closely to list prices in 
their sales." Survey of Manufacturing Activity. April, 1958, p.6.
2 Loc. cit., p.8.
3 Ibid.
4 Survey of Manufacturing Industry. June 1961, p.8.
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increa ised  lo g  r o y a l t ie s  where p r ic e  in c re a se s  in  sawn tim ber were con­
s id e re d  to  be ex cessiv e .^
Ln December 1959> in  an e f f o r t  to  reduce com petitive  d isco u n ts  below 
l i s t  p>rices, th e  ^ lb o u r n e  merchants and the  m i l le r s 'a s s o c ia t io n s  o f 
V ic to r ia ,  Tasmania and South A u s tra lia  agreed to  r e s t r i c t  w holesale s a le s  
o f tim iber in  th e  Melbourne market to  m erchants who were members o f  the  
agreem ent a t  f ix e d  p r i c e s The f a c t  th a t  the  agreem ent was extended to  
im ported  tim ber from the  date  o f removal o f im port l ic e n s in g  could su ggest 
th a t  p r i o r  to  t h a t  d a te  th e re  had been l i t t l e  concern w ith  com petitive  
s e l l i n g  o f im ported tim b er. A p r ic e  m aintenance arrangem ent was a lso  
in tro d u ce d  in  th e  Newcastle a rea  as from the d a te  o f removal o f im port 
l ic e n s in g  (1 .4*1960).
A lthough th e  T a r i f f  Board made l i t t l e  d i r e c t  comment on the  e f f e c t  o f  
the  im port c o n tro ls ,  i t s  views were given in d i r e c t ly  when i t  was commenting 
on a re q u e s t fo r  t a r i f f  quota on tim ber.- '’ ” . . .  a t a r i f f  quota system . . .  
would rev iv e  . . .  most o f  th e  in c id e n ta l  o b je c tio n ab le  fe a tu re s  which were
1 " . . .  i t  i s  a reaso n ab le  in fe re n c e  from the D ep artm en ts  subm ission th a t  
A sso c ia tio n  members ( in  November 1956) were charg ing  p r ic e s  . . .  c o n s id e r­
ab ly  in  excess o f  the  (p r ic e )  l i s t s  and the  lo g  p r ic e  in c re ase  c o rre c te d  
t h i s  p o s i t io n ” . R eport o f the  Timber In q u iry  Committee 1959» ta b le d  in  
Queensland P a rliam en t (b u t n o t p r in te d ) ,  31*8.1959/ Book I ,  p p .1 -3 . The 
f a c t  th a t  th e  in c re a se  in  lo g  p r ic e s  had th i s  e f f e c t  suggests e i th e r  
l im i t s  to  th e  m arket s tre n g th  o f the  s e l l e r s  o f  tim b er, or a re c o g n itio n  
th a t  an in c re a s e  in  p r ic e  to  o f f s e t  th e  in c re ase d  c o s t o f lo g s  would have 
le d  to  f u r th e r  lo g  p r ic e  in c re a s e s .
2 T a r i f f  Board R eport, Timber, 20 .12 .1960 , p .2 2 .
3 There i s  l i t t l e  d if fe re n c e  between a t a r i f f  quota w ith  im ports o u ts id e  the  
quota being  s u b je c t  to  a p ro h ib i t iv e  du ty  and a q u a n ti ta t iv e  l im i ta t io n  as 
provided by im port l ic e n s in g .
associated with the import licensing of timber ... the fixing of the amount 
to be imported at the lower rate of duty, the privileged position of the 
firms permitted to participate in imports (at the lower rate), the
-iallocation of imports, the claims of new importers and "tied sales".
Similarly its comments on prices would seem to imply its views of the 
experience of the licensing period; "The adoption of the tariff quota 
principle would tend to eliminate any competition from imports over the 
great bulk of the trade and the only check on prices would be such as 
arises from the statistics of demand and competition from substitute 
building materials. At the same time, a heavy increase would be expected 
in the price of the restricted supplies of Douglas Fir admissable at the
( j O  (V\M A a ^J»lower rate of duty in view of the premium which this timber now saasks in
othe Australian market".
Some protection to sawmilling may be provided by the tie up in
3ownership between merchants and millers.
The Timber Inquiry Committee in Queensland in 1959 seemed to suggest 
a strong marketing position for plywood; it expressed "... a strong 
suspicion that prices of this commodity, at least that portion produced in 
Southern Queensland, are at a higher level than necessary".^"
1 Tariff Board Report, Timber, 20,12,1960, p.26.
2 ibid., p.25,
3 According to one source between 30-35 % of all N.S.W. sawmills are owned 
or controlled by Sydney timber merchants. See Australian Financial 
Review. 18.8.1960, p.15,
1 Loc^ c^it^  p.l*
Protection from import competition for the local industry may also 
have resulted from the control by the Australian Plywood Board (A.P.B.) 
of the distribution of most of the plywood sold in Australia. In 
evidence before the Tariff Board, importers and users of plywood claimed - 
and their claims were not disputed - that the marketing of plywood pro- 
duced in Australia as well as that imported from New Guinea, was almost 
entirely under the control of the A.P.B., which fixed prices, discount 
rates, conditions of sale and restricted the rights of its distributors 
to handle imported plywoods other than from New Guinea. Among the con­
ditions of sale which it was claimed operated was the practice of forcing
buyers to take certain proportions of differing qualities whether required 
oor not.
It seems likely that the enforcement of these arrangements was 
facilitated by the restrictions on plywood imports from alternative 
sources.
Paper
In the case of paper products, the Tariff Board, noting that factors
1 Goods originating in New Guinea were exempt from licensing control all 
through the period under review. Imports of New Guinea plywood rose from 
nil in 1951-52 and 1952-53 to 25.8 million square feet in 1959-60 (in the 
same year imports from all other sources were 3.7 m. sq. ft.). Imports 
from New Guinea fell to 20.9 m. sq, ft. in 1960-61 while imports from 
other sources rose to 10.6 m. sq. ft. Import Clearance Bulletins.
2 Op.cit., p.32. The Board also noted that, with few exceptions, and 
despite the lower cost of New Guinea plywood landed in Australia, plywood 
from the Territory was marketed at the same price as domestically pro­
duced plywood. Ibid.
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other than costs entered into selling prices, commented on the higher
rates of profits taken by the major Australian producers compared with
•1the overseas suppliers.
The impact of overseas competition upon the local producers was 
limited to some extent by the existence of agreements between one major 
producer, Australian Paper Manufacturers, and merchants and converters. 
Under these agreements, merchants agreed not to sell competitive imported 
products on a lower markup on cost, determined under an agreed formula, 
than the mark-up available on the local product, while converters under­
took to purchase all their requirements from local sources.^
The extent to which the restriction on imports rather than the 
agreement between the manufacturer and the merchants and converters 
limited imports is difficult, if not impossible to determine. The 
existence of the agreements, or at least their effective operation, must 
be partly if not wholly ascribed to the existence of the licensing of 
imports and the pressure which this enabled the local manufacturers to 
exert on merchants or converters who could not be certain of obtaining
1 "Comparisons of the net profit earned (before provision for taxation) 
on the basis of per ton sales and as a percentage on selling price 
disclosed the Swedish returns to be much below the comparable returns 
of A.P.M." (Australian Paper Manufacturers). Tariff Board Report,
Paper and Paper Products. 9.9.1957, p.16; "A comparison of margins ... 
on lines in which local pulp predominated with margins obtained by U.K. 
manufacturers on sales of competitive grades showed the profit margins 
earned on the local papers (by Associated Press and Paper Mills Ltd) to 
be substantially in excess of those available to the U.K. manufacturers. 
Ibid, p.18.
2 Ibid* p.17. See also Special Advisory Authority’s Report, Paper, Paper 
Boards and Paper Felt, 21.5.1962, p.3»
their necessary supplies from alternative sources.
This is possibl® more clearly the case in respect of agreements est­
ablished by the other major producer which were introduced as a result of
-lthe removal of the licensing controls on paper. These agreements were
directed against the other local competitive producers as well as imports,
but there seems little doubt that the incentive to submit to the paper
company’s terms was the need to ensure supplies in the event of a
reimposition of import restrictions.
It is not clear to what extent these agreements actually reduced
imports, since initially about a quarter of merchants refused to join
the agreements and were forced to import papers they would otherwise 
2purchase locally.
Rubber Goods
In 1955 the rubber tyre industry was apprehensive about possible 
inroads being made by imports into the original equipment market which 
normally constitutes about a third of the total market.^ In the event the
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1 "Following the removal of all import restrictions on paper ••• the Company 
found it necessary to take two steps: firstly to change its system of 
distribution from all paper merchants to those merchant houses who were 
prepared to sell on papers in priority to competitive paper from other 
suppliers, and secondly ... to reduce the price of our papers."
Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd, Chairman1 23s Address, 1960.
2 The Deputy Chairman of the Tariff Board thought imports may well have been 
less without the agreement. See his report, Paper and Paper Board, 
23*5«1961, p.6. Substantial temporary duties later imposed on these 
papers probably forced many of these merchants to accept the agreement.
3 Tariff Board Report, Rubber Tyres and Tubes. 7.12.1955* p.5
k (j 9
fears were not realised either because of the reimposition of the controls 
or because they were unnecessary.
The industry itself appeared to be of the view that it had received 
some protection in the second intensification period as well but, despite 
virtually no change in protection tariff rates for the industry during the 
period, the local industry seemed well entrenched in the original equipment 
market in 1962.^
Several of the local producers of tyres and tubes have overseas 
affiliations and this may have reduced to some extent competition from the 
United Kingdom and from the United States. The entry of a major overseas
O  'nX>producer into the local industry^ during the period ■ did-ast-haw any 
noticeable effect on the pricing policies of the industry.
The Tariff Board noted in 1955 that apart from volume discounts 
(i.e. sales as original equipment), prices and conditions of sale were 
uniform for all manufacturers: M... any competition likely to have any 
influence on local selling prices while agreement exists between local manu­
facturers in regard to selling prices, can only come from imports” These
1 "In spite of the existing protective tariff rates ... products such as 
tyres can be landed in this country from Japan, Italy, England and Sweden 
at prices which are attractive to some sections of the trade.” Dunlop 
Rubber Australia Ltd, 40th Annual Report by the Chairman (Sir Daniel 
McVey) to Shareholders« 7.10.1960, p.4.
2 "... local manufacturers appeared to have no fears of losing their hold 
on this (the original equipment) part of the market” Tariff Board Report, 
Pneumatic Rubber Tyres and Tubes« 30.3.1962, p.11.
3 B.F. Goodrich Australia Pty Ltd
4 Rubber Tyres and Tubes» p*13*
uniform price arrangements seem to have broken down to some extent in the
later years of the period; although uniform list prices were maintained,
discounts in excess of those nominally permitted were common at both
wholesale and retail levels. In April, 19&0 new marketing arrangements
were introduced by the manufacturers to stabilise marketing arrangements
1and eliminate "uneconomic discounting practices in the industry".
In its 1961 examination of the industry the Tariff Board noted the
common pricing policy of the manufacturers and commented that "... some of
the increased imports in recent years have been partly a result of
Australian distributors adhering to price policies which encourage the
purchase of imported tyres and tubes by organisations using fleets of 
omotor vehicles".
In recommending increased duties on rubber footwear in 1955, the 
Tariff Board noted that "... the present range (of local production) 
includes several lines which in the absence of import restrictions, would
410
1 Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd, loc, cit.» p,2. Although no published
evidence has been located in confirmation, it is thought that in these 
arrangements the manufacturers attempted to limit import
competition by refusing to supply distributors and tyre retreading 
firms with their products if they sold or retreaded imported Japanese 
tyres; some support for this contention comes from the establishment 
of a number of new retread firms dealing in and retreading largely 
imported tyres,
2 Tariff Board Report, Pneumatic Rubber Tyres and Tubes. 30,3,1962, p,11»
In the event the Board did not consider the industry unduly threatened 
by the competition from imports and in fact recommended a reduction in 
the ad valorum alternative duty; one member of the Board, in a 
dissenting opinion, said that because one importer had been able to 
supply a popular size of tyre for 25s, retail below the price of the 
comparable local tyre, other importers could do the same and make inroads 
into the local market. Ibid, p,12.
not be able to compete with importations except with the assistance of 
duties of unreasonably high level"J In April 1959, footwear was trans­
ferred from the interchangeable quota category to the specific quota 
category. This action was designed to supplement the action of the 
Japanese Government in December 1958 in voluntarily limiting imports of 
casual footwear (mainly rubber thong sandals).^
Although the Tariff Board in its earlier report on footwear referred 
to the existence of a selling agreement between manufacturers of rubber 
footwear-^, there was no reference to such an agreement in its later report.
The Tariff Board noted in a report on rubber belting that prior to 
February, 1960 "importation of the goods under reference was subject to 
severe licensing restriction and the Australian industry supplied over 
95 per cent, of the value of market requirements. In the two years since 
then the local industry has continued to supply over BO per cent, of the 
value of market requirements, though less profitably in 1961."^
The Board noted that "Australian manufacturers1 234 selling prices ... 
were in general common and based on discounts from an agreed list."^
1 Tariff Board Report, Footwear. 11.3*1955, P*13*
2 Tariff Board Report, Footwear. 9*^*1959, pp.6-7.
3 Loc. cit., p.13* Evidence was given to the effect that the agreement was 
enforced by refusing to supply in absence of an undertaking not to sell 
below the prices paid by the manufacturer, Ibid. The enforcement of such 
an arrangement would clearly have been facilitated by the existence of 
import licensing.
4 Tariff Board Report, Conveyor and Transmission Belts and Belting. 28,6.1962
p*10.
This appeared to react on the industry after licensing controls had been 
removed, since some users indicated that they had imported more than may 
otherwise have been the case due to the practice of level tendering.^ 
Artificial Flowers
The share of the substantially increasing market for imports of these
items supplied by Hong Kong rose from slightly under 5 per cent, (out of
£69,000 f.o.b.) in 1956-57 to over 80 per cent, (out of £663,000 f.o.b.)
in 1960-61. This suggests not only a substantial decline in prices of the
Hong Kong products in relation to other supplying countries, but also a
decline in import prices compared with domestic production in Australia
over the last few years of the period. This is confirmed by evidence given
to the Tariff Board in 1960. At that time the Board noted that the price
dis parities were of such a magnitude that existing duties were having no
oprotective effect and recommended their removal.
The evidence presented for these industries has dealt with a number of 
features of the period during which import licensing was in operation. It 
has clearly emphasised the evidence in regard to pricing policies - in part,
1 ’’Evidence from electricity authorities included complaints of level 
tendering for the supply of conveyor belting by Australian manufacturers. 
Generally, these authorities stated that they preferred to purchase from 
local sources, but that this practice involved unnecessary costs for 
them in that they were being asked a price which would be profitable to 
the least efficient producer. They indicated that for these reasons, they 
had directed more of their purchasing abroad, since import licensing was 
removed, than would otherwise have been the case,". Ibid, p.11.
2 Tariff Board Report, Artificial Flowers. Fruits. Plants. Leaves and 
Grains, 8.12.1960, pp.7-8.
though not entirely, this is by design. It indicates fairly clearly that 
over a considerable range of products prices are determined by the con­
ditions in the market rather than by the costs of production. It may be 
useful to indicate with a few examples that this applies over a wider range 
of products than we have been able to discuss in any detail here.
The Board observed in a report on internal combustion engines that 
M... it would be surprising if prices which applied during a period of 
import restrictions would be sustained in circumstances of open 
competition".
Observing that the local producers of domestic floor polishers* had
received some protection from import licensing, the Board commented that:
"The retail prices fixed by the manufacturers have no direct 
relationship with costs of production ... but appear to be based 
on the highest figure that consumers generally are prepared to 
pay for these appliances."2
The lack of competition other than from some exporters to the market
was noted by the Board in respect of electric cable:
"... competition is limited to imports supplied by overseas 
manufacturers which are not members of the Cable Makers 
Association or any section thereof."3
The Board later referred more generally to the lack of competition 
in all copper products. Noting "that import licensing restrictions have
1 Tariff Board Report, Internal Combustion Engines. 20.12.1956, p.11.
2 Tariff Board Report, Floor Polishing Machines. 23.10.1957, p,7.
3 Tariff Board Report, Covered Cable and Covered Wire Classifiable Under 
Tariff Item 181(A)(1)( a ) * 11 .3.1955. 0.11.
been rigorously enforced on (copper products) generally ...M  ^ it referred
to the fact that in respect of brass and copper shapes, other copper alloys
and virtually all cable and wire products,
”... fixed uniform Australian prices have been agreed upon and are 
maintained by local manufacturers. ... It would appear that a similar 
situation exists in relation to United Kingdom manufacturers tendering 
on the Australian market. The development of this situation could 
have been assisted by both import restrictions and also by the close 
financial integration which exists between many of the operating 
companies in the industry."2
Having noted in 1954 that slide fastener prices were very high^, the 
Board concluded again in 1953 that prices were determined not on costs but 
on the state of competition in the market.^
Again, in 1954 the Board referred to inclusion of an excessive profit 
margin in the prices of fabric dress floves, output of which was receiving 
protection from import licensing.^
Many more examples could be quoted but those referred to should be 
sufficient to indicate that over a wide range of products of that sector 
of secondary industry competing directly with imports, costs are not a
1 Tariff Board Report, Products of Copper and Other Metals. 20.11.1959, p.9.
2 Ibid.
3 Tariff Board Report, Slide Fasteners, 11.6.1954* pp.10-11.
4 Ibid., 26.6.1953, p.8.
5 Tariff Board Report, Fabric Gloves, 3.2.1954, P*16.
6 See, for example, the following Tariff Board Reports: Taximeters. 3.2.1956 
p.5; Styli for Sound Playback Equipment. 30.6.1961, p.8; Single and 
Multityned Cultivators. 9*10.1956, p.6; Umbrellas. Sunshades and Parasols. 
23.2.1961, p.5.
prime determinant of prices. The evidence certainly does not indicate that 
the higher profits taken at various times during the period were a result 
of the controls on imports, though this is clearly the implication in many 
cases. It does suggest that prices in this sector of secondary industry 
are extensively demand based.
Further conclusions on the implications of the evidence we have 
presented here we shall leave for a subsequent chapter.
Appendix X II .A
Group A, In d u s try  S u b c lasses  (32 su b c lasses)
S ubclass A c t iv i ty
I I  -  2
-  3
I I I  -  1 /3
-  2 
-  $
IV -  3
6
-9 /1 1 /1 3
-19
-21 /2 2  
-30
V -  1 /2
VI -  2
-  4
-  6
-  7
-  9
-11
-12
VII -  6
V III-4 /8  
V II I -  7
-  9
X -  1
-  2
-  9
-10 
X II I -  1 
XV -  3
-  4
-  8 
-  9
Earthenw are, China P o rce la in  and T e rra c o tta  
G lass (o th e r  than  b o t t le s )
I n d u s t r i a l  and Heavy Chemicals and A cids; E xplosives 
( in c lu d in g  Firew orks)
P harm aceu tica l and T o i le t  P rep a ra tio n s  
O ils , V egetable
P la n t ,  Equipment and Machinery (in c lu d in g  machine to o ls )  
E l e c t r i c a l  M achines, Cables and Apparatus 
Motor V eh ic le s : C onstruction  and Assembly; Motor B odies; 
Motor A ccesso ries  
C u tle ry  and Sm all Hand Tools
Non F errous M etals -  R o llin g  and E x tru sio n ; Founding, 
C as tin g  e tc .
Sewing Machines
Jew e lle ry ; Watches and Clocks ( in c lu d in g  re p a ir s )
Cotton S p inn ing  and Weaving 
H osiery  and Other K n itted  Goods 
Rayon, Nylon and Other 'Synthetic  F ib res  
F lax  M ills
Canvas Goods, T en ts , T arpau lins 
T e x tile  Dyeing, P r in t in g  F in ish in g  
O ther
Bags, Trunks and Other Goods o f L ea ther and L ea ther 
S u b s t i tu te s
M illineay, Hats and Caps 
H andkerch iefs, T ie s , Scarves 
Gloves 
Saw m ills
Plywood M ills  ( in c lu d in g  Veneers)
Paper Making
P e n c ils ,  P enho lders , Chalks, Crayons.
Rubber Goods (in c lu d in g  Tyres made)
P la s t i c  Moulding and Products 
Brooms and Brushes 
Toys, Games and S p o rts  R eq u is ite s  
A r t i f i c i a l  Flowers
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Chapter XIII
Import Restrictions and the Tariff
The operations of the Tariff Board, as the instrumentality
responsible for advising the Australian government on questions con-
-|ceming protection to domestic industry, and the role of the tariff 
as the principal means by which such protection was accorded to those 
industries, were both affected importantly by the direct quantitative 
control of imports. In this chapter we shall consider the inter­
relationship of import licensing and th^tariff from these two aspects.
It will be obvious from the previous discussion that the Tariff 
Board was unique in its close relationship with the import competing 
sector of Australian industry* Consequently its views on the effects 
of the protection provided by the controls on imports themselves merit 
attention. More importantly the Tariff Board is a mechanism which 
influences the allocation of resources* The direct control of imports
impinged directly on the Board’s operations. At the same time the 
2Board’s policies will themselves have accentuated or mitigated the
1.
For a brief, but comprehensive discussion of the functions and 
operation of the Tariff Board, see Reitsma, op*cit*. Chapter III.
For a more detailed discussion see G.J* Hall, The Australian Tariff 
Board 1922-1956. unpublished M.Comm.thesis, Univ.of Melbourne, 1958*
2.
This is of course a simplification since the Tariff Board merely 
recommends levels of protection in the context of a protective policy 
set by the Government. Such formulation of overall policy can only 
be couched in terms of general principles, the interpretation of which 
can vary considerably in its application. The long cherished independ­
ence and freedom from political interference of the Tariff Board also 
varies both with the membership of the Board and the government in 
power.
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consequences of the direct controls* Perhaps most importantly the
Board*s attitude to development which took place under the protection
of import licensing will have had a significant influence on the
expectations of potential investors.
The tariff itself, and more particularly, changes in the levels
of tariff duties, were important determinants of the level of imports
during the period* It will be necessary therefore to consider the
extent of the changes in the effective level of tariff protection
accorded to Australian industry during the period under review.
This situation which existed from 1952-1960 was not new to the
period under review* As early as 1940 the Board noted that the
existence of import licensing and the difficulty of obtaining imports
11 ••• is such that except in unusual cases, Australian manufacturers
1do not require the Customs Tariff to protect their operations*n
Normal conditions did not return in the immediate post war period, 
and in its 1946-47 Annual Report, the Board again noted that M • • • 
since the end of the war, Australian manufacturing industry generally 
has been operating under almost completely sheltered conditions in
pa seller^' market.M Again in 194& the Board made reference to the 
protective effect of the current restrictions on imports from Canada
T.
Tariff Board, Annual Report, 1939-40, p*23* Similar comments 
weremade in its subsequent annual report (for 1941-42).
2.
Loc* cit*. p*27
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and the United States, together with the shortage of goods normally
1
obtained from those and other countries.
Although it had referred in its 1953-54 report to the fact that
the absolute or near absolute protection which had been given to
Australian industries by war conditions and subsequently by the
controls on imports permitted laxities and inefficiencies to develop
2
and remain uncorrected in many Australian industries, in the follow­
ing year the Board reported that there were few instances where
higher duties were being sought as a result of filling gaps left by
3
import restrictions.
In its Annual Report for 1956-57, however, the Board commented: 
n ,,, there has been a steady flow of new references to the Board in 
the last few months following the easing of the import restrictions
4
and the conclusion of the Trade Agreement with Japan,” Similarly,
in the following year,” ••• an important factor contributing to the
large number of references before the Board (is) that the continued
high level of imports has removed from many manufacturers the inciden-
5
tal protective effects of earlier stringent import restrictions.”
1.
Tariff Board, Annual Report. 1947-40, p,41*
2,
Tariff Board, Annual Report, 1953-54? p.l6,
3.
Tariff Board, Annual Report, 1954-55? p.
4*
Tariff Board, Annual Report, 1956-57, p.35.
Tariff Board, Annual Report, 1957-58? p*4*
5.
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It observed, however, that "... in several cases the Board has found 
during examination of problems of individual industries, that although 
these problems are attributed to competition from overseas, in fact they 
have been caused by increased competition from other manufacturers and/or 
a general decline in demand for the goods concerned." It instanced the 
textile industry.
An important comment, though more general conclusions were drawn 
from it than was perhaps intended, was made by the Board in its Annual 
Report for 1958-59 in which it noted that "... although in the course 
of the year the Board held inquiries into 47 subjects, it should be 
noted that these inquiries provided no apparent support for the conten­
tion that the protection afforded by import licensing had fostered
2uneconomic growth in industry generally."
In the following year, the first report following the virtual 
dismantling of the import licensing system, the Board made a somewhat 
more cautious comment. After observing that "... the virtual abolition 
of import licensing and an expanded level of imports have sharpened 
competition in the Australian market and have been a restraining influ­
ence on prices...n it continued "Although fears have been expressed that 
the relaxation in import licensing will result in a considerable increase 
in the imports of some commodities competitive with Australian industries,
1.
Ibid, p.5*
Tariff Board, Annual Report. 1959-60, pp.5-6.
2.
the Board so far has received no concrete evidence that this is 
happening over a wide range of goods. It may be that sufficient time 
has not yet elapsed for the relaxations to have exercised their full
-Jinfluence on the Australian market.11 It added, however, that Austra­
lian industry generally had met successfully the competitive challenge
2following the relaxation of import licensing in recent years.
In its Annual Recoil, for 1960-61 the Board was able to provide
a judgement based on more substantial experience of the post import
licensing period: "The removal of import licensing has contributed
to an increase in the number of applications for tariff protection.
In general the Board found that most industries appearing before it
were worthy of protection. However, in certain cases the Board refused
to recommend protective duties for industries that had developed during
3the period of import licensing."
Again in its latest report, the Board commented: "... the Board, 
noted several industries which, having commenced production behind the 
shelter of import licensing or having expanded into unprofitable areas 
of production, were unable to compete with imports with the assistance 
of a reasonable level of protection*
IT
Tariff Board, Annual Report. 1959-60, pp.5-6.
2*
Ibid, p.6.
3.
Loc.cit., p.7.
4*
Tariff Board, Annual Report. 1961-62, p*9*
The Board, while noting the expansion which had taken place 
under the stimulus of import licensing appeared reasonably satisfied that 
the bulle of this development had been economic. Just what this conclu­
sion means will depend in part on what the Board defines as uneconomic. 
Traditionally the Tariff Board recommends assistance to industries 
which are ’economic and efficient’. These terms have never been 
precisely defined, the Tariff Board itself having expressly declined 
to do so. To some extent, however, the Board’s judgements of what 
constitutes an ’economic’ industiy will be reflected in the level of 
duty which it recommends. The Board has never specified precisely 
at any time what it would consider a maximum level of duty for an 
economic industry though it is clear from its reports on individual 
industries that it does have in mind an order of magnitude beyond 
which it is reluctant to go. It is clear also that although the
Board has noted ”... the desirability of uniformity of tariff treat- 
2ment ...” as one consideration in its tariff making, its judgement 
of what constitutes the maximum duty consistent with an economic 
industiy does vary to some extent from industry to industry. Our 
concern here, however, is whether this level may have changed over 
the period.
In Table XIII-1 a rough indication is given of the level of pro­
tective duties recommended during 1950-51 and 1960-61. The method used
T.Tariff Board. Annual Report. 1958-59, p.9*
2.
Tariff Board, Annual Report. 1956-57, p.13*
in constructing this table is crude, and may understate the rate of 
duties imposed since specific duties which have been omitted tend to 
be somewhat higher in many cases, particularly when imposed on 
textiles.
Table XIII-1
Protective Rates of Duty (B.P.T.) Recommended by 
the Tariff Board: 1950-51 and 1960-61. *1
Ad Valorum Rate Recommended (Percentage).
Year 5 ^ 10 12§- 15 17J- 20 22$- 25 2 7§- 30 43 42§- Total
1950-51 1 1
No.
5 3 3 1 2 - - - 1 - - 17
1960-61 - 2 
No.
1 2 1 2 3 4 3 2 1 1 22
Source: 1950-51: G.J. Kali, op.cit*. p.225*
1960-61: Tariff Board Reports.
They do suggest that there has been some increase in the level of 
duty which the Board considers to be consistent with an economic industry. 
The impression derived from the comments in the various reports suggests
1.The duties shown are those recommended solely as ad valorum rates or 
as an ad valorum alternative to a specific or specific plus ad valorum 
composite duty. (Normally an ad valorum alternative duty only applies 
if it is higher than the alternative duty)• The 1960-61 figures may 
not be completely comparable with those for 1950-51 though the differ­
ence arising from the method of computation should not be large* The 
total number of recommendations included in the table have little mean­
ing because of the exclusion of recommended specific duties* There is 
an increasing tendency for the Board to recommend specific duties 
including ones which vary with the value of the imported item. Excluded 
from the table, in addition to specific duty recommendations, are items 
of minor significance, and temporary duty recommendations* Also 
excluded are recommendations for duty free entry. It should be noted 
that the duty rates shown are only those applicable to British Prefer­
ential Countries.
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t h a t  in  1950-51 a maximum could be somewhere between 17J- p e r c en t, 
and 22^- p e r c en t, whereas f o r  th e  l a t e r  y e a rs  1960-61 a duty  of 27-2* 
p e r  c en t, has been regarded  as th e  le v e l  o f p ro te c t io n  which could
be shown to  be necessa ry  in  r e la t io n  to  B r i ta in  w ithou t r a is in g  doubts
1
as to  th e  ’economic1 n a tu re  of th e  in d u s try .
There were many su g g estio n s  in  th e  p re ss  and elsew here a t  th e
tim e th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were reimposed in  1954 and 1955 th a t  th e  t a r i f f
r a th e r  than  d i r e c t  im port c o n tro ls  should be used to  r e s t r i c t  im ports.
The Board gave a re p ly  to  some o f th e se  su g g es tio n s  in  i t s  Annual
R eport f o r  1954-55, though l im it in g  i t s  re p ly  to  su g g es tio n s  which
im plied  severe  d is c r im in a tio n  among c la s s e s  of im p o rts . I t  r e je c te d
th e se  su ggestions on th e  grounds th a t  th e  use o f t h e  t a r i f f  would
imply th e  absence of com petition  in  th e  lo c a l  m arket in  reg ard  to
p r ic e s ,  bu t a t  th e  same tim e could mean g re a te r  com petition  f o r  employ-
2
ees w ith  s t i l l  h ig h e r dom estic c o s ts .
The T a r i f f  Board r e i t e r a te d  i t s  views in  th e  fo llo w in g  y e a r 
a rgu ing  th a t  ”. . .  th e  long  run d isadvan tages o f such a scheme would 
outweigh th e  sh o rt run advan tages, to  say n o th in g  o f th e  problems which
3
would be c re a te d  by v io la t io n  of in te r n a t io n a l  ag reem en ts .”
1.
The l a t t e r  f ig u re  i s  given some support by th e  f a c t  th a t  more im ports 
e n te r in g  A u s tra l ia  from B r i ta in  in  1960-61 were d u tia b le  a t  a r a te  of 
27g- p e r c e n t, th an  a t  any o th e r  r a te  (about a f i f t h  o f a l l  d u t ia b le  
im ports from B r i t a in ) • Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ,  Customs C learances 
a t  S p e c if ie d  Rates of Duty -  A u s tra l ia :  1960-61. (mimeographed;•
2.
L o c .c i t . . p.7*
T a r i f f  Board Annual R eport, 1955-56, p.5»
3.
It also argued that "the tariff could not be used as a control 
without the use also of prohibitive duties". A further objection was 
that since imports would have to vary with the level of the foreign 
exchange reserves:
"If control were exercised through the tariff the impermanence 
of protection would have an unsettling effect on trade and 
industry generally, of far greater disruptive character than 
that which has resulted from the 'stop and go' application 
of import restrictions*
The apparent evidence of 'missing the point1 that these arguments
reveal, since the Board ignores the possibility of imposing temporary
duties without affecting the substantive protective rates, would seem
to be explained by some internal dissension the Board was experiencing
at thi^6ime arising out of this point*
One member (Mr* Date) refused to sign the Annual Report for 1954-55
because of his disagreement with the Board's views. In his statement 
2of dissent , Mr* Date argued for a more flexible use of t he tariff 
rather than import licensing:
"It,appears necessary and desirable in all the circumstances to 
use the Tariff more deliberately as an instrument for guiding 
the allocation of labour and capital resources between different 
avenues of production.
This connotes a more flexible Tariff policy than that to 
which we have been accustomed, including the grant of Tariff 
protection on a strictly temporary basis, together with some 
deliberate reductions."
1 *
Ibid. p*6.
2*
Not included in the Annual Report, but laid on the Table in the 
Federal Parliamentary Library in October, 1956.
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Mr. Date returned to his theme in 1958 when the Board declined to
recommend protection to the textile printing industry which, it
concluded, ”... had developed consciously under the protection of
import licensing”, having ignored ”... the repeated warnings that the
continuance of import restrictions should not be relied upon ...”
In an independent comment Mr. Date argued:
”If the pros and cons of this case have been correctly 
argued and properly assessed by the Board from the view­
point of the overall national interest, then if its 
conclusion proves anything at all it proves that the 
prospect of open public inquiry and report by a Tariff 
Board ... is as necessary to the proper functioning of 
import restrictions ... as it is to the setting and 
administration of the tariff itself.”2
Given the long established generally accepted tariff policy in 
Australia it was clearly unlikely that his suggestions for varying 
established protective rates under other than normal (and consequently 
slow) Tariff Board procedure would have been accepted. There would 
clearly, however, have been advantage in using some form of additional 
tariff surcharge to limit imports. Provided it had been clearly 
stated as a temporary surcharge it would have answered most of the 
Tariff Board’s objections. The imposition of an equivalent sales tax 
on domestically produced goods, the expansion of which it was desired 
to discourage, would have met substantially the Tariff Board’s
1.
Tariff Boa^ rd Report, Printing of Textiles. 10.4*1958, p.20.
2.
Ibid
remaining objection "L
Even if the Tariff Board, or the tariff itself were not used as 
the means of controlling imports the Board might have been expected 
to play a somewhat more active role in the operation of the controls 
on imports.
In the immediate post war period there was some indication of a 
readiness on the part of the authorities administering the controls 
on imports to refer particular problems to the Tariff Board for examin­
ation* In one case, import licences had been issued for sealed units 
for refrigerators, evoking strong protests from the local manufacturers 
The licences were withdrawn and the Minister ordered that no more be 
issued pending the Tariff Board’s reviewing the position and making 
a recommendation* The Board’s finding was that the issue of licences
would not be in the national interest since they were only available
2from the dollar area*
Asked by the Minister, in 1946, to report on whether the importa­
tion of domestic vacuum cleaners was warranted and, if so, to what 
extent, the Board was less helpful than in the case of refrigerating
One objection to this procedure might be that it was less likely to 
be removed than direct controls once the immediate need had passed.
This may be an objection of substance in view of past experience, 
Primage duties were imposed on all imports on 10th July, 1930 as part 
of the emergency measures taken at that time* Although many of these 
duties have since been removed they still apply to a considerable 
number of import items, many of which are protective items*
2.
Tariff Board Report., Sealed Mechanical Refrigeration Units. 15*2.1946.
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equipment. In its reply, the Board said, ”... the Board feels that 
all it can do is to submit to the Minister the information given at the 
inquiry without attempting to draw any conclusions therefrom.”
It may be argued that the Board failed to take the opportunity at 
this time to make a contribution, for which it was particularly fitted, 
to the smooth and effective administration of the import licensing 
system. There would certainly have been some advantages to have been 
gained from a closer working relationship between the Tariff Board and 
the administration of import licensing. Although this would undoubtedly 
have caused some difficulties such as the strain on the Board’s limited 
resources, its lack of current knowledge of day to day licensing 
policy and importantly the time it would have need to investigate and 
make recommendations in cases referred to it, these were largely 
administrative problems capable of solution. A more fundamental 
objection would be that this would have raised difficulties then or on 
some future occasion for the Board in its decisions regarding the 
appropriate level of tariff protection to which the industry was entitled. 
Had the Board been a party to decision regarding levels of imports to 
be permitted of particular items or to the approval of particular manu­
facturing projects for the purpose of making available import licen- 
2sing facilities, the generally clear distinction between import
IT
Tariff Board Report, Vacuum Gleaners. Domestic (Local Production 
in Relation to Current Demand). 2.10.19^6.
2.
See Chapter XIV.
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licensing and tariff protection for local industry would have become 
blurred, or the Board’s subsequent examination of the protective needs 
of industries whose investment plans had been subject to the Board!s 
surveillance and implicit approval would have been compromised.
In the event it appears that in the period under review, only 
one case dealing with an aspect of import licensing administration 
was referred to the Board. The existence of import licensing made 
it more difficult for the Board to assess the true nature of the compe­
tition from imports which applicants for additional protection would 
face under conditions of free importing. It was therefore more than 
normally difficult for the Board to assess the extent of the genuine 
cost disability and hence the protective needs of the industry. This 
problem had arisen in the earlier post war period, but the Board 
tended at that time to avoid making recommendations for increased 
tariff protection where an application was based on the grounds that
the industry would have difficulty competing imports at some future
2time when the controls were relaxed or removed.
In anticipation of similar requests, as the controls were relaxed 
in the first relaxation period, the Board gave its view on this question 
in its Annual Report for 1952-53:
IT Advice was sought on the level of imports of sausage casings to be 
licensed from the United States. Tariff Board Report, Hop; Casings. 
2.4*1954* It seems probable that the reason in this case was that a 
somewhat similar request on the same subject had been made some years 
earlier. See Tariff Board Report, Hog Casings. 15*10.1947*
2.
See, for example, Tariff Board Report, Acetylene Black. 1.3*1940,
pp.10-11.
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nThe Board does not subscribe to the view that the Tariffs 
should be raised in anticipation of difficulties ahead.
Neither does it believe that the Tariff barrier should be 
the first line of defence against overseas competition.”^
This was not quite in line with the government’s view during the 
period that industry expecting serious competition from imports in 
the absence of the direct controls should seek tariff protection before 
the controls were lifted. What appears to have been a direct reply to 
the view of tha Board quoted above was given on behalf of the Govern­
ment a few months later:
’’The protection to Australian industry that is incidental 
to the operation of import licensing has, in fact, enabled 
some industries to become established without tariff protection. 
The removal or relaxation of import licensing .,. would leave 
some of these industries exposed to competition. The government 
considers that the level of tariff protection required to 
enable these industries to continue after licensing is removed 
should be determined by the Tariff Board without undue delay.”2
This conflict between two reasonable positions, given the circum­
stances, was not completely resolved. The Board’s difficulty was 
illustrated in the following not untypical example in which the Board 
decline to recommend additional protective duties.
’’There is ... no evidence available from current information 
on imports which would enable the Board to reach firm conclusions 
as to the disadvantage which might result from substantial modi­
fication in import licensing.”3
In another case the Board resolved the difficulty by recommending 
a provisional increase in duty which would not operate until the level
"*Loc.cib.. p.S.
Sir Eric Harrison, Parliamentary Debates. Vol. H.of Reps.2, (2.12.1953)> 
p.798.
o
"*Tariff Board Report, Towels. Towelling and Textile Articles Made from 
Towelling, 5.1.1959, p.T^
of imports suggested it was required.
In the first relaxation period the BoardTs lack of sympathy with
development which had arisen simply as a consequence of the direct
control of imports seems to have been reflected in the evidence of
applicants who showed a tendency to 1 soft pedal1 the protection they
2had received from the restrictions*
In later years there was less reluctance by applicants to attri­
bute the continued existence of their enterprise to the licensing of
imports. While, as we have seen, the Board in a number of cases,
3refuted these claims as statements of fact,' it did not suggest that 
had the statements been accurate the consideration would have been 
irrelevant. It appears that in the later period the Board largely 
judged each case before it on the basis of the principles it customer, 
ily applied irrespective of the initial stimulus for the expansion.
1
Tariff Board Report, Cotton Canvas and Duck, 19»9*195S, pp.10-12.
Since the duties were subsequently imposed on 26.11.1959 there would 
have been some advantage in imposing them immediately thus redirecting 
importers1 profits into government revenue. On the other hand, the 
duties may not have been required, in which case the industry would 
have been overprotected. There tends to be a considerable delay in 
removing any excess protection. See G.J. Hall, op.cit.. pp.251-255- 
2.^*E.g. "While it is understood that the Board does not take into account 
assistance given to local industry by import licensing the company sub­
mits it is not receiving any assistance from current import restric­
tions ..." Evidence given (September, 1955) on behalf of Australian 
Cotton Textile Industries Ltd., Tariff Board Report, Cotton Piece 
Goods, (Drills, Denims, Etc,), 29*6.1956, p.29*
3*
Chapters XI and XII
In the early period of licensing the Board’s attitude may have 
contributed to inhibiting some development under the protection from 
import licensing, reinforcing any similar effects of official exhort­
ations and the influence on expectations of the relaxations which 
were in fact made. In the later period potential investors were at 
least aware that the fact that their investment was stimulated by the 
restrictions on imports would not diminish their chances of obtaining 
tariff protection. On the other hand the Board’s fairly strict 
adherence to its established principles may have tended to limit some 
of the more speculative development. In both periods its general 
unwillingness to increase the level of protection unless its need was 
demonstrated by the actual presence or at least a clearly demonstrable 
threat of import competition, may have reinforced this effect.
Any negative influences on potential investors’ speculations 
arising out of the Tariff Board’s attitudes during the period would 
have been small in relation to the undoubtedly positive effect of the 
fact of a firm policy of protection as such. However, it may well 
have been significant at the margin; moreover, it was probably import­
ant in the negative sense that a more compliant attitude may have
T7~
This is of necessity a very much simplified view of the Board’s 
tariff making during the period. One could select a number of examples 
to illustrate an approach more or less inconsistent with this approach; 
but this would also be true of the principles the Board normally 
applied to its tariff making. Any more detailed examination of the 
Board’s tariff making in practice would be out of place here. See 
Reitsma, on.cit..passim, (but particularly Chapter III); G.J. Hall, 
on.cit., passim, (particularly Chapters VI - VIII).
encouraged more uneconomic expansion.
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The practical effect of the Tariff Board's recommendations will 
be reflected in the movements in the levels of effective protection 
provided to domestic industry and to this aspect we shall now turn 
our attention.
We argued in an earlier chapter that a measure of the protection 
arising from the direct controls on imports was extremely difficult 
if not impossible to construct. Similar considerations apply with 
only little less validity to a measure or an index of the protection 
provided by tariff duties. An unchanged protective duty will not 
necessarily mean an unchanged level of effective protection even if 
the import price remains unchanged. Changes in economic or technical 
conditions of production, or shifts in the demand curve etc., will 
affect the degree of protection provided. Similarly, equal rates 
of duty on different items will provide different degrees of effective 
protection. Aggregation of the various rates of protective duty to 
form an index implies that the degree of protection bears the same 
relationship to the level of the duty for each protected product.
Such aggregation will therefore be a somewhat inaccurate procedure, 
the degree of inaccuracy of which will be largely unknown.
With given supply and demand conditions for the output of the 
domestic product, changes in effective protection provided by the
IT
C.f. A. Loveday, "The Measurement of Tariff Levels", Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society. Vol. XCII, Part IV, (1929), p.493.
tariff may arise from a change in the height of the tariff or from a 
change in the import supply price. The effect of the latter will 
depend to some extent upon whether the duty is a specific duty or an 
ad valorum duty. At the present juncture we are concerned primarily 
with the changes in the height of the tariff due to legislative or 
administrative action. Some consideration to movements in import 
prices is given in Chapter XV.
There is no clear and unambiguous meaning to the term 'the height 
of the tariff'. To some extent the unambiguous nature of the concept 
may be reduced when, as in the present case, consideration is limited 
to the height of the duties applicable to products competitive with 
the output of particular industries. There will still be differences 
from industry to industry in the number of unprotected products and 
an industry with many unprotected products and a few highly protected 
products may have the same average rate of protection as another in 
which all products are protected with a relatively low duty. This is 
of course a familiar problem of any averaging process. It is further 
complicated in the case of averages of tariff duties since duties may 
be set either as absolute amounts or as proportions of the value of 
import prices; in the former case the proportion the absolute amount 
bears to the import price will vary with that price. These are
Primage duties, although originally imposed in 1930 largely for 
revenue purposes have had a protective effect for many industries. 
These do not require legislative action for their removal.
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practical problems for which solutions while not completely satisfactory, 
may be found.
We have seen why the height of the duty bears an imperfect 
relationship to the level of effective protection. It seems reasonable 
to suggest, however, that movements in the height of the tariff would 
be more closely related to movements in the level of protection. How 
close this relationship actually is will depend importantly upon the 
extent of the changes within the domestic economy and there were clearly 
substantial changes in both supply and demand conditions within the 
Australian economy during the period. This need not concern us unduly 
here since we are attempting in this study to examine the effects of 
some of these other factors. In other words we are in a very approxi­
mate manner attempting to see both the movement in the height of the 
tariff and then the relation between this movement and the degree of 
effective protection.
Any measure of movements in the height of the tariff must be 
crude; some are cruder than others. Perhaps the crudest is that 
freaxuently used - usually because it is the simplest to construct; this 
is an index of changes in the ratios of tariff revenue to imports - 
either dutiable imports or total imports. Table XIII-2 presents some 
indexes of this nature.
The absolute and proportionate fall in the volume of imports on 
which high revenue duties are levied - from 20 per cent, of dutiable 
imports in 1950-51 to less than 10 per cent, in 1961-62 - accounts
4 3 6
primarily for the significant difference in the third index compared 
with the two other indexes* A comparison of the indexes in columns 
(2) and (3) will show the effect of the inclusion of revenue duties 
on such indexes* If anything the two indexes move in opposite direc­
tions and demonstrate that the use of s uch indexes without excluding 
at least the major revenue items can give misleading results*
The index in column (3) does suggest some increase in the 
average rate of duty on imports subject to protective duties* In 
part this will represent the swing to non preferential sources of 
supply and consequently a decline in the protection given to imports 
from these sources by the margin of preference* Column (l) on the 
other hand suggests some decline in the average duty paid on imports. 
This will be partly due to the decline in revenue duties; it may also 
indicate an increase in effective protection*
In addition to these more obvious influences, however, less 
apparent changes will influence both the absolute level and the change 
from year to year. A significant change in the level of activity with­
in the economy will reflect itself in the index. In the event of a
1.
Such a measure was used, for example, by an official enquiry 
into tariff protection in South Africa in 1958 to make intercountry 
comparisons of movements in levels of protection. C.f. report of 
the Commission of Enquiry into Policy Relating to the Protection of 
Industry* Government Printer« Pretoria, 23.7.1958, (b«G* No.36)* p.7* 
While some recognition was given to the fact that the inclusion of 
revenue items affected the results, the completely misleading nature 
of such comparisons both of absolute levels and over time may be 
seen from a comparison of columns (2) and (3).
Table XI11-2
1 Simple1 Indexes of Tariff Protection 1950-51 to 1961-62 
Base: 1950-51 = 100
Indexe p Annual Changes in Indexes
(l) (2) (3) a) 
. %
(2)
Of
JO
(3)
%
1951-52 91 99 109 -9 -1 9
1952-53 111 134 115 22 35 5
1953-54 ns 112 120 6 -16 4
1954-55 101 97 121 -14 -13 1
1955-56 91 95 ns -10 - 2 -3
1956-57 SI 94 119 -11 -  1 1
1957-58 77 84 10S - 5 -11 -9
1958-59 7S 95 123 1 13 14
1959-60 7S 92 118 • t -  1 -4
1960-61 S2 93 144- 5 i 22
1961-62 (b) 85 9§ 128 4 5 -11
Actual % % %
Proportions:
1961-62: 10.1 23.1 17.4
(l) (a)Net Customs Revenue) \ as a proportion of total i
(3)
Net Customs Revenue) \ as a proportion of dutiable imports* 
Net Customs Revenue' ' less the "Excise1 tariff duties
i.e. spirits, tobacco and petroleum products as a 
proportion of dutiable imports less "excisable" goods 
i.e. spirits, tobacco and petroleum products. There 
is some protective element in the duties on tobacco 
and petroleum products but these have been ignored; 
they would be small compared to the revenue duties. 
Other revenue duties have been ignored.
(a) Primage duties are included.
(b) 1961-62 figures are subject to revision.
Source: Commonwealth Statistician, Customs Clearances at
Specified Rates of Duty - Australia: ibid. Customs 
Duties Collected at Specified Rates of Duty - 
Australia, (mimeographed): Import Clearance Bulletins.
substantial inflationary pressure and a c onsequent increase in imports, 
the proportion of dutiable imports may change significantly. Dutiable 
imports, including those with high rates of protective duty may 
increase rapidly even though local industry is able to sell everything 
it produces. The index would increase though protection as normally 
regarded would have stayed the same. Nor is an increase in this sense 
inconsistent with a decline in the protection afforded to local 
industry. If import prices fall such that the import price plus duty 
is below the local price it will be more profitable to import. The 
index in any of the three forms will increase although effectively 
protection has declined. Of course, this would apply to any index of 
protection which did not specifically take import prices into account.
Moreover, in the present context an important factor is that 
yearly movements in the indexes will reflect the intensity and changes
in the intensity of the quantitative control of imports to the extent
that this changes the proportionate distribution of dutiable and duty 
free imports, or within the dutiable class of items the proportions of 
more heavily dutiable to those less heavily dutiable. The changing 
incidence of the control on dollar area goods will also be reflected 
in these indexes to the extent that import demand was diverted from
the more heavily dutied dollar area products, subject mostly to m.f.n.
rates of duty, to the less heavily dutied goods from the United 
Kingdom or other preferential B.P.T. countries.
The index will, of course, reflect any movement in demand for 
imports between preferential and non preferential sources whether 
due to import licensing or not. An offsetting factor, however, is 
the presumption that such a change would be determined largely by 
relative price movements favourable to the m.f.n. countries. If, in 
these circumstances, the ratio of the prices of the B.P.T. countries 
to domestic prices remained constant then the ratio of the m.f.n. 
countries’ prices would have moved against local industry, protection 
has in fact risen and this may be more or less accurately reflected 
in the movement of the index.
Perhaps the major theoretical disadvantage of these indexes 
however is that they implicitly weigh each tariff rate by the value 
of imports of that item, and its weighting system is in inverse relation 
ship to the protective effect of the tariff; at the extreme the weight 
of a prohibitive tariff is nil. In the absence of adequate data of 
consumption and production of items to which the protective tariff 
applies, this method, with the refinements referred to above, is the 
only measure possible but, as Carmody has shown, such an index has to
be used with caution since it tends to underestimate the levels of
1protection. The practical and theoretical drawbacks of these forms 
of index are likely to be more evident when considering individual
TT
A.T. Carmody. MThe Level of the Australian Tariff: A Study in 
Method'*, Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research,
Vol.4, (1951-525, pp.60-62. '
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industries.
The form and weighting appropriate to an index of tariff levels 
must be determined largely by the purpose for which it is designed. 
Thus, total consumption ia more appropriate when total welfare is 
being considered and this was the weighting used by Carmody. Some 
weighting on the basis of importance in trade may be preferable
1
when the degree of obstruction to trade is under consideration.
Concern in the present context is simply with the changes in the 
protection accorded to local production by the tariff. While it seems 
apparent the production weights are the most suitable for such an 
index, it is not so clear whether the weights should be fixed, i.e. 
the index to reflect simply changes in tariff rates, or whether the 
weights should change for each year as output of each item included 
in the index changed. This second alternative would give for each 
year the level of production under which local producers were 
actually operating. Although for many purposes the latter would 
seem to be a more useful measure than one based on fixed weights, 
for the present purpose it has the fundamental disadvantage that, 
with varying weights the index can change for two reasons: it
can change either because tariff rates
lT "
C.F. the method used by the League of Nations. Tariff Level 
Indices. League of Nations, Geneva, May 1927; J.G.Crawford, ’’Tariff 
Level Indices”, Economic Record. Vol.10, (1934)*
change, or because of changes in the relative proportions of output 
of items receiving different levels of protection. In the second 
case, it will reflect changes both in the tariff and changes in any 
other causal factors including, for example, the changes due to the 
protective effect of import licensing.
Since the aim is to isolate these various effects, the 
variable weight index is clearly less satisfactory for the purpose, 
and it is on the basis of fixed weights that the index was construct­
ed.
Indexes were constructed for a number of industries which are 
of importance in the import competing sector of Australian secondary 
industry. These are shown in Table XIII-3. The details of their 
construction and the nature of their limitations are discussed 
briefly in Appendix XIII:A. In terms of value of gross production 
in 1958-59 these industries represented about one fifth of the total 
value of output of secondary industry and well over half that of the 
industries included in Group A.
The discussion in the appendix suggests that the two major 
qualifications to be made interpreting these indexes are the use 
of the preferential rate of duty to indicate movements in the 
level of protective duties and the inability to take fully into
account the effects
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of the reduction of by-lav/ (concessional duty) entry. The net effects 
of the various qualifications are difficult to assess; "there may be some 
tendency to understate the increase in protective duties but it would 
probably not be large.
The measures we have presented indicate a variable pattern. In 
some industries, notably cotton textiles, there have been substantial 
and fairly regular increases in protective rates of duty. In s ome there 
would appear to have been declines in protective rates of duty; the 
general pattern would seem to be for some, but not substantial, increase 
in the level of protective duties.
Since one of the effects we are interested in explaining is the 
extension of local production of importable products it is of interest 
to note that despite the increase in duties in 1960-61 the cotton 
textiles share of the market fell substantially (see Table VIIS ).
On the other hand as the discussion in the preceding chapters 
will have suggested there may well have been some industries or some 
important products where the effectiveness of an unchanged level of 
tariffs increased over the period; rubber tyres may be such a case.
This is perhaps more strikingly illustrated in the index for industry 
subclass (lV-3) in Table XIII-Ü; the decline in tariff rates shown in 
this index in 195S-59 is due largely to a reduction in duties on refrig­
eration equipment. For most products covered by the reduced duties the 
reduced level of protection would have remained effective in the sense 
of enabling returns to factors of production to be maintained at levels
comparable with returns to factors in other lines of productive activity. 
The equalising of returns in this case may of course have resulted in 
a decline in such returns since prior to the reduction in duties the 
item was presumably over-protected in the sense used here.
It may be useful to repeat that we are considering here changes 
in tariff rates, and that the measures in Table XIII-3 are based on 
fixed weights. They do not therefore take into account the extent of 
increased production of an item under a protective tariff. We have 
already explained why this was considered the more satisfactory 
approach but it needs to be noted that the production covered by the 
tariff rates included within the indexes will be larger at the end 
of the period than at the beginning.
Is it possible to draw any conclusions regarding the relative 
effect of the direct controls and the tariff on those items which were 
in fact subject to a protective tariff? Table XIII-4 provides some 
information which may assist in taking us closer to an answer.
It is clear that the level of imports of dutiable goods fluctuated 
more than goods not subject to duty. It might be argued that dutiable 
goods would be those into which demand would tend to move more directly 
when pressure on internal supplies was being experienced since their 
value in total represented a smaller proportion of total demand for 
these goods than in the case of non dutiable goods. If this were so 
one would expect to find a close relationship between imports of dutiable 
imports and the level of internal activity. For a number of years in
Table X II1 -4
D u tiab le  and Non D u tiab le  Im ports 
1950-51 to  1960-61
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Annual Changes
D u tiab le  . Non D u tiab le D u tiab le Non D u tiab le
I m p o r t s ^ Im ports ^ Im ports Importp
£m* £m. % %
( l) (2) (1) (2)
1950-51 301 366 • » •  •
1951-52 397 555 32 52
1952-53 1/0 302 —64 -45
1953-54 275 315 96 4
1954-55 364 398 33 27
1955-56 335 420 -  8 6
1956-57 259 407 -23 -  3
1957-58 313 427 21 5
1958-59 282 464 -10 8
1959-60 362 525 28 13
1960-61 443 599 22 14
1961-62 356 496 -20 -17
(a) Excludes S p i r i t s ,  Tobacco and re f in e d  petroleum  products  
which a re  su b je c t to  h igh  revenue d u tie s*
Source; Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ,  Customs C learances a t
S p ec ified  Rates of Duty -  A u s t r a l i a . (mimeographed).
th e  p e rio d  th e re  does seem to  be a r e la t io n s h ip  of t h i s  n a tu re ; 
d e c lin e s  in  d u tia b le  im ports in  1955-56 and in  1958-59, however, a re  
no t c o n s is te n t  w ith  t h i s  hypothesis*  The d e c lin e s  cannot be exp lained  
as a  s t a t i s t i c a l  a cc id en t consequent on th e  use of va lue  d a ta . In  
1955-56 im port p r ic e s  f o r  a l l  commodity groups, w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  of 
t e x t i l e s  which showed a sm all f a l l ,  ro se  s l ig h tly *  In  1958-59 th e  
t o t a l  index  remained unchanged; o f th e  sub-indexes th a t  f e l l  only te x ­
t i l e s  was l ik e ly  to  have been inc luded  more in  th e  t o t a l  of d u t ia b le
4 4 G
than non-dutiable imports. The fall in dutiable imports in 1955-56 
would seem clearly to have been a result of the restriction on the 
level of imports provided by import licensing. The rise in non- 
dutiable imports for that year would seem to reflect clearly the 
experience of the ’uncontrollable’ items discussed in Chapter VIII.
The movement in dutiable items bears a close relationship with the 
import licensing levels for all years except 1953-59» During that 
year there was no change in the overall ceiling for imports although 
pressure on the ceiling was increasing. There was, as a result, some 
additional pressure placed on specific licence items for which reason­
able substitutes were available from domestic production; generally 
these would be dutiable goods.
An examination of Table VTI-£ indicates that the major fall in 
imports in 1953-59 took place in textiles, agriculture machinery, 
timber and pharmaceuticals. The last three items can be explained 
principally by the pressure of the licensing system although the 
demand for tractors, the major item in the decline in agricultural 
imports, will have been due partly to the low level of farm income 
in 1957-53. The decline in textile imports would seem to be partly
a result of the increases in duties, particularly on cottons and rayons,
in
which were only partially offset by the/fall import prices; demand for 
rayons and to some extent cottons was low during the year, reflecting 
a relatively low demand f or clothing generally, and this may have been
447
as important as the increase in duties in the decline in imports.
Some slight decline in quota usage, i*e. quota licences issued, was 
observed in late 1957-58 and early 1958-59 but it would probably have 
shown up more in ’wastage* on licences.
Movement in tariff levels however would seem to be only a limited 
explanation of yearly movements in dutiable imports; this does not rule 
out movements in tariff levels as an explanation of the fact that non­
durable imports showed an upward trend for the period while only a 
slight, but not clearly defined, upward trend can be discerned in 
dutiable imports. This trend in dutiable imports will also reflect 
the extension of protective duties over a wider range of items. This 
is unlikely, however, to have been sufficiently large in any year to 
account for the yearly changes shown.
Any conclusions we may draw at this stage from the data presented 
here can be only tentative and imprecise. It would seem possible 
however to conclude that although there has been an increase in the 
level of tariff rates over the period the increase has by no means been 
uniform for all import competing industries. Nor, to the extent that 
it is possible to draw a conclusion from the data available, does it 
seem that in general there has been any substantial increase in the 
level of protective duties provided to domestic import competing
_  - -
Since the interchangeable quota category had relatively few 
items which were not dutiable, any transfer of usage at this time 
would most likely show up in the imports of dutiable goods.
industries. We shall try to assess the importance of the increase 
in effective tariff protection over the period as a whole and in 
relation to other factors operating during the period in a later 
Chapter (Chapter XV).
The data evidence does suggest that at times of restrictive 
licensing dutiable goods have been more severely restricted and this 
tends to confirm earlier conclusions that extensively over the range 
of import competing industries the extent of competition from imports 
in these periods was determined by import licensing rather than by the 
tariff.
It should not be overlooked that for many industries where imports 
were small and varied little, the tariff may have been an important 
factor in limiting import competition. Nevertheless we may conclude 
that at times of restrictive licensing the direct controls on 
imports offered more effective protection over a wide range to 
domestic import competing industries, a protection over which the 
Tariff Board had no control so far as its direction was concerned, 
and only limited influence in respect of its effects.
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Appendix XIII.A
Method and Notes to Table XIII-?.
1
Weights: Fixed weights batfed on average of value of output 
for each item in 1950-51 and 1957-58* Indexes were 
not calculated where identifiable value of output less 
than 70$ of total for subclass*
Rates; British Preferential Tariff rate was taken to represent 
protective rate. Primage duties were included.
Where rate is alternative of specific or ad valorum, 
the latter was used, unless item was large or rate 
relatively high.
Specific rates included as ad valorum equivalents
of unit values of imports (or production if not available 
2
from import data). Changes in unit values from year to 
ye ax excluded by averaging.
Changes in Rates: From Customs Tariff Schedules: duty amendments 
obtainable from Commonwealth Gazette.
1.
Obtained primarily from Secondary Industries Bulletins and from 
Commonwealth Statistician Manufacturing Industries series. Supple­
mentary information on output and particularly prices was obtained 
from Tariff Board Reports, Industry Survey series, (industries 
Division, Department of Trade), and trade journals.
2.
From Import Clearance Bulletins, from Annual Statements of Trade of 
the United Kingdom, or from Secondary Industries Bulletins.
Time Period: Any change introduced between 1st July and 31st 
December was assumed to operate for full year; any 
change between 1st January and 30th June was taken to 
be inoperative until following year.
By-Law: Where possible, changes in by-law provisions taken into 
account. No account has been taken of by-law admission 
under Tariff Item 449.
Overall,the tendency of the indexes is probably to understate -
perhaps only slightly - changes in duty rates. The omission of
1
some important by-law changes and the assumption that the B.P.T. 
rate is the protective rate would probably lead to an understatement 
of the extent of the change. The output of many subclasses contains 
sizeable non traded items, e.g. service and repair facilities; in 
relation to the subclass as a whole the sample of output would tend 
to overstate the changes in rates.
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1.
In 1950-51, 21$ of total imports were entered under the various sub- 
paragraphs of Tariff Item 449 (the main by-law tariff item). In 1959- 
1960, entries under these items represented 16$ of total imports. The 
reduction in by-law entry would be particularly important for the 
machinery plant and equipment sub-classes.
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CHAPTER XIV
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AND INVESTMENT IN SECONDARY INDUSTRY.
From the discussion in Chapters IV and V it will be clear that 
the imposition of direct controls on imports in a situation of balance 
of payments deficit will affect investment in a number of ways, depend­
ing on whether resources are fully employed, the extent and nature of 
action taken to reduce expenditure and upon whether the controls them­
selves have an effect on disabsorption. Ignoring investment or dis­
investment in stocks, it is almost certain that the controls would 
stimulate investment in import competing industries. However, to the 
extent that investment goods have to be imported, the manner in which 
the controls are operated will affect both the level and direction of 
this investment.
Some consideration of this directional influence on investment , 
insofar as it concerned secondary industry will be considered in the 
present chapter. More directly of concern here, however, will be the 
influence of this investment exercised by the authorities administer­
ing the controls. The particular question of overseas investment 
during the period, and the influence on it of the controls will also 
be considered. Professor Cameron, as a result of his inter-industry 
studies, has shown the import content to be of the order of 20 per cent
of the total investment. One would expect the import content to vary 
according to the form of investment; in particular, to be considerably 
less for building and construction expenditure than for investment in 
plant and machinery. Thus the greater the share of building and con­
struction expenditure in the total, the smaller the overall import 
content would be. In each of the two years investigated, Professor 
Cameron has shown that building and construction expenditure comprised 
more than half total fixed capital expenditure. In 1953-54 the gross 
national product contribution of the building industry, including 
building materials was 30 per cent, of which the import content was
only 4 per cent of the building industry's contribution. A similar
2picture emerged from the 1946-47 figures. Expenditure on dwellings,
schools, hospitals, roads etc., could be influenced by the overall
level of activity within the economy; it is unlikely to he affected
by protection provided by the restriction of imports, nor to be sig-
3nificantly affected by the need to seek licences for imports. 
Expenditure in 1953-54 on the construction of private dwellings,
1 Import content of public and private investment in fixed capital
equipment 1946-47 18$; 1953-54 20$. Burgess Cameron, "The Factor 
Content of Consumption, Exports and Investment, 1953-54”, Series?
The Factor Content of Final Demand. Paper No.3 (roneod), Canberra 
University College, May 1958, p*2.
2 Ibid.. p.5.
3 Although the equipment required for hospitals, for example, would 
probably have a high import content
schools, hospitals and roads amounted to between 40-50 per cent of 
Professor Cameron1s estimates of total building and construction 
expenditure.
Clearly, other fixed investment expenditure would have an import 
content substantially higher than the average of 20 per cent or so 
for all fixed investment expenditure* Not all of this would be dir­
ectly stimulated by restrictions on imports. Many industries do not 
experience import competition and decisions to invest would pay little, 
if any, regard to the existence of the licensing of imports. On the 
other hand, some part of the non-dwelling building and construction 
would be to house productive facilities established as a result of the 
restriction of imports.
In addition, a sizable proportion of total investment is public 
investment which is generally not influenced by the extent of compet- 
ition from imports. In 1953-54? for example, public investment rep­
resented 35% of total fixed investment. Similarly, while some expend­
iture on motor vehicles, which is included in the total figure for 
fixed investment would have been associated with investment stimulated 
by the restriction of imports, it is unlikely to be large. The influence 
of the restrictions as a stimulant of investment expenditure would be
1 Though some public investment may have a high import component, 
e.g. airlines, railway re-equipment programmes.
limited then to some part of the items "other new building and con­
struction" and "other capital equipment", and would, in fact, directly 
influence much less than the total of this investment expenditure.
These items, as can be seen from Table XIII-1 tend to vary from 
between 30 per cent to 36 per cent of total fixed investment.
Table XIV-1: Investment Expenditure on Fixed Capital Equipment
Year Total Public 
and Private
Private Non Dwelling (2) as per 
Construction & Machinery cent of (1) 
etc. (Not vehicles)*
1 2 3
£m £m 2
1950-51 864 264 30.6
1951-52 1126 345 30.6
1952-53 1041 329 31.6
1953-54 1137 362 31.9
1954-55 1285 418 32.5
1955-56 1380 475 34.4
1956-57 1408 495 35.2
1957-58 1522 528 34.7
1958-59 160 6 532 33.2
1959-60 1823 623 3 4 .1
1960-61 1925 687 35.7
1961-62 1887 638 33.8
Source: National Income and Expenditure.
In considering the extent to which this area of investment
expenditure was dependent upon imports and hence in effect under the
control of the import licensing authorities, we are again limited to
orders of magnitudes.
Table XI\r-2 compares total private expenditure on plant and 
equipment, other than vehicles, with total imports of producers’
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Table XIVT-2: T o ta l P r iv a te  E xpenditure  on, and Im ports o f , C a p ita l
_______________________________ Equipment._______________________________
Year P r iv a te  Expenditure Im ports (3) as % 
o f (1)
(3) as % 
of ( 2 )
£m £m £m i
1 2 L 1
1950-51 210 182 80 38 44
1951-52 264 232 120 45 52
1952-53 246 248 101 41 41
1953-54 276 278 114 41 41
1954-55 306 297 124 41 42
1955-56 325 334 134 41 40
1956-57 322 368 122 38 33
1957-58 360 367 145 40 40
1958-59 370 401 139 38 35
1959-60 420 460 166 40 36
1960-61 460 495 198
Source: 1 N ational Income White Paper, Table VI.
2 Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ,  C a p ita l  and Maintenance
Expenditure r P r iv a te B usinesses in  A u s tra l ia ,
(mimeographed'). Note, p r io r  to  1956-57 does n o t
inc lu d e  c o n s tru c tio n  in d u s try .
3 Monthly Review o f B usiness S t a t i s t i c s ; P roducers '
C a p ita l Equipment.
c a p i t a l  equipm ent. The l a t t e r  in c lu d e s  some im ports by p u b lic  au th ­
o r i t i e s .  S ince i t  does n o t in c lu d e  tr a n s p o r t  equipment in  any form,
1
however, the  p u b lic  a u th o r i ty  component i s  n o t l ik e ly  to  be la rg e .
The f ig u re s  in  Table XUZ-2 su g g est t h a t  im ports o f p ro d u ce rs ' c a p i t a l
1 Some o f f s e t  w i l l  be p rov ided  s in ce  some p a r t  -  p robab ly  sm a ll-  o f 
th e  im ports o f t r a n s p o r t  equipment w i l l  be by p r iv a te  in v e s to rs .
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equipment represented something of the order of 40 per cent of total 
expenditure on capital equipment plant and machinery, excluding 
vehicles. This would represent a sufficiently large proportion to 
make the operation of the licensing controls of considerable sig­
nificance, but even then might well be understating the position.
The figures for imports, in effect, represent in most years 
the import of investment goods which was actually approved. They 
do not indicate the extent to which applications were not approved. 
Moreover, some part, which may well be large, of the investment 
expenditures internally may have been dependent upon imports of some 
types of plant or machinery. This would apply similarly to non 
dwelling construction expenditure.
It seems clear that the quantitative control of imports in­
fluenced directly decisions to invest in respect of a substantial 
proportion of total productive investment. Some consideration of 
the way in which what was an incomplete but, nevertheless, widely 
significant control on investment is therefore warranted.
One of the particular problems faced in administering the issue 
of licences for capital equipment, plant and machinery was in consider­
ing applications for these items for the purpose of expanding local
1 The value of additions and replacements of land and buildings in 
secondary industry represent, on average, about a third of total 
net additions to land, buildings, plant and machinery.
production or for undertaking in Australia the production of items 
previously imported, and in this way the administration of the 
licensing system had a considerable effect on the level and 
direction of investment in secondary industry.
It was stated as government policy from the start of this
period that it was not intended to encourage the expansion of
1industry under the shelter of the licensing system*
It was, of course, far from easy in any particular case to 
decide whether or not the particular industrial development project 
would have been undertaken in the absence of the restriction of 
imports, or to demonstrate that it was consciously based on a 
decision to take advantage of the shortage of the product in the 
local market resultingfrom the limited supplies of imports.
In the early stages of the period, during 1952 and 1953, some 
limitations were placed on the investment activities of Australian 
firms by the existence of controls on capital issues, although 
import licensing criteria were probably more stringent than those 
of the Capital Issues Board.
Illustrative of the problems which were faced in considering 
an application for licences to import capital equipment etc. to
1 "It is clear to us that if we permit an indiscriminate expansion 
of secondary industry to replace these imports, renewed inflation­
ary pressure will develop ... the most strenuous efforts will be 
made to discourage the growth of temporary and uneconomic industries 
during the period of import restriction, and especially to avoid 
the diversion of resources away from the primary and other basic 
industries”. Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies), Press Statement. 
29.3.1952.
enable local production to be commenced or expanded are the following:
(i) the need to apply similar treatment to all applicants;
(ii) if approval were given, a commitment was implied to provide 
licensing facilities for the necessary raw materials, parts 
etc. to ensure an economic level of production;
(iii) the project may have been designed merely to obtain imported 
goods indirectly i.e. in the form of component parts, while 
imports of the complete goods were severely restricted;
(iv) the project may have been one which was unlikely to have been
started in the absence of import licensing;
(v) the time for completion of the project; this implied commit­
ments to make available licences in future licensing periods 
when the overall foreign exchange position might have required 
substantial intensification of the licensing restriction.
(vi) scarce foreign exchange might be required to import investment 
goods for production in a field where full of excess capacity 
already existed.
It should be noted that, in common with all applications for 
specific licences, applications for imported capital equipment and 
machinery were granted only if similar equipment were not available 
from local sources, subject to considerations of price, quality and 
delivery times which also varied according to the level of licensing.
Applications requiring substantial imports of machinery and 
equipment, whether for new or expanded production or simply for
modernising existing production facilities were generally assessed 
on an overall or project basis. In the early period of licensing 
this tended to be fairly informal with emphasis on the degree of 
local content intended in any new or expanded output, and the relative 
essentiality of the end product. Some evidence was available at the 
time regarding orders of essentiality such as those determined by the 
National Security Resources Board for the purposes of the capital 
issues controls, or those laid down for the purpose of allocating 
foreign exchange received from International Bank loans. The admin­
istrators were also in the position at this time that, since the 
licensing system was expected to be shortlived, a refusal, even where 
the reason for the project was unconnected with the existence of 
import licensing, was not thought likely to delay the project for 
any great length of time.
With the onset of the second intensification period, with its 
severely restricted licensing levels, the expectation of a long period 
of control and consequently a greater certainty of protection as well 
as a more certain denial of markets to overseas exporters, the need 
was seen to qualify the criteria used in making decisions in these 
cases and to formalise the approach. We have already suggested that 
refusal of such applications in the earlier period, while important
1 The motor vehicle industry was an example of an industry1s expansion 
plans, being considered on such a basis even before 1952, in relation 
to its import requirements from the dollar area. It continued to be 
a major example when licensing was extended to imports from non 
dollar area sources.
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to the firm concerned, was not considered a long term barrier to
importing. In later periods, this was less the case and the implica-
1tions of approval or rejection appeared of greater magnitude.
Moreover, it is probably true that the refusal of licensing 
facilities for proposals where it appeared that the refusal was 
based largely on the ground that the scheme was merely a means of 
circumventing the controls, e.g. applications for licensing facilities 
to enable assembly of imported components, stimulated the applicants 
to consider more extensive local manufacture than they would other­
wise have done.
In general terms, the criteria upon which consideration of 
such applications was based varied over the period according to a 
number of factors, the principal ones of which were the intensity 
of restrictions, the overall level of activity (not unconnected, of 
course, with the intensity of the restrictions), the length of the 
period during which the controls had been in operation and the 
expectations regarding the future level and durationcf the controls.
The principal factors considered when deciding upon an applica­
tion for imports for the purpose of establishing or substantially 
expanding local production, not necessarily in order of importance 
were i
1 With perhaps one qualification. With the extension of the range 
of local production between 1952 and, say, 1956, the need to seek 
licences for imports may have been less although the local product 
may have been more expensive.
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(i) the existing balance of payments position; a borderline case 
in times of severe restriction might not be refused outright 
but asked to re-apply when the position was somewhat easier;
(ii) the initial and subsequent cost in terms of the foreign 
exchange requirements. This involved consideration of the 
initial cost of the plant and equipment; whether it was all 
required during the current licensing period or involved 
commitments for future periods (which at the same time 
relieved pressure on the current period); and the imported
raw materials, or components necessary. It also involved 
the extent to which other applications could be expected which 
would require similar treatment, and the costs in terms of 
foreign exchange this would involve;
(iii) the extent to which the projected production would replace 
imports. This consideration was largely related to the extent 
to which the proposal involved the production locally of an 
item which was wholly or partly imported previously, i.e. 
direct import replacement;
(iv) the essentiality of the end product. This was largely judged 
on the basis of the criteria similar to those established for 
the purposes of the capital issues control. At certain times, 
however, particularly when the level of internal activity was 
high relative to imports, as in 1956 and to some extent 1957,
some preference was given to finished consumer goods in order
to relieve the pressures on supplies of these items;
(v) possibilities of export. This was a somewhat imprecise
criterion but at least some-tangible evidence was sought of
1export consciousness on the part of the applicant.
During 1957 there was a significant change in the emphasis 
placed on some of these criteria, particularly that concerned with 
the degree of local manufacture, reflecting in part the fact "that in 
some industries, excess capacity was developing, e.g. motor vehicles, 
earth moving equipment, certain textiles, as well as the fear that 
industries were seeking to establish manufacturing in the expectation 
of continuing protection from import licensing. The change in policy 
in regard to licensing of motor vehicles described in Chapter XII was 
an early move to reintroduce the market mechanism, and the following 
statement, although made with particular reference to motor vehicles, 
was generally applicable:
"The Government*s only concern with a company*s decision
to establish or expand production is related to the request
which is normal from a company considering investment as to
2what exchange funds it can be assured of receiving”.
1 This was generally of more consequence for investment from overseas 
(see below).
2 Minister for Trade (Mr. McEwen), Press Statement. 12.4.1957.
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It was made clear to each successful applicant that the approval 
of the issue of licences for an investment project implied no commit­
ment regarding the merits of the project as such. They were warned 
that there was no guarantee of protection beyond that of the existing 
tariff when the controls were removed.
In addition, more direct action was taken, by refusing licences, 
in cases where it seemed clear that the proposal had little prospect 
of success; however, although it was reasonable to question whether 
a project was economic, i.e, whether it would continue to exist when 
import licensing was removed in the absence of substantial tariff 
protection, it proved difficult in practice to demonstrate this. Even 
where the expectation was that the expanded production of an existing 
product requiring high tariff protection in the absence of licensing, 
e.g. textiles, would require similar protection, it could only justify 
refusal of licences if the authorities were prepared to pre judge the 
competitiveness of the new production.
As we have seen above, greater emphasis vras placed upon allow­
ing market criteria determine the direction of investment within the 
limits of the foreign exchange available and this was of some import- 
ance for the motor vehicle industry. However, the problems of rapid 
and not necessarily economic expansion arise most clearly when severely 
restrictive control is being applied. The market mechanism can only
1 See Chapter XII
be allowed a very limited role if this implies permitting more expend­
iture on foreign exchange, as it did in the case of motor vehicles. 
Unless the ceiling on imports is in course of being raised it implies 
also reductions in imports of other items which may well stimulate 
further expansion of investment opportunities in other areas.
It would not be difficult to find fault with many of the criteria 
used as a basis for judging the desirability of allocating scarce re­
sources for the purpose of establishing new productive capacity. It 
could be argued, for example, that by following a policy which encour­
ages production of items which were previously imported simply because 
this is considered to be a means of saving expenditure of foreign ex­
change is likely to be an inefficient way of doing this. An item 
produced simply because it directly replaces imports may, in all other 
respects, be an uneconomic proposition and could well lead, eventually, 
to a greater expenditure of foreign exchange - through its indirect 
effects - than if the local production of the item had not taken place.
Similarly, the concept of essentiality ceases to have very much meaning
1once it is analysed in any depth.
On the other hand, it needs to be stated that in administering 
the import licensing system the authorities were faced with the need 
to administer the licensing of investment goods according to a con­
flicting admixture of short and long run objectives. Just as the
1 See Chapter IX
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circumstances of import licensing implied a domestic valuation of 
foreign exchange greater than that indicated by the exchange rate, 
so in the short run it may have been justifiable to pay for not 
spending foreign exchange at a price which may look high in terms 
of the exchange rate. During the period from 1956 to early 1958, 
the pressure of the licensing system was really severe. Applications 
for capital equipment,for example, were banking up at an increasing 
rate. Necessarily the administrators had to look for savings which 
would show up in one, two or perhaps three licensing periods ahead; 
hence the switch in 1956 to allowing expansion of production of 
consumer goods where it might be hoped that goods to meet the 
pressure of demand might eventuate more quickly. Under the circum­
stances at this time the short run factors had necessarily to be the 
prime consideration, but^Were made to take into account the long run 
factors such as limiting expansion likely to prove uneconomic, and 
relating the pattern of expansion to market demand.
It could be argued further that the import licensing authorities 
were not equipped to judge on the pure economics of the desirable
pattern of industrial development and that more use should have been
1made of the Tariff Board. We noted in Chapter XIII some difficulties 
which would arise from the Tariff Board*s closer involvement in the
1 Or, perhaps, the Division of Industrial Development of the Department 
of National Development which in 1956 became the Industries Division 
of the Department of Trade.
the operation of the import licensing system, particularly the increased 
difficulty of avoiding commitments on future tariff protection.
Moreover, it is not completely self evident that the Tariff Board 
would have been able to provide the sort of advice which would have 
enabled an economically desirable pattern of industrial investment to 
be induced through the administration of import licensing control.
The basis upon which orthodox economic theory tells us the 
question of resource allocation should be determined is the more or 
less classical notion of comparative advantage irrespective of whether 
it directly replaces imports or not. Yet even here we are faced with 
the problem that while this might be satisfactory in a static system, 
there is little basis for judging which industry has or is likely to 
have a comparative advantage in a dynamic system where productive 
efficiency changes over time, market prices of commodities and factors 
may differ from their opportunity costs and greater external economies 
may arise from development in one direction rather than another. Thus 
what is an economic pattern of investment in the long run may not be 
ascertainable from current market prices and opportunity costs. This 
is becoming the standard criticism of the doctrine of comparative 
advantage; these criticisms tend to be directed at the three principal 
assumptions on which it is implicitly based; that factor prices reflect 
opportunity costs; that the quality of factors of production does not 
change significantly over time; and that economies of scale are not 
of major importance. The Australian economy had by 1952 well passed
the stage of an underdeveloped economy in the context of which crit­
icisms, based on the unreality of the first two assumptions, most 
validly apply.
The economies of scale argument which is based on internal
economies has little theoretical support in the static type of model
where perfect knowledge is assumed. In this situation, the investor
would take the long term cost situation into account determining the
direction of his investment. Corden argues, correctly, that proof
of internal economies is not a valid argument for a firm seeking 
1tariff protection; by definition the internal economies of scale 
are known. The situation we are considering is different; it involves, 
in effect, a certain amount of protection which must be distributed. 
Internal economies of scale may, in this context, be a valid basis 
for selection of industries; as such this would have been implicit 
in the licensing authorities1 consideration of the economic prospects 
of investment projects. However, to enable these economies to be 
obtained, some limit to the number of firms entering the industry 
would have been necessary. This would have conflicted with the basic 
principle of offering the same opportunity to all applicants without 
which the licensing administration would have been open to charges
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tt1 MImport Restrictions and Tariffs • • • loc. cit.. p.33S
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of favouritism, bias and perhaps worse. True decreasing costs are 
inconsistent with competition and tend to monopolisation of the market; 
restricting entrants to an industry to enable the economies of scale 
to be obtained, as well as by definition limiting competition from 
imports, would tend to provide further opportunity for exploitation, 
and consequently the community would not benefit. To mitigate extreme 
forms of exploitation in this way, additional imports may have to be 
permitted, but this would lead to increased foreign exchange expend­
iture when the immediate objective is the reverse.
The likely realisation of external economies would similarly
2provide a basis for selection although both Dr. Corden and Professor
3Reitsma have concluded that there may be little further scope for 
external economies in the Australian economy.^ Assuming that it is
1 In the case of overseas investment, different treatment to overseas 
firms from different countries would have been considered discrimin­
atory.
2 MImport Restrictions and Tariffs ...”, loc. cit.. p.337.
3 Reitsma, op. cit., p.185.
4 From this conclusion Corden argues for a uniform tariff, Reitsma 
for more selectivity in future tariffs. The difference would appear 
to be more apparent than real. Corden argues ”... there is rarely 
much case for protecting one industry rather than another ...”; 
Reitsma that ”... with development, the tariff will have to become 
increasingly ^elective and limited”. The difference between the 
two authors is thus limited to the extent to which external 
economies may derive from particular industrial development -
both agree that it is fairly small. Dr. Reitsma1 234s argument 
would thus not seem to be inconsistent with a general uniform 
tariff on other than the selected items even if the uniform 
tariff is a zero tariff.
possible conceptually to predict where external economies may be 
expected to arise, it would in practice be difficult and subject 
to wide margins of error. Even then, decisions on this basis would 
account for only a limited proportion of the total amount of invest­
ment activity regarding which decisions were necessary.
A further criticism is that comparative advantage at all times 
will be wasteful of resources specific to the production of a par­
ticular product. This may be true with respect to short term 
movements in prices, but if the movement is a long term one it is 
preferable to let bygones be bygones.
Against the proposition that the current pattern of prices is 
an unsatisfactory indicator of future prices, it may be argued 
therefore, that to the extent the future differences are predictable 
they would be reflected in current prices, with the exception of 
the external economies argument which we have already discussed. 
Where they are not, there is little rational basis on which to 
formulate such estimates. Basing decisions regarding patterns of 
production on such estimates is likely to be no less, and possibly 
more wasteful of resources than the assumption that the present 
situation, as discounted by the market, is a fair indication of 
what the future situation will be, at least insofar as secondary 
industry is concerned.
This argument implies that it is possible to -tell before a 
production process has actually been installed what the costs of
production are likely tobe. A perusal of the Tariff Board*s comments 
in reports on industries in which particular firms are in course of 
establishment or have recently commenced production suggests this may 
be far from a simple matter. Moreover, unless the licensing authorit­
ies were able to make their assessment during the planning stage of 
the productive process, they would have to accept the assessment of 
the applicant for the licence who would have - and no doubt had - an 
incentive to underestimate his expected costs of p roduction.
Nor are costs of production of existing firms in the industry - 
where production of the product in question is already being carried 
on - a satisfactory basis of judgement since there tends to be a wide 
variation between the costs of production of different firms withrone 
industry."^
Provided the licensing authorities make their decisions on the 
basis of the existing opportunity costs, there seems little reason 
for not replacing the quantitative controls with the price mechanism.
Imports licensed on a project basis formed a high proportion of 
the various licensing Banks. The importing of capital equipment over 
a number of periods and commitments in respect of raw materials, 
components etc., while only of a'best endeavours* nature, neverthe­
less provided a certain amount of rigidity in the system. The items
1 C£. Tariff Board*s comments to this effect in its Annual Report. 
1960-61, p.13.
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not included in projects were licensed under the criteria applicable
to other imports described in Chapter IX.
Table XIV-3/1 shows the value of plant and machinery brought by-
secondary industry as a whole, and by the industries which we desig-
Table XIV-3/\: Value of Additions and Replacements to Plant 
and Machinery Total Secondary Industry and Group 
_____________A Industries: 1950-51 to 1959-60._____________
Year Total
Secondary
Industry
Group A c (iii) as per
Subclasses cent of (ii)
Including Excluding
Iron and Steel; and 
Mineral Oils
£m £m £m 2
(i) ( i i ) ( i i i ) ( is )
1950-51 69.4 66.3 25.0 37.7
1951-52 80.6 73*5 27.1 36.9
1952-53 88.1 SO. 5 30.7 38.1
1953-54 93.9 80.5 28.5 35.4
1954-55 139.9 93.2 33.5 36.9
1955-56 135.6 104.3 37.3 35.7
1956-57 141.1 102.4 41.8 40.8
1957-58 142.0 122.2 49.8 40.8
1958-59 160.3 122.0 51.0 41.8
1959-60 185.3 158.7 62.2 39.2
a This is a gross rather than net investment figure. An error, 
probably not large, will be contained in these figures since 
some investment expenditure will probably be contained in the 
item *Tools Replaced and Repairs to Plant1.
b Total Classes I to XV (excludes Heat, Light and Power).
c For industries included in Group A see Appendix XIIjA.
Source: Secondary Industries Bulletins
nated Group A in the previous chapter* The large and irregular i^Wstw.
ments made in the iron and steel industry and in oil refining, and the
more or less independence of their relatively short term decisions to
invest from the factors, with which we are concerned, make it useful to
*1exclude these two subclasses from the total of secondary industry.
The interesting feature of the table is the relatively low level 
of investment in the Group A subclasses in the three years 1953-54 to 
1955-56, when importing - at least in the first two years - was rel­
atively relaxed. In part, it probably reflects the digesting of big 
capital expansions made in earlier years in heavy chemicals, paper etc. 
It may reflect emphasis on direct import replacing investment during 
the period of restrictive licensing; or it may reflect the low level 
of activity in import competing industries resulting from increased 
import competition. Alternatively, it may reflect the delayed transfer 
of the boom from the import competing sector to the non traded goods 
sector of secondary industry.
The data for 1955-56 and 1956-57 reflect the tightness of the 
control on investment goods at this time. Few licences were provided
1 Other individual subclasses e.g. motor vehicles and plant, machinery 
etc., but the variations in investment are of a smaller magnitude 
than the two excluded; there is a greater degree of heterogeneity in 
the firms included in the subclasses; and there is a greater prob­
ability of the investment expenditures being induced by relatively 
short term factors. Nevertheless, it suggests that too much weight 
cannot be placed on relatively small changes.
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fo r  new p ro d u c tio n , p r i o r i t i e s  being  given to  equipment necessa ry  to  
m ain ta in  e x is t in g  p ro d u c tio n . The l im i t s  th i s  p laced  on investm ent 
a c t i v i t y  may have a s s is te d  in  l im i t in g  th e  e x te n t o f the  in f la t io n a r y  
p re s su re s  w ith in  the  economy. The l im i t s  p laced  on investm ent a c t i v i t y  
by the c o n tro ls  -  s u b s ta n t ia l  backlogs o f a p p lic a t io n s  fo r  c a p i t a l  
equipment remained u n t i l  w e ll in to  1957 -  may help  to  ex p la in  a fe a tu re  
of th e  p e rio d  which i s  a l i t t l e  unexpected on a p r io r i  grounds.
In  view o f the  in te n s i ty  o f the c o n tro ls  in  o p e ra tio n  during  
th ese  y ears  one would ex pec t th i s  to  b r in g  about an expansionary  s i t ­
u a tio n  d o m estica lly  in  the  absence o f e f f e c t iv e  a c tio n  to  r e s t r a in  the  
le v e l  o f in te r n a l  demand. F a i r ly  severe  d e f la t io n a ry  a c tio n  was taken
e a r ly  in  1956 and th is  would have tak en  some tim e to  be worked ou t o f
■\
the  system . In  1957-58 unemployment ro se  above th e  1956-57 le v e l ,
and th e  l im ite d  p re ssu re  on th e  l ic e n s in g  system in  the  second h a lf  o f
1957-58 was such as to  give grounds fo r  ex p ec tin g  e a r ly  removal o f the  
2
c o n tro ls .  While th e re  was a v a r ie ty  o f f a c to r s  invo lved  im p o rtan tly  
a t  th e  time i t  may be p o s s ib le  th a t  the  severe l im i t s  on im ported
1 For a d iscu ss io n  o f th e  economic s i tu a t io n  in  1957-58 see D. Cochrane, 
"The A u s tra lia n  Economy Ju ly  1958", Economic Record. V ol. XXXIV, No.
68 (August 1958), p p .143-159« Only b r i e f  re fe re n c e  i s  made to  p r iv a te  
investm en t.
2 "We were v e ry  n ear to  g e t t in g  ou t o f im port l ic e n s in g  in  A p ril 
1958 . . .  n S i r  John Crawford, (then  Permanent Head o f the D epart­
ment o f T rade), "The A lte rn a tiv e s  to  Im port L icen sin g " , Address 
to  A u s tra lia n  C ouncil o f R e ta i le r s . 8.5*1958, n o te s  k in d ly  made 
to  me by the  a u th o r .
Investment goods in 1955-56 and 1956-57 had some inhibiting effect 
on the level of internal activity in 1957-58 and consequently may in 
part explain why the existence of the controls did not s timulate 
fairly rapid expansion.
Investment from Overseas.
Australia*s balance of payments over the period received con­
siderable assistance from substantial inflows of foreign capital. The 
aspect of overseas investment with which we are concerned here is the 
manner in which overseas investment was affected by the licensing of 
imports. In a general sense the quantitative controls on imports 
may provide an incentive for the direct investment in Australia, both 
by foreign producers prevented from exporting direct, and to the extent 
that it increased the differentials in expected profit rates in 
Australia and overseas. The form and pattern of this investment 
may also have been influenced by the method of administering the 
import controls in Australia.
Capital inflow into Australia in the post-war period has been
mainly in the form of direct investment from the United Kingdom and 
2the U.S.A.,'~ and the extent of this inflow is shown in the Table XIV-3.
1 It should be noted that in his explanation of investment behaviour
in Australia in the post war Smyth does not mention the controls on 
imports. D.J. Smyth, "Investment, Growth and the Trade Cycle: The
Post War Australian Experience1 2’, Economic Record. Vol.38, No.82, 
(June 1962), pp.242-243.
2 Cf. D.T. Horner nU.S. Direct Investment in the Post War Period", 
Economic Monograph No.241« Economic Society of Australia and New 
Zealand (N.S.W. Branch), March 1962.
Table XrV-3: Direct Overseas
Companies 1950-51
Investment in Australian 
to 1960-61.
Year Unremitted Profits New Capital Total
£m £m £m
1950-51 22.2 44.9 67.1
1951-52 23.9 56,6 80.5
1 9 5 2 -5 3 17.9 3.1 21.0
1953-54 30.4 38.3 6 8 .7
1954-55 3 0 .3 6 8 .7 99.0
1 9 5 5 -5 6 40.7 71.8 112.5
1 9 5 6 -5 7 47.7 48.2 95.9
1 9 5 7 -5 8 43.4 53.2 96.6
1958-59 63.3 42.3 105.6
1959-60 68.7 91.3 160.0
1 9 6 0 -6 1 63.2 120.6 183.8
Source: C.B.C.S. Bulletin of Oversea Investment, Australia 1960-61.
It would be surprising if a clear relation between the controls on 
imports and direct investment in Australian companies emerged from 
the data available even if the controls on imports were the major 
factor in determining its volume. First there is probably a lengthy 
time lag before a decision to invest results in the transfers of 
substantial investment funds; there is probably in many cases a 
lag between the time of a new stimulus such as import restrictions 
and the decision to invest pending assessment of their effects and 
probable duration. Consequently, if the controls &d in fact stim­
ulate overseas investment, the resultant transfer of investment 
funds was probably spread over anything up to several years after 
their imposition. On the other hand, after the decision has been 
made it may still be a fairly simple matter to delay the actual
transfer of funds at fairly short notice - this possibly was the 
case in 1952-53.
The rate of inflow of direct overseas investment in Australian 
companies was high during the period, particularly after 1954-55, 
although it was also high in 1951-52, and was substantial in the years 
from 1947-48 to 1949-50.1
The bulk of this investment in the years for which an industry 
break up is available - 1956-57 to 1959-60 has gone into manufactur­
ing, (see Table XIV-4), although in only 1956-57 was new capital
81Table XIV-4: Overseas Direct Investment in Australia:
______Percentages by Industry 1956-57 to 1959-60,_____
Industry 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60
per cent per cent per cent per cent
Primary, Produc tion, 
Mining 11.8 8.1 5.9 8.1
Manufacturing 77.0 62.8 60.8 52.3
Finance and Property 6.8 7.8 8.3 14.1
Commerce0 3.7 19.7 24.0 22.3
Other Industries 0.7 1.6 1.0 3.2
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: C.B.C.S. Bulletin of Overseas Investment: Australia 1960-61
Notes: a includes undistributed profits
b includes oil exploration
c includes oil distribution and primary produce dealing.
1 Total direct investment (including undistributed profit) in Aust­
ralian companies in these years - earlier figures are not available - 
was 1947-48, £36.8m; 1948-49, £40.7m; 1949-50, £64.9m. (Source
as for Table XIV-3).
in flow  in  excess of th e  amount o f u n d is tr ib u te d  p r o f i t s  in  m anufact­
u r in g . The su b d iv is io n  o f d i r e c t  investm ent in  m anufacturing in d u s try  
(Table XIV-5) shows th a t  the  l a r g e s t  in d iv id u a l a re a  o f d i r e c t  in v e s t ­
ment in  two o f th e  fo u r y ea rs  was th e  chem ical and o i l  re f in in g  group .
£1Table XIV-5: Overseas D ire c t Investm ent in  M anufacturing 1956-57 to
________________________________ 1959-60._________________________________
In d u s try 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60
£m £m £m £m
Founding, Engineering
8 .9 10.1 1 4 .2M etalworking0 10.2
T ran sp o rta tio n  equip­
ment e tc , 10.5 19.4 12.8 25.7
E le c t r i c a l  Goods e tc . 10 .4 3 .8 5.6 6 .5
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco 4 .0 5.9 6 .6 4.3
Chem icals and O il 
R efin ing 31. S 16.1 17.9 19.6
Other N knufacturing 6 .9 6 .7 11.1 10.8
T o ta l M anufacturing 73.8 60.8 64.1 81.1
T o ta l A ll  In d u s tr ie s 95 .9 96.6 105.5 155.1
Source: C .B .C .S. B u lle tin  of Overseas Investm en t: A u s tra l ia  1960-61.
N otes: a in c lu d es  u n d is tr ib u te d  income
b in c lu d es  o i l  e x p lo ra tio n  
c in c lu d es  assem bly and r e p a ir s
While th e re  has been s u b s ta n t ia l  overseas investm ent in  the  chem ical
in d u s try , th e re  was c le a r ly  a s ig n i f ic a n t  volume o f overseas d i r e c t
1
investm en t in  o i l  r e f in in g  in  A u s tra l ia  over th e  p e rio d , an in d u s try  
which was u n a ffe c ted  by th e  c o n tro ls  on im p o rts .
1 But no te  th e  amounts shown under chem icals and o i l  r e f in in g  exclude 
bo th  o i l  ex p lo ra tio n  and o i l  d i s t r ib u t io n .
478
The existence of quantitative import controls is only one of
many factors which affects ä decision to invest overseas; it is
only one of many factors determing the trading situation faced by
the exporting country any one of which will be part of any decision
-jto invest in an overseas company. Moreover, direct investment in 
Australia by overseas firms was by no means a new experience, con­
siderable investment of this nature having been made over a long
2period of Australia's history.
The preferential tariff applicable to the United Kingdom and 
some other Commonwealth countries, the quotas on some U.S. imports 
prior to the war and in the first year or two of the war not matched 
by similar restrictions on United Kingdom goods, and the severe 
dollar import restrictions in the post war period would have been 
significant as determinants of the level and pattern of overseas 
investments prior to 1952, although the closer political and economic 
ties with the United Kingdom were also a major factor working in the 
opposite direction. Differences in the trading situation facing the 
exports of the two countries were substantially reduced by the im­
position of controls on imports from all sources in 1952, A signif-
1 For a case study of the reasons for overseas investment by United 
States firms see H.J, Robinson, The Motivation and Flow of Private 
Foreign Investment, California, 1961.
2 One investigator has suggested that already by 1953 about a quarter 
of the funds employed in the manufacturing sector were controlled 
from overseas. E.L. Wheelwright, Ownership and Control of Australiah 
Companies, Sydney, 1957, pp.78-80.
479
icant influence of the controls may have been in providing an incent­
ive to U.K. companies to develop manufacturing activities in Australia
1to an extent greater than would otherwise have been the case.
Additional incentive would have been offered to the U.S. investors 
by the extension of control to non dollar goods since competition 
from U.K. and other non dollar suppliers1 exports in the Australian 
market was substantially reduced.
Existence of a highly protected market for their products would 
seem itself to have enabled a substantial increase in overseas owner­
ship and control of Australian manufacturing at a relatively low cost 
to the overseas investors concerned. The following table shows that 
during the period from 1950 to 1959 over three quarters of U.S. direct 
investment in Australia was financed from undistributed profits. To 
the extent that the demand for peculiarly 1 American1 goods is inelastic 
the severe restrictions on dollar goods would have made greater the 
profit which could be taken on the local version made by the subsid­
iary or associate of the dollar area firm.
Table XIV-6: Inflow of United States Direct Investment
1950-59 - By Industry and Category - £m,________
Mining & 
Smelting Petroleum
Manufact­
uring Trade Other Total
New Capital 2.2 47.5 32.0 5.3 4.4 91.4
Undistributed
Profits 6*0 40.3 110.9 5.2 4.7 167.1
Total 8.2 87.8 142.9 10.5 9.1 258.5
1 This appears to be true, for example, of the motor vehicle industry
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Table XIV-6 (Continued).
(i) Petroleum - Most of the new capital came before 1956; 
about half the total coming in 1955, coinciding with 
the construction of large oil refineries by Australian 
Oil Refining Ltd., and Standard Vacuum Refining Co.,
(Aust) Pty. Ltd.
(ii) Manufacturing - New capital inflow was less than £5m. 
per annum until 1958, when it was £9.8m.
Source: Computed by F.N. Bennett from U.S, Business Investment in
Foreign Countries (Supplement to Survey of Current Business) 
and Annual Survey Current Business. United States Department 
of Commerce, Washington, 1 9 6 0 . (Made available by Mr. E.L. 
Wheelwright in an address to the Economic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand (Canberra Branch), 1962).
Table XIV-7: United States and Canada:
Australian Companies8, 1950-51
Private Investment 
to 1960-61
in
Year uNewtf Capital Undistributed Income Total
£m £m £m
1950-51 12.2 8.1 20.3
1951-52° 13.5 12.1 30.6
1952-53 -10.4 12.4 2.0
1953-54 0.3 17.0 17.3
1954-55 23.7b 15.8 39.5
1955-56 11.9b 20.1 32.0
1956-57 7.0 20.6 27.6
1957-53 6.5 20.6 27.1
1953-59 14*6 31.5 46.1
1959-60 27.4 34.3 62.2
1960-61 53.9 32.9 86.8
Source: Bulletin of Oversea Investment: Australia 1960-61.
Notes: a includes portfolio investment
b prior to 1956-57 includes undistributed income of 
overseas insurance companies - this would represent 
only a small proportion of total undistributed income
c prior to 1952-53, excludes holdings by Australian 
nominees of overseas investors, and by overseas 
investors using Australian addresses.
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A similar picture is demonstrated in Table XIV-7; in six out
of the eleven years, ^ew* capital inflow was below, often well
below the level of undistributed profits while in one year there
was a net outflow. The (four) years of relatively high new capital
inflow were all years of high internal activity in Australia and
1this may have been the major factor inducing this investment,' The
earlier discussion of time lags suggests that factors occurring in
earlier years may account for part of the inflow in these years.
The annual inflow of portfolio investment from the United States
is known, but is thought to have been small, though it may have
2increased in 1960-61.
It appears more a characteristic of American firms than of
British firms that the overseas subsidiary is wholly or largely
owned by the parent company and the earnings of the subsidiary are
3used for further expansion.' Therefore, the large proportion of
increased foreign investment financed out of undistributed profits 
is not peculiar to Australia.^' Of course an essential prerequisite
1 It could also have contributed to their high level of intbr'uü a  dc'j, 9iavegtmeas;
2 Mr. Wheelwright has estimated that United States and Canadian port­
folio investment in Australia from 1947-48 to 1959-60 totalled only £5.6m.
3 See E.T. Penrose, "Foreign Investment and the Growth of the Firm", 
Economic Journal. Vol. LXVI, No.262 (June 1956), p.227.
4 "Between 1946 and 1951 ... no less than three quarters of all 
United States and new direct foreign investment in manufacturing 
industry was the result of the ploughing back of profits earned 
in foreign branches and subsidiaries", Processes and Problems 
of Industrialisation in Underdeveloped Countries. United Nations, 
1955, quoted by E.T. Penrose, op. cit.
for overseas direct investment is itself the differentials in expected
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profit rates.
Data comparable with that in Table XIV-7 is not available for 
the United Kingdom but Table XIV-8 indicates that, although a sub­
stantial proportion of investment is financed from undistributed 
profits, the proportion is by no means as high as in the case of the 
United States,
Table XIV-8: United Kingdom: Private Investment in
______________ Australian Companies.________________
Year "New11 Capital Undistributed Income Total
£m £m £m
1950-51° 3°.51 12.9 43.4
1951-52 36.7° 10.2 46.9
1952-53 16.0“ 5.2 21.2
1953-54 32.1“ 12.4 44.5
1954-55 43.4b 13.9 57.3
1955-56 53.0b 19.5 72,5
1956-57 37,5 24.1 61.6
1957-58 42.3 19.8 62.1
1958-59 38.6 28.3 66.9
1959-60 74.2 31.1 105.3
1960-61 82.5 23.8 106.3
Source: C.B.C.S. Bulletin of Overseas Investment: Australia 1960-61,
a includes portfolio investment
b includes undistributed income of overseas insurance companies - 
this would represent a relatively small proportion of total un­
distributed income.
c excludes holdings by Australian nominees of overseas investors, 
and by overseas investors using Australian addresses.
The administration of import licensing was directly involved in 
the process of direct investment in productive processes in Australia
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by overseas firms. To transfer investment funds in the form of goods 
an import licence was required; moreover, where the subsequent import­
ation of materials and components was concerned the potential investor 
would wish to obtain some idea of the extent to which these would be 
licensed. The criteria used in evaluating an investment project from 
an overseas source and the variations over time in these criteria 
were with minor exceptions the same as those applied to investment 
projects originating from domestic sources.
The only significant difference - the degree of significance 
depending on the extent of dollar discrimination at the time - con­
cerned the type of currency involved. In general, the criteria were 
applied more stringently in the case where the import requirements 
were from dollar sources than from non-dollar sources; against
this, however, where the project replaced imports currently being
2obtained from dollar sources it received a fairly high priority.
Two further factors were involved. First, greater emphasis 
was placed on the need for planned development involving an increasing 
degree of Australian content, although some relaxation in this respect 
was made in the last years of the controls where - as in the case of
1 In the first six months of 1956-57 very few domestic investment 
projects were approved; approvals were granted to overseas 
companies where a relatively high ’no exchange’ content was 
involved.
would
2 In this case its ’essentiality’/generally be rated highly; while 
dollar discrimination was applied to any extent, goods being 
imported from this source were largely restricted to goods con­
sidered to be essential.
motor vehicles - the already installed capacity and the existing 
proliferation of types of product suggested that extensive - and 
more or less forced - investment in manufacturing facilities for 
products whose share of the market was unlikely to be large could 
result in the deliberate encouragement of clearly uneconomic pro­
duction. The emphasis placed on increasing the Australian content 
was partly a reflection of the desire to encourage direct import 
replacement, and partly to avoid inequity which would have occurred 
were firms able largely to circumvent the controls by establishing 
a minimum degree of local manufacture and seeking priority for import 
licences on the grounds of the need to sustain their manufacturing 
operations. In a number of cases special licensing treatment was 
refused on the grounds that the degree of manufacturing envisaged 
was too low, suggesting that the main purpose of the investment was 
to expand the local market for the product at the least cost, to 
the investing company. In some cases this resulted in plans for 
investing here being abandoned; in others original investment plans 
were revised to provide for a greater degree of local manufacture 
initially and for a greater subsequent extension of these activities.
Although no firm commitments were possible regarding future 
availability of import licences in the event of a further intensif­
ication of the restrictions on imports, the overseas investors were 
given a ’best endeavours’ assurance. It was made clear, however, 
that the licensing facilities made available to them in these circum-
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stances would depend upon the extent to which they had adhered to 
their stated intentions regarding increases in the Australian content 
of their products, thus providing a further incentive to the firm 
to increase the extent of its manufacturing activities.
In the course of considering investment projects of overseas 
companies, the licensing authorities were able, on a number of 
occasions, to reduce or have removed export franchise restrictions
provided for in the agreement between the parent company and the
1subsidiary. It is difficult to determine how important this was 
in practice either because the restrictions may still have held in 
fact, even though not provided for in the written agreement, or 
because once licensing control was removed the franchise restrictions 
may have been reimposed.
The second aspect was that concerned with the importation of 
goods as a means of transferring capital to Australia. Many firms 
sought to transfer their investment funds to Australia in the form 
of physical commodities either for sale in Australia or for direct 
use in their local plants. It could be argued that since these 
imports would involve the economy in no additional cost in terms 
of foreign exchange in the short run, and since they would increase 
the supply of goods available with a fixed total expenditure of 
foreign exchange, they should be permitted.
1 Cf. H.W. Arndt and D.R. Sherk, "Export Franchises of Australian 
Companies with overseas Affiliations", Economic Record. Vol.XXXV 
No.71, (August 1959).
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There are a number of offsetting arguments against permitting 
these imports freely and the licensing authorities dealt with applic­
ations for licences to imports where no foreign exchange commitment 
was involved on the same basis as those where foreign exchange ex­
penditure was involved, i.e. the applications for licences were only 
approved if they would normally have qualified for an import licence. 
First, free importing opportunities in these circumstances would have 
offered an incentive for currency manipulation by exporters and others 
earning foreign currency - to the extent that this occurred there 
would have been a drain on the foreign exchange reserves; second,
particularly in the case of consumer goods for which, in general,
1 2’no exchange’ licences were not issued, had these imports been freely 
permitted, firms with overseas associations would have had considerable 
advantages over those without them; third, and again particularly in 
the case of consumer goods, the shortage of supplies of imported goods 
and the consequent high internal prices would have enabled the over­
seas firm to invest here at considerably less expense to himself;
1 i.e. licences issued for goods for which no foreign exchange 
commitment was involved.
2 Apart from goods admitted as a capital contribution to a develop­
ment project, other types of goods licensed on a ’no exchange’ 
basis were: gifts of a nominal value; goods imported but which
would 1b exported within 12 months (e.g. cameras of visiting film 
companies); goods replacing goods paid for but which were lost 
or damaged in transit or defective. Limited quantities of con­
sumer goods were occasionally licensed on this basis to enable a 
firm to test the market for a new product before deciding whether 
to establish production in Australia.
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fourth, once a firm had sold the imported goods it could genuinely 
have decided against investing the proceeds in Australia and applied 
pressure on the exchange control authorities to permit repatriation 
of the funds.
The application of this policy, particularly of licensing 
only that type of capital equipment not available from domestic 
sources may have discouraged some overseas investment since it 
generally increased the cost of investing in Australia. In any 
particular case this additional cost was probably relatively small 
and unlikely to have been a significant deterrent to overseas invest­
ors. In the case of the overseas investment which actually took 
place the benefits in terms of foreign exchange receipts were corr­
espondingly greater than would otherwise have been the case.
The table in the appendix to this chapter shows the total 
issues of ’no exchange’ licences during tie period under review. The 
following table shows for a short period, the value of ’no exchange’ 
licences issued for the major items of capital (including electrical) 
equipment compared with total licences issued for the major items 
of capital plant and equipment. As direct overseas investment in 
Australia other than undistributed income was £4Sm. in 1956-57 and 
£53m, in 1957-58, the figures suggest that the extent to which the 
transfer was affected directly by the movement of physical goods 
was relatively small.
Apart from the effect on direct overseas investment in
488
Table XIV-9: Issu es  of No Exchange L icences fo r  C a p ita l
______________ Equipment 1956-57 and 1957-58_______________
L icensing  P eriod  T o ta l of L icences No Exchange L ie - T o ta l No Ex-
Issu ed  fo r  C a p ita l ences fo r  C a p it-  change L ic -  
_________________ Equipment1 *3- a l  Equipment D ences Issued
£m £m £m
1 .7 .5 6 to  3 0 .9 .5 6 15.6 0.39 7 .5
1 .10 .5 6 to  31 .12 .56 15.1 0.08 7.3
1 .1 .5 7 to  3 1 .3 .5 7 19.7 0.16 5.8
1 .4 .5 7 to  3 1 .7 .5 7 27.3 0.15 5.6
1 .8 .5 7 to  30 .11 .57 24.4 0.12 5.7
1 .12 .57 to  3 1 .3 .5 8 22.3 0.43 5.9
1 .4 .5 8 to  3 1 .7 .5 8 22.5 0.68 5 .4
a Licence is su e s  fo r  Banks B.10 (C a p ita l Equipment -  o th e r than
e l e c t r i c a l  -  in c lu d in g  p a r t s ) ,  and Bank B. 11 (E le c t r ic a l  m achines, 
ap p ara tu s  and a p p lia n ce s  in c lu d in g  p a r t s ) .  These banks in c luded  
th e  bulk  o f c a p i t a l  p la n t  and equipment fo r  m anufacturing p u r­
p o ses .
b No exchange l ic e n c e s  is su e d  fo r  item s covered by Banks B.1Q and
B .11.
S ource: From in fo rm atio n  made a v a ila b le  by the  Department o f T rade.
A u s t r a l ia ,  the  c o n tro l on im ports would c e r ta in ly  have been an 
i n f l u e n t i a l  f a c to r  in  s t im u la tin g  o th e r forms o f a s s o c ia tio n  w ith
ov erseas  f irm s , such as l ic e n s in g  arrangem ents. The number o f such
1
arrangem ents has in c re a se d  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  over the  p e rio d  and, a l ­
though many would p robab ly  have been en te red  in to  in  any ca se , many
1 There i s  no p re c is e  d a ta  a v a ila b le  fo r  th ese  arrangem ents -  the
In d u s tr ie s  D iv is io n  o f th e  Department of Trade has e s tim ated  th a t  
th e re  a re  now about 1000 l ic e n s in g  arrangem ents in  the  en g in ee rin g
in d u s try  a lo n e , a g re a t many of which would have been e n te red  in to  
d u rin g  th e  p e rio d  subsequent to  1952.
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of them were no doubt stimulated by the controls. Again many of 
these arrangements depended upon licences for imported equipment 
on components and in at least one case the licensing authorities 
were able to secure a substantial reduction in what appeared to be 
excessive royalty payments as a condition of granting the licensing 
treatment sought.
Quantitative conclusions on the stimulus to overseas invest­
ment in Australia by the quantitative controls on imports are not 
possible. There are reasons for thinking, however, that the controls 
on imports were a significant factor in determining the volume of 
overseas investment in Australia during the period both directly by 
forcing foreign producers to produce in the market if they wished to 
sell in the market, and indirectly by raising the level of internal 
activity and hence the expected profitability of such investment. The 
method of administering the controls may in some ways have discour­
aged some investors but probably, through the incentives for increased 
Australian content, increased the total volume of such investment.
The manner of administering the controls no doubt increased the direct 
contribution this investment made to the foreign exchange reserves, 
and may also have had some influence on the terms on which the invest­
ment was made. On the other hand the tendency for the controls on 
imports to increase the general profitability of local production 
would seem to have enabled much of this investment to have been made
at a lower cost to the investors than would have been involved in their
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absence.
To the extent that any of this investment has been forced1 2, 
in the sense that in the absence of the controls it would be more 
profitable for the firm to export to Australia paying duty at the 
current level rather than produce locally, there may be an incent­
ive to discontinue local production. It is doubtful if this would
occur on any significant scale, although we have noted some examples
1of this elsewhere. To do so would be a fairly costly procedure 
unless the plant and equipment had a good resale value. It would 
also leave the firm in a vulnerable position should tariffs be 
increased on the imports of the item. In the short run a firm 
might be forced to revert to importing if a competitor did so but 
subject to the normal requirements being fulfilled it is probable 
in these circumstances that an application for increased tariff 
protection would be successful.
One other factor which may be an important result of the extensive 
production facilities by overseas firms in Australia and the assoc­
iation of overseas firms through licensing and royalty arrangements
is that this will tend to reduce the extent of subsequent import 
2competition. This may be expected to be more directly the case
1 See references in Chapter XII (motor vehicles and parts) and 
Chapter XVI (electric shavers).
2 If a local firm enters into production of an item previously 
imported under the shelter of the restrictions he may expect
to face competition from previous suppliers once the restrictions 
have been removed. If a major overseas supplier establishes
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where the establishment of the overseas interest in Australia results 
directly from restrictions on imports since the greater the export 
interest in the markets which is prejudiced by the restrictions, the 
greater the incentive to produce in the restricting country. This 
would probably be of greater significance in the case of producers’ 
equipment and highly processed consumer goods, where the association 
of name and reputation lead to a highly differentiated product, which 
are also the items in which a local producer of a substitute but un­
established product would find the greatest difficulty in meeting 
competition from overseas producers whose product was established in 
the market. This may be part of the reason for local industry 
retaining much of its gains in the share of the local market when 
import controls were removed.
More generally, the often stated proposition that equity in­
vestment is preferable to fixed income borrowing from overseas is
2 (Continued from previous page).
local production it normally does not have to face competition from 
the parent firm. (Though it does happen - Joseph Lucas (Australia) 
Pty. Ltd., and Robert Bosch (Australia) Pty. Ltd., manufacturers of 
electrical equipment in 1962, sought protection against import 
competition, predominantly from their parent companies. Tariff 
Board Report, Automotive Electrical Equipment. 9.11.1962, p.15.
Of course, it may pay the firms to achieve an increase in tariff 
protection in this way).
1 Nevertheless, it may also apply to commodities of a more homogen­
eous character. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. of U.S.A. previously 
the major supplier of polyethylene to the Australian market, has set 
up production facilities in Australia. Other producers may attempt 
to compete on the Australian market but they would presumably be 
less successful than if the parent company were exporting.
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not unambiguously valid in the particular Australian context in
view of the experience of the past ten or so years. Where the
internal level of activity tends to accompany a high level of
reserves there is a clear advantage in an overseas debt repayment
1obligation which fluctuated with the level of internal activity. 
This situation certainly does not hold generally for Australia - a 
high level of internal activity and hence a high potential profit 
remittance, may result from import controls or some similar action 
imposed because of the balance of payment problem and a low level 
of foreign exchange reserves.
1 Cf. H.W. Arndt, "Overseas Borrowing - The New Model", Economic 
Record, Vol. XXXIII, No.65, (August 1957), pp.247-261; and 
R.J, Cameron, "Comment on Overseas Borrowing", Ibid., pp.261- 
264* Dr. Cameron makes the point that an important means of 
limiting the cost of overseas capital is the avoidance of 
inflationary situations, p.264*
Appendix XIV.A
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!ITo Exchange* L icences Issu ed : 1952-1959
Length of D o lla r Area Non D o lla r T o ta l
P eriod Area
Months £ ’A m. £*A m. £*A m.
1. 9 .52 to 31. 12.52 4 3.1 3.7 6 .8
1 . 1 .53  to 31. 3-53 3 5.7 14.6 20 .3
1 . 4.53 to 30. 6 .5 3 3 .9 2 .8 3.7
1 . 7 .53  to 30. 9 .53 3 - 1 .6 3.3 4 .9
1 .10 .53  to 31. 12 .53 3 2 .8 3.9 6 .7
1 . 1 .5 4  to 31. 3-54 3 3.2 3 .9 7 .1
1. 4 .5 4  to 30. 6 .5 4 3 1 .1 3*6 4.7
1 . 7 .5 4  to 30. 9 .5 4 3 3.0 3.0 6 .0
1 .1 0 .5 4  to 3 1 .1 2 .5 4 3 1 .4 2 .2 3.6
1 . 1 .55 to 31. 3.55 3 2 .1 3.0 5.1
1 . 4.55 to 30. 6 .55 3 3.6 4*6 8 .2
1 . 7 .55 to 30. 9.55 3 2 .1 3.7 5.8
1 .10 .55  to 31.12.55 3 3.5 4.2 7 .7
1 . 1.56  to 31. 3.56 3 n .a . n .a . 9 .4
1. 4.56 to 30. 6 .56 3 n .a . n .a . 11 .9
1. 7 .56 to 30. 9 .56 3 1 .8 5.7 7 .5
1 . 10.56  to 31.12.56 3 1.8 5.5 7 .3
1 . 1 .57  to 31. 3 .57 3 2 .1 3.7 5 .8
1. 4.57 to 31. 7 .57 4 1 .9 3 .7 5 .6
1 . 8 .57  to 30.11 .57 4 2 .1 3.6 5.7
1 .12 .57  to 31. 3.58 4 2.2 3«6 5. 9 U )
1 . 4.58 to 31. 7 .58 4 2 .5 2 .9 5 .4 (a )
1 . 8.58  to 30. 11.58 4 2 .0 3.7 5 .7
1 . 12.58  to 31. 3-59 4 2 .C 5 .4 7 .4
1 . 4 .59 to 31. 7 .59 4 1 .7 3 .3 8 . 8 (b)
(a) in c lu d es  sm all amounts issu ed  on a ’’World" b a s is .
(b) in c lu d es  £3*3m. issu ed  on a "World" b a s is .
Source: In fo rm atio n  made a v a ila b le  by th e  Department o f Trade.
chapter XV
Import Restrictions and the Effects on 
econdary Industry
In the previous chapters we have considered a number of aspects 
of the experience of secondary industry under import licensing. The 
present chapter will be in the way of a drawing together of the find­
ings on a number of the aspects which seemed of importance in 
particular areas. In the first place we shall examine the group of 
subclasses which we have termed Group A to see whether in the aggre­
gate the average pattern of activity of these industries differed 
markedly from that of the remainder of manufacturing industry.
For the purpose of comparisons of movements in output we shall 
consider movements in value of production and, to a lesser extent, 
movements in employment. In view of the obvious limitations of these 
series for the purposes we have in mind, some explanation is perhaps 
necessary. The only measure of output of manufacturing industry is an 
unofficial production index. While, with qualifications, it may be
1.
The Australian and New Zealand (A.N.Z.) Bank!s Index of Factory 
Production, published in the A.N.Z. Quarterly Surveys. This 
is a base weighted index constructed by combining gross output 
indexes for individual industries by means of value added or net 
output weights. Its coverage is now roughly a half total value of 
output of secondary industry. We shall subsequently make use of 
the aggregate index using the 1953-54 based index linked to 
the earlier 1948-49 based series. The coverage of the earlier 
index was something less than 40 per cent, of total value of 
output.
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considered a useful measure of changes in manufacturing output as a 
whole, it has two limitations for the present purpose* First, the 
base year and the extent of industry coverage, including the industries 
in the sub-indexes, were changed during the period. Secondly, the 
breakdown of the index into industry group sub-indexes, even on the 
augmented basis available since 1953-54 is insufficiently disaggregat­
ed for our purpose.
In the absence of suitable price series it was not possible to
-jdeflate either the value of production or the value of output series
2in a way which would give meaningful results. Consequently we are
1.
Perhaps the most satisfactory measure of the trend in the amount 
of work done in an industry is a deflated value of production or 
real net output series. There are difficulties involved in deflating 
a value of net output (value of production) series since, at least, 
it requires a deflation of both the gross value of output and of the 
value of materials used in producing that output. In addition to the 
normal statistical difficulties there is the further difficulty of 
deciding which price series to use to deflate the value of raw material 
inputs in view of the time lag between purchase and use etc. and this 
may raise some difficult conceptual issues. C.f. P.A. David, "The 
Deflation of Value Added,n Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol.
XLIV, No.2 (May 1962), p p .148-155.
2.
While some price series could be constructed from unit values given 
in the official production statistics, in many cases these would repre­
sent only a relatively small proportion of total output of the subclass; 
for many subclasses no value or Quantitative data for constituent ele­
ments of the total value of output is available. Moreover, even where 
such data are provided, in only a few cases do they constitute all or 
nearly all of value of output. Since it is probable that prices of goods 
subject to varying levels of import competition may move differently to 
those not so affected, it would be misleading to use such price series 
to deflate value of output of the industry subclass as a whole.
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obliged to use value of production data. Unsatisfactory as this is, 
it is not without some offsetting features. Although value of produc­
tion includes the effects of both volume and price changes, protection 
from import competition, as we have seen, may have both volume and price 
effects. While it would be much more satisfactory if we were able to 
separate the two effects of this series, this is less of a handicap 
than if we were simply concerned with only one of the aspects. There 
will of course be other price factors which will affect the value of 
of production, such as salaries and wages paid - but given raw material 
prices and demand based pricing, in the absence of changes in raw 
material costs and in the market situation, an increase in wages and 
salaries paid will not change the size of the value of production but 
will simply reduce the magnitude of the share going to gross profits. 
Moreover, there would seem to be no strong a priori reasons for expect­
ing movements in raw material prices to be substantially different in 
the group of subclasses from those in industries not included in Group 
A.
The following tables show the movements in value of production of 
the fifteen major manufacturing classes in the official statistics, 
and of the subclasses classified into Group A.
The value of production of the group of industries constituting 
Group A increased slightly faster than that of manufacturing industry
IT
Moreover in a qualified sense, the value of production is of 
interest in itself since it represents the economy’s valuation of 
the work done in the particular industry.
-ible XV-1
4 9 7
M anufacturing In d u s try  : Value of P roduction  1950-51 to  1960-61
Year T o ta l C lass- T o ta l Group 
aW .  Sub­
c la s s e s .  £m.
Column(3) Indexep(Base 1950- Column( 5)
es I  to  XV. 
£m.
as % of 
Column(2)
195.1 .= 1P.PI
Column(2) Column(3) Column(6)
a ) (2) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5) (6) (7)
1950-51 824*7 265.8 32 .2 100 100 100
1951-52 999.6 330 .5 33.2 121 125 103
1952-53 1049.8 336 .5 32.1 127 127 100
1953-54 1188.8 401.2 3 3 .9 144 151 105
1954-55 1318.8 447.7 34 .0 160 167 104
1955-56 1 4 /6 .3 483.9 3 3 .4 175 182 104
1956-57 1561.5 519.7 33 .2 190 196 103
1957-58 1662.6 567.1 3 4 .1 202 214 106
1958-59 1765.9 612.8 34.7 214 231 107
1959-60 1994.3 697.7 35.0 242 263 108
1960-61 2077.5 712.2 34* 4 252 268 106
(a) For in d u s tr ie s  su b c la sse s  inc luded  in  Group A
see Appendix XII.A.
Source: C alcu la ted  from d a ta  in  Secondary In d u s tr ie s
B u l le t in s . and Siinrna-ries of P r in c ip a l  S t a t i s t i c s  
of F a c to r ie s  (1959-60 and 1960-61)
as a whole. The r a te s  of growth in  th e  v a rio u s  in d u s tr ie s  making up 
Group A, however, v a r ie d  co n sid e rab ly , as was th e  case w ith  th e
1.
This may be seen from th e  frequency  d i s t r ib u t io n  of in c re a se s  over 
th e  p e rio d  of va lue  of p ro d u c tio n :
Table X V (F t)-l
Change in  Value of P roduction : P ercen tage Changes 
1960-61 over 1950-51: Frequency D is tr ib u tio n
A ctual P ercen - P ro p o rtio n  of Value o f
tag e  In c re a se  
%
Group A
No.
A ll In d u s tr ie s Group A
Production*
%
A ll In d u s t r ie s
D ecline 2 11 0 .2 0 .6
0-50 3 13 1 .7 3 .7
51-100 6 36 3 .9  1 8 .4
(c o n t!d o v e rlea f)
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individual industries within the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
Hov/ever, the pattern of growth of value of production was less regu­
larly distributed in the case of industry as a whole than in the case 
of the subclasses in Group A, There is a larger proportion (weighted) 
of the industry subclasses which had a relatively low rate of growth 
in manufacturing in general than in Group A. Overall in 60 industries, 
constituting well over 20 per cent, of the average value of production 
in 1950-51 and 1960-61, the increase in value of production was less 
than 100 per cent. In the case of the Group A industries, 11 subclasses 
representing slightly over six per cent, of value of production of the 
group^ increased in terms of value of production by less than 100 per 
cent. Broadly it seems reasonable to suggest that the value of produc­
tion of importing industries increased more rapidly than the average 
over the period as a whole.
Footnote 1 contM from previous page.
% No. %
101-150
Groun A 
4
All Industries 
25
Groun A 
15.7
All Industries 
14.3
151-200 8 25 30.4 23.9
201-250 5 18 26.9 20.9
251-300 1 8 14.6 8.5
301-400 2 6 6.5 2.2
401 1 5 0.1 7.0
32 147 100.0 100.0
* Weighted by average of value of production in 1950-51 and 1960-61.
1.
The irregularity of the distribution for industry as a whole is 
partly due to the two large subclasses, iron and steel (subclass 
IV - 1/2) and petroleum products (subclass III - 6), in which the 
increase in value of production was relatively very high.
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Of course, this does not mean that the more rapid growth, in this 
sense, of the industries included in Group A was necessarily the 
result of the control of imports, though it is not inconsistent with 
the proposition that the greater quantitative increases and/or price 
increases in these industries were in some degree a consequence of the 
reduction in import competition which occurred over the period. Some 
support for this proposition is given "by the annual movements in value 
of production, details of which are given in Table XV-2. For purposes 
of comparison, annual changes in the volume of factory production as 
indicated by the A.N.Z. Bank Index are also shown.
?able XV-2
Annual Percentage Changes in Value and Volume of Production 
in Manufacturing Industry. 1950-51 to 1960-61
Year Total 
I
Classes 
to XV
(i)
Total Group 
A Subclasses
(II)
Total Class­
es I to XV 
less Group A
(h i )
A.N.Z.Bank Index. 
Volume of Factory 
Production 
(IV)
% % % %
1951-52 21 25 20 2.6
1952-53 5 2 7 -5.0
1953-54 13 19 10 18.6
1954-55 11 11 11 8.0
1955-56 10 8 10 5.6
1956-57 8 7 8 2.6
1957-58 6 9 5 6.0
1953-59 6 8 5 5-6
1959-60 13 14 12 9.2
1960-61 4 2 5 0.7
(a) Excluding Heat, Light and Power.
Source: Columns I to III Table XV-1.
Column IV. Composite index from H.F.Lydall, 
"Quick Indicators of Industrial Output", paper 
given to N.S.W. Statistical Society, Sydney, 
August 23rd, 1962, Table IV, p.13*
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There would seem to be no simple relationship between movements 
in value of production and the controls on imports. Nevertheless, 
the data in Table XV-2 would suggest that in terms of movements in 
value of production, the Group A industries as a whole experienced 
less stability of production and/or prices than industry as a whole, 
though clearly the use of averages may disguise individual movements 
within the two groups. Even if we were to examine the pattern of 
movement of the industries within the two groups over the period it 
would not be particularly illuminating in the absence of a split 
up between value and volume movements.
Table XV-3
fa)Employment in Manufacturing Industry : 1951-52 to 1960-61 
Annual Percentage Changes
Year Total I-XV 
less Group A 
%
Total 
Group A 
%
1951-52 • ♦ • *
1952-53 1 2
1953-54 5 10
1954-55 3 4
1955-56 2 2
1956-57 0 1
1957-53 1 2
1953-59 1 3
1959-60 5 7
1960-61 -3 -10
(a) Number of persons on pay-roll at end of June in each year 
excludes working proprietors.
Source: 1951-52 to 195S-59 - Secondary Industries Bulletins : 
1959-60 and 1960-61 from data supplied by the Common­
wealth Statistician.
"‘Value of production is based on goods produced - not necessarily sold. 
It is worth noting that non farm stocks increased by £180m. in 1954-55 
compared with £60m. in the preceding year and £130m. in the subsequent 
year. The extent to which these were distributed between domestically 
produced end imported goods is unknown as is the case in respect of the 
distribution among individual industries in the case of stocks of home 
produced goods.
Annual employment movements in secondary industry are shown in
-]Table XV-3, Employment in Group A industries increased by some 23 
per cent, over the period 1951-52 to 1960-61 as a whole compared with 
14-15 per cent, for the remainder of secondary industry. If we com­
pare 1959-60 with 1951-52, because of the unemployment in 1960-61, 
the absolute increase in employment in the Group A industries was
2about the same as the increase in the remainder of secondary industiy; 
the percentage increase was about 37 per cent, compared with some 17 
per cent, for non Group A industries. In employment terms the expan­
sion of Group A industries seems to be more pronounced than when in 
terms of value of production. While the movement of the Group A sub­
classes is more uniform than that of the value of production series, 
it still illustrates the greater variability of activity in the import 
competing sector.
1.
Employment data is not veiy satisfactory as an indicator of move­
ments in output, since it is unlikely that the employment to output 
ratio will remain anything like constant over the period. Nor is 
there any particular reason why changes in this ratio should be 
the same for the two groups of industries being considered. For 
example, it would be possible to argue that industries subject to 
competition from imports may be more inclined to substitute capital 
for labour if labour is the scarce resource. A further limitation of 
the present series is that it contains both male, female and junior 
employees. Identical numerical movements may therefore be quantita­
tively different.
2.
Emplo3nnent in Group A industries increase by some 101,000 while in 
non Group A industries the absolute increase was about 106,000. The 
total increase over the period of 207,000 shown in the series used 
here is higher than the increase of 154*000 in average annual employ­
ment for the same period, which includes, whereas the present series 
excludes, working proprietors.
From these figures it would seem that there are reasonable 
grounds for thinking that activity in the Group A subclasses expanded 
faster than in the remainder of the manufacturing sector, both in a 
real sense, insofar as this is indicated by the employment figures, 
and in terms of the money value of production. However, the relative­
ly greater expansion of the Group A subclasses would appear to be 
notably more pronounced in respect of employment than of value of 
production.
Now let us consider what we are able to say about movements in 
profits and prices. In Table XV-4 gross profit margins are shown 
for the Group A subclasses and for secondary industry as a whole.
We noted in Chapter VII that the gross profit margin was the 
markup, before tax, on raw materials and wage costs to cover over­
heads and net profit* For the purpose of the present calculations, 
the gross profit margin consists of :
Value of Production - Wages and Salaries 
Value of Output
The relationship between price and gross profit margins may be 
stated briefly* Under conditions in which prices are cost determined, 
i*e* a fixed percentage markup on variable costs, prices will follow 
movements in variable costs* When prices are market determined the 
margin will change in accordance with changes in demand. The margin 
will be determined by the elasticity of demand for the product. One 
feature of the direct control of imports is that, other things/equaf,
Table VJ-A
U nit Gross P r o f i t  M argins; (a) M anufacturing In d u s try  
1950-51 to  1960-61
Year T o ta l G lasses T o ta l Group Annual P ercen tage Change
I  to  XV 
%
A Subclasses 
% Column ( i l ) C olum n(lll)
( i ) d i ) (h i ) (IV) (V)
1950-51 16.3 20 .1
1951-52 15.9 19.0 -  2 .5 -  5 .1
1952-53 16.7 20.5 5 .0 7 .6
1953-54 16.9 20.6 1 .0 0 .2
1954-55 16.3 19.9 -  0 .5 -  3 .3
1955-56 16*8 18 .9 n .c . -  4 .7
1956-57 17*8 20.0 6 .0 5 .7
1957-58 18.1 20 .3 2 .0 1 .6
1958-59 18.8 20.2 4*5 -  0 .6
1959-60 18.9 2 1 .4 0 .5 6 .1
1960-61 18.8 2 0 .4 -  0 .5 -  4 .9
n .c .  = no change.
Source: For 1950-51 to  1958-59 -  C alcu la ted  from 
d a ta  in  Secondary In d u s tr ie s  B u lle t in s :  
f o r  1959-60 and 1960-61 from Summaries of 
P r in c ip a l  S t a t i s t i c s  of F a c to r ie s : A u s tra l ia  
(1959-60 and 1960-61).
(a) O v era ll changes in  g ross p r o f i t  m argins can r e s u l t  in  two 
ways* Gross p r o f i t  m argins of in d iv id u a l in d u s tr ie s  can 
change o r th e  p ro p o rtio n  of th e  t o t a l  rep re se n te d  by 
in d u s t r ie s  w ith  low er o r h ig h e r th an  average g ross m argins 
can change as a r e s u l t  of d i f f e r e n t i a l  growth r a te s  of 
in d iv id u a l in d u s t r ie s .  To e lim in a te  th e  l a t t e r  f a c to r  th e  
g ross margins in  th e  ta b le  have been w eighted f o r  such 
in d u s try  on th e  b a s is  of th e  average o f th e  v a lu e  of produc­
t io n  f o r  1950-51 and 1958-59.
i t  reduces th e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f demand fo r  th e  p roducts  of dom estic in d u s try , 
and p a r t i c u la r ly  f o r  th e  p ro d u c ts  of th e  im port competing s e c to r .  We 
m ight, th e re fo re ,  expect m argins to  r i s e  in  th e  im port competing s e c to r  
du rin g  th e  r e s t r i c t i v e  p e rio d s  of l ic e n s in g  c o n tro l, provided th a t  
p r ic e s  a re  m arket determ ined .
The data for gross profit margins suggest a number of conclusions. 
First they indicate that businessmen in both the traded and the non 
traded goods sectors were able to increase gross margins in the years 
of tight restriction of imports, 1952-53 and 1956-57, although not in 
1955-56. Second, that in the import competing sector, insofar as it 
is represented by the Group A subclasses, the movements in the margin 
would seem to reflect substantially the influence of import competi­
tion. Movements in the margin in the non traded goods sector seemed
generally to follow those in the import competing sector but only to
1a limited extent. Finally, the level of the margin in the import 
competing sector stayed relatively unchanged; variations were gener­
ally around a stable margin. In the case of/non traded goods sector 
there appears to be a definite upward movement in the margin.
The results shown for Group A compared with the whole of second- 
ary industry may be a little surprising, in view of earlier discussion 
and the evidence in Chapters XI and XII. They might suggest the 
conclusion that, in fact, the industries receiving protection from 
import competition from import licensing have tended, or have been 
forced, to take out the benefits of such protection in the form of 
increased output rather than in terms of increased profits. The rela­
tively rapid increase in the margin in 1952-53 followed a greater fall
^*To limit the calculations, separate details for secondary industry 
less the Group A subclasses have not been shown; this has some dis­
advantage in interpreting the movements in the margin since the 
changes shown in column (il) will include the changes in column (ill).
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for the Group A industries in 1951-52 and the increase in both areas 
from 1950-51 to 1952-53 was approximately the same. The increase in 
Group A margins in 1959-60 was substantially greater than that of 
industry as a whole but it followed years in which, relatively, Group 
A !s margin had either declined much more or increased considerably less 
than those of industry as a whole.
The boom conditions in 1959-60, perhaps, explain the general 
movement in gross profit margin in that year but not why Group A was 
able to increase margins in that year much more than industry in gener­
al, while in earlier years it had been unable to do this. While the 
increase in capacity and the emergence of excess capacity over a wide 
range of industries may have meant increased competition in certain 
areas which may have affected earlier years - say 1957-5B and 1958- 
59 - more than 1959-60 when inflationaiy pressures were being felt, 
^from imports in some as a result of relaxations of import restrictions.
Clearly, an explanation of the reasons for movements in particu­
lar years would need a fairly detailed examination of the particular 
industries in the two groups. Moreover, as an indicator of net 
profit movements and of prices the gross profit margin is somewhat 
imprecise since it is affected by changes in raw material costs, 
levels of capacity utilisation, the substitution of capital for labour 
and vice-versa, the level of wages paid, etc. As we noted, however, 
while in the case of particular industries one can give reasons for 
one of these factors affecting the level of the gross
^*We noted that this seems to have happened in the textiles and 
rubber goods industries for example.
margin there seem to be no reasons to think any of these factors
would apply to one set of industries more than another, inhere the
two groups of industries would seem to differ, however, is in the
fluctuating level of import competition.
Gross profits will be reflected in net profits according to the
relationship between overhead costs and the gross margin. For many
items of overhead cost it may be assumed that the movement will be
random with respect to the relative movements in gross margins of 
.or non tradedtraded/goods industries, although selling expenses, advertising etc. 
may change according to the degree of competition. Apart from these 
factors the net profit margin can change either because capacity in 
use changes but price remains unaltered, or because capacity utilis­
ation stays the same but price does not. There are no series of 
net company profits suitable for our
1
It should be noted that we are considering gross margins 
which include overhead costs. Thus an emergence of excess 
capacity which leads to higher per unit costs of overhead 
should lead to higher gross margins to the extent that this 
can be passed on in prices. An increase in output without 
an increase in plant capacity could lead to increased net 
profits without an increase in margins. To the extent that 
in 1959-60 previous excess capacity was utlised this would 
not explain the increase in margins - rather it would make 
it more difficult to explain the sharp rise in the gross 
margins.
purpose and any conclusions about net profit movements can be little 
more than speculation. While we are thus not able to say what happen­
ed to net profits in the import competing sector it is clearly possible 
for net profits to increase markedly with little or no change in gross 
margins if, for example, the limits on import competition enabled 
existing excess capacity to be fully employed, thus reducing overheads 
per unit.
Certain rather tentative conclusions may be drawn from this 
discussion. First, to the extent that the gross profit margins reflect 
movements in net profits, some relationship between movements in the 
intensity of the restrictions and movements in profits seems to exist. 
Clearly profit levels also reflect the level of internal activity; 
the relative importance of one rather than another is difficult to
1.
The following net company profits on shareholders1 funds in 
manufacturing industry may provide some basis for comparison. 
Table XV(Ft)-l
Yet Company Profits on Shareholders1 Funds Employed: Manufacturing
Industry: 1950-51 to 1960-61
Year Profits % Year Profits °L
1950-51 9.0 1955-56 9.5
1951-52 7.8 1956-57 9.5
1952-53 8.7 1957-58 8.5
1953-54 10.1 1958-59 8.4
195V55 10.4 1959-60 8.3
1960-61 6.6
Source: Reserve Bank: Statistical Bulletin. These ratios are calcu-
lated from accounts issued by companies during the year. Since
balancing dates are spread throughout the year and some large companies 
balance at the beginning of the year, the economic conditions which 
the profits in any one year will reflect could differ substantially.
The series would need to have some adjustment made for variations in 
company tax rates since to a considerable extent this is treated by 
companies as a cost.
determine. Other factors of course determine profits in an industry 
in an absolute sense such as the level of internal competition, but 
unless we have reason to believe these have changed over the period 
they may be considered more important in relation to absolute 
profits rather than to changes from year to year* Factors such as 
growth of overall demand for products of particular industries would 
tend to have a longer term influence on profit levels; how these 
would reflect themselves in profits would depend upon a variety of 
factors concerning the industry and market organisation. On a priori 
grounds it might be reasonable to suggest that products for which 
demand has increased most significantly would tend to be products 
which can be traded internationally - or at least for there to be no 
particular bias towards products not traded internationally. 
Consequently this would not be the explanation of the more rapid 
growth of the gross margin in secondary industry as a whole.
Gross margins in predominantly exporting industries may be expect­
ed to behave differently to margins in industries serving the domestic 
market* Subclasses where the export market is a major determinant
1.
One could perhaps cite television sets as an example of a product 
for which there was a rapid increase in demand but in which there is 
only limited international trade. The component parts of television 
sets, however, can be considered internationally traded goods without 
any particular natural protection - with the exception perhaps of 
cabinets and the glass bulb for the picture tube. On the other hand, 
demand for electronic equipment, motor vehicles, plastic materials, 
and particular chemicals has also risen rapidly, all goods which are 
normally extensively traded internationally.
of internal profits are few in number; a number of other industries
have some export interest but it is normally small in relation to
that of the domestic market (See Chapter Xl)*
Price control, which reverted to the States in 1948 and applied
with varying but generally rapidly diminishing intensity from State
to State in the early years of the period, might be considered a
possible explanation. If the controls had held profits down, their
upward movement may simply have been a return to normal levels.
Cheek found that despite price controls, unit gross profit margins
rose substantially during 194B to 1950; he found no connexion between
price controls and movements in gross profit margins.
Similarly, while there is a relationship between movements in
stocks and profits this would not necessarily affect one set of
2industries rather than another; moreover, stock movements in the 
period under review, while they may be part of the explanation of 
annual movements, would not explain the divergence in the trend.
It would seem therefore that the major determinant of variations 
in the profitability of domestic manufacturing industries would be the 
level of internal activity. From the discussion in Chapter XIII it is 
clear that whatever influence the tariff has had in the longer term
IT
Cheek, op.cit.. p*19S
2.
If anything, one would expect unintended stock accumulation 
to occur in import competing industries because of the greater 
fluctuations.
sense over the period, it was not a major factor in determining 
yearly changes in the level of import competition facing import 
competing industries. Similarly, the discussion in Chapters VIII 
and X would leave little doubt that variations in the restrictions 
on imports have been the major determinant of year to year changes in 
the level of import competition.
The evidence on prices we can obtain from unit gross profit 
margins is far from satisfactoiy but it suggests that margins v/ere 
increased when competition was reduced. This may not have meant that 
prices were increased, although some fragmentary evidence of price 
increases has been presented; it may mean that reduced costs have not 
been revealed in selling prices. Together with the evidence in 
Chapters XI and XII it suggests fairly strongly that businessmen did 
’ride the market5where they were able.
We have only examined movements in indicators of output rather 
than output itself; our examination has similarly been limited to a 
group of import competing industries which, although we have termed it 
representative, may not be representative of import competing indust­
ries not included in the group. We have argued generally that the
T. ~
The importance of a given increase in the import ceiling will, 
of course, differ substantially according to circumstances within 
the economy or the particular industry. The increase in the 
ceiling from £775m. to £800m. in April, 1957 was probably of more 
concern to import competing industries than the increase from 
£800m. to £850m. in 1959.
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major determinant of short run changes in the level of import 
competition has been import licensing.
It is probable, nevertheless, that the import competing industries 
increased output over the period more than non traded goods industries.
The increase in unit gross margins in the predominantly non traded 
goods sector may explain in part the greater relative increase in 
employment in Group A subclasses than in value of product! oa. It may 
simply mean that prices have risen more than in the Group A sector 
and that value comparisons are correspondingly misleading.
Much of the discussion so far has been concerned with the short
'/teedrun aspects of the situation; we used to consider more specifically 
the longer run situation.
We observed in Chapter VII that there were grounds for arguing 
that there had been a decline in the average propensity to import 
during the period under review.
Answers now need to be provided to the questions: of what signi­
ficance for the economy as a whole was the direct import replacement 
which apparently took place in some sectors of manufacturing industry? 
to what extent was the direct import replacement which actually took 
place, induced by the quantitative controls on imports and what factors 
have enabled it to continue in existence? It will be apparent that 
both questions have to be considered in the context of a consideration 
of the events which followed the virtual removal of the quantitative 
controls on imports in I960, i.e. the extent to which the process of
d i r e c t  im p o r t re p la c e m e n t w hich  o c c u rre d  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  o f  t h e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on im p o r ts  was r e v e r s e d  when more o r  l e s s  f r e e  im p o rt 
c o m p e t i t io n  was p e r m i t t e d .
The fo l lo w in g  t a b l e  shows th e  a c t u a l  m ovem ents i n  im p o r ts  
r e l a t e d  t o  some m agn itudes o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  economy o v e r  th e  p e r io d .  
T a b le  XV-5
T ren d s i n  V a lu e  o f  Im p o r ts  1950-51  t o  1960-61
Y ear Im p o r ts  G .N .P . 
£m.
c . i . f .
Im p o r ts  o f  V a lu e  o f  ( i )  a s  p e r  ( i i i )  a s  ( i i i ) a s  
M a n u fa c t-  O u tp u t o f  c e n t  o f  p e r  c e n t  p e r  c e n t  
u r e d  P ro d -  F a c to r i e s  ( i i )  o f  ( i i )  o f  ( iv )
u c t s ' a '  (b)
£m,
( i ) ( i i ) ( u i ) ( iv ) (v) (v i) ( v i i )
1950 -1 839 3633 670 2097 23. I 1 8 .4 3 1 .9
1951-2 1203 3369 988 2562 3 1 .1 2 5 .5 3 8 .5
1952 -3 590 4213 456 2634 14.0 10.8 1 7 .4
1 9 5 3 -4 755 4562 6 0 4 3000 16.6 13.2 20.1
1954-5 938 4919 757 3330 1 9 .1 1 5 .4 2 2 .7
1955-6 926 5315 735 3652 1 7 .4 1 3 .3 20.1
19 5 6 -7 825 5743 627 3899 1 4 .4 1 0 .9 16.1
1957-8 910 5828 688 4145 15.6 11.8 16.6
1 9 5 3 -9 911 6231 693 4353 1 4 .7 11.1 1 5 .9
1959-60  1075 6894 816 4880 15*6 1 1 .9 1 6 .3
1960-1 1235 7255 977 5062 1 7 .0 1 3 .5 1 9 .3
S o u rc e : ( i )  Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ,  B a la n c e  o f  P ay m en ts .
( i i )  W hite P a p e r s :  N a t io n a l  Incom e and E x p e n d i tu r e .
( i i i )  T ab le  V I I-6
( iv )  S eco n d a ry  I n d u s t r i e s  B u l l e t i n  and Sum m aries o f  P r i n c i p a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  o f  F a c t o r i e s .
N o te s : (a )  A t n o t i o n a l  la n d e d  c o s t .  See A p p en d ices
VTI.A and  V I I .B .
(b) C la s s e s  I  t o  XV, i . e .  e x c lu d in g  C la s s  XVI -  
H e a t, L ig h t  and  Pow er.
rThe decline in spending on imports demonstrated by a decline in 
the ratio of imports to gross national product will consist of the 
two elements; one, the substitution of non traded goods for import­
ables and, two, the replacement of domestically produced importable 
goods for those previously obtained from overseas* There is some 
value in attempting to show the second separately and this implies 
comparing imports with the output of finished commodities at producer 
prices with imports. In a very rough way this is what column (viii)
iTable XV-5 attempts to do.
There seems little doubt from the data in the table that there
has been a considerable degree of direct import replacement over the
period though some of the import replacement which apparently took
whichplace during the period and/may, in part, have been induced by import 
controls, does not appear to have been maintained in the absence of 
the controls in 1960-61. The extent of the reversal of the process
1
of
Ö
1.
There are well known and real objections to the use of value of 
output, a major one of which is that they are gross figures, 
including double counting. At best, these figures can only be taken 
to indicate rough orders of magnitude of the value of output of 
manufacturing industry. A net figure such as the value of production 
would overcome this problem but it is not completely clear what 
meaning the result would have. If, during the period, the extent 
of double counting had increased, the value of production could be 
expected to decline as a proportion of total output. In fact, how­
ever, it increased gradually - and more or less steadily - indicating 
either a slight decline in the extent of duplication or an increase 
in the ratio of labour and overheads per unit value (or some 
opposite and to some extent offsetting movements in both)• Consequently 
the shape of a curve indicating changes in the ratio of imports to net 
value of production would be virtually identical with that of gross 
value of production.
of import replacement is probably somewhat less than suggested by the
ilevel of imports in 1960-61.
It is a commonplace argument that there is a tendency for 
increased development of an economy to result in increased expenditure 
on services. Since these items have a low import content they make 
increased expenditure on services probably the most straightforward way 
by which the propensity to import will fall. Insofar as it can be 
judged, expenditure on services has probably increased over the period. 
The value of production of manufacturing industries also increased 
over the period as a percentage of gross national product; in part this 
represents an increase in manufacturing activity at the expense of 
imports. However, if imports of goods competing with locally produced 
manufactured goods are added there is no clear tendency for the two 
as a total of G.N.P. to decline.
1.
See references in Chapter VII to the effect of abnormal factors 
on the demand for imports in 1960-61.
2.
From the national income statistics it may be seen that personal 
expenditure on consumption of a services nature (costs of personal 
assurance business, rents and imputed rents, electricity and gas, 
fares, domestic servants, and other personal expenditure) was almost 
21 per cent, of gross domestic expenditure in 1960-61 compared with 
just over 15 per cent, in 1950-51* Including expenditure on food 
which, in the Australian context, is probably not inappropriate, the 
percentage has increased from about 32 per cent, to some 36 per cent. 
Expenditure . on public works and services has increased marginally 
as a proportion of gross domestic expenditure. While this does seem 
to support the probability of an increase in expenditure on service 
type consumption and food it is a superficial analysis. Clearly 
some public authority expenditure will be directly on imports, for 
example.
It seems likely, therefore, that to a considerable degree the
import substitution which is demonstrated by the movement in the
import propensities was a result of import replacement by manufactur- 
-)ing industry.
Manufacturing industry, of course, consists of both traded and
non traded goods. It may be that expenditure on the non traded goods
sector has itself increased as a proportion of total expenditure.
Certainly the increase in value of production of the sector of second-
aiy industry, which excluded the Group A subclasses, was not greatly
different from that of Group A subclasses themselves. However, the
nature of the industries contained within it and the special meaning
2we attached to the term non traded, make the experience of the aggre­
gate of secondary industry excluding Group A subclasses of limited 
value as a basis for conclusions regarding the non traded goods sector.
Our concern is more immediately with import replacement, in its 
direct sense, which took place in the import competing sector. The
Of course, the value of production includes value of production 
of goods for export. The omission of an allowance for changes in 
this factor - which would be proportionately quite small - is 
unlikely to be of significance.
2.
In effect, we defined as non traded goods, those goods which were 
not in fact being traded under normal commercial conditions during the 
period, i.e. it would include as non traded goods those where tariff 
protection was adequate or more than adequate. It excluded goods such 
as prefabricated houses which reflected the abnormal conditions of the 
1950-51 and 1951-52 period. The example of prefabricated houses 
illustrates the conceptually imprecise nature of the term non traded 
good, and that our special meaning is only a difference of degree and 
not of principle.
information presented for individual subclasses in Table VII-5, 
provides some indication of the degree of direct import replacement 
which has taken place in manufacturing industry. However, what the 
table really shows is the extent to which the activity in each sub­
class has grown in relation to total demand for the products of the 
subclass. This may explain, for example, why in the chemical industry
- normally considered a prime example of direct import replacement -
1there appears to have been no net import replacement. Yet the 
expansion of the chemical industry in terms of value of output has 
been greater than the average for manufacturing industry as a whole 
as may be seen from Table XI-2.
In previous chapters we have already considered some aspects of 
the part played by movements in tariff protection and by overseas 
investment in Australia. An important factor which remains to be 
considered is the movements in relative costs or prices of imported 
goods vis-a-vis those manufactured in Australia.
Indexes of import price movements over the period both by major 
commodity groups and by sources of origin are shorn in Tables XV-/Zand
*It should be noted that the chemical industry includes both the heavy 
chemicals subclass (ill-l) and the explosives subclass (HI-3) • It 
was not possible to treat them separately since they were combined 
for the purposes of the official statistics prior to 1952-53* Value 
of production for the explosives subclass fell from almost £6m. in 
1957-53 to less than £2§m. in 1960-61. The number of establishments 
also fell from 17 to 13 over the same period. It is therefore possible 
that there has been some transfer between subclasses - it need not be 
the case that the transfer was to subclass III-l - and consequently 
the overall growth of subclass III-l was offset in part by the decline 
in subclass III-3*
X V - a t  the end of this chapter. These leave little doubt that, in 
general, relative prices in Australia have moved against the domestic 
producer* Annual changes in these indexes are shown in Table XV-6. 
Table VI-(
Annual Percentage Changes in Imnort and Wholesale Prices
1950-51 to 1961-1962
Ysa£ Import Price Wholesale (Basic
Inders, Materials and Food-
stuffs) Index.
(Goods principally 
home produced)
% %
1951-52 19 26
1952-53 -  3 9
1953-54 -  4 2
1954-55 1 (a)
1955-56 3 4
1956-57 2 1
1957*553 3 - 1
1958-59 (a) 1
1959-60 1 5
1960-61 2 5
1961-62 2 - 8
(a) less than 0*5 per cent.
Source: Import Price Index : Table XV-12 and source
there cited.
: Wholesale Price Index : Ilonthlv Review of 
Business Statistics.
The wholesale price index in particular is unsatisfactory for
purposes of comparisons of relative prices - and even less satisfactory 
as a measure of relative cost movements, to the extent that prices do
not move in the same way as costs* Moreover, of course, in the aggre­
gate they contain individual elements which may move significantly
differently to that of the average. The sub-indexes of the wholesale 
price index provide little help here since they contain both imported 
and home produced goods.
Table XV-11 presents some statistics for wages in Britain and in 
Australia. This shows that since 1955 nominal weekly wage rates have 
risen less in Australia than in the United Kingdom. Although strict 
comparisons are not possible between the series of actual earnings 
data, it would appear that actual earnings moved upward more rapidly 
in Australia up to about 1956-57 but that, subsequently, actual earnings 
have increased faster in the United Kingdom than in Australia. Wage 
rate series - particularly series of actual earnings - are of course not 
a satisfactory basis for comparisons of cost movements. Wage costs 
need not move commensurately with movements in wage rates or wage earn­
ings; these may simply reflect increases in productivity, some or all 
of the benefits of which are being passed on to labour.
Other exporting countries are becoming increasingly important in 
the Australian market, and Table XV-7 shows movements in wholesale 
prices for a number of these.
The indexes in Table XV-7 would seem to suggest that Britain had 
improved her competitive cost position not only relative to Australia 
but relative to all other countries shown. Apart from t he fact that
17 ~
But note the fall in Australian wholesale prices in 1961-62 
in the previous table.
Table XV-7
W holesale P r ic e  Indexes : S e lec ted  C ountries 
(Base Year 1953 = 100)
le a n A u s t r a l ia ( a) West Germany Janan U nited Kingdom U.S,A.
1951 S5 100
i ® W
i t 104
1952 93 103 i t 101
1953 100 100 100 i t 100
1954 99 93 99 100(c) 100
1955 103 100 93 103 101
1956 106 102 102 107 104
1957 107 103 105 107 107
1958 105 103 98 101 108
1959 106 102 99 102 108
1960 112 103 101 102 10S(d)
1961 108 105 105 101 108(d)
(a) B asic  M a te r ia ls  only
(b) D iscontinuous s e r ie s
(c) New Inde^; : base y e a r  1954 = 100
(d) Linked s e r ie s
Source: Monthly Review of B usiness S t a t i s t i c s  
th e  b a s is  of export p r ic in g  i s  o f te n  d i f f e r e n t  to  th a t  fo r  th e  dom estic 
m arket, in  c o u n tr ie s  such as Japan and th e  U nited Kingdom, as in  
A u s tra l ia ,  comparisons o f w holesale p r ic e  s e r ie s  a re  of l im ite d  va lue  
s in ce  th e y  w i l l  a lso  r e f l e c t  movements in  im port p r ic e s .
1
Export p r ic e s  a lso  have l im i ta t io n s  f o r  t h i s  purpose, bu t su b jec t 
to  th e se  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  may prov ide  some in d ic a t io n  o f th e  movement of 
r e l a t iv e  p r ic e s ,  (see Table XV-8)•
1.
Export p r ic e  indexes r e f l e c t  to  some e x te n t a t  l e a s t  th e  com petitive  
s i tu a t io n  on w orld  m arke ts. They may a lso  be a f fe c te d  s ig n if ic a n t ly  
by ex p o rts  of p a r t i c u la r  ty p es  o r to  p a r t i c u la r  m arkets n o t re le v a n t 
to  A u s tra l ia .  For example, th e  U.S. index  w i l l  be in flu en ced  by 
p r ic e s  of ex p o rts  of farm  p ro ducts  -  only one item  of which (Tobacco) 
i s  exported  on a s u b s ta n t ia l  s c a le  to  A u s tra l ia .
Table XV-8
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Export Price Indexes of Major Supplying Countries 
1950-61 (Base: 1955= 100)
Year United Kincdom United States West Germanv Japan
1950 84 88 81 90
1951 99 101 99 1291952 104 100 107 106
1953 100 100 100 100
1954 99 99 98 96
1955 101 100 98 97
1956 105 103 101 101
1957 no 107 103 98
1958 109 106 103 89
1959 108 106 100 92I960 n o 108 101 941961 111 n o 106 93
Source? I*M#F. International Financial Statistics 
While these indexes reflect the relative movements in export
prices in favour of Japan and Germany since 1953* they do not suggest 
that export prices in the United Kingdom and in the U.S.A. have moved 
significantly differently to wholesale prices in Australia.
The evidence of the various prices series presented does seem to 
suggest some relative improvement in the competitive position of Aust­
ralian industry in the later years of the period, though in itself 
it would not seem to indicate that this improvement was sufficient to 
explain the local industry’s ability to maintain its increased share 
of the domestic market against competition from imports.
We have already observed that one major defect of price series of 
this nature is that they may or may not reflect movements in productivity .1
‘Few attempts have been made by Australian economists to measure produc­
tivity movements, partly due, no doubt, to the absence of an official 
index of industrial or manufacturing production. Maizels examined long
(cont’d overleaf).
Table XV-9
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Indexes of Wage C osts in  M anufacturing: U nited Kingdom and
A u stra lia ?  1950-51 to  1960-61
l e a r ^ Volume of Average 
Output p e r Weekly 
Person Wage
Wage Costs Volume of 
p e r U nit Output 
of Output p e r Person
Average
Weekly
Wage
Wage C osts 
p e r U nit 
o f Output
( i) ( i i ) ( i i i ) (iv ) ~TT T (v i]------
1951 100 100 100 100 100 100
1952 97 108 111 102 123 121
1953 102 113 111 101 132 131
1954 106 118 111 113 139 123
1955 n o 126 115 118 148 125
1956 109 lf-6 12.5 120 158 132
1957 111 143 129 123 165 134
1958 111 148 133 129 169 131
1959 118 152 129 134 174 130
I960 122 156 128 143 188 131
1961 121 162 134 148 197 133
(a) U .K .: c a len d a r y e a rs j A u s tra l ia :  y e a r  ended 30th June.
Source: ( i )  N a tio n a l I n s t i t u t e  of Economic and S o c ia l Research (U.K.)
Index o f Output p e r  person  employed in  m anufacturing , p u b lish ed  
in  N a tio n a l I n s t i t u t e  Economic Review (rev ise d  index  on b a s is  
1958= 100) .....................
( i i )  N ational. I n s t i t u t e  Economic Review. O f f ic ia l  (M in is try  of 
Labour) Wage r a te  indexes (o ld  and new s e r ie s )  l in k e d ,
( i i i )  Column ( i i )  d iv id ed  by column ( i )
(iv ) A.N.Z. Bank index  o f fa c to ry  p ro d u c tio n  exclud ing  power, 
( lin k ed  s e r ie s  from H .F .L ydall, o p ,c i t , ) .  d iv id ed  by index of 
annual average of persons employed in  m anufacturing in d u s try  -  
In d u s try  c la s s e s  I  -  XV ( i . e ,  exclud ing  pow er). Data from 
Secondary In d u s tr ie s  B u l le t in s .
(v) Index of Average Weekly Wage Earnings in  M anufacturing (New 
S e rie s ) from Monthly B u lle t in  of Employment S t a t i s t i c s ,
(v i) Column (v) d iv id ed  by column ( iv ) .
F t , l  c o n t 'd  from p rev ious page
term  tre n d s  in  lab o u r p ro d u c tiv i ty  from 1911-13 to  1953-54 -  1954-55 in  
A .M aizels, ’’Trends in  P ro d u ctio n  and Labour P ro d u c tiv ity  in  A u s tra lia n  
M anufacturing I n d u s t r ie s ”, Economic Record. Vol.XXXIII, No.65, (August, 
1957), p p .162-181. For th e  p e rio d  1 9 4 7 - /3 '-  1949-50 to  1953-54 -  1954- 
55 he estim ated  an in c re a se  in  volume of m anufacturing  ou tpu t p e r employ­
ee of about 25 p e r c en t, o r s l ig h t ly  g re a te r  i f  allow ance f o r  t h e  d e c lin e  
in  hours worked i s  made. A s e r ie s  of e s tim a te s  of p ro d u c tiv ity  movements 
in  a l l  m ajor sec tio n s  o f th e  economy from 1953-54 to  1957-58 was p re s e n t­
ed by Dr. W .F .G .S alter, in  h is  S tatem ent of Evidence given b efo re  th e  
A rb i t r a t io n  Court in  th e  B asic  Wage Enouirv. 1959. Dr S a l te r  e stim ated  
th e  annual in c re a se  o f o u tp u t p e r person  engaged du rin g  th e  p e rio d  cover­
ed w ith in  th e  range 3 .5 to  5*5 p e r c en t. The method used in  Table XV-9 
i s  analogous to  th a t  used  by D r .S a l te r  f o r  th e  purpose of making s im ila r  
com parisons.
The series presented in Table XV-9 do attempt to make allowance
for this factor insofar as the comparative position of Australia and
the United Kingdom is concerned.
Apart from conceptual difficulties involved in the measurement
of productivity, the data in the table can be only approximations.
Indexes of factory production can at best only imperfect indicators
and the degree of imperfection increases substantially, the longer
2the period covered by the index from the base year. Moreover, the
3coverage is a relatively low proportion of total factory output,"
1 Cf. R. Wilson, "Facts and Fancies of Productivity", ANZAAS paper, 
1947; F.B. Horner, "The Meaning of Production Indexes", Economic 
Record, Vol.37, No.77, (March 1961), pp.82-97.
2 It is generally accepted that the use of a weighting system for 
more than five years tends seriously to impair the efficiency of 
a production index, Cf, Index Numbers of Industrial Production,
U.N. Statistical Office, New York, 1950. The ANZ Bank Index is 
currently based on 1953-54 weights. The previous index with which 
it has been linked for the present purpose was based on 1948-49,
3 The index covers under half factory output. Dr. Salter has argued 
that the ANZ Bank index would tend to understate total output 
growth on the grounds that products not covered in the index are 
to a large extent either new products (such as plastics) highly 
complex products, (such as electronic equipment), output of which 
tends to expand at a faster rate than average (op, cit., p.8),
On the other hand, for most industrial subclasses some, and for 
a number a substantial, proportion of the activity within the 
subclass consists of repair or service facilities. For some - 
such as motor vehicle and shoe repairs this is the major or sole ac 
tivity. It might be expected that increases in output in these 
activities would tend to be generally lower than average. It is 
not clear that this effect would be completely outweighed by that 
to which Dr, Salter refers. This is given some support if the 
index is applied to the value of output to which it refers. The 
implied price movement in the index can then be seen to be between 
12-13% from 1953-54 to 1960-61. Over the same period the wholesale 
price index (principally home produced) increased by some 16%, and 
the consumer price index by about 21%. This does not suggest any 
pronounced bias in either direction.
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In addition, the wage series used are not completely appropriate
nor is there strict comparability among the series used for Australia
and that used for the United Kingdom; particularly the United
Kingdom index will understate British wage cost movements relative
2to those of Australian wage costs*
Despite these limitations, the trends revealed seem to be 
sufficiently pronounced to enable conclusions to be drawn with some 
confidence. In the early years of the period covered there was a 
pronounced deterioration in Australia’s competitive position vis-a- 
vis the United Kingdom. Although the subsequent movement is by no 
means uniform from year to year, this trend was clearly reversed in 
the later years of the period and Australian industry appears to 
have made a considerable improvement in its competitive position 
vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. This situation is also demonstrated 
in comparison with import prices from the United Kingdom; and to 
some degree with import prices overall.
Two further factors need to be considered. First, although 
Britain remains the largest supplier to the Australian market, in 
many industries competition is being experienced increasingly from
1 The Australian wage series which include wages earned in the heat, 
light and power industries, is an earnings series; that for the 
United Kingdom is a wage rates series.
2 See L.A. Dicks-Mineaux and J.R. Shephard, ’’The Wages Structure 
and Some Implications for Incomes Policy”, National Institute 
Economic Review. No.22 (November 1962). The authors found that 
earnings in manufacturing rose by over 5% more than the wage 
rate index from 1948-50 to 1957-58 (p.40).
other sources, particularly the United States, Japan and Western 
Germany.
Comparisons of the various price series presented suggest a 
possible improvement in the relative competitive position of 
Australian industry in relation to imports from the United States 
and Canada since 1952-53; nor does there appear to have been a 
noticeable deterioration vis-a-vis imports from other non sterling 
countries as a whole. The competitive situation in relation to all 
of these countries is, of course, conditioned by the higher (m.f.n.) 
tariff levels which apply to imports from these countries, and these 
rates are increasingly becoming the effective protective rate. This 
will have offset to some extent the probability that the apparent 
improvement in the competitive situation vis-a-vis Britain and the 
United States has not been paralleled in the case of Japan.
The second factor is that the series we have been considering 
are averages. The situation will undoubtedly differ significantly 
from case to case. It could be argued that unit wage costs would 
tend to decline more in import competing industries than in non 
traded goods industries. This could be due to the greater stimulus 
to the introduction of more efficient machinery and techniques whic'h 
would result from import competition; and that to the extent that 
expansion was greater in these industries than in the non traded 
goods sector this has required investment in new - usually more 
efficient - machinery, and has enabled more of the benefits of
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increasing scale of operations to be obtained. To the extent that
this is so the improvement in the competitive position of import
1competing industries would be correspondingly greater.
Despite the qualifications necessary it would seem that there 
has been a significant improvement in the competitive position of 
Australian secondary industry in the later years of the period, due 
to reductions in unit wage costs. This trend may have been further 
assisted to the extent that costs of imported raw materials were 
reduced as a result of the removal of discrimination in the 
licensing system, or the relaxation and ultimate removal of the 
controls altogether.
One further factor needs to be considered briefly; this is 
the extent to which the ‘natural1 protection provided by freight 
charges has changed over the period. It is clear from Table XV-10 
that the protection afforded to local industry by freight rates has 
varied considerably from year to year. Movements in c.i.f. charges 
as a proportion of total imports, however, are inadequate as in­
dicators of movements in actual rates,since they do not take account 
of price changes in imports. In the following table the costs of 
freight have been shown as proportions of the volume of imports at 
constant prices.
1 This may be offset to some extent if - as well may be the case - 
productivity in the export industries of the United Kingdom has 
increased more rapidly than in British industry in general.
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Table XV-10: C.i.f. Charges as Percentages of Imports at Constant Prices.
Year ended June.
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
13.1 16.1 16.4 11.2 11.4 14.0 16.6 17.0 16.2 15.5 14.7
Source: Appendix VII:A
The figures in Table XV-10 represent the average amount of 
fnatural! protection provided by the c.i.f. charges for each of the 
years of the period. The 1natural* protection received by the 
Australian producers of importable goods has fluctuated over the period 
but the apparent upward trend in freight rates has on average been 
fairly slight. On particular items or for particular industries the 
movements may have been more substantial but in some cases this may 
have been offset by increases in freight, including coastal shipping, 
rates within Australia.
From the investigation of the effects of import controls on 
secondary industry in the present and previous chapters it may be 
possible to draw some more or less tentative conclusions. Clearly 
there has been a substantial expansion of activity in manufacturing 
industry in the period under review. We may, a priori, expect this 
expansion to have been greater in the import competing sector than 
in the sector producing non traded goods and some support is given 
to this view by the evidence presented.
The factors determining the areas of expansion in secondary 
production are many but there are clear grounds for thinking that
the direct control of imports and the opportunities it provided 
through the reduction of supplies and the elimination or reduction 
of import competition were important factors. There may be some 
grounds for thinking, however, that the controls on imports may 
have been of as great, if not greater, significance in influencing 
the level of returns in the import competing industries.
The limited evidence seems to suggest considerably more 
variability of returns to the import competing industries than to 
the balance of secondary industry. It may also indicate a greater 
upward trend in prices - insofar as these are indicated by move­
ments in g*oss profit margins - in the non traded goods sector.
In Chapter VII we noted Cheek’s conclusion that there was no
evidence that businessmen successfully rode the market in times of
1high demand. Evidence of ’riding the market1 in the case of par­
ticular industries benefitting from protection of import licensing 
has been presented and the evidence of the unit gross profit margins 
suggests that in total these individual cases were significant. 
However, to the extent that we are able to draw general conclusions 
from the evidence presented the riding of the market may not have 
been limited to the sector protected by import licensing. The 
evidence is not inconsistent with the situation that the riding of 
the market was more successful in the case of industries which did
1 Cheek, op. cit.. p.205
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not benefit from import licensing. The conclusion in this latter 
respect can be no more than tentative but it is consistent with 
the general process of the transfer of prosperity from the traded 
sector to the non traded goods sector and the fact that while the 
market situation in both sectors may be tempered by internal com­
petition, the non traded sector avoids the further tempering from 
import competition.
Consequently, while the movement in gross profit margins may
1in part represent technological changes in industries or increases 
in prices and/or costs, the extent of the movement would together 
with the other evidence seem to suggest some degree of riding the 
market both in import competing and in industries, particularly in 
the second intensification period.
There seems little doubt that there has been a significant 
degree of direct import replacement in secondary industry during 
the period. Mich of this would appear to have been artificially 
induced by the controls on imports though clearly much of it cannot 
be directly attributed to the controls. Despite an apparent reversal 
in many areas in 1960-61, the extent of the reversal has clearly 
been overstated in the data presented in view of the abnormal
1 It is interesting that the stability of the gross profit margin 
is the common experience of investigators overseas. Moreover, 
it should be noted that the upward trend in gross profit margins 
reveals a different pattern to that observed by Cheek who noted 
the relative stability of the margin during the period 1945-46 
to 1954-55« The data in Table XV-4 indicate a relatively stable 
pattern to 1955-56 (in line with Cheek*s conclusions op. cit., 
p.192) but show a rising trend in subsequent years.
importing pattern in that year* It seems reasonable to conclude that 
in fact much of the direct import replacement has been retained des­
pite the removal of import controls.
It is not possible to be at all precise about the reason for 
what appears to have been a permanent movement in the import pro­
pensity. There may have been some diversion of total demand to the 
non traded goods sector but this does not seem to have been at the 
expense of demand for manufactured importables. It seems probable 
that the initial relative price movement in favour of the non traded 
goods sector may have been offset to some extent at least by perhaps 
greater increases in costs and/or prices.
There have been increases in effective tariff protection over 
the period arising both from increases in tariff rates and from 
existing tariff rates applying to a wider volume of production. The 
second factor is difficult to assess in the absence of a much more 
detailed examination of the data for individual industries and for 
individual products. The general increase in tariff rates over the 
period, however, would not appear to have been substantial. In general, 
therefore, it would seem possible to argue that while the increase 
in effective tariff protection has been an important factor during 
the period, particularly in certain industries, it is far from the 
complete explanation of the reduction in the import propensity.
Some part of the answer - and it may well be substantial - may 
lie in the fact of the removal of the major import competitors
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through their acquiring an interest in the manufacture of their 
product in Australia. The association between total direct invest­
ment and imports from the investing country is clearly a complex 
one. The product may replace other local goods rather than imports 
or the investment may be in the form of an assembly plant where, 
since we are not considering a static situation, imports of com­
ponents may be greater value than the previous imports of the 
complete item. We have seen, however, that the effect of import 
controls would be to encourage direct import replacing investment 
and to discourage manufacturing operations limited to the assembly 
stage. It was also argued that overseas investment in domestic 
production would tend to be more competitive with overseas compet­
ition to the extent that the most efficient overseas supplier enters 
into local production.
Other forms of protective devices may have been developed
1during the period which are important for particular products
but in total these are unlikely to have made a contribution of any
significance.
Some increase in ties between manufacturers and merchants may
2be of significance in particular industries but again in total 
unlikely to provide much of the explanation. Similarly, uncertain­
ties associated with importing, as for example those induced by
1 E.g. State health regulations for animal and vegetable products 
prohibition of the use of wax matches (on safety grounds) in 
Australia.
2 E.g. paper making, plywood.
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local manufacturers applying for or threatening to apply for temporary 
protection are unlikely to 1b significant in total, though possibly 
significant to producers of particular products.
Some contribution may also have been made by changes in tastes. 
Where the local manufacturer has been able to take advantage of short­
ages of a traditional1 2 product by establishing a reputation for 
quality and a particular demand for his own product, he may maintain
his market even when ample supplies of the traditional imported product
2again become available.
Although there have been considerable variations in freight 
rates from year to year over the period, freight charges have shown 
some tendency to increase over the period and may have provided some 
slight increase in natural protection. For some industries this 
increase may have been offset by increases in transport costs within 
Australia. Overall this is unlikely to have been important.
While these various factors have each made some contribution 
to the decline in the import propensity, and some of them a significant 
contribution, it is possible - and in fact probable - that in total 
they fail to provide the whole answer. It seems possible to argue
1 Cf. Brent H. Evans (Secretary, Australian Tariff Council, previously 
the Joint Committee for Tariff Revision), "Temporary Protection", 
Economic Monograph. No.244> Economic ^ociety of Australia and New 
Zealand, (NSW Branch), July 1962, p.5.
2 This is distinct from the production in Australia of the traditional1 
imported product which has already teen considered.
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that some part, which may be a significant part, of the explanation, 
lies in improvements in productivity and to some extent reduced raw 
materials costs which have placed many products in a more favourable 
competitive position vis-a-vis imported goods. The evidence present­
ed, subject as it is to many qualifications, suggests that this 
factor may have been of considerable importance.
It also must be recognised that the retention of the market 
after the removal of import restrictions was in many cases achieved 
only by means of a considerable reduction in profit margins. More­
over, in view of the excess demand existing in the economy in 1960- 
61 and the deflationary situation in 1961-62 it must be admitted
that any conclusions drawn on the basis of the situation in either
1of these two years must be subject some qualification.
It seems clear that some of the direct import replacement 
which took place during the period under review is being, or will 
be, maintained under conditions where imports are free of such 
restrictions only with some difficulty and with relatively high 
levels of tariff protection. On the other hand much of this 
direct import replacement appears to have been maintained in the 
face of unrestricted import competition, in many cases with a 
reduction of prices and profits margins but not necessarily to an
1 This is given some point by the example of belting fabric where 
although local prices had been higher than the imported product 
’for some time”, the local telting manufacturers had not started 
to import until late in 1962. See Report of the Special Advisory 
Authority. Belting Fabric. 17.1.1963, p.2.
unreasonably low level.
1In some of the areas where it has not been maintained, or
has been maintained only with the assistance of substantially
2increased tariff protection it should be observed that part at 
least of this failure for the import replacement to s tick has not 
been an unfavourable movement in relative prices vis-a-vis trad­
itional suppliers but with respect to new suppliers such as Japan 
and to a lesser extent, in terms of overall significance, Hong 
Kong. To this extent, while the expansion in some industries in 
this situation under the shelter of the restrictions may have 
proved in the event to have been uneconomic it was not necessarily 
demonstrably the case when the expansion was initiated. In other 
words, the emergence of Japan as a low cost producer of a number 
of products competitive with Australian production could have 
rendered domestic production of such products uneconomic, even 
had the expansion of the Australian industry naturally entered into 
the process of import replacement been influenced only by the 
existing price relationships.
The extent of the part played by any one of the factors we 
have considered remains a matter largely of conjecture. Neverthe­
less, it seems possible to conclude that, for a variety of reasons,
1 E.g. artificial flowers
2 E.g, synthetic fibres.
much of the direct import replacement which took place over the 
period, including that induced or Artificially* stimulated by 
the quantitative controls on imports, has in fact become natural 
import replacement in that it has continued in the face of 
unrestricted imports without significant increases in tariff
protection
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Chapter XVI
Effect on Export Prices
In the discussion in Chapter V above, we saw that the imposition 
of quantitative restrictions on imports could be expected to have 
certain effects on the price received by or charged by exporters.
The particular direction of such a change, i.e. whether import 
prices increase or decrease, will depend upon a variety of factors, 
including the degree and nature of competition existing in the market, 
the form of the restrictions actually imposed on imports, and the rela­
tionships which existed or developed between importers and exporters.
Under competitive conditions, the reduction in the volume of the 
export good purchased, consequent upon the restriction of the total 
volume of commodities which are permitted entry into an import market 
will increase total supplies relative to demand and will consequently 
tend to reduce the price of t hese goods if supply is to be equated 
with demand* This effect will, of c ourse, be smaller the smaller the 
amount that the actual cut in imports by the restricting country 
represents of total demand in world markets for the c ommodity.
For a wide range of manufactured goods, competitive marketing 
conditions do not exist. Under these circumstances, the existence of 
quantitative restrictions on imports may lead to a number of differing 
responses from exporters in their pricing policies* The principal 
factors which influence this response are as follows:
First, if a value quota is used as the means of restriction, the 
exporter may see advantage in reducing the price in order to increase 
the volume he is able to sell to the market. While this would reduce 
his r e t u m  per unit of exports, he may consider this justified for two 
reasons:* (a) he may consider it worthwhile as a longer term policy 
in order to maintain the product before consumers, preserve distribu­
tion channels, or to provide some discouragement to the local production 
of a directly competitive product> (b) if an exporter has a locally 
established branch or subsidiaiy, he will be able to avoid the loss of 
profit which would otherwise result from the reduced price received 
for exports, since it would merely mean a transfer of the point where 
the profits are taken. In addition, as a result of the restrictions 
on imports, an additional profit will be available on the limited 
volume which does enter. The less other exporters reduce their export 
prices, the greater the discrepancy between demand and supply of the 
import item, and the greater the incentive for the exporter with a 
local associate to reduce his price and increase his share of sales.
Second, to the extent that the exporting interests have or are 
able to create a strong monopolistic position, an incentive will 
exist for them to increase their prices to absorb some or all of the 
increase in prices which it was possible to obtain for the limited 
supplies available within the restricting economy.
Third, if a volume quota is the method of restriction employed 
the exporter will have some incentive to raise his export price, since
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this will not affect the level of imports permitted. Moreover, although 
in the case of the licensing system operated in Australia from 1952 
to I960, the value quota was the principal method used, there were 
many items, particularly of basic raw materials, where increases in 
the value of the quota were made where price increases had, or project­
ed increases would have, reduced the volume of imports. Items licensed 
on a specific licence basis were not uncommonly considered in quantity 
terms rather than by value.
There are thus a number of factors operating to move prices 
actually paid for imports in different directions. Were the restric­
tion of imports the only influence of significance during the period, 
it would be optimistic to expect prices series to show any precise re­
action one way or another. There were in fact many factors operating 
during this period affecting the determination of prices. One compli­
cating factor is the fact that before the imposition of quantitative 
import restrictions in 1952, many items obtained partly or wholly from 
overseas were in short supply in Australia as a result of the limited 
supplies available from the United Kingdom and other easy currency 
areas, the existing restrictions on imports from the dollar areas and 
Japan, and the limited productive capacity in Australia for many 
products in high demand. Because of this shortage of supplies of a 
number of items and the pressure of demand for these items, the market 
situation internally was not very different from that which existed 
under import licensing. Exporters thus had a similar incentive to
raise their prices. In some items the shortages had been overcome 
in earlier years* while for others the shortages remained well after 
1951.
Thus to some extent, so far as seeking the reflection in export­
ers* pricing policies of the restriction of imports is concerned, the 
situation after 1952 in regard to many commodities would not have 
differed from that existing before the full scale reimposition of 
import licensing.
One difference of importance, however, is that the situation of 
shortages before 1952 was to a considerable extent world wide. The 
high level of internal activity and the pressures on existing supplies 
may have enabled some differentiation in pricing in this market rela­
tive to other markets to have taken place* Generally, however, one 
would expect the increased export prices to have applied in all export 
markets - those markets which were unwilling to pay these prices being 
denied supplies to enable the limited quantities available to go to 
those who were willing to pay. In the situation after 1952, the 
essential nature of the effect of quantitative restrictions is twofold. 
The reduction of demand relative to supplies would affect prices on 
all export markets. Other effects, i*e. pricing to appropriate the
IT
Nevertheless, examples of discriminstory pricing during this 
period may be found* For example, British exporters of rayon 
y a m  charged higher prices in the Australian market than in New 
Zealand (both prices were substantially higher than domestic 
price)• Tariff Board Report, Woven Ravon Piece Goods Industry. 
26.8.1949, pp.23-24.
importers1 margins and tailoring prices to the form of import control 
in operation in the export market, necessarily imply discriminatory 
pricing practices in the restricted market*
It is customary to assume that the market in Australia is 
sufficiently small for any action taken in regard to imports to have 
no practical effect on the level of export prices to this market. 
Under circumstances where only a few items are subjected to changes 
in, say, tariff rates which reduce to some extent the volume of 
imports, this argument may be more or less valid as far as export 
prices in general are concerned, though not in respect of the price 
of the product to which the tariff rate is applied. In t he circum­
stances of the 1952 restrictions when imports were reduced to about 
half the level of the previous year there seems less reason to accept 
this proposition. Certainly, in total the import cuts made by 
Australia represented a little under two per cent, of total world 
exports; while small this is certainly not insignificant. Moreover, 
for some items, e.g. textiles, motor vehicles, the total share of 
world exports taken by Australia would have been larger than the
average, and the cuts proportionately, were also larger than the 
2average.
T.For a convenient series of value of world exports see G.A.T.T. 
Trends in International Trade. Report by a Panel of Experts,
Geneva, October 1958, Appendix Table A.
2.On a constant price basis imports of textiles in 1952-53 were 
slightly less than a quarter of the level of the previous year, 
while imports of built up motor vehicles fell from some 73,000 
units to about 6,000 units. In the case of motor vehicles the 
decline would be less - closer to two thirds in value terms - when 
c.k.d. packs, components etc. are taken into account.
Even though reductions of this order of magnitude could reason­
ably be expected to have some effect on world export prices, this is 
not to say that we may expect to identify them in indexes of export 
prices* The effect is almost certain to be outweighed by other 
influences being exerted on world prices at the same time* A decline 
in raw material prices from the high levels of the Korean War boom 
period had started in 1951 and continued in 1952* Trade in manufac­
tured goods where price movements show up only very slowly was being 
affected by the intensification of trade and exchange restrictions 
among industrialised countries in 1951* Apparently prices of these 
goods continued to rise in 1952 but declined in 1953» This is given
some support by the movement in the export price indexes for the
2United Kingdom and West Germany in Table XV - 10.
The various indexes in Table X7I-1 show a somewhat diverse 
pattern, and generally reflect the factors to which reference has been 
made above. One might conjecture that the restrictions on Australian 
imports of textiles from Britain, increased supplies of which had been 
diverted to Australia as demand slackened in other markets, may have
1.
Although the volume fell, See Trends in International Trade. 
Graph 1, p*14»
2.
The fact that the United States index in Table XV-10 does not 
show a comparable upward movement may be attributed to its larger 
weighting of unmanufactured goods. The downward movement for 
Japan may be partly due to a greater weighting for textiles and 
to the more competitive pricing of Japanese exports necessary to 
break into world markets, made possible by the rapid increases in 
productivity.
helped to trigger off the decline although it seems inevitable that 
demand in Australia would have fallen substantially and that prices 
on world markets would have fallen irrespective of the imposition 
of direct controls in Australia.
Table XVT-.1
Import Price Indexes: Selected Items by Quarters 
1951-52“and First Half 1952-5?
1950-51 = 100
Quarters
1951-52 1952-53
. 1st. . 2nd. pxCL • 4th. 1st. 2nd
Index:
All Items 112 114 113 Ill 108 107
Basic Materials 109 113 106 93 86 81
Textiles 119 119 114 105 96 92
Metal Mfrs. 113 115 117 119 119 118
Motor Vehicles 111. 114 116 121 119 119
Elect. Mch’y 109 112 113 116 119 119
Other Machines 
and Mch*y 106 108 111 113 117 118
Other Mfrs. 118 122 122 120 117 113
Source: Commonwealth Bank
In the 1954-55 period the indexes for the corresponding periods 
following the reimposition of the controls show a variable but gener­
ally upward movement in import prices* Compared with 1952 the 
reductions were both smaller and were imposed more gradually. Conse­
quently, even less discernible price effects might be expected* In
addition, on this occasion the restrictions were imposed in different 
world market conditions.
Since the controls were lifted there have been signs of substantial 
reductions in prices of some commodities exported to Australia, partic­
ularly chemicals, some textile materials, certain basic metal products 
etc. In some cases these appear to be the result of dumping on the 
Australian market either to obtain the market from the local producer 
or to meet competition from other suppliers. The Australian import 
price index for basic materials showed a fall of six per cent, in 
1960-61 and two per cent, in 1961-62. Prices of textiles fell by two 
per cent, in 1961-62 but from the relatively high level they had 
reached in 1960-61. For some commodities price falls to the Australian 
market seem to have been specifically related to conditions in the 
market. In others they probably reflect more the general pressure on 
world prices of the products concerned as a result of the reduced rate 
of growth of demand, following the general slackening in the rate of 
economic growth in the more industrialised countries and considerable 
increases in productive capacity for a number of basic industrial raw
1.
’’The drastic import cuts which Australia imposed in April 
1955 came after the deterioration of Britain*s own balance and 
were quite overshadowed by the spontaneous effects of boom condi­
tions elsewhere. British exports, on the whole»were keeping up, 
but they did not share fully in the expansion that was taking 
place in world trade.” R. Nurkse, ’’The Relation Between Home 
Investment and External Balance in the Light of British Experience, 
1945-1955, ** Chapter 8 of Equilibrium and Growth in the World 
Economy. Cambridge, (Mass.), p.20B.
materials* In most cases it is not possible to isolate the
determining factor* Kindleberger*s comment that ”It is virtually
impossible to isolate the effects of import restrictions on the terms 
1of trade”, is apposite in the present context*
The use of data for prices of imports into Australia will, of 
course, be misleading if it is the case that there was any substan­
tial degree of discriminatory export pricing in this market*
In considering the discriminatory aspects of exporter pricing it 
is necessary to recall that to increase prices the exporter must have 
some sort of monopoly position in world markets; in addition the react­
ion of an exporter to the direct control of imports in the Australian 
market may lead to a price movement in either direction depending upon 
whether the aim was appropriation of the importers profit or to 
increase the volume of exports to the market* In the latter case it 
would be difficult to distinguish this effect from competitive dumping* 
Consequently, unless the effect of price differences between‘markets 
were substantial, and unless they tended to be predominantly in one 
direction, it would be unlikely to show up in a comparison of aggregate 
price indexes such as a comparison of price for exports to the Austra­
lian market with a similar series to all markets* This is confirmed 
by the series in Table XVT-2.
C*P* Kindleberger, The Terms of Trade; A European Case Study.
New York, 1956, p*78*
Table XVI-2
Comparison of United Kingdom Export and Australian 
Import Price Indexes
U*K. Export Aust.Import U.K. Export Aust*Import
Price Index. Price Index. Price Index. Price Index.
All items* Imports from 
U.K. (a)
Textiles. Textiles (b)
Calendar
(i) (Ü) (iii) (iv)
Years (Indexes converted to Base Year 1951 = 100) •
1951 100 100 100 100
1952 105 102 94 93
1953 101 99 85 83
1954 100 98 85 83
1955 102 101 85 831956 106 103 85 83
1957 111 107 86 84
1958 n o 108 86 83
1959 109 109 84 83I960 i n n o 87 91
(a) All imports from United Kingdom
(b) Textile imports from all sources*
Source: (i) and (iii); U.K* Central Statistical Office,
Annual Abstract of Statistics: (ii) and (iv) derived 
from import price index in Statistical Bulletin.
Reserve Bank of Australia, (formerly Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia)•
Since exports to Australia were normally well below 10 per cent* of 
total British exports differences in movements in the indexes in 
columns (i) and (ii) could be explained in terms of the difference 
in commodity coverage. This is more likely to be the explanation 
for the differences in the movements in 1957-1959 than discriminatory 
pricing by British exporters to the Australian market* The two series
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for textiles, on the other hand, move fairly closely in line with 
each other; in part this may be due to the increasingly competitive 
world market for textiles and consequently limited scope for discrim­
inatory pricing; increasing competition does not of course rule out - 
it may encourage - dumping.
As an alternative method of attempting to demonstrate whether and 
to what extent, the existence of import licensing in Australia influ­
enced the pricing of exports to the Australian market, data relating 
to individual items exported to Australia were examined with a view 
to comparing them with data for the same items exported to other 
export markets.
For the present purpose a selction of items exported from the
1.
Unit values can only be calculated satisfactorily for a limited 
number of items. If the commodity item for which it is intended 
to compute unit values is less than completely homogeneous, changes 
in unit values may reflect changes in the commodity composition of 
the item as well as in price. Thus a wide range of items in which 
quantity data are available must be considered unsatisfactory for 
the computation of unit values. For many items quantity data are 
not collected, or are collected on a basis considered inappropriate 
- at least for the present purpose - for the calculation of unit 
values, e.g. machinery by weight (for an argument for the acceptab­
ility of such a basis of unit value calculation see Kindleberger, 
on.cit.« p*35S). Similarly, the value of trade in the item had to 
be of sufficient size not only in total but in respect of exports 
to Australia, not only for the latter item to be shown separately 
but to avoid the distortion which may arise where small shipments 
are involved. The limited number of items shown in the table repre­
sent less than a quarter of the items originally selected. A major 
reason for the ommission of the remainder was the exclusion from the 
statistics of separate data for exports to Australia, or the small 
size of the values shown, but also important were changes in the 
definition of the item, changes in the nature of the quantity data 
collected, e.g. from lbs. to square yards et.c
United Kingdom to Australia were examined, unit values calculated
for the exports to Australia, and compared with unit values of the
same items exported to all other countries (i.e. excluding the exports
to Australia) • The results are shown in Table XVT-3*
The data does suggest some difference between the prices of
exports to Australia and to other destinations* In the case of glass
there seems to be a generally consistent pattern of prices higher to
2Australia than on average to other destinations* The series for 
cotton piece goods is interesting in that it reveals a more or less 
steady change from pricing above to pricing below the average and a 
somewhat similar pattern is demonstrated for artificial fibre piece 
goods; the picture is almost the reverse for electric wire and, less 
clearly, for writing paper* On the other hand the data for tinplate 
and the limited series for ammonium sulphate both suggest that prices 
to the Australian market are comparable with those to other markets.
1
1.
United Kingdom statistics were selected both because they were 
most readily available and because the United Kingdom is the largest 
single exporter to Australia* Moreover, the preferential tariff 
treatment given to imports from the United Kingdom provides a 
greater opportunity for practising discriminatory pricing.
2* For 1952 where the ratio is less than 100, the ratio probably 
reflects the rapid movement of market prices over 1950 to 1952.
In periods of rapid price movement the use of a figure relating to 
a period as long as 12 months involves a strong possibility of 
distortion through the inclusion of a wide dispersion of prices. 
Since there is no reason for shipments to be spread evenly over 
the 12 months, unit values to one destination could differ substan­
tially from those to another simply because of bunching of shipments 
at different times of the year* The ratios for glass for 1950 and 
1951 were 207 and 114 respectively which tends to support this 
explanation.
o50
Superficially the series for towelling would suggest an increase in 
prices of towelling exports at times of severest restrictions, i*e. 
1952 and 1956* The 1952 rise may be simply a result of bunching of 
high priced exports to Australia before the restrictions - and the 
price decline - compared with more evenly spread shipments elsewhere. 
The ratios for 1950 and 1951 (90 and 92 respectively) are consistent 
with either explanation* Unit values of exports of linen towelling 
to Australia rose in 1956 while they fell to other sources* They 
also rose again in the following year to Australia but a larger 
increase in unit values was recorded for exports elsewhere.
The data in Table XVT-3 suggest that exporters of many of the 
products shown do discriminate in their pricing to the Australian 
market. In a number of the cases the pattern is consistent with 
adaptation to the circumstances of the licensing controls - though 
admittedly as a full explanation it would seem to require some rapid 
shifts from high prices (relative to those to other markets), for the 
purpose of sharing the importer1s profit, to low prices to increase 
the volume exported under a fixed value quota.
Differences in licensing methods applied to the commodities will 
affect the exporters reaction* We need to examine the way imports 
of each of these commodities was controlled* First, it is necessary 
to distinguish the situation for glass. Total demand for plain clear 
sheet glass was allocated by quoba between the domestic producer and 
importers from 1934 to 1959 under a Trade Agreement with
55
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Notes to Table XVI-3
(y) A ratio in excess of 100 indicates a unit value of exports
to Australia in excess of that to other destinations. (Exports 
to Australia were subtracted from the totals of all exports 
before calculating unit values of exports to other sources).
It should be noted that a ratio of 100 may not mean an 
identical price even assuming the product is equivalent in all 
respects. For example, the terms of credit of the export sale 
may differ substantially implying a different effective price.
(a) Unit value considered unreliable or separate data for exports 
to Australia not shown.
(b) Fertiliser C grade.
(c) Woven-grey unbleached.
(d) Linen.
(e) Clear plain sheet.
(f) Paper insulated.
(g) Not machine glazed - in large sheets.
(h) Cut staple fibre.
(i) It appears that there may be an error in the original data.
Source: Annual .Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom.
Vol. Ill,(relevant years).
-JBelgium. Within the total import quota Britain as well as
Belgium was allocated country quotas, a small (less than two per
cent.) quota being left open to other exporters. Glass was included
in the table mainly as a check on the statistics; other evidence is
available to show that under the import quota exporters of plain
clear sheet glass did follow a price policy determined primarily by
2conditions in the Australian market.
Of the remaining items, tin plate was freely licensed (N.Q.R.) 
until 1959« Ammonium sulphate was on a specific licence basis, only 
the difference between demand and local production being licensed. 
Electric wire and artificial fibres were also licensed on a specific 
licence basis. The remaining items were all controlled on a quota 
basis. Writing paper was transferred from the interchangeable quota 
category to a specific bank in 1957. Actual unit values of exports 
rose only slightly but fell to other destinations. This difference 
may have been a result of the change of the item to a specific quota 
category with less fear of a price rise leading to a transfer of 
licences to other uses, or it may be simply a result of the inclusion
of different qualities of papers in the total import figures. It is
~ Provisional Commercial Agreement between the Bel.rro-Luxemburg 
Economic Union and Australia 1936 which superceded arrangements 
made by Exchanges of Notes in 1934 and 1935« Terminated at 
Australia!s request in July 1959*
2."The fact that overseas glass manufacturers cannot increase their 
sales above the limits prescribed by the Trade Agreement has caused 
them to follow the general level of prices set by Australian Window 
Glass Pty.Ltd.", Tariff Board Report, Plain Clear Sheet Glass. 
17.4*1959, p*7*
clearly not possible to draw much in the way of firm or even probable 
conclusions from the information in the Table except that it does 
suggest a certain amount of price discrimination by British exporters 
among export markets* The following table suggests that this does not 
occur only among British exporters.
Table XVI-Z
Newsprint: Unit value of Imports into the United
Kingdom and Australia from Sweden and Finland
U.K* imports from? Australian imports from:
Sweden Finland Sweden Finland
£A per ton (c.i.f.) £A per ton (f.o.b.)
Year^
(l) (2) (3) (4)
1951 74 73 52 50
1952 74 75 125 112
1953 59 60 71 68
1954 62 62 56 57
1955 63 64 55 56
1956 67 66 61 56
1957 68 68 65 61
1958 70 69 64 66
1959 66 67 63 64
I960 67 66 59 58
(a) For United Kingdom - calendar years: for Australia,
12 months ended June 30th of year shown.
Source: (l) and (2): 
(§) and (4):
Annual Statement of Trade of the
United Kingdom
Import Clearance Bulletin
r j r-
« i ü oD esp ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  Scandinavian paper e x p o rte rs  opera te
-1
under a uniform  p r ic in g  agreement (th e  Scan Convention ) th e re  was
f o r  most o f th e  p e rio d  no apparen t d is c r im in a tio n  -  a t  l e a s t  between
2
B r i ta in  and A u s tra l ia .
The evidence so f a r  does no t suggest a t  a l l s  tro n g ly  th a t  th e re  
was a s ig n i f ic a n t  re a c t io n  of ex p o rte rs  to  th e  c o n tro l of im ports in  
t h e i r  p r ic in g  p o l ic ie s .  Yet th e re  i s  ample evidence t h a t  ex p o rte rs  
do ta k e  account o f market c o n d itio n s  in  t h e i r  p r ic in g  p o l ic ie s .
The T a r i f f  Board l e f t  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  th e  evidence p resen ted  
in  Table X7I-5 was in d ic a t iv e  o f 1r id in g  the  m arket1 and i t  appears 
to  have accep ted  evidence given in  cases on p h th a lic  anhydride, 
canvas and duck and on paper p roducts  th a t  e x p o rte rs  had tak en  what 
th e  t r a f f i c  would b ear d u rin g  th e  p o s t war p e rio d  of heavy demand and
3
world sh o rta g es .
I t  i s  fre q u e n tly  a s s e r te d  in  evidence b e fo re  th e  T a r if f  Board 
t h a t  overseas m anufacturers ta k e  f u l l  advantage of th e  absence of
1.
K ind leberger r e f e r s  to  Swedish wood pulp  and paper being so ld  
in  th e  U nited S ta te s  a t  two th i r d s ,  and in  A rgentina a t  tw ice , 
th e  world p r ic e  in  1952. The low p r ic e  in  th e  U nited S ta te s  he 
a s c r ib e s  to  p r ic e  c e i l in g s  in  o p e ra tio n  th e re  which Swedish ex p o rt­
e r s  met; in  A rgentina to  a d isco u n t on th e  peso in  th e  exchange 
c le a r in g s , which was o f f s e t  in  th e  supply p r ic e .  K ind leberger, 
o n . c i t . , p . 69.
2 .
T a r i f f  Board R eport, Paper and Paper P ro d u cts . 9*9*1957.
3 *
"There i s  no doubt th a t  in  th e  p e rio d  of sh o r ta g e ,, A u s tra lian  
u s e rs  were e x p lo i te d ," T a r i f f  Board R eport, P h th a lic  Anhydride« 
22.9*1954* p«8. See a lso  T a r i f f  Board R eports , Cotton Canvas and 
Duckj 2 .4 .1954 ; Paper and Paper P ro d u cts , 22.12.1953*
o56
Table XIV-5
Export Prices to Australia and Domestic Selling 
Prices in United Kingdom
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.
Prices at end of:
Soda Ash
mi 124S 1242, 125° 1251(£ Sterling) m 2 ma
Export f.o.b.
C.D.V.
9.0 11.6 11.6 11.6 14.1 15.1 1 5 . 1
7.0 7.9 7.2 8.3 9.6 12.0 11.1
Caustic Soda (Solid)
Export f.o.b*
C.D.V.
18.0 23.0 21.0 21.0 26.0 26.0 27.0
16.2 17.4 17.4 19.5 19.6 23.1 23.2
Carbonate of Soda (Refined)
Export f.o.b. 
C.D.V.
12.0 14.5 12.5 12.5 16.0 16.0 18.0
10.2 11.6 11.6 12.0 11.3 I4.I 12.3
Calcium Chloride (Solid) •
Export f.o.b.
C.D.V.
9.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 12.0 13.5
8.1 8.1 8.5 9.4 9.9 11.1 11.5
(a) C.D.V. s Current Domestic Value, (i.e. normal 
selling price in domestic market)•
Source: Tariff Board Report, Alkali, Chlorine and Chlorine 
Products. 30.7.1954) p.15»
1local production in their pricing policies. In a report on cathode 
ray tubes the Board accepted evidence that prices of imports fell
17 ~ ~
See, for example, evidence by applicants in Tariff Board Report, 
Rayon Tyre Yam, Rayon, Tyre Cord and Rayon Tyre Fabric , 30.7.1954, 
p.10. Evidence was given in an enquiry on acetate rayon y a m  in 
1954 by J. Koppel for Courtaulds (Australia) Ltd, that ”In the past 
certain rayon exporters, knowing that no rayon industry existed in 
Australia, have exacted an excessive profit margin”. Since spinning
(continued overleaf)
when overseas s u p p lie rs  became aware th a t  lo c a l  p ro d uction  was about
to  begin* The Board has a lso  in d ic a te d  an awareness th a t  United
Kingdom m anufacturers tend  to  tak e  h ig h e r p r o f i t  margins from exports
of item s n o t produced lo c a l ly :
nThe in d ic a tio n s  o f c o llu s io n  between U nited Kingdom 
m anufacturers suggest th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  i f  th e re  were no 
A u s tra lia n  in d u s try , e l e c t r i c i t y  supply  a u th o r i t i e s  might have 
to  pay h ig h e r p r ic e s  f o r  U nited Kingdom equipment th an  they  
a re  now p a y in g .M2
R eferences to  overseas s u p p lie rs  an d /o r lo c a l  im porters absorb ing
3
any in c re a s e s  in  d u tie s  a re  no t in f r e q u e n t . '
1 . (co n t.fro m  p rev ious page)
(by C ourtau lds) s ta r te d ,  com petito r p r ic e s  have been tw ice reduced, 
so th a t  in  th e  case o f some d e n ie rs  th e  ex po rt p r ic e  i s  low er than  
th e  home market p r i c e . M This a s s e r t io n  was denied by re p re se n ta tiv e s  
of th e  e x p o rte rs . I t  i s  of i n t e r e s t ,  however, as an in d ic a t io n  of th e  
p r ic in g  p o l ic ie s  fo llow ed, t h a t  th e  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f B r i t i s h  
C elanese and th e  th re e  Dutch firm s involved  in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  p r ic e  
red u c tio n s  re fe r re d  to  had been made to  m ain ta in  p r ic e  p a r i ty  w ith  
th o se  o f L u stre  F ib res  L td .,  th e  d i s t r i b u t o r s  fo r  C ourtau lds (U nited 
Kingdom)• T a r if f  Board R eport, C ontinuous Filam ent Ace ta te  Rayon 
Yarn , 30 .7 .1954, p p .5 -6 .
1.
T a r i f f  Board R eport, Cathod e Ray Tubes and Pa r t s  t h e reo f.
29 .6 .1960 , p .g .
2 .
T a r i f f  Board R eport, C irc u it  B reakers and Switch G e a r.(e t c . )  
4.2.1954* p .1 9 . See a lso  th e  d isc u ss io n  of w all and f lo o r  t i l e s  
in  C hapter XI; and s im ila r  conclusions drawn in  re sp e c t of p r o f i t  
m argins on v a rio u s  types of la th e s .  T a r i f f  Board R eport, M etal 
Working L athes. 30*6.1958, p .1 0 .
3.
R eport of the  S p ec ia l A dvisory A u th o rity , Polyv in y l  Ch lo r id e 
Produc tg . 18 .7 .1962, p .2 j  T a r i f f  Board R eport, I n d u s t r ia l  N itro ­
c e l l u l ose* 17.11.1961, p .7 . The fo llo w in g  example may i l l u s t r a t e  
th e  ab so rp tio n  o f a du ty . S u p e rf ic ia lly  th e  d a ta  in  Table X V l(F t .) - l  
shox/ two d i f f e r e n t  re a c tio n s  to  th e  im p o sitio n  of th e  s p e c if ic  
tem porary duty  of Id . each on low p ric e d  b a l l  p o in t pens in  September 
1961. The d a ta  suggest th a t  th e  Japanese e x p o rte rs  reduced t h e i r
(c o n t’d o v e rlea f)
The emphasis pn the United Kingdom exporters is not merely due 
to the relative importance of the United Kingdom among Australia’s 
import suppliers* The existence of the preference margin in the 
tariff provides them with opportunities to appropriate at least some 
of the margin* The Tariff Board has on many occasions commented that 
United Kingdom manufacturers were taking advantage of the preferential 
tariff rates applicable to them by charging prices which enabled them 
to receive most of the preference margin themselves and were being
3* (Cont’dfrom previous page)
prices - i.e. they absorbed the duty themselves; the German 
exporters certainly did not 3-ower their prices - and may have 
increased them to avoid the duty* The change in the figures for 
West Germany is not in itself large enough to be significant* 
Moreover one German biro pen was forced from the Australian market 
by a local producer enforcing his patent rights. Tariff Board- 
Report., op*cit*. p*5*
Table XVI (Ft.note)-l
Indexes of Unit Values: Imports of Ball Point Pens' i2i3ItLi&o3i (Äisp)
^Pljln^ountry. 1959-60 1960-61 1.7 *1261. ia 
g.s’s . m
West Germany 114 78 119 125
Japan 150 217 217 100
United Kingdom 115 149 116 117
United States 16 12 11 16
(a) date of operation of additional temporary duty.
Source: Calculated from data of import clearances
in Tariff Board Report, Ballpoint Pens and 
Pencils* 13*12*1961, pp.12-13*
encouraged to do so by the United Kingdom Government.
We noted that where an overseas company had a local associate 
there would be a strong incentive to reduce the price of exports to 
the restricting markets, particularly if the local market is under­
supplied. The subsidiary would then be able to make a higher profit 
because of its larger turnover and would be completely free to trans­
fer these profits to its parent company. Evidence of this form of 
arrangement can be no more than circumstantial but the following table 
may indicate an arrangement of this nature.
One reaction to these figures could be that the explanation lies 
in the fact that the item covers both complete and substantially com­
plete items and the different values merely represent items in differ­
ent stages of assembly and completeness. To some extent this is, no 
doubt, true but, on the other hand, the Deputy Chairman of the Tariff 
Board describing the industry said that one section of the industry 
”... consisting principally of Philips and Ronson, imports electric 
shavers in substantially complete form and adds certain components of 
local origin, mainly cords and plugs and in some instances
r r ~  ~~
Tariff Board: Annual Report 1952-53. In an enquiry into chemical 
products where the price of one imported product was £40 per ton (30 per cent.) above the current United Kingdom domestic value, the 
Board was quoted a letter received by a witness from the United King­
dom Board of Trade which said, MThe Government’s policy on this 
(export policy prices) is that they like to see industry get as much 
for their exports as the traffic will bear”. Of course, this approp­
riation of the preference is precisely what Australia does in the case 
of many of its primary products receiving preferential entry into the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere. In fact, Australian sugar prices to 
Canada, New Zealand etc. are fixed by agreement at world price 
plus preference.
r /o $
Table XVT-6
Unit Valuer of Imports of Electric Shavers: Assembled. 
Complete or Substantially Complete
Year
From: U*K* Netherlands
£A.
Other Sources
1954-55 12 • 4 6.4 5.4
1955-56 5*3 4.4 4* 4
1956-57 7.6 11.8 2.8
1957-58 10.2 2.0 1.9
1958-59 2.2 2.7 1.9
1959-60 2.0 2*6 1.3
1960-61 3.5 5.5 1.8
Source: Import Clearance Bulletin
cases* n The unit values for imports from the United Kingdom would 
2include Ronson’s importations but could also include imports made 
by other companies such as Sunbeam Corporation Ltd* The column re­
lating to imports from the Netherlands almost certainly relates 
entirely to Philips Electrical Industries Pty*Ltd. Because this 
company imported a largely completed shaver, it suggests a strong poss­
ibility that an adjustment of intercompany pricing policy was made to 
enable a greater volume of importations during a period of fairly
1.
Tariff BoardTs Report of the Deputy Chairman on Electric 
Shavers. 22nd March 1962, p*2* The Deputy Chairman, in referring 
to statistics of parts of electric shavers indicated that these 
statistics are affected by the method of calculating current 
domestic values for inter-company transactions, p*4.
2.
Ronson Pty.Ltd
tight import restrictions 1
It is not necessarily the case that the exporters in the 
follov/ing example determined their policy towards their export prices 
on the basis of the quantitative restrictions on imports above, but 
it may well have been an important consideration:
because of the present policy of exporting to Australia 
at prices below the current domestic value, the incidence 
of this protection (from import licensing) has been reduced 
since a greater quantity of lamps is obtained against import 
quotas which, of course, are granted on a value basis.”2
Again, in the case of small hand tools, the Tariff Board found
that although in terms of costs of production the overseas firms had a
considerable advantage ’’the differences are not reflected in the landed
costs, which, except in a few cases, are above the ex-factory prices...
O
(of local product).0
We have argued that it is not unlikely that the magnitude of the 
import cuts imposed in 1952 was sufficiently large to have had some
1.
The same company was importing receiving valves at what appeared 
to be considerably below cost in 1959. See Tariff Board Report, 
Radio and Television Equipment. 30.6.1959, p.lo. The general 
argument that overseas firms do adjust their prices so that profits 
are taking at one point rather than another is supported by the 
Tariff Board’s comments in another enquiry,
”... it would appear that even after allowing for ... special 
charges, plus a reasonable markup, the overseas parent firms 
may follow a policy of taking ... in the country of origin 
part of their profits from sales of the finished products in 
Australia.”
Tariff Board Reoort, Abrasives. 15.6.1962, p*9*
2.
Tariff Board Report, Electric Filament Lamps. 10.9.1958, p.14*
Tariff Board Report, Pneumatic Hand Tools. 9.10.1956, p.8.3.
effect on world prices - at least for some commodities of importance 
in Australia’s import bill.
Little evidence has been found that exporters’ pricing decisions 
were consciously or importantly influenced by the fact of the restric­
tions or the form in which they were operated. There is, however, 
ample evidence that the pricing of a wide range of exports to the 
Australian market is based upon a conscious consideration of the 
particular circumstances in that market.
There are a variety of factors which exporters would have to 
consider in formulating their price policies in the Australian market. 
Even were the quantitative restriction of imports the only significant 
factor in this respect in the period under review, the incidence of 
the restrictions and the manner of their operation varied from item 
to item and from year to year, and a regular pattern of reactions 
over a range of items could not be expected. In fact, of course, it 
was not the only influence. World supply and demand conditions chang­
ed} the local production patterns in Australia changed; new products 
arose, demand for others declined; levels of tariff protection were 
varied, patent rights expired; associations with overseas companies 
were established or changed in form; competition from countries such 
as the United States and Japan increased. These, and many other 
factors will have relevance to the pricing of exports to Australia.
That exporters extensively adjust their prices to meet changes 
in a wide variety of circumstances would seem to have been amply
demonstrated in the evidence presented above. In spite of the 
lack of direct evidence, it would seem reasonable on the basis 
of this indirect evidence, to argue that it is unlikely that 
exporters would not have taken the direct controls on imports 
similarly into account in their pricing policies.
It is probable that any reaction to the controls by 
exporters with no financial association with importers of their 
products would be more likely to result in price increases 
rather than price decreases.
It is not inconceivable, of course, that such increases 
in prices would offset any price reductions to increase the 
volume of exports and any favourable terms of trade effect.
Chapter XVII 
Effects on Importers
We noted in the discussion in Chapter IV that under certain 
assumptions there may be a case for using quantitative restrictions 
on imports in the short term as a means of conserving foreign exchange 
and, in this way, provide extra time to take action internally to make 
whatever longer term structural adjustments are necessary. Among the 
factors which would determine the length of the short term in this 
sense were the reactions of importers to the nei^  profit opportunities 
created by the restrictions on imports. In effect then for the use of 
quantitative controls on imports to be justified in economic terms 
requires inertia, institutional rigidities or, at least a sufficient 
consideration of the need to preserve customer goodwill for importers 
to refrain from raising prices for some considerable time.
When direct controls on imports are imposed for a longer period, 
i.e. long enough for importers to have adjusted their prices to the 
new market situation, the extent of the misallocation of resources that 
will be induced by the change in relative prices will depend to some ex­
tent upon the particular circumstances under which the controls operate. 
The degree to which the importing business ossifies and trade connexions 
become rigid will depend in part upon the extent to which the existing 
pattern of importing is varied either by intervening periods of free 
importing or by the extent to which existing quota allocations
r i"' r
are varied or to which new importers are allowed to enter at times 
of restriction. In addition, the extent of deviation from the optimum 
will also depend upon the degree of flexibility in the licensing system 
and the extent to which importers avail themselves or are permitted to’ 
avail themselves of this flexibility.
In the particular context of the Australian licensing system this 
largely meant the degree of perfection in the market for interchangeable 
licences.
As in earlier chapters, the answers we obtain to these questions,
while important in a consideration of the effects of the quantitative
control of imports in the period from 1952 to I960, will have a wider
relevance to the basic assumptions of economic theory.
It is a far from simple matter to indicate directly the behaviour,
end the reasons for the behaviour, of prices of imported products; and
again in view of the limited statistical data available we are forced
1to rely heavily on indirect evidence and inference.
The only completely satisfactory evidence of the price reactions 
of importers would be that obtained from an examination of importers1 
books of account. This was not considered a practical procedure at
1.
There were about 16,000 firms or persons engaged regularly in 
the business of importing and about 4>000 others who periodically 
imported. No official statistics nor for that matter, so far as 
is known, unofficial statistics of importing businesses are 
collected separately; for many importing would be combined with 
other activities such as wholesaling, retailing or manufacturing.
least in the context of the present study* We must therefore make 
use of such other evidence as is available • In seeking answers to the 
questions we have set ourselves, certain points need to be borne in mind.
First, the alternative to price increases for the restricted supply 
of imported goods must be some form of unofficial rationing, long order 
lists etc. Second, price increases may be disguised by such means as 
tied sales etc. Third, differences in the method of licensing imports 
could influence the manner in which the price increase, if any, was 
taken. Over a large range of goods, particularly those licensed on a 
specific licence basis, the importer was also the user. Many of these 
goods were of a capital equipment nature. It would be difficult to
tdisentangle the influence of relatively cheap capital equipment in the 
pricing of goods produced from that equipment from the many other 
factors which are likely to be quantitatively of a greater importance 
in determining prices over the period of the life of the equipment. 
Similarly, it is virtually impossible to judge exactly what influence 
the particular price of raw materials has on the price of a final 
product marketed some time in the future. In particular is this the 
case where as not infrequently happened, a processor had to obtain 
at least some of his raw material requirements from domestic suppliers.
Similar considerations apply to some extent to items licensed on 
a specific quota basis where again there was a predominance of raw
1.
See Chapter VI.
materials and components, frequently imported by the actual processor.
In the case of the interchangeable quotas this factor is of less 
importance. While in many cases interchangeable quotas were held by 
actual users or by retailers, the operations of importers probably 
ranged more widely over these goods. The evidence available in regard 
to trafficking in licences (examined in detail below) would seem to lend 
itself to the inference that, to some extent at least, importers were 
prepared to let the price mechanism perform the function of allocating 
the limited supplies of imported goods.
It needs to be noted also that the benefits received by importers 
from the restriction on the supply of imports need not result in profits 
over and above those normally made in the business of importing. They 
may merely arise through the avoidance of losses which would otherwise
have occurred. This would seem to have been the situation in 1952.
1Many importers were heavily overstocked and, but for the severe 
reduction in imports effected by the controls on imports, would have
1.
Among the reasons for this overstocking were increases in 
available supplies on world markets, particularly in the United 
Kingdom where rumours of sterling devaluation had led to some 
cancellation of orders by European countries, and in the U.K. and 
other supplying countries as productive capacity was restored. In 
this situation the widespread practice of over-ordering in order to 
increase the share of the limited supplies available led to many 
importers receiving well in excess of their requirements when these 
orders were fulfilled* Some over-ordering also resulted from the 
situation during the wool booga in 1950 and 1951 when it seemed 
that almost anything could be sold at a profit in a period of rapidly 
rising prices. There was also probably some stockpiling against 
the possibility of war. C.f* A.N.Z. Bank Quarterly Review.
June 1952, p»5*
faced a need to  w rite  down s u b s ta n t ia l ly  stock  v a lu es  in  o rd er to
move them. The need to  reduce s tock  le v e ls  would have been accen tu a ted
1
by th e  commitments to  repay loans o b ta ined  to  fin an ce  im ports, w hile
th e  e x te n t  of th e  w ritin g  down necessa ry  would have been accen tu ated
2
by th e  f a l l  in  world p r ic e s  fo r  many com m odities.
Table X V II-1
Non Farm Stocks 1950-51 to  1960-61
Year Annual Change 
£m.
Year Annual ( 
£m
1950-51 240 1955-56 130
1951-52 380 1956-57 70
1952-53 -170 1957-58 70
1953-54 60 1958-59 60
195V-55 180 1959-60 135
1960-61 220
Source: White Paper -  N atio n a l Income and E xoend itu re .
I t  i s  apparen t from th e  ta b le  t h a t  s to ck s  ro se  abnorm ally in  1951-52, 
fo llow ing  a s u b s ta n t ia l  s tock  in c re ase  in  1950-51« While th e s e  f ig u re s  
in c lu d e  value  changes of stocks in  a p e rio d  of ra p id ly  r i s in g  p r ic e s
1.
The Chairman of D ire c to rs , Commercial Bank of A u s tra l ia ,  was quoted 
as saying  th a t  most of th e  £145m. of new advances made in  th e  8 months 
to  March 1952 had been to  im p o rte rs . Mr. Joshua, P arliam en ta ry  
D ebates. V ol.218, (29*8.1952), p .792. In  a d d itio n , th e  sh o rtag e  of 
l iq u id i ty  which would have re s u l te d  from th e  balance  o f payments 
d e f i c i t  would norm ally have provided some compulsion to  reduce s to ck s . 
2 .
Except to  th e  e x te n t th a t  th e  f a l l  in  ex p o rt p r ic e s  was caused 
by th e  im p o sitio n  of th e  im port c o n tro ls . See C hapter XV.
there is little doubt that in physical terms stocks were abnormally
high by the end of 1951-52, nor that large quantities of imported
goods were included in these totals. Although many importers were
financing these stocks with loan finance, it appears that many importers
would probably have had difficulty in meeting their obligations in the
1absence of the controls on imports.
The following statement demonstrating the position of one company
is not untypical of a great many made at the time:
”*... this company, in common with many others found itself 
inundated with materials far beyond its immediate requirements. 
..... the relief the (import)restrictions brought was the 
maintaining of the value of our stocks, even though, in the 
meantime, replacement prices overseas tended to fall.2
Similar reports that the imposition of import restrictions were
commonplace in company statements in respect of timber, metal products,
3carpets, paper, motor vehicle components etc. One observer suggested 
that the controls were a ’blessing in disguise’ for distributors of 
less popular makes of motor cars;^ and it was also reported that the
1.
J.C. Horsfall, reported from London in April 1952 that many 
importers in Australia were in arrears in payment for goods 
already delivered* Australian Financial Review. 12*6*1952, p*5*
2.
Report of Chairman (Mr* Aboud) to shareholders, Pioneer Holdings 
Ltd, 24*10*1952 reported in Australian Financial Review. 30.10*1952,p.15»
3.
See, for example, reports of Chairmen’s addresses to shareholders of 
Hancock and Gore Ltd, (Timber) in Australian Financial Review. 5.2*1953) 
p.S; Westcott Hazel and Co.Ltd, (machinery) Ibid. 6*11.1952. p.14:
Pyrox Ltd, (motor vehicle equipment) Ibid. 9*4*1953) p«7; Tullocks Ltd, 
(garden equipment), Ibid. 16*4*1953) p*7.
Ibid. 13*3*1952, p*3*
4*
banks were reassured regarding their large financial interest in the
accumulated stocks. Not all stock holdings were saved from the need
for disposal at heavily discounted prices - substantial reductions in
2imported tyre prices were claimed at the time, and there were reports
of high price imported metals being sold at relatively low prices to 
3liquidate stocks.
One report suggested the possibility that the restrictions
permitted pricing arrangements to be maintained on imported timber in
South Australia and that this enabled the downward revision of stock
/
values to be avoided.“"
On a much smaller scale something of the same pattern was exper­
ienced in 1955 and 1956, but while in this case there was some 
involuntary stocking it would seem that to a considerable extent the 
accumulation of stocks reflected a conscious desire to insure against 
the reimposition of the import restrictions. *
The examination of the import statistics in Table VII-3 will 
indicate that there are a few areas in which imports were not high in
1.
Ibid. 10.4-1952, p.20.
2.
Statement by Senator Armstrong, Parliamentary Debates. Vol* 219 
(8.10.1952), p.2647.
3.
It was reported that imported brass brought into the country 
at 5s.9d. per lb. was being sold at 2s*9d. per lb. v. Australian 
Financial Review. 26.3*1953» p*3*
Australian Financial Review. 16.7.1953* p*8.
4*
1951-52. In some cases it may be that the high import figures fairly 
accurately reflect the deterioration in the competitive position 
of the d omestic position, or revealed a poor competitive position 
hitherto disguised by shortages of imported goods. Although imports 
of many raw material and equipment items had been assisted by concess­
ional (by-law) entry at low rates of duty much of the importing would 
seem to have been made largely irrespective of prices at a time when 
world prices were high.
While the relatively lov; level of internal activity within the 
economy which lasted for some time after the imposition of the restric­
tions coupled with the general fall in import prices probably prevented 
the full cost of the imported goods being recouped on many items, it 
is clear that many importers were saved from financial embarassment by 
the imposition of the import controls in 1952. Importers were generally 
able to avoid the consequence of their misjudging of the market and to 
some extent it was true that the less cautious the importer the more 
he was able to benefit from the imposition of the controls.
These very substantial stocks of imported goods meant that the 
impact of the controls on supplies was not felt for some considerable 
time after they were imposed. Over a wide area prices of imported 
goods reflected more slowly than would otherwise have been the case
the fall in world prices. While a drop in prices corresponding to 
the fall in world prices would have been disruptive to the importing 
sector, the maintenance of the prices of these goods at close to the 
high prices at which they had been obtained meant that no immediate 
benefit to the domestic cost structure was obtained and costs were 
forced further out of line with those in exporting countries who 
were able to benefit more quickly from the fall in world prices.
An attempt was made to examine the reactions of importers to the 
restrictions on imports through comparisons of series of local selling 
prices of imported goods and import prices (in this case unit values). 
As we observed in Chapter VII only a limited amount of data is avail­
able for actual wholesale or retail selling prices, at least in a 
form from which continuous series may be constructed.
The series published by the New South Wales Deputy Commonwealth 
Statistician include a number of items which are wholly or largely 
imported, although by far the greater proportion of the items relate 
to locally produced goods. After a close examination of the imported 
items almost all of them had to be
1.
There is little doubt that in 1952 the pressure 
by the textile manufacturers for their own manufacturing 
quotas was largely due to the fact that textile prices 
in world markets had fallen considerably, a fall which 
was not reflected in the selling prices of textiles 
out of the large stocks held in Australia.
rejected for the present purpose. Of the three items for which 
comparisons could be made with some confidence, two were paper 
products and the other was imported oregrn timber.
The results for the three items are given in Table XVI1-2. 
Comparisons between the indices for the three items do not show a 
clear pattern although, in general, the direction of movenents in 
import values tended to be paralleled in selling prices. In some 
years selling prices fell less or rose more than import values, but 
these movements are alternatively explicable in terms of the overlap 
in timing of shipments resulting from the use of annual data. At the 
same time, there are indications of unchanging selling prices for 
brown kraft wrapping paper in the three years ended 1959-60 and in 
writing paper from 1953-54 to 1955-56. The strong position of the 
domestic paper producers in the marketing of paper in Australia and 
their own policy of holding their prices unchanged, which were dis­
cussed in Chapter XII, are probably the reasons for the pattern of 
movement in paper prices.
We argued in Chapter VII that price movements were very imperfect 
indicators of movements in profit margins and this is illustrated in
1.
There were several reasons for discarding these items. In some the 
series was incomplete, and the incomplete series covered a period of 
insufficient duration to be meaningful e.g. imported rayon tyre cord; 
in several cases, it was not possible to identify accurately the item 
in the import statistics for the purpose of computing reasonably 
comparable unit value series e.g. imported magazine paper; in one 
case, import controls were applied in a manner permitting almost all 
requirements to be met e.g. rubber smoked blanket; for several items 
import data in some years was not sufficient to permit satisfactory 
unit value series to be computed e.g. plain chipboard.
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th e  case of Oregon tim b er in  th e  movement of p r o f i t  margins (Table 
XVTI-3)• I t  should be noted  th a t  p r ic e s  of tim ber were c o n tro lle d  in  
New South Wales u n t i l  1952. The p r ic e  c o n tro ls  were reimposed in  1955» 
Table XVI1-2
Indexes o f Landed Costs of Im ports and Domestic 
(New' South Wales) S e ll in g  P r ic e s : 1950-51 to  1959.-60. 
1950-51 = 100
Year White Bank
W riting  Paper
Brown K raft 
Wrapping Paper Oregon Timber
Landed 
C o s t 'a '
S e l l in g  
P r ic e  ( d)
Landed 
C ost(a)
S e ll in g  
P r ic e (c )
Landed 
C ost(a)
S e l l i r
P r i c e 1
1951-52 151 103 168 133 145 124
1952-53 141 77 114 123 136 103
1953-54 178 76 102 105 123 97
195 « 5 181 76 111 96 129 112
1955-56 181 76 116 100 142 125
1956-57 184 80 119 101 155 133
1957-53 168 75 117 102 139 117
1958-59 161 70 129 102 126 118
1959-60 157 69 125 102 152 126
(a) Duty paid  has been included in  landed c o s t;  o th e r
charges from sh ipboard  to  w holesale warehouse have
been igno red .
(b) In d en t p r ic e .
(0) W holesale P r ic e s .
Source: Landed C osts: U nit Values c a lc u la te d  from
Import C learance B u l le t in s :
S e ll in g  P r ic e s :  Deputy Commonwealth S t a t i s t i c i a n ,  
New South Wales S t a t i s t i c a l  R eg is te r  (a n n u a l) .
Table m i - 3
Oregon Timber: Profit Margins in Key South Wales: 
1951 to 1955
Operative date of price Merchantable
S. d •
Clears ^
s. d.
21.8.1951 18 1 a a a a
1.9.1951 • • • a 24 1
26.10.1951 23 7 • a a a
1.11.1951 • a • • 25 7
22. 4.1952 12 3 a a a a
1. 5.1952 • • • • 14 10
15. 9.1952
Price
8 8
Control lifted 14.10.1952
a a a a
24.ll.i952 2 1 (b) a a a a
1.12.1952 • • • a 41 11
1. 2.1953 • • • # 65 2
2. 2.1953 25 9 a a a a
1. 5.1953 26 6 49 3
1. 1.1954 30 1 38 10
11. 1.1955 28 4 a a a a
1. 4.1955 33 10 37 5
(a) First quality
(b) In view of its size this figure would seem to be suspect. 
Although Oregon list prices in New South Wales fell in 
November 1952, this was also the case in February 1953, 
when the profit margin on the basis of these figures rose 
by nearly 24s.
Source: Mr. Justice Richards, Report Into Certain Aspects of
the Timber Industry. 1955, New South Wales Parliamentary 
Papers, 5th Session, 1955-56, Vol.3-
In his report on the timber industry in New South Wales, Mr. 
Justice Richards concluded that it *... it is clear that some immediate 
action to protect the public interest is called for in relation to 
the prices of imported timber.’
TT
Loc.cit. p.134* It was as a consequence of this report that 
price control was reimposed on timber sold in New South Wales.
He observed that, on the evidence before him, dollar quotas for
timber were only made available by the licensing authorities to members
of the various timber merchants associations and ’.., so far as the
evidence went no timber merchant who was not a member of one of the
associations . .* has been successful in obtaining a dollar quota1 .
On this aspect he commented, that this aided the Associations 1... in
exercising a control over the supply and price of timber imported from
the two countries, (Canada and America) .
In Chapter XI we referred to the "price equalisation" arrangements
for imported and locally produced coloured ceramic tiles operated by the
tile merchants. In its report on the industry the Tariff Board also
referred in adverse terms to the high markups being charged on imported
3white tiles, of which there was no local production.
A witness in a tariff enquiry on canvas and duck said 1Although 
the price of cotton piece goods imported from overseas is lower than 
the price of Australian made piece goods, the canvas good manufacturers 
have not passed the benefit on to consumers but have increased their
1.
Ibid, p.70.
2.
Ibid, p.134
3.
!The Board considers it important to draw attention to the distribu­
tion of white tiles in Australia. ... Evidence showed that white tiles 
from the United Kingdom land into the Australian merchants’ stores at 
21s. 5d. per square yard and retail in at least one State at 47s. 6d. 
per square yard - a margin of approximately 122 per cent, compared with 
70 per cent, for imported coloured tiles and 33 per cent, for locally 
produced coloured tiles.1 Tariff Board Report, Ceramic Tiles and Tile 
Blanks. 27.10.1961, p.10.
1 2profit margins’ • This statement was supported by other witnesses.'"
In an enquiry on various chemical products, the Tariff Board 
referred to the fact that, ’... where formulators used imported chemi­
cals at lower cost than the Australian, the ultimate user did not gain 
any advantage, as the price of the formulated product was based on that 
of the competitive product made by (the local producers)’•^ A similar 
policy was noted in the case of another chemical.^
In its conclusions in another report, the Board referred to ’some 
objectionable practices’ which had occurred in the distribution of
imported sausage casings during periods of short supply, when ’excessive
5price’ was charged.
An applicant for increased protection on titanium compounds said 
that his company (which was both importer and manufacturer) ’has 
never raised its selling prices to exploit a state of shortage as has
1.
Tariff Board Report, Cotton Ganvas and Cotton Duck. 2.4*1954 
Evidence of Mr. T.A.W. Furphy, p.5*
2.
Ibid. See, for example, evidence of Mr A.W. Atkins p*6. A 
counter assertion was made by the canvas manufacturers that local 
yarn producers’ profits were too high. The Tariff Board appeared 
to be satisfied that there was substance in both assertions.
3*
Tariff Board Report, Alkali,. Chlorine and Chlorine Products. 
19.4*1955, p.27.
4*
Phenothiazine. See Tariff Board Report, Dinhenvlamine and 
Phenothiazine. 29*5.1959, p*7.
5* .
Tariff Board Report, Ox Runners. Surgical Sutures and Sausage 
Casings. 16.12.195Ö, p.8.
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been done by the a p p lic a n t company in  re s p e c t o f  im ported m a te r ia l* .
In  an o th er re p o r t  a w itn e ss  quoted an in s ta n ce  in  which the im ported 
item was r e t a i l i n g  a t  the  same p r ic e  as the lo c a l ly  produced item ; 
im plying a p r o f i t  m argin of over 100 p e r  c e n t ,  on the  im ported item .
In  the  case o f  b icy c le  ty re s  the Board no ted  th a t  the b e n e f i t  of 
low er c o s ts  o f im ported ty re s  had no t been passed  on to  the  p u b lic .^
An example was given in  ano ther re p o r t  in  which the  Board s ta te d :
"There i s  no evidence th a t  the  advantage o f purchases a t  i n i t i a l  
equipment p r ic e s  (from overseas) have been passed  on to  consumers « . . .
The Board i s  concerned a t  the  s i tu a t io n  d is c lo se d  a t  t h i s  en q u iry  where 
the r e t a i l  p r ic e  of (im ported) rep lacem ent p a r ts  i s  f ix e d  a t  a f ig u re  
which i s  alm ost fo u r tim es the  landed  c o s t ,  s o le ly  to give h igh  m argins 
to  d i s t r ib u to r s  . . . " ^ .
In  the case o f im ported ch a in , the  T a r i f f  Board commented th a t  the  
landed  p r ic e s  were s u f f i c i e n t ly  low t h a t ,  in  the absence o f the l im i t  
on im ports p rovided  by the im port r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  they may have w arran ted  
exam ination w ith  a view to  imposing dumping d u t ie s .  l e t  d e sp ite  the 
f a c t  t h a t  ’ the  d i s t r ib u to r  o f im ported ch a in  (was able to ) lan d  the
IT
T a r i f f  Board R eport, Titanium  Oxide and T itanium  W hite, 5.12.1954? 
p .6 .  This w itn ess  l a t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  an o f f e r  made to  him o f £1000 
f o r  a ton  o f  tita n iu m  oxide, the l i s t  p r ic e  o f which was between 
£200 and £250.
2 .
T a r i f f  Board R ep o rt,Remote C on tro ls  fo r  C ycles, 20.2.1953? p .8 .
3.
T a r i f f  Board R eport, Rubber Tyres and Tubes, 7 .12 .1955 , p . l 6 .
4 .
T a r i f f  Board R eport, Voltage R eg u la to rs , 20 .12 .1956, p .8 .
Chain a t  a co n sid e rab ly  lower c o s t  than  th a t  a t  which the d i s t r ib u to r  
of A u s tra lia n  chain  can o h ta in  h is  su p p lie s  from the  fa c to ry .  . . .  the 
d i s t r ib u to r s  o f im ported and A u s tra lian  chain  s e l l  a t  the same l i s t  
p ric e  and w ith  more or l e s s  the same d is c o u n ts .1
In  a t a r i f f  en qu iry  on ta x im e te rs , p r ic e s  p re sen ted  in  evidence 
showed th a t  d e sp ite  s u b s ta n t ia l  d if fe re n c e s  between p r ic e s ,  to  r e t a i l e r s  
o r ag en t, o f the  im ported and lo c a l  p ro d u c t, the p ric e  to  u s e r  was
p
v i r t u a l l y  the same.
Again in  the case o f vacuum c le a n e rs , ' I t  was q u ite  c le a r  from the 
evidence th a t  some im ported c le a n e rs , s e l l in g  in  q u a n tity , are p r ic e d  
up to  the  le v e l  of th a t  charged fo r  A u s tra lian  u n i ts  .
I t  i s  c le a r ly  n o t p o ss ib le  to  p re se n t a i l  the examples of th i s  
type of ev id en ce .^  Those s e le c te d  were designed  to  p rov ide some in d ic ­
a t io n  o f the range of item s in  which th i s  im port p r ic e  behaviour i s  
o b se rv ab le , in c lu d in g  the f a c t  th a t  goods lic e n se d  under each of the 
m ajor m ethodsof im port c o n tro l -  s p e c if ic  quo ta , in te rch an g eab le  quota 
and s p e c if ic  lic e n ce  -  are re p re se n te d ; as are raw m a te r ia ls ,  producer 
equipm ent and consumer goods.
*T a r i f f  Board R eport, Chain and C hains, 28 .9 .1956, p .S .
2 .
T a r i f f  Board R eport, T ax im eters , 3 .2 .1956 , p p .V o .
3.
T a r i f f  Board R eport, Vacuum C leaners and Vacuum C leaner P a r t s ,
17 .12 .1954 , p .1 4 .
4.
See a lso  fo r  example, T a r i f f  Board R eport, F lu o resc en t Lamps. 
27.4*1959, p * 5 ,; I b id , E l e c t r i c a l ly  Operated H air C lipping  M achines, 
1 2 .6 .1 9 5 9 , p .5 , ;  Ib id , F lo o r P o lish in g  M achines, 23 .10.1957, p p .6 -8 ; 
I b id , Record Changing D ev ices, 12 .5 .1955 , p .4 ;  Ib id , Pneumatic Hand 
T o o ls , 9 .10 .1956 , p .8 ; I b id , M etal Working Shaping M achines, 27 .2 .1958, 
p .7 .
The evidence in  most cases does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  prove t h a t  the 
lo c a l p r ic e s  o f im ported goods were in c reased  as a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f 
".he r e s t r i c t i o n  o f im ports.^  I t  does suggest q u ite  s tro n g ly  t h a t ,  
over a wide range o f im ported goods, p r ic e s  were determ ined by the 
le v e l  o f in te r n a l  com petition  r a th e r  th an  in  any d i r e c t  r e la t io n s h ip  
to im port c o s ts .  In  a number of cases  the r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  im ports 
enabled  the im porters  to  opera te  p r ic in g  arrangem ents designed  to  
l im i t  com petition  among them selves. Moreover, the T a r i f f  Board 
fre q u e n tly  comments on the f a c t  t h a t ,  as in  the case o f w hite  ceram ic 
t i l e s  quoted above, im port p r ic e s  are r e l a t i v e ly  h ig h er where th e re  i s  
no lo c a l  p ro d u c tio n , and th a t ,  as in  the case o f c h a in s , where th e re  i s  
lo c a l p ro d u c tio n  the cheaper im ported a r t i c l e  s e l l s  a t  o r  about the  same 
p r ic e  as the  d ea re r lo c a l ly  produced a r t ic le .-^
1.
The Board no ted  in  one case th a t  d e sp ite  a sw itch  in  demand from 
lo c a l  p ro d u c tio n  to  low er p r ic e d  im ports , fo llow ing  the rem oval o f 
im port l ic e n s in g  c o n tro ls ,  th e re  had been no re d u c tio n  in  r e t a i l  
p r ic e s  d e sp ite  ’ r e la t iv e ly  large* p r o f i t  m arg ins. T a r i f f  Board R eport, 
P e n ic i l l in s  and S trep tom ycin , 31*8.1961, p .1 4 .
2 .
Reference has a lread y  been made above to  the  s i tu a t io n  w ith  re sp e c t 
to  im ported tim ber in  New South Wales (the  l a r g e s t  m arket in  A u s tra lia  
fo r  Oregon) and p o s s ib ly  in  South A u s tra l ia .  See a lso  f o r  example 
T a r i f f  Board R eport, F lu o rescen t Lamps, l o c . c i t ; elsew here i t  was 
claim ed th a t  w h o lesa le rs  o f b icy c le  p a r t s  would not supply im ported  
p a r t s  excep t to  members of the R e ta i l  Cycle T rad e rs ’ A sso c ia tio n , See 
Mr P o lla rd , P arliam en ta ry  D ebates, H .of Reps. V ol. 9 , (12 .4 .1956) p .1269 . 
3 .
See fo r  example T a r if f  Board R eport, M etal Working L a th es , 30 .6 .1958 , 
p .1 0 ; Ib id , Chrome Chem icals, 28 .7 .1958, p .6 . Evidence was g iven  in  
an o th er en q u iry  suggesting  th a t  t h i s  was observab le  in  p r ic e  d if fe re n c e s  
between S ta te s  according to  w hether th e re  was lo c a l  m anufacture o r  no t: 
”In  Sydney the p r ic e  o f im ported c h a ff  bags i s  much lower th an  in  
Melbourne where th e re  are no c h a ff  bag m a n u fa c tu re rs .” Evidence given  
by Mr Abrahams, T a r if f  Board R eport, Bags, Sacks, Packs and B a le s , 
27 .8 .1956 , p .9 .
High s e l l in g  p r ic e s  fo r  im ported p ro ducts  were no t always charged 
e n t i r e ly  by c h o ice . In  some cases i t  may have been f e a r  o f  being too 
com petitive  and being  faced  w ith  in c re ase d  d u t ie s .  In  o th e rs , where 
im porters  a lso  o b ta in ed  su p p lie s  from lo c a l  in d u s try , i t  was more o r 
l e s s  fo rced  upon them by the dom estic in d u s try  whose barg a in in g  p o s i t io n
•I
was s tren g th en ed  as a r e s u l t  o f the r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed on im p o rts .
N evertheless  com plain ts were made fre q u e n tly  to  the a u th o r i t ie s  
ad m in is te rin g  im port l ic e n s in g  th a t  im porters  were charg ing  e x c e ss iv e ly  
fo r  im ported raw m a te r ia ls ;  in  many cases these  c laim s formed the b a s is  
o f  re q u e s ts  by m anufactu rers  fo r  q u o ta s , or as in  th e  case of those  
t e x t i l e  m anufactu rers who had re ce iv ed  m anufacturing quotas in  an e a r l i e r  
l ic e n s in g  p e r io d , a d d it io n a l  quo tas in  o rd e r th a t  th ey  cou ld  circum vent 
the Im p o rte rs . Com plaints were a lso  made by m anufactu rers th a t  t h e i r  
normal s u p p lie rs  had ceased  to  supply them e i th e r  because th ey  were able 
to  g e t a b e t t e r  p r ic e  from o th e r m anufactu rers o r because they  were 
u sin g  t h e i r  l ic e n c e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  and more p ro f i ta b le  l i n e s .  The 
o f f i c i a l  a t t i tu d e  was th a t  the  im porter was expected  to  continue supply­
ing  h is  t r a d i t io n a l  custom ers:
M. . .  Where i t  i s  b rought to  the n o tice  o f the  Department of 
Trade th a t  an im porter has ceased  to supply those m erchants 
whose o rd e rs  formed th e  b a s is  f o r  e s ta b lis h in g  the im p o rte r’ s 
q u o ta , the m a tte r  i s  tho rough ly  in v e s t ig a te d , and where 
n e ce ssa ry , c o rre c t iv e  a c t io n  taken  . . . n^
1.
See th e  d isc u ss io n  o f p ap e r and plywood in  C hapter X II.
2 .
Prime M in is te r  (M rM enzies), P a rliam en ta ry  D ebates, V ol. 
H .of Reps. 10, (2 2 .5 .1 9 5 6 ), p . 2365.
It is not known what effect the official attitude to the use of
the interchangeable quota licences affected importers1 attitudes, 
though it must have contributed to a reduction in the perfection of 
the market for these licences. Of course, not all such complaints 
were genuine, but as a result of growing pressures from textile manufac­
turers in 1957, the Department of Trade sought from textile merchants 
and manufacturers their views on the position of the licensing of 
textile materials. The replies to questions asked regarding merchants’ 
pricing charges, are of interest in this context.
In their replies, a number of merchants claimed that some manufac­
turers supplied them with their surplus licences and that others used
their surplus licences to import textile materials and sell them either
1to the merchants or to retailers.
Many of the manufacturers observed that it was clearly apparent 
that a manufacturer’s possession of a licence conferred an opportunity 
to obtain a better price from a merchant. For this reason a number of 
manufacturers were seeking quotas not to import directly themselves but 
in order to obtain better prices from the merchants*
The questions asked of the textile trade - both merchants and 
manufacturers - included one asking if a differential pricing structure
IT
One of the difficulties in the administration of the licensing 
of textiles was that, in addition to being raw materials for the 
textile and clothing industry, a wide range of textile piece 
goods could be disposed of through normal retail outlets.
existed on textiles according to whether the manufacturer purchasing
through a merchant held an import licence or not. Understandably there
was no unanimous answer to this. However, it was accepted by many of
the respondents, merchants as well as manufacturers, that the possession
of an import quota entitling the quota holder to licences to import
conferred an advantage, i.e. the licence had a value of its own.
The argument that the use of quantitative controls on imports
avoided the increases in costs which would have accompanied any other
method of reducing imports persisted throughout the period of import
licensing. A recent example of this thinking can be seen in a report
recommending the limitation of imports of timber - for protective purposes -
by quantitative restrictions; a major reason given in support of this
recommendation was that to have used tariffs would have raised the
1cost of timber to domestic homebuilders. While this reasoning has a 
superficial attraction since provided prices of imported timber are not 
increased by the merchants - and the examples given earlier in this 
chapter provide no grounds for confidence for this assumption - some 
consumers wi}JL be able to buy timber with no increase in costs. It 
is difficult to see how homebuilders who are now unable to purchase 
imported timber will be able to avoid increased costs except by not 
building a house. The alternative is to use local timber which by
rr
Report of the Special Advisory Authority under fart V of the
Tariff Board Act, 1961-62, on Timber (Mimeographed version),
27.6.1962, pp.5-6.
definition is dearer 1
In most cases, arguments concerning the effect of the quantitative
control of imports on domestic prices and costs arose in the context
of what was known as "trafficking1 in import licences, which was
commonly though to raise the costs of imports within the domestic 
2economy. The experience in respect of trafficking provides some
evidence of the behaviour of importers.
It was not long after the restrictions on imports were reimposed
in 1952 that the question of the sale of licences was raised. In May
1952, the following comment was made in a financial paper:
"Dealing in import licences has started because of the Government’s 
restrictions and in the opinion of some traders it could assume 
large proportions.
In some instances it is causing concern to long established 
traders because business could be taken out of the normal 
channels.
1.
Moreover, to the extent that demand is diverted from imported timbers 
to domestic timbers, some pressure on the prices of domestic timber will 
result; while it may be thought that this would be slight, presumably 
the alternative facing domestic timber millers in the absence of an 
increase in protection is to reduce prices or to reduce output.
See, for example, the following statement by Dr. Evatt, (then Leader 
of the Opposition): ’A person who has ... a right to import and has no
further intention of importing often advertises to sell his right from 
the government, and that means a direct addition to the cost of goods 
in this country and a direct increase in the cost of living 
Parliamentary Debat es. H.of Reps. Vol.10, (17*5*1956), p.2173* Similarly, 
referring to the buying and selling of licences, the Financial Editor of 
the Sydney Morning Herald said ’This black market has added to the 
effective cost of imports to the public’, Sydney Morning Herald. 22.2.1960
p. 1.
3*
Australian Financial Review. 8.5*1952, p*3*
There are cases ....  where traders who have established
a quota on, say textiles are offering to sell the use of that 
quota for a premium of as much as one third of its value to 
the regular distributor of, say, crockery, artificial jewellery, 
toys or cigarettes* Or they are approaching the retail trade 
direct and offering to import similar lines.*’
An official statement of policy on this aspect of the licensing
controls was made shortly after:
"There is some evidence of attempts by persons who had quotas 
established under import licensing procedures to sell any rights 
under such quotas*
Quotas were established solely to facilitate import 
procedures and actually do not confer any automatic rights to 
imports within the values provided by the quotas .*.
All reports of attempts to sell import quotas will be 
investigated and I will not hesitate to refuse to issue import 
licences to any person who attempts to make a profit solely 
because of administrative procedures*”1
Such warnings may have had some effect in limiting the extent of 
trafficking in licences by making it necessary to be more circumspect 
in seeking to sell the use of an import licence, since withdrawal of 
the quota was a fairly severe threat to importers. On the other hand, 
they may only have changed the f orm in which the sale of the use of 
the licences was effected. The line between trafficking in the sense 
used here, and the normal business practice of importers and indent 
agents was difficult to establish* In the event it would appear that 
only the more blatant cases were ever capable of being investigated 
officially; consequently the number of cases in which the quotas of an
1.
Senator O ’Sullivan, (Minister for Trade and Customs), 
Press Statement. 1*6*1952.
importer was cancelled was fairly small including, in the later stages 
of the period under review, the situation where the person purchasing 
the licence was also subject to a penalty of some loss of licence 
rights.^
Public attention to trafficking1 in licences was drawn particularly
by advertisements in newspapers which seemed to imply an offer to buy or
2sell the use of import licences. It is interesting to note that these
advertisements continued after the subdivision of the interchangeable
3
quota as from 1st July 1956.
1.
During 1955, licences to the value of about £32m. were cancelled; 
in the next 18 months the value of licences cancelled was roughly £lm. 
while in the subsequent 12 months £0.7m. worth of licences were can­
celled. (Mr Osborne, Parliamentary Debates, H.of Reps. Vol.15, 
(2.9.1959), p.1547). Even in the year when action against trafficking 
appears to have been most severe, 1955, the value of licences cancelled 
was less than two per cent, of total interchangeable quota licences 
issued (£117.6m.) during the same period. It should be noted that, 
despite claims that the purchase of licences was equally at fault, the 
penalty for a purchaser was merely the debiting of his licence entitle­
ments with the licence bought. The loss to the seller could be the 
the loss of all or part of his quota. Moreover, a purchaser who was a 
manufacturer would also have a strong case for special licences if 
action taken to debit his quotas with bought licences meant that in 
future periods he was unable to obtain sufficient raw materials to 
maintain production or employment.
2.
E.g. "Importer with "B" Quota Required to Indent goods for large 
retail distributing company. Profit margin not less than 25 per cent, 
on landed price and correct procedure will be followed ..., "Australian 
Financial Review. 23*2.1956, p.15*
3 #
*E.g. "B1 Licence. Client Prepared to Pay 10 per cent, to Holder of 
B1 Licence", Australian Financial Review. 2.8.1956, p.14; repeated Ibid, 
9.8.1956, p.15. It may be that the reduced interchangeability was 
responsible for the apparent lower rate of premium offered, though, of 
course, the advertiser may have been unsuccessful in obtaining the 
licences he sought.
The question of such advertisements was frequently raised in
Parliament. It was pointed out by the responsible Minister on several
occasions that there was nothing in conflict with the regulations in
the practice of advertising for the use of import quotas. Where it
appeared that a financial consideration was being sought or offered
simply for the use of an import licence, the Department of Customs
would investigate, and in any event as a normal practice would ensure
that the advertiser was fully aware of the provisions of the Regulations.
It is noticeable that it became a regular practice for advertisements
of this nature to include a reference to the effect that ’’correct
2procedure will be followed1’. The incidence of advertisements of this
1.
n..there is no breach of the law, or of Customs practice when an 
individual licence-holder seeks a buyer for his goods before he imports 
them. In times of restriction, people who used goods look for importers 
who have licences and who are able to import those goods. When a lic­
ence holder imports goods and clears them through Customs in his own 
name he is entitled to sell them to whom he pleases and he is equally 
entitled to contract for their sale before they are imported. The advert­
isements that one sees seeking licence holders who are able to import 
goods, are explained by these circumstances and there is not necessarily 
anything sinister about them • ••”. Mr Osborne, Parliamentary Debates.
H. of Reps. Vol.9, (8.3.1956), p.650; ’When advertisements appear in the 
paper for a spare quota the legal and practical basis of the matter is 
that they are seeking an importer who is in a position to import goods 
for them which they want. I am not aware of any means to control this. 
However, the department does very strictly look out for unfair uses of 
import licences, and deals with them accordingly”. Mr Osborne. Parlia­
mentary Debates. H.of Reps. Vol. 9 (28.2.1956), p.264*
2.
An advertisement which sought an indentor for ’B ’ category goods offer­
ing ’’Deposit with order and good profit margin assured and no financial 
outlay involved ...” Australian Financial Review , was first inserted 
5.1.1956, p.20 and repeated unchanged in each subsequent issue until 
24*5*1956 when it was amended to include the reference to ’’Correct 
procedure followed.”
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nature was considerably reduced in subsequent periods though it 
reappeared again briefly in 1959; while this was in part due to the 
easing of the general restrictiveness of licensing of interchangeable 
quota goods, it was no doubt due to some extent to the attention which 
was paid to such cases by the licensing authorities.
The form of profit taking in this sense was not restricted simply 
to direct sales of licences; in a number of instances firms advertised 
themselves for sale with an abnormally large value placed on goodwill -
most of which appeared, superficially at least, to be its valuation
1of the worth of its interchangeable quota. Transfer of the quota to
the new owner was not automatic but it was frequently difficult to
justify a refusal to transfer the quota. Again, there were complaints
concerning takeover1 operations where it appeared that the principal
objective of the takeover was to obtain the interchangeable quotas
2of the company being taken over.
1.
Typical of advertisements of this nature is the f ollowing: "Small 
Importer Business for Sale. No Import Licence Problems plus £2500 
•B* Quota. Stock ’(optional). Goodwill £2500."• Australian Financial 
Review. 11.4*1957, p.8. The similarity of the value of licences and 
the value of goodwill may, of course, be coincidental.
2.
"I cite the example of the firm of Bird*s which has gone insolvent 
and is selling to the Myer organisation a quota fixed on a base year 
quota of £700,000 ..." Mr Clark, Parliamentary Debates. H. of Reps. 
Vol. 9 (21*3.1956). p.965* In his reply the Minister for Customs and 
Excise (Mr Osborne) said "... where a company^ undertaking is sold 
the existing import quotas which the company holds are not transfer­
able as of right to the purchaser of the company. Each case is 
investigated on its merits and, in fact* in the particular case he 
mentioned, the quotas have been reviewed and very considerably 
reduced." Ibid.
When licensing was virtually removed in February I960, the Financial
Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald said:
importing will be open to anyone - the black market prices 
of about 10 per cent* of face value of a transferable import 
licence which have prevailed up to now for several commodity 
groups will disappear"•1
Even after this time at least one importer apparently considered
the fact that he held quotas for the goods still under licensing
control worth some financial consideration, and worth mentioning in an
2advertisement seeking sale of his business*
The implication of the foregoing evidence would seem to be that, 
despite frequent exhortations by the authorities administering the 
licensing and despite the efforts made in an attempt to reduce its
incidence by changing the base year of the quotas and by limiting the
3interchangeability of the quotas, the practice of selling licences 
or their use was fairly widespread* On the other hand, at no time did 
interchangeable quota licences represent much more than 15 per cent* of 
total licences issues and for a considerable part of the time they 
represented closer to 10 per cent* of total licence issues* A consid­
erable proportion of these would have been required and used in the 
normal course of business by importers, manufacturers and retailers*
1 . ’
Sydney Morning Herald, 22*2*1960, p*l.
2.
See Australian Financial Review, 19*5*1960, p*49, where the sale 
offer includes "Holder of restricted import quotasM*
3*
See Chapter III
The magnitude of licences likely to have been available at any one 
time for sale to other users was probably relatively small*
The importance of the flexibility of the interchangeable quotas 
was not limited to the extent to which licences were sold* Many 
holders of such licences, such as retail stores and wholesalers as 
well as importers were able to switch the direction of use of their 
licences either to more profitable lines or to products available from 
domestic production* The evidence in Chapter IX, unsatisfactory as 
it is, lends some support to the view that the extent of this switching 
from item to item may have been quite substantial*
The objections to trafficking were twofold, In part the objec­
tion was that it raised prices of imported goods and thereby raised 
the cost of living* The evidence suggests that, to a considerable 
extent at least, the prices of import goods rose in any case; the 
selling of licences was unlikely to have raised the price of imports 
in these circumstances* Moreover, even though in a certain combina­
tion of circumstances the effect of trafficking may have been to 
raise prices, we have argued earlier that it was desirable that all 
import prices should be raised*
1 * It might be the case that if a quota-holder had not sold his 
licences they would have remained unused; they would eventually have 
been cancelled and within an unchanged ceiling would have enabled 
additional licences to be issued to other importers. If the importer 
granted these additional licences sold to the final consumer at the 
import price plus dermal1 profit, it may be said ttet the sale of 
the licences would have resulted in an increase in the price of import- 
ed goods* Even if the new importer raised his selling prices to the 
free market level there may have been some difference between the two
/••* contfd
The major - and not completely logical - objection to trafficking 
was based on considerations of equity - that it was inequitable that 
anyone should profit from possession of a licence to import issued by 
the government* First, there are of course, a variety of cases where 
governments issue "pieces of paper" which become of considerable value 
to the recipient* Second, an importer is able to make a profit from 
the receipt of the licence without actually selling the licence; he 
can do this by importing and selling the imported goods at whatever 
price the market will bear* He could be selling to the person to whom, 
had he been permitted, he would have sold the licences* In the former 
case, it would have been a legitimate business transaction; in the 
second an action subject to risk of loss of licence and licence entitle­
ment* Third, the importer was not the only one placed in the position 
of being able to make considerable profits out of the government action. 
By the mere act of imposing a quantitative limit on imports, local pro­
ducers were immediately presented with the opportunity for increasing 
prices and hence profits* There was little if any political objection 
to this*1
1* (previous page cont*!)
types of imports in their overall effect on internal prices. If the 
additional licences are given for imports demand for which is mors 
inelastic this may be the result; the same result could of course be 
achieved by changing the relative intensity of licensing of the two 
classes of goods* In any event it is unlikely to be of significance 
in this context*
1 *
And, of course, the provision of tariff protection to a company 
is to some extent at least a straight-out gift to the shareholders 
of that company of the increased profits it is thereby enabled to make.
To the extent that trafficking was considered an offence, it was 
largely the offence of being blatant about the profit taking, and only 
to a lesser extent the profit talcing itself*
There are good economic arguments to support the view that the 
allocation of resources brought about by a process equivalent to 
trafficking in licenceswas preferable to the one where the pattern of 
importing set in a previous period was rigidly maintained or where the 
pattern was arbitrarily determined by the licensing authorities* This 
does not mean, however, that it was desirable that importers should be 
able to appropriate to themselves the profit from the restriction of 
imported supplies* Within a system of quantitative limits on imports, 
a system whereby licences for imports are auctioned would be more 
desirable on equity grounds* The possibility of auctioning licences 
for goods in the interchangeable quota category wa3 considered by the 
licensing authorities but was rejected as politically unacceptable*
A further possible alternative would have been the imposition of 
a lump sum tax on importers* This would be designed to remove from 
them part of all of their monopoly gains without enabling them to 
pass on the tax as a further
IT”
This essential contradiction was recognised by the authorities 
administering the import licensing system* Given the existence of 
the licensing system they had to accept the political difficulties 
involved in open trafficking in licences and attempt to prevent it 
as far as possible.
%> «j1cost* Moreover, if it is felt desirable on equity grounds to offset
the redistribution of income to holders of licences, there is an
.offsettingequally good case, from equity for/to a corresponding degree the 
redistribution to local producers who receive protection from the 
restriction of imports. This again is an incomplete picture; as has 
been argued in Chapter IV the operation of direct controls on imports 
without a sufficient disabsorption of resources domestically, i*e. 
without a cut in money income or an increase in total saving, enables 
not only those industries receiving direct protection but all 
industries to increase their profits as a result of the inflation 
produced.
To offset all income redistribution resulting from the direct 
control of imports would reduce the efficiency of the mechanism within 
the system, making for a structural adjustment tending towards a correc­
tion of the basic imbalance. While there is little reason for seeking 
a redistribution of income to importers as such, it would seem to be 
preferable to permit such a redistribution than to attempt to avoid 
it by reducing the flexibility of the licensing system. A method of 
limiting imports which did not involve the issue of licences, at least 
on these grounds, would seem to have distinct advantages.
1.
There would, no doubt, be practical difficulties in imposing 
such a tax. It should be noted, however, that in the interwar 
period almost all the Hhiropean countries which operated extensive 
quantitative control over imports levied taxes on the licences. 
See Heuser, oo.cit.. pp.235-238.
Finally, we need to consider the extent to which the controls 
induced rigidities into the importing sector* Flexibility in the 
pattern of importing would be reduced to the extent that import 
licence entitlements over a wide range of goods were based upon 
imports made in a base year period* A similar result would follow, 
to t he extent that the principle was adhered to that licences should 
be given to importers rather than to manufacturers*
The latter principle was, of course, designed to protect the 
importers* In times of severe restriction of imports, and consequent­
ly a shortage of supplies, not only did a licence to import acquire 
a value of its own, but the services of importers were needed less by 
those who in normal circumstances found it profitable to avail them­
selves of importers* services* Hence many who used or retailed 
imported goods sought licence entitlements with the intention of by­
passing the importer* Generally these were resisted less perhaps in 
the earlier years of the period than later, though some flexibility 
existed in the system to deal with cases where importers were judged 
to be taking advantage of their traditional clients, or in a few 
cases, as for example in textile manufacturing, where it could reason­
ably be argued that through the expansion of its operations the firm 
had reached a stage where under normal circumstances it would have 
undertaken its own import purchasing.
More generally, importing became a profitable pursuit and there 
were many requests for nnew importer” quotas. Again, in general,
these were refused, although in the first relaxation period these 
applications tended to be dealt with more sympathetically, quotas 
being made available in many cases* In the second intensification 
period, these cases were dealt with together with other anomalies, 
provision being made for the limited entry of new importers under 
necessarily strict criteria* Provision was also made, under the 
Replacement method of licensing, for licences to be granted to appli­
cants not previoudLy holding quotas*
We noted earlier that in the first intensification and relaxation 
periods anomalies, other than the hardship1 cases which arose within 
the first year or so and were dealt with by a special section estab- 
lished for the purpose, tended to give rise to less concern than in 
later periods. This, it was suggested, was due both to the expecta­
tion that the licensing system (and hence the anomalies) were of 
short duration and to the fact that the problem of anomalies could be 
adequately accommodated on an ad hoc basis where necessary by issuing 
special licences within an expanding import budget* In addition some 
forms of anomaly were directly related to the length of time the 
licensing system had been in operation.
One of the modifications made to the licensing system to tailor 
it more to a longer term policy instrument in the second intensifica-
17
See Chapter VIII
tion period was to put the adjustments to anomalies on a coordinated 
basis* The following types of anomaly were those for which specific 
action was taken on a 1planned for’ basis from April 1957, in addition 
to the fnew importer1 adjustments referred to above:
(i) Traditional Importer Adjustments. This was an example of
an anomaly that resulted largely from the ad hoc treatment of problems 
which arose within a system designed for the short term only* It was 
found that many long established importers who had received no addi­
tions to the quota established on the basis of their base year import 
were considerably worse off than many who had, including new importers 
been given quotas when the licensing level was being increased,
(ii) Expansion of Business* As the rate of expansion of business 
is far from uniform, those whose businesses had expanded faster than 
others or who were planning expansion through new premises, increased 
retail outlets etc, tended to have, or to face the prospect of, a 
considerably lower ratio of imported products to turnover than those 
whose expansion had been relatively slow,
(iii) Changed Nature of Business, In a few cases, fundamental 
changes in the nature of business conducted since the base year 
resulted in an increased need for import entitlements to bring the
17
”It could be easily demonstrated that many importers had in 
earlier and easier licensing periods received concessional licens­
ing treatment* As well, many new importers had been given quotas*
This meant that those traditional importers who had not received 
concessions had lost ground to other importers”, Minister for 
Trade,(Mr McEwen), Press Statement. 12.6*1957*
y-'
ratio of imported to local goods more in line with the proportion 
normal for the new type of business.
Within the general procedures for *anomaly adjustment1 were a 
number of other types which were not strictly anomalies in the sense 
as those cited above. These include those similar to the ones which 
arose in 1952, such as unrepresentative base year (resulting from 
the change of the base year for interchangeable quotas from 1950-51 
to 195V55)> and general hardship cases. Also included were cases where 
1import/export1 firms had suffered reduced flexibility in their opera­
tions due to the restrictions. While action taken to overcome these
problems was not insignificant, it is probably true to say that such
2action did little more than ameliorate the extreme cases.
These examples illustrate some of the ways in which distortions 
arose in the importing sector through the operation of the direct 
controls on imports.
There is no doubt that many importers found that the existence of 
import licensing provided them with profit opportunities which would
1.
Of the increase in the ceiling of £75m. c.i.f.e. in April 
1957, £9m. oi.f.e. was allocated for anomalies adjustments.
2.
In the case of traditional importer1 anomaly adjustments inter­
changeable quotas were increased by the amount by which the importer1 s 
quota in December 1956 was less than 20 per cent, of imports of like 
goods in 1950-51* Minister for Trade, Press Statement. 12.6.1957.
On the other hand some ^ 0 0  importers - about 25 per cent, of the 
estimated number of regular importers - benefitted. Minister for 
Trade, Sydney Morning Herald. 9*10.1957, p.S.
not otherwise have existed. Some incentive to increased efficiency 
remained in the syetm but little compulsion. The overall turnover 
of importers was in general reduced in those years when the controls 
were at all significant, and while the opportunity for increased 
profits presented itself, importers were faced with additional costs 
arising from the procedures of import licensing and a higher proport­
ion of overheads to turnover. It would seem that the efficient 
importing firms would have welcomed the removal of the restrictions;
less efficient firms may have found the protection provided by their
2virtual monopoly of importing rights rather comfortable.
From the evidence presented it seems reasonable to conclude that, 
at times when the licensing controls were applied restrictively, the 
allocation of the restricted supplies was affected by means of the 
price mechanism over a wide range of imports. The evidence is far 
from sufficient to reach firm conclusions on the length of the short 
term during which importers refrain from raising prices to meet a new 
market situation. It would seem, that to a considerable extent 
importers5 pricing policies are relatively flexible, determined more
1.
See for example the following, nor unrepresentative, comment 
concerning a reported fall in profits of a major steel merchant.
"In those years when steel was in short supply and import quotas 
controlled the market, William Adams could call the tune to customers 
....« Bulletin. 25.8.1962, p.54*
2.
"... the more competitive import situation following the lifting 
of most import controls had required importers more diligently to 
seek the most competitive sources of supply", Tariff Board, Annual 
Report. 1961-62, p.9*
by current market conditions than by established trading habits 
with consequential inflexible prices* In view of the fact that, in 
general, export prices are far less stable than domestic prices, the 
importer would be less able to maintain unchanging prices than would 
domestic producers little affected by world market conditions* Such 
relative price instability makes for windfall profits and losses and 
would tend to induce a pricing policy designed to make up on the 
swings what was lost on the roundabouts. One might reasonably expect 
a fairly flexible and necessarily opportunist attitude to prices.
In these circumstances and in the light of the evidence given in this 
study one can have little confidence that the short term rigidity of 
prices would be other than quite short.
An assessment of the evidence regarding the longer term aspects 
of the licensing system is even more tentative. Much of the dealing 
in interchangeable quotas would by its nature have been unknown to 
few but the participants in the transaction. This might suggest the 
possibility that, in spite of the efforts made to limit the transfer 
of licences the extent to which we are aware of its occurrence 
indicates a degree of perfection of the market of some magnitude.
The degree of flexibility, as distinct from the transfer of licence 
use, would probably have been more significant in its overall effects. 
We must remember, however, that in only a small part of the system, 
predominantly the interchangeable quota category, but also to a much 
smaller degree the specific quota category and some specific quota
banks, was flexibility of any significance provided to the importer. 
The various ad hoc and planned measures to offset anomalies, to 
admit new importers and to increase oAuotas of existing importers 
reduced some of the rigidities of the system as did the fluctuations 
in the level of overall imports. Nevertheless there can be little 
doubt that the direct controls on imports introduced considerable 
rigidity into the importing sector; over much of the period the 
importer was faced with few penalties for inefficiency and little room 
for enterprise and ingenuity except perhaps in devising means of 
obtaining additional import licences.
CHAPTER XVIII.
CONCLUSION
The long run development of an economy and the pattern of such 
development are far from self-determining* Almost invariably, the 
determining factors are influenced, at varying degrees of intensity, 
by outside circumstances including, importantly, government policies 
in both direct and indirect relationships to those factors. The 
economic development and the pattern of such development in the 
Australian economy in the post war period has been influenced con­
siderably by the existence of import controls and by the form in 
which those controls were operated. Within the term economic devel­
opment we have distinguished two aspects: the determinants of the
overall rate of economic growth; and the efficiency of the allocation 
of resources to promote growth. While the two aspects are closely 
interdependent there is some value in distinguishing between them in 
examining the consequences of a set of economic policy measures. Our 
approach to these questions was directed basically to the consideration 
of the effect of the controls on imports on the efficiency of the 
allocation of resources within the economy.
The purpose of this study was to answer a number of questions 
which, broadly, relate to these aspects of the control of imports. 
Consequently, the experience of the control of imports in Australia 
from 1952 to 1960 has been examined from the point of view of, first, 
the methods employed in the operation of the controls; second, the
oU2
short run or direct effects of the controls and third, the longer 
term structural effects.
The import licensing system, although imposed initially in 
1952 to meet what were considered to be short term abnormal cir­
cumstances, remained in force with varying degrees of intensity 
until 1960. From our examination of the mechanism of the controls 
two general features seem to emerge. First, the authorities admin­
istering the controls were faced with what they recognised to te 
essentially conflicting objectives. Their immediate objective was 
to reduce foreign exchange expenditure. This implied taking certain 
actions in selecting imports, approving investment projects, etc., 
which conflicted with their longer term objective which was to min­
imise the extent of interference with the normal market determined 
pattern of economic activity. The second feature of the actual control 
of imports was the fact that, in their conscious efforts to reduce the 
distortions induced by the controls, the closer the authorities moved 
to reducing the distoring effects, the closer the method employed 
approximated to the price mechanism. Methods such as the replacement 
system of licensing which, apart from the short term effect of ensuring 
some control on stock accumulation, approximated to importing without 
restriction was only possible when such free importing for a commodity 
or group of commodities could be permitted within the limits of the 
available supply of foreign exchange.
Under a given level of permitted imports, relaxations in one 
direction meant intensification of control in another; with a 
given degree of relaxation, the greater relaxation on one item the 
less possible on others. To the extent that directional relaxations 
in this sense were designed to reduce inequalities in the restrictive 
ness of the controls the system moved more closely to approximation 
with the price mechanism.
While they remained partial approximations to the price mech­
anism they removed distortions in one direction at the expense of 
creating others.
Similar conflicts were observed in the criteria followed in 
the selection of imports as well as in the approval of investment 
projects. Again the tendency was for measures taken to offset 
distortions in one direction to imply additional distortions in 
another, simply as a consequence of the logic of the controls.
This did not always follow. Thus the use of the interchange­
able quota system provided an approximation to the price mechanism 
over part of the system, but political necessity made it necessary 
to attempt to limit the favourable effect of this method by dis­
couraging more or less actively the transfer or sale of licences 
which would seem to be an essentially favourable feature of the
method
oO 4
Had the interchangeable quota been applied over all imports, 
a form of control which we have argued would have been preferable 
to the existing forms of control, it would have differed from a 
tariff or equivalent measure only in that the monopoly profits 
which would accrue to the importer under the interchangeable quota 
would go to the Government with a tariff.
In this conclusion, however, we need to recognise that some 
arguments regarding the distorting effects of a system of quantit­
ative controls on imports need considerable qualification in the 
light of the experience of the period under review.
The argument that quantitative control of imports permits 
essential goods to he imported relatively freely while restricting 
severely non essential goods, with consequential effects on the 
expansion stimulated under the protection provided by the controls, 
is not supported, or at least is supported only with considerable 
qualification. The term essential is necessarily imprecise; 
moreover, not only do community valuations of essentiality change
but they are also subject to a conflict between the long and short
1term comparable to that described above. Even so, there would 
seem to have been considerably less restriction of imports of goods 
commonly termed non essential than one would expect from this 
argument. Similarly, the spotty unemployment and increasingly
1 E.g. consumer goods became relatively essential in 1956 (as they 
were in 1951) for essentially short term reasons.
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chaotic administration which Lundberg and Hill predicted did not 
eventuate.”^
A variant of the argument about essentiality was put forward
by Firth and Hagger. The argument in Chapter TV suggested that
under certain fairly rigorous conditions the use of quantitative
controls on imports could increase welfare. The effects on the
redistribution of income, however, were largely ignored. The
argument of Firth and Hagger was essentially based on the question
2of the distribution of income within the restricting country.
There must be considerable doubt about the efficiency of 
import controls as a means of effecting some desired (in some 
sense) redistribution of income. It will be apparent from the 
discussion in Chapter IX that social valuation was a major factor 
in the determination of essentiality of goods in the absolute sense 
but whether they were licensed for import depended on their avail­
ability from local sources. Considerations of income distribution
1 See Chapter XI.
2 Arguing against Dr. Cordents proposal for a uniform tariff Firth
and Hagger put the argument in the following wag: "a 20% increase,
say, in all import prices, brought about by raising the level of
a uniform tariff would, in all probability, have comparatively 
little effect on the volume of luxury goods we import for our 
tycoons and their wives. On the other hand, it would almost 
certainly mean that we import fewer foreign textbooks and less 
power generating equipment because the grants made to University 
Libraries for the purchase of books and the loan allocations of 
instrumentalities such as the Victorian State Electricity Commiss­
ion are both fixed in money terms. In this event Dr. Corden would 
have it that textbooks and generating equipment were less essential 
that Rolls Royce cars and French dresses. We should feel bound to 
disagree with him". G.G. Firth and A.J. Hagger, "The Australian 
Economy, February 19591 2*, Economic Record. Vol.XXXV, No.70 (April 
1959), pp.19-20.
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1may have been important indirectly in occasional cases but not to
2any significant extent.
Additional arguments customarily put forward in favour of
3direct controls on imports are their speed and their certainty,""
We saw that the experience of 1955 and 1956 and to some extent 1959 
suggests some qualification to this, apart from the question of time 
lags. The experience of 1955 and 1956, however, illustrates another 
feature of conflict in the use of direct controls. There is little 
doubt that the required reductions in imports could have been made 
in those years or that a required reduction in imports can be made, 
at any time. The administratively difficult task is to reduce imports 
to the level sought without reducing them considerably below the 
target level. The politically difficult job is to accept the effects 
of reaching the desired level of imports. The basic problem in 1956 
was the need to choose between disrupting the domestic economy and
1 E.g., the exemption of tea from restriction, the transfer of 
crockery from the interchangeable quota category to a specific 
quota.
2 Apart from begging the question of the basis on which decisions 
regarding income distribution should be effected, the argument 
taken to its logical conclusion would require that goods deemed 
by the authors to be essential e.g, electrical generating equip­
ment should not be made subject to a protective tariff. Moreover, 
they seem to imply that the restriction of imports would have had 
no effect on prices of the imported goods or alternatively that 
there was no restriction on their importation. This was more or 
less the case with b>oks etc. for universities but not the case 
for electrical generating equipment.
3 Firth and Kagger, on, cit.. p.17; K.J. Hancock, op, cit,, p.25
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failing to achieve the savings in foreign exchange required. Other 
factors, the need to honour existing contracts, to consider adversely 
affected supplying countries, the need to honour licences issued in 
an earlier licensing period, etc,, will occur to varying degrees but
these only accentuate the basic problem, A second point - also made
1by Hancock - is that given mmoderate Government competence”, cir- 
which
cumstances/demand the certainty and speed attributed to direct con­
trols on imports can normally be avoided. We also argued in Chapter 
VIII that, similarly, while there are advantages in a stable import 
ceiling under licensing control, the case of a stable ceiling is not 
without offsetting features and there is considerably less of a case 
if imports are being restricted by means of a tariff or an equivalent 
price measure.
In general, it would seem possible to conclude that the manner 
in which the mechanism of the control was operated mitigated some of 
the extreme features which on a priori reasoning may be expected from 
the direct control of imports. Nevertheless, the extent to which this 
was possible was limited at times when the effects might be expected 
to be most severe and, in general, they would seem to have been 
reduced the more effectively, the closer the approximation to a price 
mechanism.
Before dealing specifically with the iwo remaining general
1 Op. cit,. p.25
questions of concern here, it will be convenient to consider a number 
of arguments for and against - mainly against - the quantitative con­
trol of imports in the light of what we have learned from our invest­
igation.
In addition to their argument that the direct control of imports 
will give rise to bottlenecks, spotty unemployment and increased 
confusion in administration, Lundberg and Hill put forward three 
further objections to the use of quantitative controls on imports. 
Briefly summarised these were:
(i) the already strong monopoly elements within the 
Australian economy will be strengthened with an 
accentuation of the pressure group character of 
the Australian economic political structure;
(ii) the cost structure will become further out of 
line with adverse effects on exports and no 
corresponding benefits on the import side;
(iii) inefficient industries will be encouraged, 
productivity will be low and increases in r eal
national income will be significantly smaller
1than would otherwise have been the case.
We have seen that an important consequence of the licensing 
of imports is that local suppliers obtain strong bargaining pressure 
with their customers not only while controls are in existence but
1 Lundberg and Hill, op cit.. pp.42-44.
after they have been removed as well. Even when controls are lifted,
1no firm could ignore the possibility that they may be leimposed.
There is a presumption that this was important in the case of the 
paper industry and undoubtedly it would seem to strengthen the 
market position of industries such as the iron and steel, chemical 
and perhaps rubber industries, although the longer imports remain 
uncontrolled the less effective such pressure becomes.
The opportunities for private profiteering to which Lundberg 
and Hill refer have been amply demonstrated in Chapters XI and XII, 
and the evidence from the examination of gross profit margins is 
certainly not inconsistent with it. It should be noted that there 
may be an offsetting factor to the strengthening of the monopoly 
elements. It seems clear that many overseas firms were induced to 
establish local productive units as a consequence of being virtually 
excluded from their markets by the controls on imports. Certainly 
they may have responded similarly simply as a consequence of tariff 
protection, particularly, as in the case of the U.S.A. where higher 
rates are involved. The degree of manufacture, however, may have
1 The present Government has emphasised that it does not intend to 
reintroduce import licensing: "Having got rid of them (the import
controls), the Government firmly intends ... to keep out of them 
...", The Treasurer (Mr. Holt), Parliamentary Debates. House of 
Representatives Vol.28 (15*11.196t>), p. i25o While there are good 
reasons for thinking the present Government has no liking for 
import controls, such statements would, of course, be necessary 
to prevent speculation even if they did not represent accurately 
the Governments position. Moreover, the Labour Party has fre­
quently impressed its intention to use this form of control as a 
balance of payments and possibly protective measure when it 
attains power.
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been greater under import licensing, particularly in view of the
policy of relating foreign exchange assistance to performance in
terms of increasing the Australian content of the product. Under
a tariff, on the other hand, much of the tariff barrier might have
been overcome by a smaller degree of local manufacture.
controls
In addition, the virtual exclusion by physical/may be a 
more direct stimulant to investment in productive facilities than 
a tariff; in the latter case the impact may be less sharply felt, 
particularly if there is a shortage of supplies in the market. The 
existence of direct controls will not only indicate to the overseas 
firm which has been excluded that it can only maintain its market 
in that area by producing the goods there, but also will probably 
indicate more clearly fairly high profit possibilities as a result 
of entering the market as a producer. On the other hand, entry of
new firms, including those from overseas, does not necessarily
2result in an increase in price competition.
A further qualification to the argument that the existence of 
quantitative import controls strengthens the monopoly elements in the 
economy is that a monopolistic position tends to be harder to maintain
1 The pattern of local assembly and manufacturing operations between 
North American and British based firms suggests this argument to 
have some foundation particularly in the case of British firms.
It may be, of course, that from the economic aspect, a lower degree 
of domestic content may have been preferable.
2 E.g. as in the case of the entry of a new overseas firm into rubber 
type production.
oilwhen excess capacity is in existence. One of the features of the 
period was the emergence, in many cases for the first time since 
the war, of excess capacity. Where a number of producers exist and 
the emergence of additional producers, in many cases, may have come
about during, and possibly as a result of, the restrictions on
1imports, this has frequently led to a competitive situation intern­
ally. Of course, the existence of more than one producer does not 
guarantee competition, but it does make restraints on competition 
harder to enforce.
Nevertheless, it is probably true for a number of industries
that the only effective competition that can be expected will come 
2from imports. Clearly, in these cases, the existence of import 
restrictions and the possibility of their reimposition strengthens 
the monopolistic position. Moreover, the existence of direct controls 
on imports enables other industries to organise to reduce or eliminate 
competition.
1 E.g. possible part of the explanation in motor vehicles and heavy 
chemicals.
2 The importance of import competition is clearly of much greater 
importance in Australian secondary industry than Professor Hunter 
would seem to imply. In an article presenting calculated concen­
tration ratios for a number of Australian industries he puts import 
competition towards the end of a list of hypothetical qualifications 
given in a footnote; although industries such as paper, chemicals, 
rubber tyres etc., are included. Similarly, the one sentence dis­
missal of the Tariff Board’s possible - though admittedly unlikely - 
role in controlling restrictive trade practices seems to completely 
underestimate its potential importance. This, despite the fact that 
of the ^9 industries for which concentration ratios were calculated 
depend to a greater or less extent upon tariff protection; see Alex 
Hunter, "Restrictive Practices and Monopolies in Australia", Economic 
Record. Vol.37, No.77 (March 1961), particularly pp.34-35 and 45.
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The experience of the period from 1952-1960 certainly supports 
the argument of Lundberg and Hill, though, as we have seen, there 
may be factors resulting from the licensing of imports which work 
in the opposite direction*
The second objection of Lundberg and Hill was that import 
controls will tend to increase the internal cost level and lower 
the competitive position of our export industries« At the same 
time, they argue, import controls need not reduce potential import 
demand as investment expenditure will be stimulated, resulting in 
increased imports of machinery; at the same potential import 
competition will remain.
Taking the second part of the argument first, the discussion 
in Chapter V demonstrated that in the absence of corresponding 
measures to reduce internal expenditure, demand internally will 
increase by an amount up to the amount of the supplies the imports 
of which are restricted from overseas unless the controls themselves
1 A further point made by Lundberg and Hill in this context was that 
the use of import controls will further strengthen the already 
strong pressure group character of the Australian economic-political 
structure. This is judged to be outside the terms of reference of 
this study. Although the experience of the last two years, i.e, 
since the virtual removal of import licensing controls, seems to 
give some support to this view, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the increase in the pressure group character of Australian 
society - assuming that an increase there has been - due to factors 
resulting from the controls on imports, and increases due simply to 
an increase in the size of the sectors which the pressure groups 
represent, an increase which may have taken place even without the 
existence of import controls.
have the effect of stimulating saving. This will stimulate additional
investment as well and result in a general increase in prices. Con-
2sequently, both potential import cfemand is unlikely to be reduced and 
may, in fact, be increased, and the competitive position of export 
products will deteriorate. The argument of Lundbergand Hill is 
therefore supported by the argument of Chapter IV but in a more general 
sense than in the manner in which was stated by them. In many respects 
this is supported by the experience of the period but not without 
qualification. In Chapter XV we noted that although the controls on 
imports had been in force and were restricting imports for a matter of 
years prior to 1957-58, the level of activity at that time was relat­
ively low, a situation which would seem to need some explanation in 
view of our a priori argument. The action taken by the fiscal and 
monetary authorities in 1956 to reduce domestic demand was clearly 
part of the explanation though we suggested that it did not appear to 
be the complete explanation; farm income was low in 1957-58 but had 
been very high the year before. One possible explanation which we 
suggested was the limit placed on investment expenditure in the two
1 The reference to the restriction of supplies which would otherwise 
have been imported includes any other factors which in the absence 
of the controls on imports would have reduced demand for imports 
even in the absence of the controls, as was almost certainly the 
case in 1951.
2 Of course, in the context of Australian institutional background, 
to the extent that the Arbitration Court attempts to recompense 
the wage-earner for the loss of real income that he suffers as a 
result of the restriction of imports, the potential demand for 
imports, the potential demand for imports will be increased.
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previous years by the severe restrictions placed on imported invest­
ment goods.^
It should be noted, of course, that in the short term, there 
will be a tendency for import demand to be increased as a result of 
any investment expenditure designed to produced locally goods pre­
viously imported, whether the decision to undertake the investment 
results "naturally", i.e. simply from the interplay of market forces, 
or whether it is induced by importcontrols or by tariffs. During 
the gestation period of the productive process, before production 
actually takes place from which the local market can be supplied, 
demand for the imported product will remain. Any imports necessary 
of plant, machinery, raw materials or components will represent a net 
addition to total import demand.
The objection that the control of imports will raise the level 
of relative costs in Australia and worsen the position of the export 
industries, we shall defer until we have considered further arguments 
by some other writers. We shall similarly defer the final objection 
of the two authors which is that because the economy will try to do
1 We have not taken this possibility further. Clearly, it would need 
a fairly detailed analysis of what happened to the resources not 
used in the investment frustrated by the restrictions on imports 
of investment goods. It was considered that this would lake us too 
far from the main subject of this enquiry.
too many things, productivity will be low, inefficient industries 
will be fostered, and in general, the real national income will be 
lower than would otherwise be the case. We shall leave this argument 
for the present until we have considered some further arguments put 
forward for and against the direct control on imports by other writers.
Dr. Corden, in his consideration of the policy of import 
restrictions listed the following additional disadvantages:
(i) they are an administrative burden and a continuous 
source of friction between the business community 
and the public administration;
(ii) they provide monopoly profits to importers;
(iii) they tend to worsen the terms of trade.
That there is a substantial administrative burden in the
licensing of imports is a matter diich need not be argued, nor can
we doubt that there was friction; "I am aware that there is ... a
widespread sense of grievance in certain trading circles in respect
of the impact of the administration of import licensing as it is
conducted at present and as it has been conducted for some time.
I think it would be impossible to administer this difficult matter
in such a way as to meet the requests and desires of all the interested
2parties and remove completely a sense of grievance”.
1 Dr. W.M. Corden, "Import Restrictions and Tariffs, opcit., 
p.331-346.
2 The Minister for Trade, (Mr. McEwen), Parliamentary Debates.
House of Representatives, Vol.10, (15.5.1956), p.1034.
Similarly the Minister referred to the inability to divorce
1import licensing from "some element of rough justice".
Undoubtedly most continued concern appears to have been
expressed in respect of the 1 2traffidcing1 in licences though other
aspects have assumed importance. It was not uncommon for companies
whose performance was less satisfactory than their competitors to
ascribe the results to differential treatment by the licensing 
2authorities. If the claims were genuine then the grievance was 
genuine; if the claims were not based on fact this does not mean 
that those who made the claims did not believe them to be true and 
so the feeling of grievance was still genuine. If the claims were 
made, even though known to be false, it may inculcate in those to 
whom it is addressed, a feeling of grievance, and provide an alibi 
for inefficient management, which would be difficult or impossible 
to verify, and so contribute to ensuring longer life to inefficiency. 
No doubt, such grievances as did arise in this positive sense con­
cerned an area of import licensing which was small relative to the
1 Ibid. House of Representatives, Vol. (14*5.1957), p.1034*
2 In perhaps the most notable example of a n$j or firm losing a 
substantial proportion of its market to a competitor - in this 
case a new entrant to the industry - a major reason ascribed by 
British Tobacco Company (Australia) Ltd., for the considerable 
success of Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd., at its 
expense was that Rothmans obtained licences for machinery to 
enable it to meet the market demand for larger size filter 
cigarettes long before British Tobacco was able to do so.
See Report of Chairman (T.J.N. Foley) of British Tobacco 
Company (Australia) Ltd., reported in Australian Financial 
Review. 1.3.1956, p•14; see also Observer. 20.8.1960, p.35.
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magnitude of the import licensing system: "... two or three mistakes
(or fancied errors) in administering import licensing can attract great
and adverse publicity. Yet some 150,000 individual decisions are made
in the course of a year; in such a number there must be more than two
1or three errors of judgement in applying policies1'.
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that a large number of 
government actions are of the type which tend to hurt individuals or 
groups of individuals either more than others or for the purpose of 
benefitting others. It is not clear that alternatives to import 
licensing would have avoided effects giving rise to grievances.*
They may be reduced but by no means eliminated if selective tariff 
rates were used for the purpose of restricting imports. Even if a 
uniform tariff surcharge or an exchange rate variation were used for 
the purpose of redirecting import demand, what might be considered 
an arbitrary redistribution of income would occur.
The argument and evidence in Chapter XVII supports Dr. Corden's 
argument that the system of licensing imports confers on importers a 
monopoly which they are able to realise upon in terms of increased 
returns per unit of imports. One qualification which we noted in the 
earlier discussion was that to some extent the ability to obtain a 
higher return on such imports as are permitted offsets the reduction 
in the importer's overall turnover. We also observed that a system
1 Sir John Crawford (from 1956 to 1960 Permanent Head of the Department 
of Trade) "Relations Between Civil Servants and Ministers in Policy 
Making", op. cit.
of import licensing tends to introduce rigidities into the business 
of importing and to provide protection to inefficient importers, 
while at the same time offering few rewards to efficient importers.
The third argument is that in the use of import restriction 
Australia tends to worsen the terms of trade. This will follow to 
the extent that foreign exporters are able to appropriate to them­
selves some of the monopoly profits. This argument has been exam­
ined in Chapter XVI, The evidence presented is inconclusive on this 
point, though it does support the view that exporters do tend to 
tailor their prices to the situation within the export market and 
to this extent lends some support to the general argument.
On the other hand, two offsetting factors should be considered. 
Firstly, there may be some gain from the general effect on prices of 
the goods being restricted in consequence of the world demand being 
reduced relative to supply, a possibility, we argued, which should 
not be neglected, at least in respect of a number of particular comm­
odities in a situation such as 1952, Secondly, the import restrictions 
may have led some exporters to r educe prices in order to gpt a larger 
quantity into the market for a given quota. Some possibility of this 
was argued in Chapter XVI, though it seems likely to be restricted to 
firms with Australian associates.
Overall, however, there are influences working both to improve 
and to worsen the terms of trade; there is no strong evidence to 
suggest that it is greater one way or another.
Dr. Corden also introduced a variation of the argument of 
Lundberg and Hill which related to the emergence of spotty unemploy­
ment, Dr. Corden1s argument was that the deflationary measures which 
should accompany the introduction of controls on imports may r educe 
demand for a different set of products than for those where demand 
is increased as a result of the restriction of imports. On the other 
hand, he argues, that the tariffs are automatically deflationary 
providing the tariff revenue is not spent. It is not clear whether 
in this context Dr. Corden is referring to a uniform tariff which 
reduces expenditure on imports by the same amount as the licensing 
system at any particular time, or whether a tariff which reduced 
imports of a particular import item to a degree comparable with the 
particular method of licensing control applied to that item. In the 
case of the latter it may be that only a small proportion of the 
previous level of imports will be imported. It is true that if the 
demand is inelastic the tariff revenue from this small level of 
imports will be relatively high but then so will the level of prices 
internally and consequently the profit opportunities for the local 
manufacturer. In fact, as we have seen, the only difference between 
a tariff and restriction by means of import licence in this case is 
that the monopoly profit goes to the government rather than to the 
importer. It seems difficult to argue as Dr. Corden does that the 
deflation brought about by the government not spending its tariff 
receipts in the case of the tariff is biased in the right direction
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whereas the deflation which of necessity should accompany the licensing 
of imports is biased in the wrong direction.
Arguments in defence of import licensing were put forward by
2Professor Firth and Dr. Hagger more or less in reply to Dr. Corden.
We shall take first the points they made in reply to Dr. Corden*s 
criticisms of import licensing.
In reply to Corden*s argument that import licensing causes 
friction between the business comunity and the public administration, 
they argue that the area of friction is much smaller than Dr. Corden 
infers for two reasons. First, that in fact "business community" 
really should read "importers". Second, that it may occur when import 
licensing is first introduced but will be gradually reduced to insig­
nificant proportions.
To these arguments, three points may be made. First, that 
friction would be limited to importers is an oversimple view. Most 
business men are affected by imports in one of two ways. They require 
imported goods in üaeir business, whether manufacturers needing part 
machinery and raw materials or retailers seeking imported goods for 
sale,or they compete with imports. In the first case they may feel
1 This admittedly w ould probably te a situation where import demand 
elasticities are less than unity in which case Dr. Corden indicates 
some of the customs revenue should be spent to maintain the demand 
for home produced goods.
2 Firth and Hanger, op. cit.. pp,17-20.
their essential requirements are not being met, or more commonly that
their competitors* needs are being met to a greater extent than their 
*]own. On the other hand, businessmen whose goods were meeting strong 
competition from imports frequently argued that the licensing system 
should be used to limit this competiton.
Second, the level of licensing was changed frequently so that it 
is true that the system tended to settle down fairly smoothly.
Third, while it was undoubtedly the case that the possible areas 
of f riction between public authority and the business community were 
reduced to the minimum the system permitted, a significant area of 
friction was that within the business community itself where there 
were numerous complaints regarding importers’ failure to supply trad­
itional customers, or only supplying at what the customer considered 
to be an excessive price. "Whether the claims were valid or not they 
gave rise to friction.
Firth and Haggers rejoinder to Corden*s argument regarding the 
monopoly profits to importers largely is (i) that there was little 
evidence that it was taking place at the time (early 1959), and (ii) 
if it was, or became extensive, it ought to be comparatively easy for 
the Commonwealth and the States to co-operate in devising price control
1 Some of the problems which were met in the administration of import 
licensing, the manner in which anomolies arose and the nature of 
these anomolies have been dealt with in the section on the admin­
istration cf the import licensing system.
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measures to ^ eal with the situation. Irrespective of doubts which must 
be held about the comparative ease with which the Commonwealth and the 
States could devise price control measures, the arguments presented make 
it clear that the alternative to price increases is shortages, ration­
ing etc. Similarly, the evidence that importers did in fact increase 
prices, or not reduce prices seems substantial.
Firth and Hagger do not deny Corden1s argument regarding the 
tendency to worsen the terms of trade through overseas exporters 
appropriating the monopoly profit except to make the point validly 
that to the extent that it occurs, the previous difficulty, that of 
the importer making a monopoly profit, does not.
In meeting Dr, Corden’s fourth point concerning the direction 
of the disinflationary influences, Firth and Hagger make use of a 
somewhat analogous argument to that used above in connexion with 
the same point. They argue that only if Australian consumers’ outlay 
on imports increases, i.e, when all elasticities are less than unity, 
would it be true that the use of tariffs would be automatically dis­
inflationary. It does not matter from the point of view of short 
term income generation within the domestic economy whether the propor­
tion spent by domestic consumers goes to the overseas exporter or 
partly to the exporter and partly to the government in the form of
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tariff revenue which, on Corden*s assumption, is saved.
Firth and Hagger argue further than in certain circumstances as, 
for example, in 1958 when there was less than full employment, to the 
extent that tariffs were disinflationary this would be an argument 
against them and in favour of import restrictions,
I think Corden could validly meet this argument by suggesting 
that there are more satisfactory ways of inflating than using import 
restrictions, one of which would be to spend the revenue which arose 
from the use of tariffs to reduce imports.
Having considered a number of particular arguments concerning 
the effect of import restrictions in the light of what this s tudy 
has told us about the experience of the period, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that in general our a priori expectations were realised. 
There seems little doubt that the system of import licensing 
was associated with a substantial deviation from the optimum alloca­
tion of resources during the period in terms of the static competitive 
model. This is distinct from the presumption that any action which 
reduces freedom of trade both between and within countries reduces
1 Consider the following arithmetic example Suppose that total
internal expenditure is 100, of which 20 is spent on imports. The 
aim is to cut foreign exchange expenditure to 10, Accordingly a 
tariff of 100% is imposed. Assume that domestic consumers now spend 
20 on imports to purchase half the volume (terms of trade assumed to 
remain constant) but paying twice as much. In this case, however, 
only 10 units of foreign exchange are e xpended (and 10 unito of foroi-gn 
exchange aro expended) and 10 units of domestic currency go to the 
government as tariff revenue. Expenditure on internal supplies 
remains at 80 units of account and consequently no disinflationary 
influence is present.
the possibility of specialisation in production and limits consumer 
choice. Given the interference with the freedom of trade, the con­
clusion would seem to be that the system of import licensing, despite 
the mitigation aspects of actions of the controlling authorities, 
distorted the pattern of resource allocation from the economic optimum.
It seems clear that the particular basis of discrimination 
among classes of imports has no bias in affording protection or 
encouragement to those industries which would appear to have the 
greatest comparative advantage; on the other hand, it might be said 
to have some bias towards those industries which have already shown 
themselves to be at something of a comparative disadvantage. In fact 
there is little connexion between the basis of classification in terms 
of priorities of imports and considerations along the lines of the 
comparative advantage approachj nor was the method of selecting among 
investment proposals the one which on theoretical grounds would be 
judged most appropriate.
There is little doubt also that the imposition of the controls 
on imports resulted in increases in the cost structure. In the case 
of imported goods the reduction in the overall supply of imported goods 
enabled their prices to be raised with the increase in price going to 
the licence holder; rigidities were introduced into the pattern of 
importing and incentives to efficiency substantially r educed. The 
discriminatory aspects of the controls prevented, for much of the 
period, imports being purchased from their cheapest source. The
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controls enabled local producers to raise their prices, they protected
and encouraged the formation of monopolistic pricing arrangements and
may well have increased the power of monopoly groups. They also
provided a stimulus to the domestic production of goods which in the
absence of the controls would not have been profitable. In this they
did not provide the stimulus in a way which would automatically limit
the disparity between local production costs and the costs of overseas
products. Again the controls limited - or substantially delayed
investment in more efficient machinery and equipment. To some extent
they limn.ted the incentive to modernise and re-equip and in some cases
may even have provided an incentive to avoid replacing obsolete equip- 
1ment. Similarly the controls facilitated the exploitation of the 
market situation by exporters.
Evidence has been presented to show that many of these effects 
were present during the period. In some others direct evidence has not 
been given but as is broadly the case with the reactions of exporters,
1 An example quoted to me more than once in discussion with departmental 
officiais, concerned a local firm producing goods -fear metal strip. For 
technical reasons the trend in new machinery was for the use of metal 
strip of size (x), and local manufacturers of strip ceased producing 
strip of size (y). Import licences were not issued unless strip was 
unavailable from local sources. One user of strip which had been slower 
than its competitors in installing the new machinery was still using 
the virtually obsolete strip of dimension (y). Since this was not 
available from local sources, the firm had to be allowed to import its 
requirements. Because imported strip was cheaper than local production 
the firm using the older and less efficient equipment was placed in a 
stronger competitive position than its competitors and had a strong 
incentive not to instal the new machinery.
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it has been argued that to ignore the opportunities provided by the 
controls on imports would be inconsistent with known reactions to other 
factors.
The overall significance of the sum total of these particular 
effects therefore becomes of importance. In view of the seeming wide­
spread nature of misallocation effects one would expect that the 
controls on imports would have worsened, rather than have improved 
the situation which made necessary their imposition. More generally, 
it would seem that the remaining arguments of Lundberg and Hill, con­
sideration of which we have deferred until now, would have received 
extensive support. We are required to explain nevertheless, why the 
controls could be removed in 1960 without more serious effects; in 
effect why despite all the factors which we have seen would be con­
ducive to structural distortion, there has clearly been a shift in 
the economy,s demand away from imports and in favour of domestic goods.
Any explanation of such longer term changes can at best be a 
matter of judgement. In the present study we can give only a partial 
answer. A wide variety of factors will influence the longer term 
pattern of resource allocation. We have had largely to ignore the 
effects in this sense of monetary and fiscal policies which both in 
their overall and in their directional effects would be major signif­
icance. Similarly we have been unable to take into account the effects 
of movements in other sectors of the economy which have no direct
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relationship to the control of imports, such as the rapid expansion 
of non residential construction which took place in the late 1 fifties, 
or the effects of overseas investment, whether indirect effects of 
investment stimulated directly by the controls, or the direct effects 
of overseas investment the motivation of which was unconnected with 
the control as such.
In the particular context of this enquiry such developments 
are in the nature of autonomous factors, but what autonomous means 
in this context is far from clear. The basic objective of modern 
economic policy, the maintenance of full employment, is not a diff­
icult objective to achieve in itself - the difficulty arises when 
the objective has to be sought in the context of a fixed exchange 
rate. In this sense the controls on imports may have teen the means 
of facilitating the maintenance of what was, for the most part, full 
employment. To the extent that this was the case factors which arose 
simply as a consequence of full employment and high levels of economic 
activity - such as some overseas investment - may have resulted 
indirectly from the existence of the controls.
Similarly we have given scant attention to the indirect effects
1of the expansion of directly import competing industries. The analysis
1 For example, iron castings, as such are tpnerally not traded internat­
ionally for technical reasons. The production in Australia of goods 
previously imported and which contained iron castings gave rise to a 
considerable increase in demand for, and expansion of production of 
iron castings. In the direct sense, these industries would not be 
considered import competing.
here of the longer term or structural influences of the controls can 
consequently be only a partial and limited assessment of their sig­
nificance. The limitations of the statistical material on which our 
conclusions are based merely emphasise the reservations which must, 
in any case, be attached to them. Despite these reservations there 
would seem to be some broad conclusions which may be drawn Horn the 
analysis.
We have argued that in fact, some part, which may well be 
substantial, of the import replacement which was artificially stim­
ulated by the controls has in fact become more or less ’natural’ 
import replacement.
While the importing of manufactured goods was probably ab­
normally high in the early years of the period due to shortages of 
capacity for the production of goods in which Australia had a com- 
parative advantage, within given tariff levels, this would not 
necessarily mean that, given the adverse costs effects of a regime 
of quantitative controls, this cost advantage would be maintained.
The tariff for many items, merely replaced the direct controls 
in providing protection to the domestic industry. In general, however, 
such examination as we were able to make of movements in tariff rates 
did not leave the impression that they had increased sufficiently to 
provide a full explanation, although, the limitations of the basis of 
this judgement will be clearly evident.
1 E.g. cement, iron and steel, wire
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There were also some fortuitous elements resulting in favourable 
cost effects during the period. At the time the controls were imposed 
in 1952, discriminatory controls were already operating; there would 
consequently have been only a limited additional adverse cost e ffect 
(due to their intensification) but a favourable cost effect would have 
derived from the removal of discrimination over the period.
In addition we suggested other factors of importance such as the 
reduced preference for an imported product as such, or the establishment 
of manufacturing facilities of firms previously exporting to Australia.
There would seem to be some grounds for arguing, however, that 
there has been some movement in relative costs in favour of Australian 
Industry and against Britain and to some extent against the dollar 
supplying countries over and above that which could be explained in 
terms of the factors we have noted. Admittedly, costs in some export­
ing countries, Britain in particular, have been rising fairly rapidly. 
Nevertheless, part of the answer would seem to be that there has been 
a significant increase in productivity in Australian industry, and
what one might expect to occur more in industries competitive with
1imports as a whole than in industries producing non-traded goods.
1 We may distinguish two reasons for this. If we assume that with 
regard to the technical possibilities of increasing productivity 
two industries are identical, but only one has to face competition 
from imports while the other does not, one might expect the industry 
subject to competition to be provided with a greater incentive to 
undertake productivity increasing activities. Secondly, there may 
be generally more opportunity for increasing productivity in the case 
of industries producing traded goods to the extent that there is a 
tendency for these industries to produce goods which are subject 
to the possibility of mass production.
In part increases would arise from factors general to the 
economy - the virtual elimination of shortages of skilled labour, 
prevalent in the early years of the period, and of shortages of 
power and fuel. In part, however, they may be attributable to the 
stimulus that the controls on imports gave to expansion of industries 
which proved able to benefit from either internal or external econ­
omies. Certainly one may point to industries where the relative
competitive situation has improved substantially over the period with
1virtually unchanged or even reduced levels of tariff protection.
If it may be argued that the controls on imports stimulated 
expansion of industries subject to economies of scale and in this 
way did in fact contribute to their own removal, does this suggest 
that on theory needs some qualification? Moreover, is the proposition
f t - A A r  i n o a a i h .  e J is  w t j A  l w . c - i ^  * C — t  t - j - v U .  t - i  t7 o - \  Q — ■*
that import controls similarly had a tendency to encourage the growth
7of small scale high cost# producers. To lake the second question first
we argued earlier that there is a tendency for the early development
of an industry to be characterised by a relatively large number of
2small scale producers.
1 E.g. Refrigeration equipment, rubber tyres; it is noticeable that 
a number of industries which were particularly apprehensive about 
the effects of import competition in the early years of the period 
at existing tariff levels have been virtually unaffected by the 
removal of controls e.g. boots and shoes, a wide area of the cloth­
ing industry.
2 The point is also made by H.R. Edwards. See his "Price Formation 
in Manufacturing Industry and Excess Capacity", Oxford Economic 
Papers. Vol.7, No.1 (February 1955), p.101.
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The logic of increasing returns implies the ability of firms 
to increase their competitive position and for the numbers of producers 
to be reduced. The motor vehicle industry would seem to be an industry 
where one or two producers are achieving economies of scale with a 
relatively large number of other producers still in the industry.
The presence of an excessive number of small scale producers is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the realisation of the economies of 
scale though it may limit the extent to which the economies which are 
possible are actually realised.
Economists have long recognised that the existence of increasing 
returns to scale invalidated the static equilibrium model and that while 
they persisted an equilibrium was not possible. While the argument as 
put by Lundberg and Hill would consequently seem to need qualification, 
in more general terms it is the applicability of the static equilibrium 
model to a situation of a period as short as the one under review which 
needs to be questioned. In other words the particular form of the 
theory we have been discussing applies imperfectly because the controls 
on imports provided a type of 1infant industry1 or ’infant industrial 
economy* protection,
The great advantage of the infant industry protection provided 
by the controls, however, was that the infant industries were forced
1 Television and refrigeration equipment are probably similar examples
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to grow up, and thus avoided, what to most economists is the major
objection to ’infant industry’ protection. It would seem reasonable
to argue that the important feature of the controls on imports were
2the relaxations made in 1954 and 1957 and, of course, their removal
in 1960. The restoration of import competition to a greater or lesser
degree at these times forced some, at least, of the benefits of the
economies of scale to be passed on to consumers. In this way they
3became external economies to other producers.
The relaxations of controls in these periods would have had 
other important effects in that the import competition they permitted 
would have stimulated increased efficiency, the replacement of obsolete 
machinery and the modernising of production productive processes. It 
would also have tended to reduce the rigidities which the controls 
induced in importing and merchanting. In this way some
1 Even in those cases where the industry eventually went to the Tariff 
Board, it may be expected that it would have developed a greater 
extent than if the industry had been forced to go to the Board 
earlier; consequently, while often being accorded some special 
protection of an infant industry nature, the industry should have 
required less than might otherwise have been the case.
2 Though the level of licensing was not high even after the relaxations, 
the growth of domestic output in some industries together with some 
slack in the domes ic economy meant that imports were providing com­
petition in some areas of domestic industry at the time e.g. synthetic 
textiles (see Chapter XII.)
3 Pecuniary external economies in Viner's terminology. J. Viner "Cost 
Curves and Supply Curves”, reprinted in Readings in Price Theory. 
London, 1953, p.218.
of the offsetting distortions in other directions would have been 
reduced*
From this general discussion one or two implications for policy 
would seem to be indicated. To the extent that the controls on imports 
led to too many producers in an industry to prevent full advantage 
being gained from the economies of scale, the last thing the Board 
should do is attempt to provide tariff protection sufficient to pro­
tect these small scale producers. At the same time, the existence of 
competition in some form is of particular importance in these industries, 
to ensure that the economies of scale are in fact passed on.
It is necessary to add that too much weight should not be placed 
on the overall importance of the argument that increases in productivity 
have occurred in the import competing sector. It is to some extent an 
explanation of the improved competitive position of Australian 
industry which is itself revealed in part by the decline in the 
proportionate level of expenditure on imports. It is not clear exactly 
how much of this decline is due to abnormal factors in the early years 
of the period, labour shortages, capacity shortages, high levels of 
investment etc., and how much to changes in tastes towards non traded 
goods; nor are we able to say by how much it is due to direct import 
replacement in secondary industry. It is clear that some direct import 
replacement has taken place in secondary industry but again not all of 
this could be attributed to the stimulous provided by the direct 
controls on imports.
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Similarly the improvement in cost levels vis-a-vis Britain, and 
to some extent the United States, does not necessarily mean a high 
level of productivity increase in total; British rates of increase in 
productivity have been low during the period under review. The 
conclusion that the existence of direct controls on imports has not 
actually moved the cost structure further out of line is an import­
ant one. That the extensive development in secondary industry during 
the period did not lead to even greater improvements is, perhaps, of 
even more importance.
We are not concerned with considering various alternatives to 
import licensing here except insofar as they have direct relevance to 
our conclusions. At this point we are only concerned to ask whether 
there is any reason to think that the beneficial effects of the 
controls would have been greater or less with a price adjustment..
The argument throughout this investigation would seem to have
made evident the advantages of a price adjustment in one form or
another. It would almost certainly have limited the extent of
2uneconomic expansion and may have hastened the demise of inefficient
1
C.f. D.C.Paige, ’’Economic Growth: The Last Hundred Years”,
National Institute Economic Review. No.l6, (July 196l), p.3&»
2
Just how much uneconomic expansion there was depends to some 
extent upon one!s definition. We noted in Chapter XIII the Tariff 
Board’s view that some uneconomic expansion of activity had taken 
place under the controls, although it was not prepared to say that 
it considered this substantial. It has not listed the industries 
it had in mind but it is clear from individual reports that these 
would include printed cotton textiles, ceramic wall and floor tiles,
(cont'd overleaf)
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firms or industries. There are, as we saw in Chapter XIV, good reasons
why current market prices need not necessarily reflect the areas of
greatest comparative advantage in the longer term. To the extent that
the argument here is valid, the experience of the period under import
controls supports this. We concluded, however, that any alternative
method of selecting investment projects would almost certainly lead to
a less desirable pattern of resource allocation - at least in an
2economy as advanced as Australia.
The form of price adjustment most appropriate to the Australian
circumstances, whether in the past or in the future, is not of direct 
3concern here. One argument, however, which is relevant and which has
Ft.1 (cont’d from previous page)
metal working milling machines, artificial flowers, chloropicrin, 
fuel injection equipment, and a number of smaller industries such as 
tailors* and dressmakers’ dummies.
We observed, however, that the Board’s definition of what level of 
tariff constituted one which could be provided under normal circum­
stances to an economic industry had been raised during the period 
under review. It is also clear that it is willing to depart from any 
general level of this nature and t o recommend substantially higher 
rates in certain cases, e.g*, automotive components, umbrellas, 
capacitors*
1
While it may not seem unduly difficult to select industries likely 
to achieve internal economies of scale, it is important to remember 
that what has to be achieved is economies of scale greater than those 
achieved by competing overseas producers.
2
Even if it were the case that the favourable effect of a sudden, 
imposed, limit on imports, followed eventually by complete removal 
of the limit was greater than that of a similar adjustment and re­
adjustment of import prices, it would clearly be a suspect basis for 
deliberate development policy.
3 For a discussion which covers these aspects see Lindberg and Hill, 
oo.cit*; J.E.Meade, MThe Price Mechanism and the Australian Balance 
of Payments, " loc. cit. Firth and Hagger, op*cit.: W.M*Corden, ’’Import 
Restrictions and Tariffs....”, loc*cit.
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been used against both devaluation and an import price adjustment
will.by itself is that the increase in import costs/in the Australian
institutional environment,lead to increased wages and, consequently,
to a wage price spiral* In the context of a devaluation it is
suggested that this may simply bring about a situation where a further
devaluation is required. This argument ignores the fact that the
effect of the import controls has been comparable in this respect to
a one-sided devaluation* That it was generally feasible without
substantial wage price spiralling suggests that a devaluation would
2similarly avoid that danger in the Australian situation. Of course, 
the increased and, in some cases excess, capacity in manufacturing 
industry shows the need for qualifying a general argument that deval­
uation in Australia*s case is inappropriate because of inelasticity of 
supply of export products.
Our general conclusion must be that the effects of the controls 
on imports were by no means uniformly adverse in an absolute sense 
- absolute in that it is probably the case that the controls stimu-
1
C.f. Firth and Hagger, oo*cit.. pp.14-15*
2
To the extent that - as is likely - farm income is increased by 
devaluation, this may make limits on wage increases harder to sustain. 
In the generally less prosperous circumstances of the farm sector now 
compared with the early nineteen ’fifties the importance of t his 
factor will have diminished. Similarly, the price increases due to 
direct controls may be less apparent, simply because they are not 
announced in a form readily recognisable as a price change, and so 
may not result in the same pressure for wage increases to compensate 
the price increases.
o37
lated expansion of output sufficient to provide the opportunity 
for the realisation of economies of scale* In a relative sense - 
relative to the situation which would have eventuated had demand 
been redirected from imports by means of the price mechanism - the 
weight of the argument would seem to be firmly in favour of the view 
that there may have been more beneficial, and certainly considerably 
fewer adverse, effects*
We emphasised, however, our judgement that of major importance 
in the period were the relaxations which were made during the period 
- and of course, the fact that the controls were eventually 
removed*
Finally, we need to consider whether the results of this investi­
gation tell us anything about the short term use of quantitative 
controls* The period is not completely suitable for this purpose 
Since the use of direct import controls for short term disequilibria 
assumes relatively moderate restriction of imports* The evidence 
suggests generally considerable flexibility in businessmen’s 
pricing policies, and in some cases fairly rapid changes in relation 
to changes in circumstances*
This does not mean that prices are adjusted to meet every change 
Deflationary reduction of demand is, of course, excluded*
1
in the market situation nor that all businessmen adjust their prices
at more than infrequent intervals. It does suggest that a great
many do behave in this way and that the length of time during which
prices remain unchanged in the face of increased demand is likely 
1
to be short. Certainly, it is likely to be less than the length of 
time which would justify establishing the elaborate administrative 
machinery necessary for efficient import control, where the controls 
are designed to replace the price mechanism.
In some circumstances, such as a temporary deficit due to stock 
accumulation of imported goods where a structural change would not 
be desirable, quantitative controls may be more effective than other 
methods of enforcing a running down of stocks. Where stocks are held 
of the imports, restricted prices would be unlikely to change but it 
would be difficult to restrict just the goods for which stocks are held.
We have argued that under the system of control on imports some 
increase in real national income occurred, and that some part of this 
increase was a result of the stimulus to expanded production provided 
by the controls. As we indicated earlier, in the absence of the
1.
This may be more the case where prices are already changing at 
frequent intervals, as in the early part of the period, due to 
increases in costs. In these circumstances price increases can be more 
easily justified and their necessity less open to question.
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controls some other action would have been necessary, offering a 
stimulus of a broadly similar magnitude. It seems most probable 
that the net effect on real national income of the control of 
imports was to lower real national income, i.e. the increase in 
real national was lower than would have resulted under alternative 
measures to reduce imports.
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